Saturday, August 23, 2008

The October War

In the waiting room of the Rwandan genocide tribunal.
Barrie Collins
Spiked Online
26 May 2006
http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/printable/322/

Back in early 2005, I received an email from Ben Gumpert, the lead defence lawyer for one of the accused at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. An expert witness for the prosecution had submitted a report that dealt extensively with a pamphlet I wrote about Rwanda. Having read the pamphlet himself, Gumpert felt that I had been misrepresented and that it would be useful if I were to clear matters up in court. He had also read other publications of mine on Rwanda, and believed I was well-placed to counter the view of the prosecution that the tragic events in Rwanda during 1994 were largely an internal matter.

My first reaction was sceptical. So far as I was concerned, the Tribunal had already shown itself less than able to conduct fair trials and was a highly politicised body toeing the line of the US, its primary sponsor. And since I had already published material making that argument about the court, I thought the court would reject me. I would end up wasting a lot of time preparing for what would turn out to be a non-appearance.

However, following much further discussion, I decided to give it a go. Of course, I knew that appearing for the defence in a genocide trial would tar me as an apologist for the savages who really did murder hundreds of thousands of civilians simply because they were of the same ethnic origin as the majority of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front. But that has long been an easy shot against anyone who refuses to follow the official version of events in Rwanda.

I thought it was worth a try because my material had already been (badly) presented by the prosecution and was now a part of its official documentation. And apart from feeling the urge to put the record straight on my own work, I also felt that the official claims about what happened in Rwanda – that the extermination of a huge number of Tutsis was caused by a reaction on the part of Hutu extremists to what was, until April 1994, a successful transition process towards peace and democracy – was beginning to unravel.

According to this version, Western powers had turned a new leaf with the passing of the Cold War in Africa and had played a positive role in encouraging Rwanda’s progress toward ethnic harmony and democracy. All would have been fine had Hutu extremists not planned and executed genocide in order to reverse these gains and retain their power. But by 2005, the evidence for such planning and execution was beginning to wear thin, while evidence of the role of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front, and the support given to it by Uganda and the US, was showing that the roots of the tragedy were in the international sphere and could not be fully explained by a conspiracy of disaffected Hutus.

The cracks were beginning to show; the truth would eventually come out. Were that to happen, I would feel a sense of vindication to be on record as one of the early dissenters from the original version of events. (For a full account of my arguments on the war in Rwanda, see my report to the court, ‘The international dynamics behind the Rwandan tragedy’, published below.)

My appearance was supposed to have been on 4 December 2005, but the prosecution wanted more time to study my report to the court. The next available slot was 20 March 2006. But upon my arrival in Arusha, Tanzania, two days earlier, Ben Gumpert told me that the prosecution had suddenly raised an objection to my appearance. Apparently, they hadn’t had enough time to go over my curriculum vitae.

I was driven to the court from my hotel on the appointed day, and escorted to a small waiting room at 9am. An hour later, nothing had happened. Finally, at 11.30am, Jonathon Kirk from the defence team told me that I would not be appearing that day. The judge had agreed that the prosecution needed more time to obtain more documents to support my cv. The next day I had to sign documents that elaborated upon my cv. I was then told to be in court that afternoon – for a public hearing of my suitability as an expert witness. This meant another session in the waiting room, from 2.30pm until 4.45pm when an ashen-faced Gumpert told me that the judges had allowed the prosecution yet more time, and that I would need to appear the following Monday, not to testify, but to face questions about my suitability as an expert. Yet the judges knew that their functionaries had already booked me on my return flight the Saturday before….

Gumpert also asked me a question that the prosecutor had put to him: had I been convicted in South Africa for possession of pornography? No, I replied – and for what it’s worth, I have no criminal record either in South Africa, where I grew up and lived until I was 27, or in Britain, where I have lived since. This was no more than a shot in the dark intended to rattle me. I said it was reminiscent of the sort of questions I’d had to deal with at the hands of the apartheid-era security police. Not becoming of an international criminal tribunal, perhaps.

On 22 April 2006, I took another flight to Arusha at the expense of the United Nations. The following day I actually made it from the waiting room into the court. Three judges in front of me. Three teams of defence lawyers to my left (three trials were running concurrently), and one team of prosecutors to my right. First the friendly questions from Gumpert. I confirmed that I had run a Masters course on the international politics of Africa at the School of African and Oriental Studies at the University of London. I had been interviewed for this position on the strength of a paper on Rwanda I presented at a British International Studies Association conference. I was to stand in for a year for someone who was on sabbatical. At the end of that year, the politics department asked me to stay on: they needed a tutor for another Masters course in International and Diplomatic Studies.

After confirming all of what was in front of me in my cv, it was then the prosecution’s turn. ‘After being the sole lecturer for a Masters course, you became merely a tutor. Isn’t it correct to say that, in the academic world, a tutor is the lowest of the low?’ And so it went on. I was in the process of completing my PhD; I wasn’t yet a doctor of philosophy; my publications were not in the top international relations journals. I was no longer a professional academic; my job was different from my academic work.

All true, but also well known to the prosecution last December. ‘So your interest in Rwanda is merely a hobby, something you do in your spare time…?’ This went on all day. I kept my cool, and when given the opportunity I said that the only issue that needed to be considered was the substance of my publications, and report to the court, and their relevance to the case. I also said that I had felt a certain obligation to appear since an expert witness presented by the prosecution had devoted a considerable portion of his report to the court to my material.

The judges told me to return the next morning for the ruling on my suitability. The following morning I spent another four hours in the waiting room. As it turned out, I was not called to the court. One of their minions appeared and told me that the judges had ruled against my appearance and he had instructions to drive me back to my hotel.

An extremely deflated and angry Ben Gumpert joined me for lunch at the hotel. As it turned out, the court had not been in session until 12pm. Proceedings were held up in order that a letter explaining the ruling could be drafted. The gist of the letter is that while I am ‘taking steps toward attaining a certain level of expertise’, I have ‘not yet attained that status’.

Of course I felt cheated and outraged. But I had to remind myself of my initial thoughts when I was first approached to appear. At the outset, the judge had agreed to my appearance, but that was before my report was received. The prosecution were then given free rein to play their games.

What is really outrageous is not so much the court’s treatment of me; after all, I was not the accused (although it sometimes felt that way). It was the fact that an international tribunal could conduct itself in such a manner. Justin Mugenzi is charged with the worst of all crimes: genocide. He has been on trial since 1999. At the very least, the planning and execution of genocide would need to be fully established before a full examination of an individual’s role within it could be determined.

But it’s clear why these cases take so long – dealing with my non-appearance as an expert witness used up the best part of three-and-a-half days of the trial, spread over four months. Because of all the time and preparation for my appearance, the defence is left unable to find a replacement expert. This means the defence lawyers have no choice but to accept the official explanation for the Rwandan genocide as given by the tribunal’s guru, Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch. This explanation rests on the behaviour of good (‘moderate’) and bad (‘extremist’) Hutus. Ironically, Mugenzi was a ‘moderate’ because he was leader of the Liberal Party which stood against ethnic domination and had the highest percentage of Tutsis of any opposition party of significance. But then, according to the prosecution, he turned into an ‘extremist’ when his party split.

What they really mean is that he turned against the Western-sponsored Arusha Accords that had elevated the unelectable Rwandan Patriotic Front into a dominant position. The fact that the Accords had thereby posed a grave threat to Rwanda’s move towards democracy does not figure where the definition of moderates and extremists are concerned. After all, this is a story about the good, the bad, and the genocidaire.

The international dynamics behind the Rwandan tragedy

Report for the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda, by Barrie Collins, January 2006.

Of the many countries in the developing world that experienced the destabilising effects of Western intervention in the post-Cold War era, Rwanda stands out as one of the most tragic and least understood. The tragedy of Rwanda is evidenced most strikingly by the horror of countless lives lost and livelihoods destroyed, and also by the torn fabric of a society that was, despite its poverty and reliance upon external inputs, in the process of generating its own developmental dynamic. What is misunderstood is the mediation between the various forms of intervention by the international community in general, and by a few Western powers in particular, and the dynamics that unleashed the mass slaughter that erupted in April 1994.

Because the international community failed to intervene and put an end to the killings of civilians at this time, Rwanda is known around the world for one thing above all others: a shameful episode of international non-intervention. The prevailing perspective has it that the preceding interventions by Western powers were by and large positive ones that had facilitated democratisation, economic reform and conflict resolution. Indeed, the cumulative outcome of these processes, the Arusha Accords, was regarded at the time as exemplary and a vindication of a cosmopolitan humanitarianism that had become viable with the passing away of Cold War vested interests.

As a result, the political crisis that developed upon the signing of the Arusha Accords, and the slide into the abyss that culminated in mass slaughter in 1994, are not thought to be attributable to any extent to the effects of actions taken by Western powers. With the partial exception of France, no Western actor is thought to be accountable for taking actions that contributed to the Rwandan tragedy. Responsibility for the explosion of violence is held to be with domestic elements. The failure to implement the Arusha Accords, the escalating civil disorder during the interlude between the signing of the Accords in August 1993 and the outbreak of renewed war and massacres in April 1994, are all attributed to a conspiracy devised by Hutu extremists.

As a result, the United Nations and the key Western actors that were involved are not thought to be in any way responsible for intervening in ways that contributed to the polarisation of Rwandan society and accelerating the downward spiral toward mass killings. Rather, they are condemned for not intervening enough. Responsibility for the killings is located solely with Hutu extremism.

Of course, the individuals who actually performed and facilitated killings are fully responsible for their actions. But the wider social forces that created the conditions for mass killing are not solely attributable to conspiracies of Hutu extremists. The view of this author is that this position ignores evidence that suggests more salient contributing factors.

The argument developed here challenges what can be termed the mainstream position which holds that between 1990 and April 1994, the international community played a positive role in Rwanda, and that the progress attributable to this role was sabotaged and destroyed by a conspiracy of Hutu extremists who planned a genocide in order to derail the democratic process and permanently secure ‘Hutu power’. The fact that Tutsi civilians were killed because they were Tutsis is not in question. What is in question is how the conditions that led to the killings were created, and by whom.

The war between the RPF and the forces of the Rwandan government provides the central and overriding context of the killings that were unleashed in April 1994. Once the killings commenced, they became a component of the resumed war between these same two parties. While the military victory of the RPF is attributed to the ending of the killings of Tutsi civilians, this author concurs with the view of René Lemarchand that the RPF ‘bears much of the onus of responsibility for the carnage, for without the RPF invasion there would have been no genocide’(1). Even African Rights, a human rights organisation viewed by many as the most partisan toward the RPF (2), states that ‘…it is beyond dispute that the RPF invasion of 1 October 1990 was the single most important factor in escalating the political polarisation of Rwanda, and plunging it into a war that displaced hundreds of thousands of people.’ (3)

This author endorses the view of Alan Kuperman that:

‘There are four potential explanations for the RPF pursuing a violent challenge that provoked such tragic consequences. One possibility is that the Tutsi rebels did so irrationally, without thinking of expected consequences. A second is that they did contemplate consequences, but their expectations did not include retaliation against civilians. A third is that the RPF expected violence against Tutsi civilians regardless of whether it challenged the Hutu regime, and so perceived little extra risk from doing so. The final possibility is that the rebels expected their challenge to provoke genocidal retaliation but viewed this as an acceptable cost of achieving their goal of attaining power in Rwanda. The evidence detailed in this study supports only the last explanation.’ (4)

Kuperman reached this conclusion having interviewed several former senior members of the RPF, including Patrick Mazimpaka - director of external affairs and top peace negotiator during the war, Theogene Rudasingwa - deputy peace negotiator and later chief of cabinet, Karenzi Karake – director of war operations in 1994, Dennis Karera – top delegate to the 1991 peace talks, Aloysie Inyumba – head of finance, Charles Murigande – representative in Washington during the war, Emmanuel Ndahiro –personal physician to the leader Paul Kagame, and Wilson Rutaysire – member of the executive committee and later minister of information (5).

His research findings compliment that which this author has acquired in his own interviews with other RPF dissidents in Belgium. Relations between the RPF and the population of the northern regions were hostile from the outset. Instead of attempting to win local people over, the RPF launched offensives that drove hundreds of thousands of people off their land and into internal displacement camps. Each offensive prompted retaliatory attacks against Tutsi civilians. By the end of the RPF’s largest offensive of February 1993 a million Rwandans were displaced. The impact was felt throughout this small country, and Rwandan society consequently polarised. The fact that the RPF membership was overwhelmingly Tutsi inevitably led to a targeting of non-combatant Tutsi families, and intensified anti-Tutsi racism. Having witnessed the effects of these offensives at first hand, the RPF could not have been in any doubt about the likely consequences that any further military attacks on their part would have.

The RPF’s ability to wage war and continue planning ever more forceful offensives while negotiating peace owes to its astute military and political acumen that recognised and exploited the possibilities that were open to them, thanks to the conducive international environment in which they operated. Vital and continuous support was given to the RPF by the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni. Museveni was in turn able to provide this support (and maintain his denial that he was so doing) because of the close relations he enjoyed with the United States government. The RPF’s own direct contacts with the United States provided them with insights as to how to utilise human rights-based arguments to legitimise its war. Through successfully demonising the Habyarimana regime on the grounds of its human rights abuses, the RPF was able to obscure its own human rights record, and, more importantly, win sympathy within the international community for its war. This support was given despite the absence of justification for the RPF’s war, despite the obvious human suffering generated by the war, and despite the fear and hostility of local people toward the RPF in the war zone and its periphery.

By early 1992, the war had turned in the RPF’s favour. By the end of its February 1993 offensive, it was demonstrably the stronger military power. With the signing of the Arusha Accords, the RPF was also set to become the strongest political force in the proposed transitional government. The RPF’s greatest weakness was the extent of its unpopularity within Rwandan society as a whole, which would undoubtedly have become evident had the scheduled elections taken place.

By the end of 1993, there was a stark asymmetry between the strength of support between the RPF and influential sections of the international community on the one hand, and the lack of support given to the RPF by the overwhelming majority of the Rwandan population on the other. The RPF needed to avoid elections and opt for a military seizure of power. With the long-anticipated departure of the French military from Rwanda, the way was cleared for a military take-over. What was needed was an excuse to resume the war. Allegations concerning the RPF’s assassination of President Habyarimana, by way of shooting down his plane, would, if proven to be true, have shown that the RPF deliberately provoked the killings in order to have an an excuse to resume its war. Since previous political killings had resulted in reprisals against civilians, the assassination of arguably the most prominent figure in Rwandan politics was certain to trigger off mass killings. Mass killings in which Tutsi civilians were singled out would be a plausible justification in the eyes of the international community for the RPF to resume the war. The RPF’s experience to date of influencing the political dispositions of the international human rights community would have helped them to regard this calculation as one that was viable.

What follows is an elaboration of the points made above.

Uganda’s role in the RPF’s war

The leadership of the RPF were the offspring of the exiled Tutsi elite who fled Rwanda in the wake of the overthrow of the colonial order at the time of Rwanda’s independence. During the periods of German and Belgian rule, colonial power had been exercised indirectly through a Tutsi-dominated order. Many of the Tutsis who settled in Uganda played a significant part in the guerrilla war that brought Museveni to power 1986. As a result, some of these exiles rose to senior positions in the Ugandan regime. The RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda began on 1st October 1990, while Museveni and Habyarimana were attending a United Nations conference in New York. Uganda denied all knowledge or complicity in the invasion. In a briefing to the defence attaches of foreign embassies on 3rd October, Ugandan army commander Major General Mugisha Muntu, said that the scale of the desertions had caught the army by surprise and the military intelligence staff were ‘highly embarrassed’ (6).

On the same day the Vice Chairman of the National Resistance Movement, Kigongo, issued a statement that the army was sealing the border with Rwanda and that deserters forced to return here would be disarmed, arrested and charged with desertion (7). Yet, according to the Human Rights Watch ‘Arms Watch Project’ there is no evidence that any were arrested.

On the contrary, RPF Commander Paul Kagame travelled often and openly to Kampala where he met with journalists, foreign supporters and diplomats throughout the war, but was never arrested. The project also concluded that there was ‘institutional complicity’ based on findings that ‘...Uganda provided weapons, munitions and other military supplies to the RPF. These included munitions, automatic rifles, mortars, artillery and Soviet-designed Katyusha multiple rocket systems… and that Uganda allowed the rebel movement to use its territory as a sanctuary for the planning of attacks, stockpiling of weapons, raising of funds and movement of troops’ (8).

In a speech the following year, Museveni made this guarded admission, ‘The truth of the matter is that these people conspired, took us by surprise, and went to Rwanda, which was not particularly difficult…. . We had some information that the Banyarwanda in Uganda were up to something, but we shared it with the Rwandan government. They actually had, or should have had, more information because, after all, it was their business, not ours, to follow up who was plotting what.’ (9) Eight years after the event, Museveni admitted his support. He told other heads of state that, while the Banyarwanda in the Ugandan army, the National Resistance Army (NRA), had informed him in advance ‘of their intention to organise to regain their rights in Rwanda’, they had launched the invasion ‘without prior consultation’. Significantly, he continued, even though ‘faced with [a] fait accompli situation by our Rwandan brothers’, Uganda decided ‘to help the Rwandan Patriotic Front materially, so that they are not defeated because that would have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been good for Uganda’s stability’ (10).

With the signing of the N’Sele ceasefire agreement in July 1992, a commitment was made that all foreign troops would leave Rwanda after the effective establishment of a neutral monitoring group (NMOG), under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). President Museveni’s position as chairman of the Organisation of African Unity in 1991 and 1992 helped him render NMOG less than effective in monitoring troop movements across the mountainous border between Uganda and Rwanda. RPF dissidents speak of their military centre of Nakivale, just inside Uganda (11). According to James Gasana, Rwandan Minister of Defence at the time, when the RPF launched their offensive of 8 February 1993 its forces were boosted by three elite battalions of the NRA (12). Gasana alleges that ‘close to 40,000 people of Hutu ethnicity were massacred by the rebels in the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Byumba’ (13).

The role of the United States

The war waged by Uganda and the RPF was facilitated by the United States in various ways. President Museveni was favoured by the United States as the foremost of the representatives of what they viewed as Africa’s ‘new leaders’ (along with Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea). In addition to supporting the style of governance pursued by these leaders, the United States also supported them as proxies in its efforts to deal with the ‘terrorist’ state of Sudan (14). Support for Museveni’s government was reflected in the levels of aid it received and in favoured treatment as far as negotiations on debt payments were concerned. Between 1989 and 1992, the U.S. alone provided almost $183 million in economic aid enabling Uganda to finance the invasion. This sum is as much as all U.S. aid to Uganda over the previous 27 years.’ (15)

Bruce Jones gives the following account of American knowledge of Uganda’s role in the invasion:

‘The fact that the FAR was caught off-guard was in part a function of U.S. intelligence. In December 1989 Habyarimana had asked the U.S. Department of State to verify Rwandan intelligence reports of RPF mobilization along the Ugandan border. Herman Cohen, then assistant secretary of state for African affairs, recalls that he consulted with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which reported it had no intelligence on troop activity in southern Uganda, having ‘turned off’ the CIA’s monitoring presence there. Unwilling to reveal that U.S. intelligence was not watching events in the region, Cohen reported back to Habyarimana that the United States had no intelligence on troop activity, without clarifying why. Evidently, Habyarimana took Cohen at his somewhat disingenuous word. In point of fact, U.S. intelligence sources (’turned on’ after Habyarimana’s visit) later confirmed what many observers suspected: that the NRA was providing direct support to the RPF inside Uganda, including transporting arms from depots in Kigali [author’s note: this is clearly a mistake, Jones must have meant Kampala] to the border for RPF use, making Ugandan military hospitals accessible to RPF casualties, and keeping civilians clear from strategic crossings into Rwanda, which had previously been unguarded.’ (16) Cohen was later to write that ‘hindsight reveals that RPF preparations in Uganda were hard to miss’ (17).

The invasion took place while presidents Habyarimana and Museveni were in New York attending a United Nations General Assembly debate. Cohen was also there, along with President Bush (senior) and Secretary of State James Baker. In his book, Intervening in Africa: superpower peacekeeping in a troubled continent, Cohen gives an account of how the news of the invasion was received. The annual General Assembly debate began on October 2nd 1990, with the Summit on the Child. It drew an unusually large number of heads of state, including 25 from Africa, all of whom wanted to meet Bush. A coffee morning with Bush was arranged for the African heads of state the following morning at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.

‘Afterward, an incredulous Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana told me that in a discussion lasting one hour, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni kept insisting that he knew nothing about the invasion and was not in a position to do anything about it.’…’Later that day, the Belgian ambassador, Herman Dehennin, called to inform me that Museveni had called him with a message for the Belgian government: ‘Please do not send troops to Rwanda to help the Rwandan government cope with the invasion.’ Dehennin also told me that the French ambassador had received a similar call. In other words, Museveni was not such a disinterested bystander after all.’ (18)

The United States was also not a disinterested bystander. While Museveni continued denying his support for the invasion, claiming that the RPF members in the NRA had deserted, the United States made no attempt to put the record straight. It seems that, despite Cohen’s revelations of what he knew, the story of the ‘desertion’ was allowed to become the accepted version, at least for the time being. According to Robert Flaten, American ambassador to Rwanda between December 1990 and December 1993, the US said nothing about the invasion because its embassy in Uganda ‘bought Museveni’s lies about non-involvement.’ (19)

The refusal on the part of the United States to condemn the invasion is revealing when one considers the extent to which it was engaged with promoting democratic reform within Rwanda and in facilitating the return of the Tutsi refugees from Uganda. The RPF justified its invasion by claiming that President Habyarimana was intransigent on these two issues. Many Western observers and journalists echoed this position. However, the United States knew that this claim was disingenuous because of its own involvement. Let us consider first the issue of refugee return.

In February 1988, President Habyarimana visited Uganda to start negotiations on the return of refugees. In a speech in Semuto on 5th February 1988, he stated that the claims of the refugees to return to their country were legitimate and that their continued refugee status was unacceptable (20). A Joint Ministerial Commission was established between Uganda and Rwanda to explore ways of solving the refugee issue. This was followed by a decision by both governments to seek assistance from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to carry out a survey in refugee settlements to determine whether refugees wished to go back to Rwanda or continue staying in Uganda (21). In July 1990, a breakthrough was achieved on the issue between the UNHCR and the governments of Uganda and Rwanda (22).

On 28 September, Habyarimana told the United Nations General Assembly that his government would offer citizenship and travel documents to all Rwandan refugees wherever they were and that it would repatriate all those who wanted to return to Rwanda (23). Rwanda’s minister of agriculture sent teams of agronomists to assess making land available for refugee settlement. Land that was being held for research purposes for the ministry of agriculture was to be acquired for refugee settlement (24). A visit by a delegation of Tutsi refugees was planned for the 25th September, but on that day the visit was cancelled. The reason for the cancellation became evident a few days later, with the RPF’s invasion (25).

Joyce Leader, then assistant secretary to Robert Flaten, the United States ambassador to Rwanda from January 1991 to December 1993, and who was given the job because of her expertise on refugee issues, stated that ‘the right of refugees, mostly Tutsi, to return to Rwanda was one of the principle causes of the RPF invasion….nevertheless, even before the RPF invasion in October 1990, Habyarimana’s government was taking steps with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to plan for the refugee return. Indeed, when the RPF launched its military attack in 1990, plans were in progress for representatives of the refugees in Uganda to return to Rwanda to see for themselves the conditions in Rwanda and to report to their people. This visit, however, never took place as the invasion intervened.’ (26)

Yet, in a statement to a joint hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs and the House Subcommittee on African Affairs, Herman Cohen seemed to forget this when he stated that ‘(T)he members of the two Sub-Committees will recall that the crisis in Rwanda did not begin in April, 1994, but in October, 1990 when 3,000 Rwandan Tutsi troops from the Ugandan army invaded their ancestral homeland under the RPF banner. They undertook this operation out of a romantic idea that they could open the doors of Rwanda to the return of several hundred thousand Tutsi refugees who had fled to Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Zaire 25 years earlier. (By decree of the Habyarimana government, the Tutsi refugees were forever prohibited from returning)’ (27).

Let us now consider the issue of Rwanda’s democratic reform process.

In January 1989, Habyarimana declared before the new legislature that there was a need for the reform of the political system. The Secretariat of the MRND was requested to undertake a new study to reform the party in order to make it better equipped to meet the new challenges (28). In addition to these domestic initiatives, French pressure was applied at the Francophone Africa Summit of June 1990, at La Baule, Brittany. At the summit French President Mitterand announced that following the end of the Cold War, the West was urging its partner countries to introduce democratic reforms. He declared France’s willingness to provide military safeguards for the transition process (29).

After La Baule, on July 5th 1990, Habyarimana stated that his ruling party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) would undergo a revision of its political principles, a kind of aggiornamento, and that the country was going to know a process of democratization by reactivating the multiparty system that had been suspended in 1965 (30). The following day he announced the necessity for the separation of the party and state (31). In August, a manifesto calling for democratic reforms was signed by thirty-three opposition intellectuals. On September 21st, the National Commission set up by the President to prepare for the introduction of multi-party democracy was in place and advised on its reform (32).

When the new constitution was signed into law in June 1991, Western diplomats in Kigali - particularly representatives of the US who had funded conferences on constitutional reform and even paid for the printing of much of the government’s constitutional literature - were ‘deeply satisfied by the move to pluralism’ (33). America responded with more aid. In July 1991 Cohen announced an increase in aid from 11.6 million dollars in 1990 to 20 million dollars in 1991, stating that on ‘both the plane of politics and economics, Rwandans are doing very well’ (34).

Although the reform process had barely begun at the time of the RPF invasion, the U.S. had been in close communication with France and shared the French view at the time that Habyarimana appeared to have a sincere commitment to the process. ‘Rwanda was already leaning toward democratic reforms by October 1990’, writes Cohen (35). This commitment did not subsequently diminish as a result of the security problems caused by the war. Ambassador Flaten was personally impressed by Habyarimana’s commitment toward instituting democratic reform (36).

The US was therefore aware that the RPF’s invasion was in no way the last resort of people who were demanding the rights of refugee return and democratic government. Yet the U.S. did more than look the other way and refuse to condemn the invasion. After the invasion was repulsed there was an opportunity to ensure that Museveni be true to his word and cease all support for the rebels, and encourage them to accept Habyarimana’s offer of amnesty and invitation to join the multi-party system. If the U.S. was sincere about assisting Rwanda’s democratic reforms it would have demanded that the RPF eschew violence. But instead, the U.S. lent its weight upon Habyarimana to recognise the rapidly resurgent rebel army as a legitimate force with whom he should negotiate. In May 1991, Habyarimana’s suspicions of American support for the RPF were confirmed when Herman Cohen demanded that President Habyarimana accept the RPF as a problem that Rwanda, not Uganda, had to address (37). There was no longer any discussion about the RPF as illegal ‘deserters’ from the Ugandan army.

This was an extraordinary move on America’s part, since an observation at the time was that ‘most Rwandans and the diplomatic and aid community believe that the RPF had no alternative but to denounce the reforms and fight on because, as an almost exclusively Tutsi group, it would have no chance at the polls, were it to enter politics. Others went further, claiming that the RPF’s refusal to accept the government’s amnesty and invitation to join the multi-party system as proof that the RPF wanted to fight its way to power and install a minority regime (38).

In fact, American ties with the RPF leadership preceded the invasion of October 1990. Under its International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, the United States was training Rwandan Tutsis who were in the NRA at the time of the invasion. The most prominent was Paul Kagame. With the death of Rwigyema, the first RPF leader who led the invasion, Kagame broke off his training at the Command and General Staff College (he was in his third of a nine month course) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He flew back to Uganda and took over the leadership of the RPF. On the eve of his departure, Kagame was given a ‘warm send-off.’ (39) As a battle-hardened senior military man, Kagame would not have missed the remaining military training. The main gain of his time there was through the official contacts he made, and the knowledge about using communication and information warfare. Lieutenant-Colonel Tony Marley, who was to play a key role in negotiating ceasefires between the RPF and the FAR, and himself a graduate of Fort Leavenworth, cautions against overplaying the training Kagame received, and adds that ‘probably the best thing he acquired there was a better understanding of Americans, which he probably put to good political effect over the following months/years.’ (40)

Kagame is quoted saying that ‘the US experience added something. Central to my studies in Leavenworth were organisation, tactics, strategy, building human resources, Psy-Ops [psychological operations], information, psychology and information among the troops.’ (41) Many of Kagame’s subordinates received similar training, including instruction in the use of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at the Barry Goldwater Air Force Range at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona (42).

A former East Africa desk official of the United States Agency for International Development, Harald Marwitz, wrote that, ‘as early as 1989, U.S. Embassy reporting telegrams to the State Department cited reports from reliable sources in Rwanda - such as foreign military observers - documenting Ugandan involvement in incipient border skirmishes and the subsequent invasion of Rwanda. There were at least 56 of these situation reports, or ‘sitreps’, in State Department files in 1991. In the same year, a U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) officer prepared and circulated throughout the State Department and AID bureaucracy a memorandum asking why the United States was providing military and economic assistance to Uganda while it was assisting former Rwandan-Tutsis in overthrowing the legally constituted and elected government of a friendly country’ (43).

To return to the events immediately following the invasion. The training Kagame and his men had received in information warfare had clearly paid off, since the international media presented a largely sympathetic case for the invasion that was aiming to end dictatorship and enable refugees to return. According to Filip Reyntjens, the RPF propaganda was so well received internationally that several non-governmental organizations and regional specialists in Belgium were prompted to jointly publish an article on 16 October, ‘Une colère de tempt de guerre au Rwanda’ (’wartime Anger in Rwanda’), which refuted the RPF’s depiction of its invasion and condemned the attack (44).

As the RPF continued its violent bid to secure power in Rwanda, Cohen intervened in order to translate RPF military gains into political gains. He travelled to Rwanda in May and impressed upon Habyarimana and the leaders of the largest opposition party, the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) the position of the United States that they should commence serious negotiations with the RPF. He then went to Uganda and threatened Museveni that unless he used his ‘influence to push the RPF into negotiations’, American aid to Uganda might be reduced in order to aid Rwandans displaced by the RPF’s war (45).

As a result of this intervention, Rwanda’s process of democratic reform was fundamentally changed. Instead of a peaceful transition period in which opposition parties competed for popular support in preparation for elections, Rwanda became gripped by the rising tensions of an externally supported war. As the military capacity of the RPF increased, so did the necessity of engaging them in negotiations over power-sharing. Yet power-sharing with a force that was operating outside the democratic process violated the purpose and spirit of democratisation. The N’Sele ceasefire agreement of March 1991, which planned negotiations toward the integration of the two armies in conflict and the inclusion of the RPF as a political partner of the former ruling party and the opposition parties, signified a departure from the process of democratic reform to a process of ‘conflict resolution’ in which a negotiated settlement of the war took precedence.

As a result, a three-cornered contest ensued with the former ruling party, the internal opposition and the RPF jockeying for position in a ‘broad-based transitional government’. Wider engagement with Rwandan society, the potential electorate, became subsumed within this externally-driven intra-elite affair. In any event, Western enthusiasm for democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa appeared to have waned by 1993. Malian President Amadou Touré observed that ‘at the conference in La Baule in June 1990 we were told that from then on a kind of ‘democratic certificate of good conduct’ would be required of African states. In 1993 there was a change of tune. From then on the message was, ‘democracy is all well and good, but it’s efficiency that counts now’’ (46).

In addition to its bilateral relations with Uganda and Rwanda, the U.S. used its position as superpower to shape interventions into those countries by international financial institutions (IFI’s), notably, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The structural adjustment programmes implemented in these two warring countries by the IFI’s also had political ‘conditionalities’ attached. In Rwanda’s case the key structural adjustment measures taken was a devaluation of the Rwandan franc by 40 per cent in November 1990, and a further 15% in June 1991. The first devaluation greatly exacerbated the effects of the halving of the world price of coffee. Coffee accounted for 80 per cent of Rwanda’s export earnings, and around 800,000 Rwandan families were engaged in coffee production. The government responded to the coffee price crash by increasing subsidies to producers, but the currency devaluations made this unsustainable(47). Instead of stabilising Rwanda’s economy, structural adjustment accelerated its downward spiral. The effects were felt throughout society, civil servants and employees in parastatal enterprises found their purchasing power greatly reduced (48). Among the rural population, falling income contributed to a famine in the south and south-west of the country, the first such famine since 1943 (49).

Among the political ‘conditionalities’ attached to the loans that were part of the structural adjustment package, was ‘progress toward democracy’. They were also used to pressurise President Habyarimana to sign the Arusha Accords. According to Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch, ‘…when it was getting very difficult to get the Arusha Accords signed, there was a deadline of August 9 that said no more foreign aid unless this accord is signed. The accord was signed (50). After the accord was signed, the loans were also made conditional on their implementation. As further negotiations entered a period of stalemate, the WB announced that it would halt the disbursements under its loan agreement.

At the beginning of 1994 several donors reduced or suspended financial aid (51/52). By then the donor community made little attempt to hide its bias toward the RPF. At the end of 1993 the crucially important donors’ roundtable on Rwanda took place not in Kigali but in Mulindi - the base of RPF operations against the government. Early in 1994 the World Bank announced that all credits to Rwanda were suspended on the grounds that the government was ‘illegal’ (53). In March 1994, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell visited Habyarimana. She accused the Rwandan government of delaying the implementation of a transitional government and told him that ‘Rwanda was losing funding’ from the U.S. ‘with each day of delay’ (54).

While the structural adjustment programme imposed by IFI’s upon Uganda during this period was geared toward similar economic objectives as in the case of Rwanda, the political approach could not have been more different. Funding was conditional upon reduction of the size of military forces. In Uganda’s case, the ‘desertion’ of the RPF from the Ugandan army meant that, on paper at least, the Ugandan army had been reduced. This reduction was viewed favourably by donors. On the other hand, the Rwandan army had to increase almost threefold in order to resist the RPF, and this led to the withholding of funds (55). In addition, pressure to implement multi-party democracy was waived in Uganda’s case. When the opposition Democratic Party threatened to hold an illegal rally in May 1992, Museveni is reported to have said: ‘If they want to see dead bodies, let them go ahead with the rally’ (56).

Some time later in 1992, a document of Museveni’s intelligence agency, the Internal Security Organisation (ISO), was leaked. It contained minutes of a meeting held between Museveni and regional rebels: Colonel John Garang of Sudanese Liberation Peoples’ Army (SPLA), unidentified commanders of the RPF, and representatives of a fighting force of the Kenya Democratic Party of former Kenyan vice-president Mwai Kibaki, at ISO headquarters of Basima House in Kampala. At this meeting, Museveni is recorded having calmed the rebels’ fears that Uganda was going to return to party politics by saying that he was under no pressure to adopt pluralism, as his version of democracy has the ‘full backing of the US and British governments’ (57). By 1994, Uganda had undoubtedly become a most favoured aid-receiving nation (58). One American official is quoted saying, ‘if you’re serious about democracy in Africa, if you’re serious about development in Africa [your programme] should work in Uganda. If it can’t work in Uganda it can’t work’ (59). The championing of Museveni by the donor community enabled him to secure his hold on power by taking repressive action against his political opponents, and also to back the RPF’s war.

To return to direct US relations with Rwanda, the US could not have failed to have noticed the RPF’s renewed military preparations being taken after the signing of the Arusha Accords, and in particular between January and April 1994, since these had been monitored by helicopters of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), as evidenced by a communication between the US embassy in Nairobi to the Secretary of State in Washington in May 1994, ‘Asked by ambassador Shinn [David H. Shinn, Director of the Office of East African Affairs in Washington] whether UNAMIR was able to track shipments from Uganda, Dallaire said that UNAMIR helicopters would notice significant shipments, as they had prior to the war [that commenced April 1994]’ (60).

The refusal of the United States to formally investigate the circumstances of the rocket attack upon the plane that killed, among others, President Habyarima, could be regarded as motivated by a concern to protect the RPF from the allegations of its involvement. This will be examined in the later section that covers the role of the United Nations.

The decision of the United States not to send an intervention force once the scale of massacres had become known during the resumption of the war between April 6 and mid July 1994 could be at least partly due to the fact that Kagame sent two messengers, Claude Dusaidi and Charles Muligande, to lobby the U.S government not to intervene (61). After its recent debacle in Somalia with ‘Operation Restore Hope’ that culminated with television footage of bodies of US marines being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu being shown to a home audience, the Clinton administration was reticent about sending its own military into new foreign conflict zones. While not wishing to risk its own forces, the US may also have not wanted to impede the RPF’s military takeover.

Upon seizing power in Kigali, the RPF formed its own government and received immediate recognition from the US. Strong military ties between the two countries commenced shortly after. These ties enabled the new state of Rwanda to invade Zaire. President Kagame of Rwanda had joined the club of the favoured ‘new generation of African leaders’ (62).

The role of the US was clearly extensive and extremely influential. Cohen enters a note of regret about it:

‘Looking back to the first day of the crisis, 1 October 1990, why did we automatically exclude the policy option of informing Ugandan President Museveni that the invasion of Rwanda by uniformed members of the Ugandan Army was totally unacceptable, and that the continuation of good relations between the United States and Uganda would depend on his getting the RPF back across the border? That the RPF were children of the Tutsi refugees of 1959-63 who were forbidden to return gave the event a certain romantic poignancy. Had we analysed the potential for disaster, however, we probably would not have silently acquiesced in the invasion.’ (63)

The role of France

As already mentioned, French announcements of its policy of promoting democratic reform in Africa at La Baule, in July 1990, accelerated the pace of Rwanda’s reform process.

French President Mitterand declared his country’s willingness to provide military safeguards for the transition process (64). In response to Habyarimana’s request for French assistance in the wake of the RPF invasion, France dispatched 150 paratroopers from the Central African Republic in ‘Operation Noroît’ (65). France was the sole Western power to have condemned the invasion as an act of foreign aggression. The deployment of French troops helped bolster the resolve of the FAR to organise its counter-attack, and assisted in operations such as targeting artillery (66).

After the retreat of the RPF behind the Ugandan border that marked the end of the ‘War of October’, a French delegation led by the Minister of Cooperation, Mr. Pellier, and the Elysée African Advisor, Jean-Christophe Mitterand, met with various European and African leaders, including leaders from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, to discuss the situation in Rwanda. It is possible that notice was given to Rwanda then that there would be a complete withdrawal of French forces from that country at some point in the near future (67). France was reluctant to be the sole military supporter of the Rwandan government, Belgian forces having withdrawn soon after the invasion. According to an informant from Ministry of Cooperation, France’s decision to disengage was already evident in 1990, ‘we did not want to remain alone…there were great powers behind the RPF. Uganda could send 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers’ (68).

The Quay d’ Orsay was represented at the N’Sele talks and encouraged the GOR to sign ceasefire of 29 March 91. Article (ii) of the agreement called for withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Elysée African Bureau led negotiations starting in late 1991 to bring GOR and RPF together. Between April and June 1992, the Quay held a series of informal talks between the two parties. The agenda included the fusion of the two armies, establishment of a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) and ‘political guarantees’. All of these brought the government of Rwanda to negotiating table in Arusha in June 1992. A representative from the Quay was present throughout the negotiations as an observer. After the major RPF offensive of February, of 1993, when the French military presence was thought to have deterred the RPF from taking Kigali, Cooperation Minister Marcel Debarge went to Kigali to reaffirm French support for Habyarimana, but also to convince him to implement Arusha agreement (69).

Following on from the N’Sele cease-fire agreement, President Mitterand made promises not to withdraw French troops without the Rwandan government’s agreement, and not before the army was strengthened. According to the N’Sele agreement, French troops would remain until a neutral military force could be deployed. This point was reiterated in Article 72 of the Arusha Accords. France lobbied the United Nations for a UN military presence to monitor the Rwanda-Uganda border and to be an interpositional force between RPF and the Rwandan army. This was rejected until March 1993, when the United Kingdom and the US wanted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to take the lead (70).

According to Callamard, it was not just pressure from the US and IFI’s that was applied to get Habyarimana to sign the Arusha Accords, ‘it is doubtful if Habyarimana would have signed the peace accords, which gave heavy concessions to the RPF, without pressure and guarantees from the Elysée through François Mitterand’s personal emissaries, and possibly from representatives of the Military Mission of Cooperation, specifically Général Huchon, Colonel Cussac - the French military attaché and head of French military Assistance Mission in Rwanda, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Maurin’ (71).

The French military departed Rwanda in mid-December. From then on the possibility of winning power by military means existed for the RPF.

The role of Belgium

Belgium acted swiftly in response to the invasion. Within three days, five hundred Belgian paratroopers had landed in Kigali. Their mission was officially limited to the protection of Belgian nationals (72). The paratroopers had wished to have sole control of Kigali’s airport, at Kanombe, but found that French forces had already occupied it and thereby controlled Rwandan airspace. The Belgians were left in control of the route between Kanombe and Kigali. It was rumoured that the French were doubtful of Belgian loyalty to Habyarimana, believing that there was some degree of complicity between the Belgian secret services and the RPF (73).

There is ambivalence about Belgium’s role as an intervening power in this war. Habyarimana had enjoyed close support from the Prime Minister, the Christian Democrat Wilfried Martens, for several years. But this support came under criticism from the Socialists and Liberals, with whom Martens entered into coalition from 1988. The Liberal Party in particular became sympathetic toward the RPF (74).

Along with its paratroopers, Prime Minister Martens, socialist Minister of Defence Guy Coëme and socialist Foreign Minister Willy Claes visited Rwanda. They did not condemn the invasion, but rather sought to mediate between the two sides. They were instrumental in facilitating a summit meeting on October 17th in Mwanza, Tanzania between Habyarimana, Museveni and President Mwinyi of Tanzania (75). Three days later, Martens was in Kampala urging Museveni to engage in negotiations. Martens also attempted to obtain agreement at the European Union for an interpositional force. The EU, however, impressed with reports of human rights abuses in Rwanda, declined in favour of supporting a regional initiative under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (76). The fact that Museveni was at that time also Chairman of the OAU and was therefore in a position to promote a partisan approach toward the RPF through the OAU, did not appear to concern the officials of the European Union. The OAU involvement took the form of the Communité Exonomique de Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL), which arranged meetings involving Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, the UN and the OAU itself (77). On their return to Belgium, Martens, Coëme and Claes faced strong opposition from the Liberals (78).

While Belgium did not condemn the invasion, it did condemn the Rwandan government for its human rights violations in response to the invasion. Ambassador Johann Swinnen went to the stadium in Kigali where detainees were held, and issued his government’s condemnation from there (79).

On October 26th, the government of Rwanda and the RPF meet in Gbadolite, Zaire, and agreed a ceasefire (80). On the following day, Belgium withdrew its forces from Rwanda (81). From this point on, Belgium lent increasing diplomatic weight behind the RPF, while at the same time continued providing some military assistance to the FAR. Under pressure from the Liberal Party, Belgium ceased delivering arms from October 1990, and did not meet earlier military commitments. What was maintained was the Kigali military hospital, and commando training at Ruhengeri that was maintained until April 1994 (82). But as far as popular perceptions were concerned, the Belgian escort of the RPF battalion to Kigali, in compliance with the Arusha Accords, signified Belgian support for the RPF.

The role of the United Kingdom

Reports from the British High Commission in Kampala show willingness on the part of the United Kingdom to support President Museveni’s denials of any knowledge of, or support for, the invasion of October 1990. In fact the invasion is not termed an invasion, but an ‘incursion’. On October 2nd, British High Commissioner to Uganda, Charles Cullimore, reported a senior Ugandan officer talking of a ‘mutiny’ by Rwandan elements in the NRA (83). Later that day, he reported National Resistance Council Vice Chairman Kigongo, state that ‘soldiers recruited into the NRA and civilians had escaped from their camps and places of work and taken up arms…’ He also quoted Mrs Bigombe, Minister of State in the prime minister’s office, ‘any who return to Uganda will be arrested. Road blocks have been set up both to apprehend any Rwandan exiles who attempt to return to Uganda and to prevent any more Rwandese in the Ugandan army from joining the group already in Rwanda’ (84).

By the October 17th, the Ugandan denials must have been wearing thin in other Western quarters. A censored report from Cullimore stated that ‘not surprisingly allegations have been surfacing here over the weekend of connivance at senior levels in the preparations for the incursion into Rwanda by Rwigyema and the Rwanda Patriotic Front….I believe we should be very cautious about jumping to conclusions in what is still a very confused situation. There are many pieces in the jigsaw which are still missing. Meanwhile [deleted] tells me that [deleted] in Kigali have agreed to recommend to capitals that there should be a community demarche in Kampala ‘seeking to bring the Ugandans to their senses’. [Deleted] agreed that such a demarche would be both premature and counter-productive. It would achieve nothing and could only damage our interests here’ (85).

Cullimore and his counterpart succeeded in ‘correcting’ these allegations. On October 18th, he reported that:

‘My [deleted] colleagues have told me that their countries’ respective ambassadors in Kigali, together with [deleted] were called to a meeting by the Rwandan foreign minister on 9 October at which he claimed that the GOU [government of Uganda] was now actually colluding with the rebels. In particular he claimed that whole units with equipment had been ‘recruited’ to strengthen the rebel forces now estimated by the Rwandans at about 10,000. He went on to allege that the rebel’s strategic command was located on Ugandan soil. The Rwandans intended to bring the matter to the Security Council as well as the OAU within the next few days. At the suggestion of [deleted] EC heads of mission…..met on 11 October to share our information and analysis of recent developments. There was a broad consensus along the following lines:

A) A) The GOU as such and Museveni himself were taken by surprise by the incursion into Rwanda although many individuals in senior positions must have had an inkling of what was afoot. As a consequence the GOU was now in an extremely embarrassing position.
B) B) There was much sympathy with the rebels’ cause among the NRM leadership including Museveni but we had no evidence of any covert policy of collusion and support for the rebels.
C) C) The GOU was serious in its official condemnation of the incursion and in calling for a political rather than a military solution.
D) D) There was no evidence whatever of official ‘recruitment’ of Rwandans whether within the NRA or from the civilian population to go and join the rebels in Rwanda.
E) E) Nevertheless there is anecdotal evidence to indicate individuals in senior positions, especially in the NRA and in the south and west were conniving in attempts to help the rebel cause….’ (86)

What is curious is that the ‘embarrassed’ Museveni, apparently having been informed of the most serious breach of military discipline in his army since it seized power in 1986, one which involved his head of intelligence and former minister of defence, did not rush back home, as his Rwandan counterpart had done. More curious still, is that High Commissioner Cullimore felt it incumbent upon himself to advise Museveni that it was time that he came home: ‘I believe it is important that he should now return from the United States without delay even if this means postponing his proposed visits to Denmark, Strasbourg and Italy’ (87).

But, as Cullimore found out, Museveni was booked on a Concorde to London (88). He finally made it to Uganda on October 10th and gave a press interview at the airport (89).

Not surprisingly, President Habyarimana was more certain of British support for the RPF than he was of American support. He said later that the RPF had access to British intelligence from the demilitarized zone that was set up after the February 1993 offensive (90).

The role of human rights non-governmental organisations

Human rights reports were highly influential in shaping Western policy and international opinion toward Rwanda. Perhaps the most influential of all was the International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Abuse in Rwanda (ICI), led by Human Rights Watch, but involving also The International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (Paris), the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Montreal) and the Interafrican Union of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ougadougou). The commissioners visited Rwanda in January 1993 and investigated massacres and other abuses from October 1990 and January 1993. Their main conclusion was that ‘President Habyarimana and his immediate entourage bear heavy responsibility for these massacres and other abuses against Tutsi and members of the political opposition.’ (91)

Part of the report dealt with a speech made by Léon Mugesera, a member of the MRND, at Kabaya in the sub-prefecture of Gisenyi, in November 1992. According to the report, ‘in a part of his speech Mugesera recounts a conversation in which he warned a member of the PL, ‘I am telling you that your home is in Ethiopia, that we are going to send you back there quickly, by the Nyaborongo [River]’. For the audience, ‘member of the PL[Parti Libéral]’ could not have meant anything other than Tutsi, and the mention of transportation by the Nyaborongo had to be understood as killing the people in question and dumping the bodies in the river, a usual practice in past massacres of Tutsi.’ (92) According to Human Rights Watch, ‘Mugesera’s speech was tape-recorded. Excerpts were broadcast on the national radio and copies were circulated among people in Kigali and other towns’.

The following month, an arrest warrant was issued to Mugesera by the minister of justice, himself a member of the Liberal Party whose membership was mostly Tutsi. Mugesera fled the country for Spain. He later moved with his family to Canada, having obtained permanent residence there. In 1995 a report was submitted to the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. The report indicated that ‘in November, 1992, Mugesera had, at a political meeting, made a speech inciting party militants to kill Tutsis. On the following day, several killings took place in the neighbourhood of Gisenyi, Kayove, Kibilira and other places. The US Department of State published a list of persons considered to have taken part in the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda. Leon Mugesera’s name was on the list in his capacity as a member of the MRND – ‘member of a death squad’ (93).

In July 1996, an adjudicator concluded that allegations against him were valid and ordered his deportation. Mugesera appealed against his deportation, and, in September 2003, his appeal was finally upheld. Called to testify at the Federal Court of Appeal as an expert witness, ICI co-chairperson Alison Des Forges ‘admitted that the Commission’s report was produced ‘very quickly, under very great pressure’’. She also acknowledged that, as a human rights activist, she could not claim objectivity although attempting to maintain neutrality as between political factions. She even admitted that some of her accusations ‘will inevitably [be] shown to be false.’ She finally conceded that the speech might be regarded by some as ‘legitimate self-defence’. She also admitted that no witness interviewed by the ICI had been present when the speech was made. Another admission was that, from the evidence she had been able to obtain, the only impact of Mugesera’s speech had been vandalism and theft. She declined to identify the person who had provided the ICI with the transcript from which the translation used by ICI was prepared. When cross-examined as to whether she took out of context passages in the speech which suited her, Ms. Des Forges admitted having done so. She admitted having selected that evidence which supported the conclusions reached by the Commission’ (94).

The court had before it a transcript of a recording of the speech. There is a mention of the Nyaborongo River, but no call to kill Tutsis or throw bodies into the river. Later on, there is an emphatic call for people to vote in the scheduled elections.

The judge’s conclusion was that ‘…the anecdote in Mugesera’s address referring to that River had a happy ending - the return of the Falashas to Israel - and it would be strange if Mugesera had recounted such a hopeful story if his intention had been to invite the audience to give the story a tragic ending’. And that, ‘[w]hile the audience was urged to ‘defend yourselves’, the methods recommended were vigilance, petitions, enforcing the laws and elections’. As far as the ICI report was concerned: ‘It was on a deliberately truncated text of Mugesera’s speech that the ICI concluded him to be a member of the death squads. It could only be concluded that Ms. Des Forges testified as an activist with a clear bias against Mugesera and an implacable determination to have his head’ (95).

With Rwanda’s descent into mass slaughter in April 1994, eighteen months after Mugesera’s speech, the thousands of corpses floating down the Kagera River into Lake Victoria were described by commentators to have been the fruit of this speech. As a result of the ICI’s misrepresentation of his speech, Mugesera was denounced by many authors as a key ideologue of the genocide in Rwanda (96).

At this point the author would like to make clear that it is not his intention to endorse any of the actual content of Mugesera’s speech, rather it to show that the speech was misrepresented by human rights agencies in an attempt to substantiate their claim that the subsequent mass killing of Tutsis was the outcome of a plan being devised around this time.

Critics of the ICI report assert that its main motivation was to demonise the Rwandan government in order to cast the RPF’s war in a favourable light. They point to the fact that the time span of the report, 1st October 1990 to January 1993, coincides exactly with the RPF invasion and subsequent war. The investigators spent two weeks in the country. While they immediately set about investigating allegations of atrocities committed by the forces of the Rwandan government, they spent no more than two hours investigating allegations of RPF abuses, and during these two hours they were under RPF escort, interviewing individuals in the presence of RPF soldiers.

They also allege that there was close collusion between the investigators and the RPF. One of the investigators, Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, became minister of justice in the first RPF-dominated government. They claim that the members of the commission co-ordinated their activities in concert with the RPF. The RPF launched its offensive on the pretext of responding to revelations of the commission and using words of a communiqué which came before the publication of the report (97). Two weeks before the commissioners’ arrival, senior RPF official Théoniste Rudasingwa wrote to the pro-RPF Rwandan newspaper Isibo. In this letter, Rudasingwa announced that the RPF would await the publication of the report before launching its offensive and violating the cease-fire of July 1992 (98).

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Marley, military adviser to the Africa Bureau of the United States Department of State, who brokered the cease-fire after the February 1993 offensive, ‘The report, however, put the Government on the defensive as far as its international image [was concerned], and permitted the RPF to play the role of the noble defender of the victims. The RPF, of course, was quick to master this role’ (99).

This is precisely what the RPF did with the report. After the February 1993 offensive, the RPF delegation to the Arusha negotiations was able to deflect criticism of breaking the ceasefire and resuming a war that generated a population of displaced that now approached a million, by demanding that ‘the government must give firm guarantees to stop the ‘genocide’ in Kigali’.

The British observer present reported sympathetically that ‘the attitude of the RPF delegation was of horror at the situation in Rwanda mixed with a determination not to throw away what had so far been achieved in Arusha. They seemed genuinely to wish to find some common ground’ (100).

Philpot comments that ‘the Commission could have published its report with a formal disclaimer about its numerous and serious shortcomings. On the contrary, it chose to launch the report with a massive media and public relations campaign vaunting the scope, credibility and prestige of the Commission and its authors. A lobbying campaign followed. All the foreign embassies and ministries were called on, as were the major European and North American funding organizations. The international reaction was swift and devastating. Belgium recalled its ambassador from Kigali. Within months, citing the report, Canada suspended twenty million dollars of aid to Rwanda’s national university in Butare. The report became the pretext for an arms embargo on Rwanda, whereas the invading RPF army had no problem obtaining all the weapons it needed. From March 1993 on, the Commission’s report was backdrop to all international meetings about or directly involving the Habyarimana government’ (101).

The partisan approach toward human rights abuses adopted by the ICI, and its intensive international lobbying with this report had a significant influence on Rwanda’s relations with the international community. A connection between the ICI and United States policy may be inferred from the fact that its leading figure, Alison Des Forges, was also working as a consultant for the United States Department of State at the time (102).

The isolation of the Habyarimana government and legitimisation of the war waged by the Rwandan Patriotic Front are vital elements in any serious investigation of the dynamics of Rwanda’s descent into mass slaughter. Both processes were externally driven and attest mainly, though not exclusively, to American influence. Such influence was brought to bear upon human rights investigations by non-governmental organisations and upon the United Nations, whose partiality toward the RPF is another important influence upon Rwanda’s tragic course of events. Analysts of Rwanda cannot afford to ignore the politicised nature of the human rights discourse.

RPF killings of civilians within their occupied areas were the main reason for the depopulation of their territory. According to Joyce Leader, Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Kigali from 1991-1994, the RPF ‘attacks centred on civilian targets: market places, social services such as schools and hospitals, and refugee camps. The rebels apparently considered anywhere civilians congregated a legitimate target…(t)here were also reports that the RPF kidnapped civilians and took them back to Uganda’ (103). James Gasana, Rwandan minister of defence and government negotiator at Arusha at the time, provides a death toll of the victims of RPF massacres in each of the communes of Ruhengeri and Byumba prefectures which total 42,200 (104). The massacres and expulsion of a vast swathe of the civilian population from northern Rwanda, and the squalid conditions in the displacement camps contributed in no small measure to the hardening of social attitudes. Displaced youth attempted to overcome their conditions by joining the national army or the militias. This experience of the war re-created the Hutu-Tutsi division in a new form. Deprivation and squalor, mixed with a deep fear and hatred of the RPF meant that this newly formulated division turned into a social force, one that became all consuming.

The February offensive was stopped short of Kigali, with French forces playing a significant part in the defence of the capital. With a sizeable amount of territory under its control, and having made the dependence of the FAR upon French forces obvious to all, the RPF had achieved its aim: greatly enhanced bargaining power at the negotiating table at Arusha.

At this point France served notice that it was going to withdraw its military forces from Rwanda. This left the MRND with little room for manoeuvre at the negotiations.

The Arusha Accords:

The coalition government formed in April 1992, was one in which the former ruling party shared ministries with the opposition parties. While it retained the ministries of defence and internal affairs, it was diplomatically weakened by the fact that the foreign ministry was in the hands of the opposition MDR. This meant that the positions of the MRND toward the RPF were mediated by, and articulated through, a foreign minister that was not one of its own. This undermined the coherence of the government position in the negotiations. Adding to this were the tensions within the three larger opposition parties. These parties were now facing up to the fact that their position had not been enhanced by the RPF’s war. It was becoming evident that the effect of the war was to enlarge the RPF’s stake in a future government at the expense of all other parties. The extent of the rise of the RPF’s position became clear with the signing of the Arusha Accords. The RPF won five cabinet seats in the agreed Broad Based Transitional Government. More important than this was that the agreed new integrated national army would have half the soldiers and half the military leadership from the RPF. This made the RPF the strongest party.

The Arusha Accords were hailed by the Tanzanian facilitator, the United Nations and Western mediators as a triumph of diplomacy that would usher in a new chapter of peace and democracy for Rwanda. Representatives of the international community felt good about themselves and their achievement. According to Joyce Leader who was also an observer at Arusha, ‘…when the President signed the Arusha Accords on August 4, 1993, he was signing a comprehensive document that constituted a blueprint for a new Rwandan political, military and social order. In one document it brought together Rwanda’s three transitions - from dictatorship to democracy, from single-party to multiparty government, and from war to peace’ (105).

Yet, if the international community had been in touch with the actual situation inside Rwanda, they may have realised that they had precipitated the most dangerous political crisis in Rwanda’s history. As an exercise in fostering democratic and accountable government, Arusha was a disaster. The most powerful political force emerging from it - the RPF - was feared and hated by an ever increasing majority of Rwandans. The opposition parties had failed to utilise the democratic space made available to it to articulate a plausible alternative to either the MRND or the RPF. Conversely, Habyarimana, who had been reviled by large sections of the newly formed opposition, saw his popularity rise. His effort to highlight the plight of the internally displaced was one important reason for this. Arusha had therefore created an untenable situation. If the agreement held, the positions in the new government would be taken up and elections held within a year. But the mass flight of people from RPF-occupied territory and the obvious popular opposition to the RPF indicated that the elections would relegate the RPF to the status of a small opposition party. If any further proof was needed of this, the result of the elections for local government in the demilitarized zone in September 1993 provided it. All the RPF candidates were defeated (106).

Having demonstrated a capacity to take the country militarily, and having won the strongest political position of any party in the Arusha agreement, it is inconceivable that the RPF would countenance losing all of this by doing badly in the scheduled elections. The indications are that this was precisely why the RPF immediately made preparations for another, final, offensive. Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), provides detail of these preparations. On February 28, 1994, Dallaire observed the RPF’s military build-up by helicopter: ‘I saw large concentrations of troops being trained, as well as evidence of defensive positions being dug on the northwest border of the demilitarized zone, near the presidential stronghold of Ruhengeri. In the middle of the zone, where it narrowed to less than a kilometre near Byumba, I spotted soldiers swarming around the rich sienna of freshly turned mounds of earth; they were like giant anthills bracketing the city on both flanks. It looked like Kagame was realigning his forces, pushing for a good secure start line from which he could launch an offensive.’ (107)

Dallaire also provides an account of how the RPF used the base it was given in Kigali, the Conseil National du Développement (CND), in terms of the Arusha Accords, as a military staging post: ‘Once secure, they had dismissed the UNAMIR troops and assumed total control of the interior of the complex. Once the RFP began digging, they never stopped for the next four months. From shellscrapes or foxholes, they dug full fire-trenches, then roofed the trenches for protection from artillery or mortar fire. They then dug full communications-trenches between the individual trenches and built bunkers that developed into caverns. By the time the war resumed in April, they had built an underground complex under the CND. It was clear that while the peace process was progressing, they were also prepared for the alternative.’ (108)

But by this time the opposition parties had split down the middle and begun to disintegrate. The MDR, Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) and PL all divided into a faction that coalesced against the RPF and another that allied itself closer to it.

Paradoxically, the MRND - the party that had been severely weakened by the Arusha Accords - was shaping up increasingly well for the scheduled elections. Senior party officials urged people to be prepared to vote. At the same time, the party was acquiring intelligence of widespread recruitment for the RPF, primarily from Tutsi families. While the FAR faced the prospect of thousands of redundancies with the schedule for the new integrated army, it was also viewing the deteriorating social and political situation with alarm. Dissent within the party and military was running high. As the opposition parties failed to agree on which of their members should fill the positions allotted to them in the transitional government, the schedule for the new government fell further and further behind. Matters took a dramatic turn for the worse in the aftermath of the assassination of Burundi’s first elected Hutu leader, Melchior Ndadaye.

Ndadaye’s assassination

The assassination of Burundi’s President Ndadaye on October 21, 1993 plunged Rwanda’s southern neighbour Burundi into chaos. There are many similarities between these two countries in terms of ethnic composition: both with a large Hutu majority and Tutsi minority, and a similar, but by no means identical, history of politicisation of ethnic identity during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Massacres in the wake of the assassination resulted in a massive influx of Hutu refugees from Burundi into southern Rwanda, estimated variously at 300,000 and 375,000. The refugees brought with them accounts of massacres at the hands of the predominantly Tutsi Burundian army. This resulted in the south of the country becoming as charged with ethnic division as the north already was, and there was a fear spreading across the country that the RPF was abandoning the Arusha accords and preparing for a take-over an a manner analogous to the actions taken by the predominantly Tutsi army in Burundi.

These tensions produced a realignment of Rwandan politics. The contest was reduced from three sides to two, as a result of the splits in the opposition parties. By October 1993, the youth militia had settled differences that had led to frequent violent clashes between them (most notably between the MRND-Interahamwe and the MDR-Inkuba) over the previous two years. The social polarisation of Rwanda had acquired its corresponding political expression. Rwandans were either allied with the RPF or enemies of it. The focus of murderous hatred upon Tutsi civilians was a tragic displacement of fear and loathing engendered by the RPF’s war, combined with a material incentive to dispossess a vulnerable section of society during a period of acute deprivation.

From October to April 1994, the situation steadily deteriorated. Political assassinations became frequent, with prominent victims on all sides. Among the victims were thirty-seven senior MRND members; Martin Bucyana, the leader of the CDR; and Felicien Gatabazi, the leader of the PSD.

The arrival of the Arusha-mandated RPF battalion in Kigali, and the departure of the French forces in December 1993, made government figures and ordinary residents of Kigali feel particularly vulnerable, and was the main reason why the notorious Interahamwe militia received military training (109).

President Habyarimana’s assassination: a catalyst to the point of no return

As the Falcon Mystoré jet belonging to President Habyarimana descended to land at Kanombe airport outside Kigali, it was brought down by two missiles. There were no survivors. Among the dead were President Habyarimana, Burundi’s new President Cyprien Ntaryamira, Rwandan military chief of staff General Deogratias Nsabimana, Major Thaddée Bagaragaza, the chief of the Presidential Guard, and Colonel Elie Sagatwa, Habyarimana’s private secretary and brother-in-law (110).

While no one appeared to have the facts about the circumstances and perpetrators of the missile attack at that time, most NGOs and analysts speculated that Hutu extremists were responsible. No less a figure than Herman Cohen lent his weight to this explanation. He told the investigation led by Senator Quilès into the French role in Rwanda that only the militant Hutus could have been responsible (111). This fits the Akazu-conspiracy thesis that the eruption of violence triggered by the plane crash was a planned signal for the commencement of a programme of genocide against Tutsis (112). According to this thesis, the Akazu, an extremist clique centred upon Habyarimana’s wife Agathe, is said to have masterminded the operation as a desperate ‘all or nothing’ strategy (113). Another shared view is that ‘(t)he fanatical Hutu elements that murdered the president then unleashed their gruesome genocide against the Tutsis.’ (114)

Mahmood Mamdani also makes a categorical claim about the identity of Habyarimana’s assailants. Under a sub-heading ‘Inside the genocide: a central design’, he states that ‘The first step was to remove those with suspect loyalties from positions of power. The presidential plane was shot down on 6 April. Public appeals were made to a meeting of prefects on 11 April and on the radio the next day, to the effect that partisan interests must be set aside to fight the common enemy, the Tutsi’ (115). Many analysts, for example those commissioned by the Danish government to investigate the genocide, consider the different arguments for the identity and motives of the assailants, and then indicate a preference for the one that is consistent with the Akazu-conspiracy theory. Here is the view of Central African historian René Lemarchand that is supported by the Danish-commissioned analysts:

‘Who actually fired the missile that brought down Habyarimana’s plane may never be known, any more than who ordered the missile to be fired. But if the circumstantial evidence is any index, there is every reason to view the shooting of the plane as an eminently rational act from the stand-point of the immediate goals of Hutu extremists.’ (116)

Human Rights Watch is clear about the momentous impact of the plane shooting: ‘the genocide of the Tutsi, the murders of Hutu opposed to Habyarimana, and the renewed war between the Rwandan government and the RPF were all touched off by the killing of President Habyarimana’ (117). Leave None to Tell the Story goes on to consider the different viewpoints on the identity of the assailants: the RPF, Hutu moderates, members of Habyarimana’s own circle, the Belgians, and the French. It then makes the point that ‘responsibility for killing Habyarimana is a serious issue, but it is a different issue from responsibility for the genocide. We know little about who assassinated Habyarimana. We know more about who used the assassination as the pretext to begin a slaughter that had been planned for months. Hutu Power leaders expected that killing Tutsi would draw the RPF back into combat and give them a new chance for victory or at least for negotiations that might allow them to win back some of the concessions made at Arusha’ (118).

In the pages that follow is an account of prompt action taken by the Presidential Guard in initiating slaughter. The implication here is that while the plane attack is important in its own right, it is not vital to the story of the genocide, which is the overriding issue. The question of authorship of the plane shooting is circumvented with the claim that it’s timing, in any event, coincided exactly with the finishing touches of the plan to eliminate Rwandan Tutsis.

Yet this account makes no sense. The RPF’s offensive of February 1983 had been a resounding success. It had demonstrated its military superiority to the FAR, and that, were it not for French resistance, it could have seized power. With the departure of the French forces in December 1993, a military take over by the RPF was entirely feasible. Furthermore, the RPF had been making press releases and public statements that accused government forces of committing acts of genocide ever since 1990. They had made repeated threats that any further acts of this nature would be met with another offensive. The idea that Hutu extremists would countenance drawing the RPF back into combat by means of killing Tutsis, in order to make military or political gains, is therefore absurd. Paradoxically, opponents of the RPF of all political persuasions knew that, while a military confrontation with the RPF would bring certain defeat upon themselves, free elections were the only feasible means of undermining the RPF’s position.

In fact, the opposite case to that of Human Rights Watch is more logical. While the RPF’s Hutu opponents were fearful of anything that would trigger another RPF offensive, the RPF badly needed a justification to bypass the terms of the Arusha Accords and seize power militarily. The February offensive had strengthened its bargaining power to the extent that it had emerged from Arusha as the strongest party, but it had also made evident the strength of popular feeling against it across the country, and destroyed the tactical alliance it had enjoyed with the internal opposition parties. Abiding by the terms of the accords would have meant abiding by the result of the scheduled elections. If the RPF had any illusions about its electoral prospects, the local elections held in the demilitarised zone in September 1993 would have dispelled them. Not a single RPF candidate won. These elections also demonstrated the rising popularity of Habyarimana, since he appeared to be the only political leader to show concern for the conditions of people in the camps for the internally displaced. Human Rights Watch does not consider a more plausible strategy behind the attack upon Habyarimana’s plane. The news of the death of the president would be certain to have prompted killings of Tutsis. These killings would then provide the RPF the justification it sought for renewing the war. Marie Béatrice Umutesi, a Rwandan organiser of women’s non-governmental organisations who has written a moving and eloquent account of her flight from Rwanda and subsequently from the refugee camps of Zaire, articulates this argument:

‘The principal reason that the Tutsi refugees had taken up arms was to gain power. Now, the Arusha Accords only gave them part of what they wanted. With the elections, Tutsi representation in the political institutions of the country would be marginal, and it would be difficult for the rebels to return to square one after having made so many sacrifices. Like most Rwandans, the rebels expected widespread ethnic riots if President Habyarimana was killed. This was predictable, because the assassination of less important Hutu leaders during the preceding month had led to bloody riots in which Tutsi had been killed and might have served as an excuse for the RPF to renew hostilities. They were prepared. During the entire ceasefire, they had never stopped recruiting.’ (119)

While the RPF may not have anticipated the scale of the killings that did take place, the immediate appearance of the killings as genocide provided the perfect justification not only for resuming hostilities, but also for taking over the country completely. Military conquest of state power had been the RPF’s objective since its invasion in October 1990. The fact of mass slaughter directed against Tutsis enabled the RPF to legitimise its seizure of the state as a necessary means of ending genocide. Although such a strategy would not absolve the individual murderers of Tutsi civilians in any way, it would reveal a cynical opportunism on the part of the RPF.

While this strategy may appear the more logical, it remains speculative until the facts of the plane attack are firmly established. Yet it appears that these facts may have already been established but suppressed by powerful vested interests, including those of the United Nations and the United States.

In a public statement in April 2000, former RPF officer Jean-Pierre Mugabe alleged that after signing the Arusha Accords, RPF general Paul Kagame ‘started visiting our unit commands and the areas controlled by the RPF. He told army soldiers not to believe at all in the Accords: ‘Be ready with your military equipment, we are going to fight for the final war against the Kigali government’’ (120).

Mugabe gives a detailed account of the military training and preparation for this ‘final war’, naming individual officers in charge of secret operations to infiltrate men and arms into the capital. His statement is supported by the accounts of two further RPF defectors who, along with Mugabe, in February 1997 submitted to James Lyons, the local head of UN investigations for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Lyons, a former FBI agent seconded to the ICTR by the US State Department, led a 20-member team investigating, among other issues, who was responsible for shooting down Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994. According to Lyons, the RPF defectors gave credible and highly detailed testimony regarding the planning and execution of the rocket attack.

They claimed that Kagame formed a commando-type group known as the ‘network’, and that he and his senior advisers put into effect a plan to shoot down the presidential aircraft as it approached Kigali airport. Michael Hourigan, Lyons’s team leader, briefed the ICTR chief prosecutor, Louise Arbour, on the matter (121). Former French Minister of Cooperation Bernard Debri gives additional circumstantial evidence of the RPF’s responsibility for the assassination, claiming that records of RPF communications prove its soldiers were ordered to begin advancing toward Kigali on the morning of 6 April (122).

In a recent report, a regional analyst of the BBC, Martin Plaut, provided a statement by a former RPF captain Josue Abdul Ruzibiza. According to this statement, Ruzibiza said that he had entered Kigali in December 1993 as part of the battalion sent to the capital to guard the RPF’s MPs and ministers. He had been ordered to secure an area close to Kigali airport, in order to provide security as missiles were fired at the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. Two missiles were brought from Parliament House, where the battalion was being housed. As the plane came in to land, the first of two missiles was fired. ‘The missile didn’t hit the engine and so didn’t cause the plane to roll over. It was the second missile that that hit the engine. The first one hit the wing, and the plane could still land. But the second one finished the plane off’, said Captain Ruzibiza.

His account comes after the result of a French inquiry under Judge Jean-Loius Brugiere was leaked in March 2004, blaming the downing of the plane on President Paul Kagame, then the leader of the RPF (123). The report fits with Ruzibiza’s testimony that states that the two men who fired the missiles are now senior officers in the Rwandan presidential guard and military (124).

Finally, the most recent allegation regarding the plane shooting has been made by former RPA officer in the High Command Unit and in the Republican Guard (President Protection Unit), 2nd Lt. Aloys Ruyenzi. In his press statement Ruyenzi states categorically that:

‘Major general Paul Kagame personally ordered the shooting down of President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane’….’Let me make it crystal clear, I attended the last meeting where the plan was hatched. I was there physically and I even know the names of those who carried out the shooting. I was working with them in the High Command unit. It is Lt Frank Nziza and cpl Eric Hakizimana’…’It is not hearsays; I was present when the meeting took place. That was on 31st March 1994 from 2.30pm to 3.30pm. The Chairman of the meeting was Major general Paul Kagame, and the following officers were present: Col Kayumba Nyamwasa, Col Théoneste Lizinde, Lt Col James Kabarebe, Major Jacob Tumwine, Captain Charles Karamba. I heard P. Kagame asking Col. Lizinde to report about his investigations and I have seen Col Lizinde giving to Paul Kagame a map of the selected place for the plane shooting etc.’ (125)

While this evidence of the RPF’s responsibility for shooting down the plane appears to be compelling, what is extraordinary is the fact that the United Nations has suppressed its own findings that pointed in the RPF’s direction. When Michael Hourigan, the lead member of James Lyon’s team investigating for the ICTR mentioned above, flew to The Hague in order to discuss his findings with ICTR prosecutor, Louise Arbour, he was ordered by Arbour to shut the investigation down. The reason he was given was that the attack on the president’s plane was ‘outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction’ (126). The fact that a rocket attack on a plane resulting in the deaths of two heads of state remains closed to investigation by the United Nations raises questions about the organisation’s commitment toward establishing the true facts surrounding the key events in question.

Dynamics of an international character weave their way throughout this tragic narrative. The tendency in many quarters to attribute the cause of Rwanda’s descent into mass slaughter simply and solely to Hutu extremism is disingenuous.

(1) Lemarchand, R. ‘Disconnecting the threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust reconsidered.’ Ideas: A Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 7. No. 1. 29th March 2002.

(2) See for example, Reyntjens who regards African Rights as ‘flagrantly pro-RPF, which is incompatible with the mission and ethics of all serious human rights organisations’ (Reyntjens, F. (1995) Rwanda: Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan) , p. 62., translated by Alan Kuperman.

(3) Omaar, R. (1994) Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights) p. 628.

(4) ‘Provoking genocide: a revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ in Journal of Genocide Research. 6(1), March, 61-84.

(5) Kuperman, Alan J. (2004) p. 62.

(6) Correspondence from British High Commissioner Charles Cullimore in Kampala, to the London Kuperman, Alan J. (2004) Foreign and Commonwealth Office, reference OF 041309Z, 22 October 1990.

(7) Correspondence from British High Commissioner Charles Cullimore in Kampala, to the London Foreign and Commonwealth Office, reference OF 041333Z, 22 October 1990.

(8) Human Rights Arms Project (January 1994) ‘Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War. (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch) p. 20.

(9) Museveni, Y. (2000) What is Africa’s problem? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) p. 106., cited in Philpot, R. (2003) Ça ne s’est pas passé comme ça à Kigali (Montréal, Quebec : Les Intouchables) pp. 30,31.

(10) Mamdani, Mahmood. (2001) When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) p. 336.

(11) Information from a former senior RPF member who had received training at Nakivale. Confidential author interview Brussels, 9 April 2005.

(12) Gasana, J.K. (2002) Rwanda: du Parti-Etat a l’Etat-Garnison (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan) p. 182. author’s translation.

(13) Gasana, J.K. (2002) Rwanda: du Parti-Etat a l’Etat-Garnison (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan) p. 185. author’s translation.

(14) Ottaway, M. (1999) Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace) pp. 1,2.

(15) Harald Marwitz. ‘Another side of Rwanda’s blood bath: onus may be displaced in tribal war.’ The Washington Times August 11, 1994

(16) Jones, B. interview with Assistant Secretary of State, Herman Cohen, and another confidential interview with the United Sates Department of State, in Washington, D.C. in June 1995, cited in Jones, B.D. (2001) Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner) p. 29.

(17) Cohen, H.J. (2000) Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. (New York, N.Y.:St. Martin’s Press) p. 225.

(18) Cohen, H.J. (2000) Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. (New York, N.Y.:St. Martin’s Press) p. 164.

(19) Author interview with Robert Flaten, Northfields, Minnesota. 7 June 2003.

(20) Gasana, J.K. (2002) Rwanda: du Parti-Etat a l’Etat-Garnison (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan) p.65. author’s translation

(21) Kumakama, D. (1997) Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers) p. 44., citing Catherine Watson,

(22) Millwood, D. (ed.) (1995) The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda) Study 1, p. 75.

(23) Philpot, R. (2003) Ça ne s’est pas passé comme ça à Kigali (Montréal, Québec : Les Intouchables) p. 29.

(24) Gasana, J.K. interview with author, Lausanne, Switzerland. 16 April 2004. . Leader, J.E. (2001) Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and Peace 1991-1994 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace) p. 8.

(25) Leader, J.E. (2001) Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and Peace 1991-1994 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace) p. 8.
26) Leader, J.E. (2001) Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and Peace 1991-1994 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace) p. 8.

(27) Cohen, H.J., Senior Advisor Global Coalition for Africa, To a joint hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs and the House Subcommittee on African Affairs.

(28) Bahunga, J. Secretary to the Rwandan ambassador to Uganda [dates], unpublished paper, ‘Transition to democracy in Africa. The case of Rwanda.’

(29) Strizek, H. (2003) ‘Human Rights in Rwanda: Life after Genocide.’ pamphlet. (Aachen, Germany: Missio ) ISSN 1618-6222.

(30) Statement made by Faustin Twagiramungu (Prime Minister of Rwanda July 1994-August 1995) to the French Parliament on 19 May 1998.

(31) Millwood, D. (ed.) (1995) The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda). Synthesis Report, p. 75.

(32) Bahunga, J. former secretary to the Rwandan ambassador to Uganda, unpublished paper, ‘Transition to democracy in Africa. The case of Rwanda.’

(33) Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report on Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi. No. 3. 1991 (London: EIU) No. 3. 1991. p. 23.

(34) Ibid. p. 29.

(35) Cohen, H.J. (2000) Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. (New York, N.Y.:St. Martin’s Press) p. 168.

(36) Author interview with Robert Flaten, Northfields, Minnesota. 7 June 2003.

(37) Cohen, H.J. (2000) Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. (New York, N.Y.:St. Martin’s Press) p. 169.

(38) Economist Intelligence Unit. No. 3. 1991. p. 24.

(39) Author interview with Robert Flaten, Northfields, Minnesota. 7 June 2003.

(40) Lt-Col. Tony Marley, author interview by email, 17 September 2004.

(41) Gowing, N. ‘New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in c/omplex Emergencies: Ominous lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997’. Paper presented at a conference entitled ‘Dipatches from Disaster Zones’ funded by the European Community’s Humanitarian Office, in London, May 1998. Reported by John Githongo in East African Alternatives, (Nairobi: Series on Alternative Research in East Africa.) September/October 1998. Gowing was formerly a news editor of Channel Four News of the British Independent Television News.

(42) Madsen, W. ‘What a difference an election makes, or does it?’ Prepared statement at ‘Blood Money out of Africa’. Forum prepared by US Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney in Washington, D.C., on April 6th 2002. Published online at From the Wilderness, accessed June 2003.

(43) Harald Marwitz. Another side of Rwanda’s blood bath: onus may be displaced in tribal war, The Washington Times August 11, 1994. 13 June 2005.

(44) Reyntjens, F. (1994) L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi: 1988-1994 (Paris: Éditions Karthala) p. 102

(45) Cohen, H.J. (2000) Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. (New York, N.Y.:St. Martin’s Press) pp. 170-172.

(46) Jeune Afrique (Supplement to Volume 1753/54 in August 1994).

(47) Figures provided by Uvin, P. (1998) Aiding Violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford,Connecticut: Kumarian Press). p. 54.

(48) Uvin, P. (1998) p. 188.

(49) Newbury, C. (1994) ‘Background to genocide in Rwanda’ Issue (African Studies Association of USA) Vol. 23, No. 2., p. 14.

(50) Hearing before the United States Congress, House of Representatives: Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 4 May (Washington DC:US Government Printing Office).

(51) Andersen, Regine (2000) How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda Third World Quarterly Vol 21. No. 3. pp. 448-9.

(52) Note: Melvern states that the World Bank stopped negotiating with the Rwandan government at the end of 1992. Funds were blocked for some months between 1992 and 1993 and resumed after the signing of the Arusha Accords. Melvern, Linda. (2000) A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. (London: Zed Press.) p. 68.

(53) Economist Intelligence Unit. (1994) Country Report: Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, No. 2, (London: EIU).

(54) DAS Bushnell meets Habyarimana and RPF, Communication from U.S embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. Document No. 1994KIGALI01316, 25 March 1994

(55) Melvern, Linda. (2000) A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. (London: Zed Press.) p. 68.

(56) Ugandan newspaper, Daily Nation, Nairobi, 8 May 1993.

(57) ‘Leaked file brands Uganda’, Africa Analysis No. 162, December 1992.

(58) Brett, E.A. ‘Uganda: 1987-94’, chapter in Engberg-Pedersen, P., Gibbin, P., Raikes, P. and Udsholt, L. (eds.) (1996) Limits of Adjustment in Afirca (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research) p. 317.

(59) Hauser, E. (1999) ‘Uganda’s relations with Western donors in the 1990s: What impact on democratisation?’ Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 37 No. 4. p. 633.

(60) Report by Brian Atwood, USAID, from US embassy Nairobi to the Secretary of State in Washington. Confidential section of Nairobi 09554, 31 May 1994. Released to William Ferroggiaro of the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act.

(61) Mugabe, J-P. ‘Declaration on the shooting down of the aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyalimana and Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira on April 6 1994.’ Issued from the International Strategic Studies Association, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

(62) On March 12, 1998, the US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, held a hearing today to examine a ‘New Generation of African Leaders’. The hearing focused on the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

(63) Cohen, H.J. (2000) Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. (New York, N.Y.:St. Martin’s Press) p. 177.

(64) Strizek, H. (2003) ‘Human Rights in Rwanda: Life after Genocide.’ pamphlet. (Aachen, Germany: Missio ) ISSN 1618-6222.

(65) Adelman, H. paper. p. 7.

(66) Kuperman, Alan J. ‘Provoking genocide: a revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ in Journal of Genocide Research. 6(1), March 2004, 71.

(67) Callamard, A. (1999) French Policy in Rwanda, in Adelman, H. and Suhrke, A. (eds.) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordafrikainstitutet). p. 161, and footnote 22.

(68) Callamard, A. ‘French Policy in Rwanda’, chapter in Adelman, H. and Suhrke, A. (1999) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) Note 21, p 178.

(69) Callamard, A. ‘French Policy in Rwanda’, chapter in Adelman, H. and Suhrke, A. (1999) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) Note 21, p 161.

(70) Callamard:, A. (1999) p. 163, and note 40, p. 180.

(71) Callamard, A. (1999) p. 167.

(72) Cohen, H.J. (2000) Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. (New York, N.Y.:St. Martin’s Press) p. 165.

(73) Gasana, J.K. (2002) Rwanda: du Parti-Etat a l’Etat-Garnison (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan) p. 67.

(74) Gasana, J.K. interview with author, Lausanne, Switzerland. 16 April 2004.

(75) Reyntjens, F. ‘Rwanda: Recent history.’ in Africa South of the Sahara, 23rd Edition 1994 (London: Europa Pulications Ltd. 1993).

(76) Adelman, H. paper, p. 14.

(77) Adelman, H. paper. p. 4

(78) Prunier, G. (1995) The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst and Co.) p. 108.

(79) Philpot, R. (2003) Ça ne s’est pas passé comme ça à Kigali (Montréal, Québec : Les Intouchables). p. 37.

(80) United Nations (1996) The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993 – 1996 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations) p. 115.

(81) Adelman, H. paper. p. 5.

(82) Gasana, J.K. interview with author, Lausanne, Switzerland. 16 April 2004.

(83) British High Commissioner to Uganda: Charles Cullimore, FM Kampala to London Foreign Office, 2 October 1990. OF 020928Z.

(84) Cullimore, FM Kampala to London FO, 2 October 1990. OF 021305Z.

(85) Cullimore, FM Kampala to London FO, 10 October 1990. OF 110827Z.

(86) Cullimore, FM Kampala to London FO, 18 October 1990. OF 121135Z.

(87) Cullimore, FM Kampala to London FO, 2 October 1990. OF 020928Z.

(88) Cullimore, FM Kampala to London FO, 2 October 1990. OF 021305Z.

(89) Cullimore, FM Kampala to London FO, 10 October 1990. OF 110827Z.

(90) Gasana, J.K. interview with author, Lausanne, Switzerland. 16 April 2004.

(91) Africa Watch, International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Interafrican Union for Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development. ‘Report of the International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990’.

(92) The text of the report is referred to in ‘Leave None to Tell the Story’ p. 85.

(93) See Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court of Appeal, Québec, April 28 and 29; Ottawa, September 8, 2003

(94) ‘Mugesera v. Canada’.

(95) ‘Mugesera v. Canada’.

(96) See, for example, Reyntjens, F. (1994) L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi, 1988-1994. (Paris: Karthala); Prunier, Gérard. (1995) The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst and Co.) pp. 171, 172., and Mahmood Mamdani (2001) When Victims Become Killers : Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press) pp. 195, 196. ; Adelman, H. and Suhrke, (1999) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordafrikainstitutet) p. 77.

(97) Philpot, R. (2003) Ça ne s’est pas passé comme ça à Kigali (Montréal, Québec : Les Intouchables) pp. 73-75.

(98) Gasana, J.K. (2002) Rwanda : Du Parti-Etat a L’Etat-Garnison (Paris : L’Harmattan) Table 2, p.183, quoting edition of Isibo of 16 February 1993, p. 3.

(99) Author email correspondence with Marley, 17 September 2004.

(100) Westbrook. FM Dar es Salaam to London FO, 22 Feb 1993. OF 091034Z.

(101) Philpot, R. (2005) Rwanda 1994: Colonialism Dies Hard. English version of (2003) French publication made available on the website of The Taylor-Report.com., chapter 4.

(102) Des Forges’ curriculum vitae submitted to the Canadian High Court of Appeal states under ‘other professional activities : Consultant, U.S. Department of State, Agency for International Development, July 191, July 1992’. In Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court of Appeal,Québec, April 28 and 29; Ottawa, September 8, 2003.

(103) Joyce Leader (2001) Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and Peace 1991-1994 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace) p. 9.

(104) Gasana, J.K. (2002) Rwanda : Du Parti-Etat a L’Etat-Garnison (Paris : L’Harmattan) Table 2, p. 185.

(105) Joyce Leader, speech, ‘The Rwanda Crisis: the Genesis of a Genocide’. delivered at Penn State University, Harrisburg, on 5th April 2001.

(106) Author email correspondence with Lt. Col. Anthony Marley 17 September 2004. Marley was military adviser to the Africa Bureau of the US department of State, and an important participant in the peace talks between August 1992 and August 1995, and the person who brokered the cease-fire after the February 1993 offensive. According to Marley ‘The Hutus in the DMZ area wanted peace, but they feared the RPF (viewing them as the cause of the war and their problems) and had no desire to see a Tutsi role in government’.

(107) Dallaire, R. (2003) Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. (Toronto: Random House) p. 200.

(108) Dallaire, R. (2003) pp. 130-131.

(109) Author interview with James Gasana.

(110) Madsen, William. (1999) Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999 (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press.) p. 108.

(111) Madsen, (1999) p. 124.

(112) See, for examples, African Rights (Revised edition 1995) Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights) p. 22 ; Prunier, Gérard. (1995) The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst and Co.) pp. 213-226.

(113) Prunier, Gérard. (1995) The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst and Co.) pp. 213-226.

(114) Chazan, C., Lewis, P., Mortimer, R., Rothchild, D. and Stedman, S. (1999) Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers) p. 410.

(115) Mahmood Mamdani (2001) When Victims Become Killers : Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press) p. 218.

(116) Lemarchand, R. (1995) ‘Rwanda: The Rationality of Genocide.’ Issue (African Studies Association of USA) Vol. 23, No. 2, cited in Millwood, D. (ed.) (1995) The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda) Vol. 1. p. 50.

(117) Human Rights Watch/ International Federation of Human Rights (1999) Leave None to Tell the Story : Genocide in Rwanda (New York : Human Rights Watch) p. 181.

(118) Human Rights Watch/ International Federation of Human Rights (1999) Leave None to Tell the Story : Genocide in Rwanda (New York : Human Rights Watch) p. 185.

(119) Umutesi, Marie Béatrice (2000) Surviving the Slaughter : The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire (Madison, Wisconsin : University of Wisconsin Press) p. 47.

(120) ‘An eyewitness testimony to the shooting down of the Rwandan presidential plane’, International Strategic Studies Association, 21 April 2000.

(121) ‘Covert Action in Africa: a Smoking Gun in Washington DC’, James Lyons, Public statement at a conference organised by US Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, 2001.

(122) Leave None to Tell the Story’: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch, 1999, p182.

(123) Le Monde ‘L’enquête sur l’attentat qui fit basculer le Rwanda dans le génocide.’ 10 March 2004.

(124) Eyewitness ‘confirms’ Rwanda attack, Martin Plaut, BBC News, 11 March 2004.

(125) Press release, ‘Major General Paul Kagame behind the shooting down of late Habyarimana’s plane: an eye witness testimony’ 2nd Lt Aloys Ruyenzi. Norway, 05/07/2004. sourced from the internet: http://www.inshuti.org/ruyenzi2.htm. The italics are Ruyenzi’s, not the author’s. The author has been in telephone contact with Ruyenzi.

(126) ‘Covert Action in Africa: a Smoking Gun in Washington DC’, James Lyons, Public statement at a conference organised by US Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, 2001.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 19:42 0 comments
Labels: Belgium, Burundi, France, ICTR, IMF, Kagame, Rwanda, Uganda, UN, UNAMIR, United Kingdom, United States, World Bank
UPDATE: Ongoing Intimidations of Journalists in Mogadishu and Garowe.
Shabelle News Network
20 October 2007

The National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) today condemns the closing of Radio Garowe in Puntland, northeastern Somalia, and the subsequent arrest of three of its journalists.

Heavily armed security forces of Puntland Regional State stormed the premises of Radio Garowe, and ordered the management to shutdown the radio around 17 hours local time, according to journalists in Garowe and Garowe Online.

The security forces also arrested three journalists of the radio whose names and titles are: Abdi Farah Jama Mire, Director of the Radio; Isse Abdullahi Mohammed, Editor of the Radio; and Mohammed Dahir Yusuf, a Producer.

The motive behind the closure is not known, but Puntland journalists told NUSOJ that it is all about news report of a member of National Security Agency of Somalia who escaped from the agency and afterwards spoke to the media by criticising the behaviour of security agency in Mogadishu, which Radio Garowe reported.

"We denounce this act of closing Radio Garowe in Puntland" said Omar Faruk Osman, NUSOJ Secretary General. "We call upon Puntland authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Radio Garowe journalists and allow the Radio to resume its operations fearlessly".

Editor's Note: In addition, Mr. Bashir Nor Gedi, Acting Manager of Shabelle Radio, was murdered today. My condolences to his family and colleagues.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 19:31 0 comments
Labels: Puntland, Somalia
Viability of Oil Pipeline to Depend On Consumption.
Rwanda News Agency/Agence Rwandaise d'Information (Kigali)
19 October 2007

The Kampala-Kigali oil pipeline due for construction is economically feasible only if demand for oil products in Rwanda and Burundi maintains a constant pace of growth, experts predict.

The feasibility study for the pipeline done by US-based Science Application International Corporation (SAIC Energy)(Emphasis mine-Editor) says the consumption of oil products such as gasoline, diesel, kerosene, jet fuel must grow at 7.8% a year between 2010 and 2020.

The report was presented at a government sponsored workshop last week to assess the progress of the oil pipeline that Rwanda wants operational in 3 years. Government is keen to have the pipeline to reduce on the exorbitant truck costs incurred to move products from Eldoret - Kenya.

Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Eastern DRC need to have the pipeline that observers suggest will depend on whether Uganda and Kenya speed up the Eldoret-Kampala pipeline.

SAIC Energy says average annual demand for oil products in the region (Rwanda, Burundi and South Western Uganda) must triple from 0.4 million m3 to 1.2 million m3 to reach minimum demand level. At this level, the US firm believes investment in constructing the pipeline will start to be meaningful.

Gasoline and diesel account for the largest share of white oil (gasoline, diesel, kerosene, jet fuel) consumption - above 80%. SAIC Energy says diesel consumption in 2006 is higher than normal due to diesel-fired emergency power generation. Rwanda has diesel generators that have been part of the power generation capacity.

Rwanda is expected to account for the largest share of regional consumption - that has been around 47% in 2006 and predicted to be 45% in 2030. The experts say South Western Uganda accounted for 29% of consumption in 2006 and will be up to 36% for the same period.

As for Burundi, SAIC Energy says it accounted for 24% of consumption in 2006 but will reduce to about 19%.

The findings presented by SAIC Energy's Christopher Ellsworth to the Kigali workshop also suggest that transportation's share of total white oil demand is expected to rise from 70% - 90% currently to well over 95% in 2030. By this it means fuel needed for driven-vehicles to move people and goods.

Mr. Ellsworth says demand from other sectors is minor compared to transportation.

The understanding by regional government was that the pipeline moving from Nairobi to Eldoret (Kenya) should be extended to Kampala (Uganda), then off to Kigali (Rwanda) and later Bujumbura (Burundi).

But according to SAIC Energy, preliminary demand projections at 7.8% annual growth indicate that an extension to Bujumbura should be a second phase to the project.

The Kampala-Kigali portion is estimated to cost 193.6 million dollars (about Rwf 106 Billion) and another $53 million is required to move the much needed pipeline to Burundi.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 19:26 0 comments
Labels: Burundi, Congo-K, Kenya, Oil, Private Military Companies, Rwanda, Uganda, United States
The hidden violence: "disappearances" and killings continue.

An RPA soldier on patrol.
Photo courtesy of BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/47807.stm


Amnesty International
AI Index: AFR 47/023/1998
23 June 1998
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470231998?open&of=ENG-RWA

"Ici, les choses vont bien, sauf la vie [...] Un malade qui souffre d'une maladie qui ne peut pas guérir pense à beaucoup de choses dont il rêve. Quand aurons-nous la paix?"

"Here, things are all right, apart from life [...] A person who is suffering from an incurable illness dreams of many things. When will we have peace?"

Extract from a testimony from Gisenyi, northwestern Rwanda, March 1998

I. INTRODUCTION

Between December 1997 and May 1998, hundreds and possibly thousands of people "disappeared" across Rwanda. Thousands of others were killed by members of the Rwandese security forces and by armed opposition groups. The most vulnerable sectors of the population are continuing to suffer, unnoticed by most of the international community, as the armed conflict in the northwest of Rwanda rages on. Soldiers of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) as well as members of armed opposition groups - the latter believed to include members of the former Rwandese army and interahamwe militia responsible for many massacres during the 1994 genocide - are deliberately targeting unarmed civilians - men, women and children, often without discrimination. By early 1998, reports of killings and "disappearances" had become so routine that many Rwandese seemed resigned to this violence as an inevitable part of their lives.

In the second half of 1997, Amnesty International published two reports describing the spiralling human rights abuses in Rwanda, in particular the deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians in the context of the armed conflict [1]. Amnesty International delegates who carried out research in Rwanda in February 1998 confirmed that the patterns of killings described in these reports have become further entrenched. They were also struck by the significant increase in the number of "disappearances". By early 1998, "disappearances" had become so frequent that many families no longer made the effort to notify the authorities or international organizations about the "disappearance" of their relatives, either for fear of their own lives or in the knowledge that little or no effective action would be taken to investigate them. Yet steps can be taken by those with power and influence to stop these atrocities.

This report provides an overview of some of the grave human rights abuses carried out in Rwanda from December 1997 to May 1998, with a particular focus on the patterns of "disappearances", extrajudicial executions by members of the Rwandese security forces - particularly by RPA soldiers -and deliberate and arbitrary killings by armed opposition groups. The examples of human rights abuses contained in this report represent only a small fraction of those gathered during this period. It is no longer possible to record all cases of killings and "disappearances" in Rwanda as these are occurring on a massive scale and are being reported daily. Difficulties of gathering, compiling and verifying information - for Rwandese and foreign organizations alike - are aggravated by the inaccessibility of many of the areas where killings are taking place and by the fear of the victims' families and friends of testifying to the atrocities they witness. The public availability of independent information is also severely restricted by the Rwandese Government's tight control on the dissemination of information relating to the human rights situation. As a result, the full picture rarely reaches the outside world.

In February 1998, Amnesty International delegates visited different regions of the country, including the northwestern préfecture[2] of Gisenyi, the eastern préfectures of Umutara and Kibungo, the northern préfecture of Byumba, the southern préfecture of Butare and the capital Kigali. Despite the inaccessibility of certain areas due to widespread insecurity, they were able to gather detailed testimonies on killings, "disappearances" and other human rights abuses, from victims, relatives of victims, witnesses and other sources. This report is based in part on those testimonies, and in part on subsequent confirmation, as well as fresh evidence, gathered since March 1998 from sources inside and outside Rwanda.

While in Rwanda, Amnesty International delegates also held talks with senior representatives of the Rwandese Government and security forces. The authorities' response to the human rights concerns raised is summarized in this report.

Amnesty International is appealing once again to the Rwandese authorities to fulfill their often-repeated promises to respect human rights and to put an end to the ongoing grave human rights violations, in particular to investigate and prevent "disappearances" and killings of unarmed civilians by members of the security forces. A government has the right to defend its country against armed aggression and a responsibility to protect the civilian population against attacks by armed groups. However, this does not provide the security forces with a licence to deliberately kill unarmed civilians. Armed opposition groups should also immediately stop targeting unarmed civilians and prevent any further such killings by elements under their control.

Amnesty International is again calling on foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations to heed the call for urgent action to put an end to the daily violation of the right to life and other human rights abuses in Rwanda and to impress upon the Rwandese authorities and leaders of armed opposition groups that the deliberate targeting of the civilian population will never succeed in bringing peace and reconciliation to the country.

In addition to the issues covered in this report, Amnesty International remains concerned about other patterns of human rights violations in Rwanda, including arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention without charge or trial in conditions amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, beatings and other forms of ill-treatment in detention, unfair trials and the use of the death penalty. Details of these concerns are contained in earlier Amnesty International publications and continue to be the object of ongoing research and action by the organization.

On 24 April 1998, the Rwandese Government carried out the first executions of people found guilty by the Rwandese courts of participation in the genocide in 1994. Many of those executed had had an unfair trial. Amnesty International believes that the public execution of these 22 people and any further executions constitute another major step backwards for human rights and will seriously harm the prospects of reconciliation and respect for human life in Rwanda. The organization's concerns in this respect are detailed in news releases and actions issued before and since the executions [3].

II. ALARMING INCREASE IN "DISAPPEARANCES"

One of the main recent developments in the human rights situation in Rwanda has been the dramatic increase in the number of "disappearances". "Disappearances" are not a new phenomenon in Rwanda, but since the second half of 1997, they have reached alarming proportions. Amnesty International has received numerous testimonies and appeals for help from individuals who have lost all trace of members of their family. In many cases, they are presumed dead, but only in a minority of cases are the bodies ever found by the families.

In some cases, the "disappeared" are believed to be alive, held in unofficial or inaccessible detention centres, such as military camps (see below). Difficulties in tracing them there are aggravated by the absence of records in many of these detention centres.

Several patterns of "disappearances" have emerged. In some cases, evidence points to involvement of members of the security forces. In other cases, the identity of the perpetrators as well as the reason for the "disappearance" remain unknown. Amnesty International recognizes that not all cases of "disappearances" can be directly attributed to the authorities. However, the government has a responsibility to investigate all cases of "disappearances", even where there is no clear indication of the involvement of state agents.

II.1 "Disappearances" in the context of the armed conflict in the northwest

Large numbers of people have "disappeared" in the context of the armed conflict in the northwestern préfectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. The majority of these are men, many of whom have been rounded up by RPA soldiers in the context of military operations and led away to unknown destinations. Some people have been led away by soldiers on the basis that they were being taken to attend a public meeting, and subsequently "disappeared". For example, on 14 February 1998, the population was made to gather for a meeting in the stadium at Ruhengeri. The men were reportedly separated from the women and taken away on military vehicles. It has not been possible to verify their fate. Similarly, on 15 March 1998, an estimated 200 people, mostly men, were led away after the population was made to gather in Ruhengeri stadium, following a reported attack by armed groups in Ruhengeri town one or two days earlier; their fate is not known. Mass arrests have been carried out by RPA soldiers, without any legal basis; it is likely that some of those arrested in this way are being detained in military camps (see below).

In addition to the above pattern, an estimated several thousand people - sometimes whole communities - have gone missing following armed clashes between RPA soldiers and armed opposition groups, or attacks by either side. A number of villages in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri have been left uninhabited. Many of these people may have been displaced by the armed conflict, which is causing thousands to flee from their homes. Some flee in anticipation of likely attacks on their village; others escape in the midst of attacks or fighting. Some have probably "disappeared". However, given the widespread insecurity and difficulties of access, it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether and which of the inhabitants have been "disappeared", killed - and if so, by whom -, arrested, or are in hiding. Others may have been taken hostage by armed groups.

One example is that of a young man from Nyamutera, in Ruhengeri, who lost all contact with his parents since their home was attacked in December 1997. Despite extensive searches, their whereabouts have remained unknown; by early June 1998, he still did not even know whether they were alive or dead.

A typical case of those "disappearing" in search of safety is that of a peasant aged around 60, who "disappeared" on 1 December 1997. Following an outbreak of violence in Mutura commune, in Gisenyi, where he worked, he fled to the neighbouring commune of Rwerere in search of safety. He did not return. Other similar cases of "disappearances" in Rwerere were reported in December 1997. In most cases, the victims are presumed dead.

II.2 "Disappearances" in Kigali of people originating from the northwest

The armed conflict and persistent human rights abuses in the northwest have caused many inhabitants of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi to leave the area and move to other parts of the country in search of safety and employment. Many have temporarily settled in the capital, Kigali. However, once there, they have been subjected to persistent harassment, discrimination and human rights abuses, from members of the security forces as well as from sectors of the population. People originating from the northwest are immediately viewed as suspicious, are often labelled "interahamwe" and accused of sympathies with armed opposition groups allied to those who carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

There appears to be a policy of singling out people from the northwest simply because of their region of origin. As the area of residence is indicated on a person's identity card and other documents, those from the northwest are easily identifiable. People are required to carry an identity card and also need to obtain a document from the authorities in their home region entitling them to travel to another region. In practice, such documents are often difficult to obtain and there are strict controls and restrictions on freedom of movement. Even those who carry the required documents are not protected from harassment.

During random identity checks by the security forces, for example at military roadblocks, many people from the northwest - especially men of fighting age - have been arrested. Some have been detained; others have been released after questioning; many have "disappeared" without trace. The authorities' response to these "disappearances" has been to claim that those arrested during identity checks are sent back to their areas of residence in the northwest. However, in many cases, their families in these areas have stated that they have not returned.

For example, Emmanuel Tuyishime, a former local government official in his thirties, came from Gisenyi to Kigali to look for work on 10 December 1997. He was last seen in Kigali on 16 December. His relatives have been searching for him ever since, have inquired in detention centres in different areas and told that he was not there. After being informed by the authorities in Kigali that people from Gisenyi were transferred back to their home areas, his family travelled up to the northwest several times - at great personal risk -, all in vain. They were told by the authorities in Gisenyi that there had been no transfers from Kigali.

During December 1997 and January 1998, identity checks and searches intensified in Kigali. Many men from the northwest were rounded up and taken into military custody. Some were released, others are not known to have returned. For example, military searches took place on 3 December 1997 in Kimisagara secteur, on 14 December in Gatsata secteur, and on 20 December in Kimisagara and Cyahafi secteurs, all in Nyarugenge commune in the urban préfecture of Kigali (Kigali ville). These operations resulted in large-scale arrests, systematic ill-treatment and "disappearances" of people, who appear to have been picked up simply because they held identity documents from the northwest. Among the victims were Jean-Baptiste Munyaneza, from Ramba commune, Gisenyi, Laurent Sinamenye, from Ruhondo commune, Ruhengeri, and Emmanuel Uwimana, a 16-year-old student who had been transferred from a college in his home area of Kibilira commune, Gisenyi, to a college in Kigali for his security.

Wellars Nturanyeninkiko, a house guard in his forties from Ruhengeri who was working in Kigali, went to visit relatives on the outskirts of Kigali in November 1997. He never returned. Friends who inquired at the prison where he was reported to have been detained for a period were told that he was no longer there. Efforts to try to trace him in his home area of Ruhengeri have since been obstructed by continuing insecurity there.

II.3 Other cases of "disappearances"

Not all cases of "disappearances" are directly connected with the armed conflict in the northwest. Sedesias Mugambira, a former government minister, was arrested in mid-December 1997 at a roadblock in Kigali as he returned from the bank from where he had withdrawn a large sum of money. He subsequently "disappeared". It was rumoured that he had been killed and his body thrown into an old water tank near the military roadblock, but his body was not returned to his family. Sedesias Mugambira had been arrested several times during 1997 and released each time because of lack of evidence of his participation in the genocide. He owned several houses near Kigali and may have been the object of jealousies in this respect.

On 9 January 1998, Juvénal Bagarirakose was led away from his home to an unknown destination by RPA soldiers, in his home commune of Kibilira, in Gisenyi - a commune which has experienced intense violence and insecurity in recent months. The soldiers reportedly burned the nearby houses of two of his sisters before leaving the area. Neither Juvénal Bagarirakose's arrest nor his "disappearance" are known to have been officially acknowledged. He is feared dead. A teacher by training who had also worked in the commercial sector, Juvénal Bagarirakose is married with three children. He had been a refugee in the former Zaire between 1994 and November 1996, when he returned to Rwanda. As a refugee he was involved in initiatives to promote dialogue and non-violent solutions to the conflict in Rwanda. He continued with these activities following his return to Rwanda, taking an active role in discussion and prayer groups with Hutu and Tutsi communities, with the full knowledge and the cooperation of local civilian authorities.

There have been other cases of "disappearances" in Kibilira. For example, Joy Musabirema and her two children, Shumbusho, aged 8, and Umugwaneza, aged 6, "disappeared" on 13 January 1998. They were reportedly led away from their home in Kalehe secteur, in Kibilira, by RPA soldiers and taken in a military vehicle to an unknown destination.

Ladislas Mutabazi, prosecutor of Gisenyi, was last seen on 18 January 1998 at Base, near Ruhengeri, where he was visiting relatives. According to some reports, he was last seen in the company of an RPA soldier. By February, official investigations by the Ministry of Justice and the gendarmerie were underway. The results of these investigations are not known. Ladislas Mutabazi is not known to have been threatened prior to his "disappearance."

Emmanuel Munyemanzi, a journalist who worked as head of production for Rwanda's national television station, "disappeared" in the capital Kigali on 5 May 1998. He went to work as usual in the morning and did not return. In March 1998, he had been suspended from his duties at the television station and transferred to another post at the Office rwandais d'information (ORINFOR), Rwandese Information Office. The head of the national television station was also suspended. The suspensions are believed to be linked to a dispute with ORINFOR's director.

Evariste Twagirumukiza, a trader, was arrested on the morning of 13 May 1998 in Kigali by armed men in military uniform. He was reportedly taken away in a vehicle belonging to the gendarmerie of the Nyamirambo district of Kigali. By early June, his whereabouts were still not known. The authorities have reportedly denied any involvement in his abduction.

Large-scale "disappearances" in Umutara

A wave of "disappearances" occurred in the eastern region of Umutara in late December 1997 and January 1998, in particular in the communes of Kahi and Gabiro. The total number of those "disappeared" is not known; several sources have claimed that at least 100 people "disappeared", others have estimated that several hundred went missing. The "disappearances" occurred during the period immediately after an attack on a taxi on 22 December 1997, on the road to Nyagatare, in which around five people were killed. This attack was officially attributed to an armed opposition group. It is thought that the wave of "disappearances" which followed may have been carried out in reprisal. The "disappearances" are believed to have been carried out by RPA soldiers with the help of local Tutsi civilians. Some local civilian authorities are also believed to have been involved.

The "disappearances" began on 24 December, on Christmas eve, in various locations including Kabarore and Kiziguro. During an identity check by military officials, a number of people were reportedly led away on trucks to an unknown destination. Some were rounded up from their homes, others from public places. Those who "disappeared" included several members of a choir, such as Jean-Baptiste Ntabara, who were preparing to celebrate Christmas. Others included Viateur Nzabarinda and his sister Mukabutare, and Joseph Karake, a religious student in his twenties, who was reportedly taken from his home, put on a military vehicle along with others, and never returned.

On 25 December 1997, Médard Gashumba, a medical assistant, was arrested, detained in the cachot (local detention centre) at Gabiro and released later the same day. On 26 December, soldiers came to his house, shot him dead and reportedly removed his body from the scene. His wife Perpétue, his four-year-old daughter Liliane Ingabire and two servants were led away and never seen again; it is presumed that they too were killed. Neither the body of Médard Gashumba nor that of his wife, daughter and servants were found. These killings are thought to be linked to a property dispute with the bourgmestre of Gabiro commune - a former RPA soldier -, who occupied one of Médard Gashumba's houses. There are unconfirmed reports that the bourgmestre had personally ordered the release of Médard Gashumba on 25 December and was present when the soldiers went to his house to kill him.

In the days that followed, scores of people were reportedly seen being rounded up by soldiers from various locations in the area, often at night, and led away to an unknown destination. Among the victims were Mugenzi, his wife and seven children; Abraham Ndumviriye, aged around 80, his two sons, Joseph Tegeri and Seth Rwamirera, as well as their wives and children, his student grandson Igirimbabazi, another grandson Festus Nkurunziza, Festus Nkurunziza's wife and two children; Niyoyita and his wife; Nkende and his sister Kumuzana; Innocent Sebahire, a teacher; an elderly man Samuel Bizirumwera, his wife and children.

The majority of the victims were former refugees in Tanzania who had returned to Rwanda in December 1996, when hundreds of thousands of Rwandese refugees were forcibly expelled from Tanzania. During their exile, most of their houses had been occupied; since their return to Rwanda, they had had to live in improvised "sheeting" while waiting for their property to be returned to them. Soon after their "disappearance", the sheeting in which they lived was reportedly removed. In conformity with the pattern of "disappearances" across the country, many of the victims were originally from the northwest of Rwanda.
Around the same period - in late December 1997 and January 1998 -, more than 30 unidentified bodies were discovered in at least three separate locations in Umutara préfecture. It is not clear whether some of the victims were among those who "disappeared", or in what ways these events may have been linked. On around 23 December, around 12 bodies were found in Rukara commune; some had reportedly been tied to trees and burned. On around 9 January, around 15 bodies were found in Murambi commune. On 22 January, 13 bodies were found at Kiziguro, also in Murambi. Soldiers prevented people from approaching the bodies to try to identify them.

The "disappearances" and other events in Umutara in December 1997 and January 1998 have received little public attention. Neither local nor national authorities are known to have taken any action to investigate them.

II.4 "Disappeared" found

Only in a small minority of cases are the "disappeared" found -often already dead. For example, Jean-Damascène Munyaneza, an education worker, "disappeared" on 5 January 1998 after being taken away from his home in Bicumbi, in Rural Kigali; his dead body was found, mutilated, two weeks later.

Frédéric Kayogora, a former school director, was arrested following his return to Rwanda from the Democratic Republic of Congo in May 1997. He was held for several months at the gendarmerie of Remera, in Kigali, then released. The authorities reportedly refused to give him a document confirming his provisional release. Frédéric Kayogora's property in Kigali was occupied by military officials. In the second half of January 1998 he went to visit the illegal occupants of his house in order to negotiate for them to return his property. He never returned. His mutilated body was later found by members of his family at the morgue.

Jean-Marie Vianney Nsabimana, a shopkeeper in Kigali, aged 28 and recently married, "disappeared" on 4 December 1997. He was led away by three men in civilian clothes, at least one of whom was armed with a rifle. Several days later, his body was found in the morgue at Kigali hospital. His head had been bashed in and his body was already decomposing by the time it was found. A guard who claimed to have recognized one of the men who had led Jean-Marie Vianney Nsabimana away was arrested, then released after claiming he had made a mistake, allegedly after intimidation.

In a more unusual case, it was revealed that a Presbyterian pastor from Kibuye, Siméon Nzabahimana, and five other people, including Hubert Bigaruka, Charlotte Bahiga and Jean Bizimungu, who had "disappeared" in Kigali on 14 February 1998 were released safely, after being detained for two weeks without charge. They had been arrested by members of the security forces as they entered Kigali, apparently because they had given a lift to a suspected insurgent. Their families had not been given any information about their whereabouts or their well-being until their release, despite extensive publicity of their "disappearance".

II.5 Detention in military custody

Some of the "disappeared" are believed to be held in military custody but it is virtually impossible to verify their whereabouts. The military authorities continue to deny access to almost all military detention centres to detainees' relatives, as well as to human rights and humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross. Rare testimonies have been obtained from some detainees released from military detention centres, indicating that a large number of people may be held there, including civilians. The majority of those held in military camps have not been charged or had their cases put through any form of judicial procedure.

As with other prisons and detention centres in Rwanda, the conditions in military detention centres are of great concern - a concern heightened by the lack of access. Former detainees have described frequent practices of ill-treatment. One man who was detained at Muhoza military camp in Ruhengeri in early 1997 - and was killed a few months after his release - had been badly injured as a result of ill-treatment there. He reported that there were many detainees held at Muhoza, some of whom had been held there for many months, in very poor conditions with insufficient food. Describing these detainees, he said: "It is as if they are dead".

Jean-Pierre Sibomana, an inspecteur de police judiciaire(judicial police inspector), was arrested by soldiers in Nyarutovu, Ruhengeri, in February 1998, and detained at Muhoza military camp. Subsequently, he was reportedly registered as having been released; however, sources have alleged that he was not released, but was taken from the detention centre and shot dead.

Another judicial police inspector, Alphonse Kaburabuza, "disappeared" on 28 December 1997 in Nyamugali, Ruhengeri. He was reportedly last seen in Base, with RPA soldiers who had arrested him. He was reportedly taken to a military detention centre, from where he was led away that same night, in a vehicle believed to be that normally used by local officials. He did not return. Local civilian officials who were alerted to his arrest reportedly stated that they would not intervene.

Martin Rugemangenzi was arrested on 15 December 1997 by RPA soldiers, in Nyakabanda secteur, Nyarugenge commune, in Kigali. Initially, he was known to be detained at a military camp in Kigali. However, when his relatives inquired, they were told that he was not held there. In January 1998, he was believed to still be detained there, but his whereabouts since that date are not known.

One of the many unresolved cases of disappearances of people believed to be in military custody is that of 112 former members of the Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR), Rwandese armed forces. They were among a group of around 155 Rwandese forcibly repatriated from Gabon in August 1997.[4] Upon arrival in Kigali, 112 of the group were immediately arrested and taken into military custody. Access to them has been strictly denied ever since and their whereabouts remain unknown, despite repeated appeals for information and access from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and human rights organizations.

The group of 112 is believed to include individuals suspected of having participated in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; however, none are known to have been formally charged or brought to trial. It is feared that they have been killed.

Martin Rugemangenzi

III. KILLINGS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS

Throughout 1997 and the first five months of 1998, thousands of unarmed civilians have been killed in Rwanda, some by RPA soldiers, others by members of armed opposition groups commonly referred to as "infiltrés" (infiltrators), others by unidentified assailants.

The majority of killings have occurred in the northwestern préfectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, but since December 1997, the violence has spread to the central préfecture of Gitarama. Overall, the killings have tended to follow patterns similar to those documented in recent Amnesty International reports [5]- typically, attacks by armed opposition groups, followed by large-scale military counter-insurgency operations. There have also been cases of killings not immediately preceded by or directly linked to armed opposition attacks.

Little information is available to the general public about the scale and nature of these killings. The picture projected by the media is heavily influenced by government control over information, particularly regarding the armed conflict in the northwest. Attacks attributed to armed opposition groups sometimes receive extensive publicity, but killings of civilians by RPA soldiers are rarely reported. Killings where the perpetrators remain unidentified are often automatically attributed to the armed opposition, without independent verification. Restrictions on information are compounded by difficulties of access to many of the areas where killings take place. Most of the foreign journalists who have visited the northwest in recent months have done so with RPA military escort, thus severely limiting the likelihood or possibility of receiving information about human rights violations by the RPA. Many international media based outside Rwanda tend to rely on information provided by Rwandese government-controlled media or on briefings by government officials. This control of information has succeeded in distorting the overall picture of the human rights situation conveyed to the outside world, with the result that few people outside Rwanda are aware of the extent of the human rights violations taking place or of the fact that since 1997, a greater number of unarmed civilians have been killed by members of the Rwandese security forces than by armed opposition groups.

A resident of Gisenyi described the situation in January 1998:


"Toute ma famille a été décimée, ma femme, mes enfants et mes frères. Je reste seul. Je ne sais pas où aller. Je me sens vraiment perdu dans un monde très hostile et très féroce. Ils ont été tués par les militaires qui étaient à la recherche des miliciens [...] La communauté internationale devrait faire tout son possible pour venir au secours de ceux qui restent [...] on cache les informations: les étrangers ne peuvent pas savoir exactement que ce sont les paysans qui meurent alors qu'ils n'ont rien à faire avec les miliciens, et qu'ils ignorent même leurs visées. Les miliciens eux aussi ont tué [des] Tutsi, vous l'avez quelque fois écouté à la radio, point positif, mais quand c'est l'autre ethnie qui est tuée, on ne dit rien [...] Le Rwanda va vers un gouffre. Chez nous, il ne reste plus rien."

("My whole family has been decimated, my wife, my children and my brothers. I am alone. I don't know where to go. I feel really lost in a world which has become very hostile and very fierce. They were killed by soldiers who were searching for the militia [...] The international community must do all it can to come to the rescue of those who are left [...] Information is being concealed: foreigners cannot know that it is the peasants who are dying even though they have nothing to do with the militia and don't even know what their goals are. [...] The militia have also killed Tutsi, you can sometimes hear this on the radio, which is a positive point, but when it's the other way round, nothing is said. [...] Rwanda is heading towards an abyss. Here, there is nothing left." )

III.1 The northwest - a region devastated

The scale and frequency of the violence in the northwest continued to increase in January and February 1998. In addition to the deliberate targeting of civilians by both parties to the conflict (see below), the military nature of the conflict was apparent as armed opposition groups appeared to become bolder in their tactics. Attacks by these groups on military as well as civilian targets were reported. Sources in the region reported that large numbers of RPA soldiers were being killed, sometimes more than 100 in a single incident. In early 1998, local sources claimed that RPA soldiers were afraid to venture into certain areas in Gisenyi which had become virtual "no-go zones", believed to be under the control of armed opposition groups; RPA soldiers would reportedly only go there for the purpose of carrying out a military operation with specific objectives, after which they would withdraw. Local civilian authorities - such as the bourgmestres of many communes - are no longer able to operate from their communes and have been compelled to move to Gisenyi town for their own security. The areas they have abandoned have been left without any form of recognized civilian authority or administration. According to some sources in the region, the armed groups have extended their control over certain areas to the extent that they are alleged to be running markets and distributing their own newsletters.

A four-year-old boy whose mother was killed in Gisenyi in December 1997.

As described in recent Amnesty International reports, the civilian population living in these areas is trapped by the conflict. Those who are unable to flee the area for safety find themselves the inevitable victims of attacks by either party to the conflict. Some are killed in the cross-fire during clashes between RPA soldiers and members of armed opposition groups. But many more are targeted deliberately and arbitrarily as defenceless pawns in the tactics of both sides, especially those from vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and displaced populations. Some individuals are targeted specifically because of their perceived affiliation: RPA soldiers have killed many unarmed civilians who, they claim, are members or supporters of the armed opposition. Armed opposition groups have killed unarmed civilians accused of collaborating with the authorities. The population has no choice. They are likely to be killed by either side which suspects that they are cooperating with the other. There is no room for neutrality.

Young children have been among the innocent victims of this violence. Many have been killed; others have survived but have been deeply traumatized after witnessing scenes of brutal carnage. One 10-year-old boy in Rwerere commune, in Gisenyi, ran away from his home in January 1998, taking with him his two younger brothers, one aged 5, the other still a baby. He fled after seeing 10 people killed in front of him, including his parents and grandparents. Another boy, aged four, was found alive, with a rope around his neck, in Mutura commune, in Gisenyi, in early December 1997. He was lying next to his dead mother who had been beaten to death.

The population is also suffering from increasing shortages of food as a direct result of the armed conflict - a cruel irony, given that the northwest is among the most fertile regions of Rwanda. RPA soldiers have forced the population to cut down banana plantations, claiming that the insurgents use them as a hiding place. They have ordered the population in certain areas not to pick their crops. Peasants who have attempted to do so in defiance of these orders have been directly threatened; some have been killed by government forces. In January 1998, a young man who refused to destroy his plantation was reportedly beaten by soldiers in Gisenyi. In early February, a peasant woman, Esther, and her teenage daughter were reportedly killed by soldiers after trying to harvest sweet potatoes in their field in Rugerero secteur, in Rubavu commune, Gisenyi.

As part of the counter-insurgency strategy, a scorched earth policy is being carried out in many areas in the northwest, where homes and fields are being burned. In some instances, hundreds of houses have been burned, in what may amount to a form of collective punishment for the actions of armed opposition groups, directed at the civilian population living in the northwestern regions. For example, on 9 and 10 February 1998, more than 100 houses were reportedly burned by RPA soldiers in the communes of Mukingo and Nkuli, in Ruhengeri, and Karago, in Gisenyi. Many of the houses are believed to have been empty as people had already fled; however, a number of people were burned alive in their homes, such as André Bayagiteto, an old man in his seventies, in Nyabirehe secteur in Mukingo.

Rubavu, Gisenyi, February 1998. The army has forced the population to destroy the banana plantations. Many residents in this area have either fled or been killed.

Amnesty International delegates who visited Gisenyi in February 1998 described a countryside which was virtually unrecognizable in some areas. The hills which are normally green and lush bore all the visible marks of the devastation. Fields had been burned, crops destroyed. Houses stood empty with their doors hanging open; others had been burned. Whole villages seemed deserted. With a few exceptions, the only vehicles travelling the roads were armoured military vehicles.

Armed opposition groups have also forced the local population to supply them with food; those who refuse may pay with their lives. In some areas, they have reportedly tried to prevent peasants from selling their crops to markets in Kigali, claiming that they would be supplying "the enemy" (the government). Thus on 17 December 1997, more than 15 people from the area of Nkuli commune, in Ruhengeri, were reportedly killed by members of an armed group for trying to take their potatoes to a location from where they could be sold to traders taking them to Kigali.

Both RPA soldiers and armed opposition groups have carried out widespread looting of property, livestock, crops and other belongings, and have sometimes forced the local population to take part in looting. Many health centres and schools have had to close.

III.2 Weapons and military equipment fuelling the conflict

Despite overwhelming evidence of daily killings of unarmed civilians by both parties to the conflict in Rwanda, and despite repeated international condemnation of the continuing proliferation of small arms in the broader Great Lakes region, the RPA and armed opposition groups are continuing to obtain new supplies of weapons and equipment which they have used to commit violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

In addition to firearms, other types of weapons - such as bayonets, nail-studded clubs, machetes, knives and farming implements - have often been used to kill civilians in Rwanda. It is generally believed that such instruments are used mostly by armed opposition groups; however, several witnesses have reported independently that RPA soldiers have also sometimes used these weapons, as have armed Tutsi civilians carrying out attacks in collusion with the RPA.

Some arms dealers have supplied military equipment to both the former and present security forces in Rwanda with no apparent regard for human rights, perpetuating a conflict in which the majority of victims are unarmed civilians. Companies in Israel - using Eastern European links -, China and South Africa supplied weapons or military equipment to the former Rwandese armed forces before and during the genocide of 1994[6]. Companies from these same countries have continued to supply arms and equipment to the RPA, sometimes arranged through companies in third countries.

In 1997, the RPA was reported to have received arms from Romania, with the assistance of an Israeli company based near Tel Aviv. According to articles published in the Romanian press in early 1998, a Russian-made aircraft, hired from a Ukrainian company, flew from the Romanian capital, Bucarest, to Kigali in April 1997. It was said to have been registered as destined for Ethiopia. The aircraft allegedly carried about 80 tonnes of armaments, such as machine guns, as well as ammunition. According to the press articles, these were listed as spare parts in documents of the Rwandese Ministry of Transport. One article alleged that weapons had also been sent to Rwanda from Romania in February 1997.

The Rwandese Government has reportedly obtained Russian-made MI-24 helicopters through a company based in South Africa [7]. The RPA has continued to use military helicopters during its operations in areas inhabited by unarmed civilians. In the first few months of 1998, helicopters were flying daily from Kigali towards the regions of armed conflict in the northwest. Several sources in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Gitarama have reported that helicopters were being used not only for surveillance but also occasionally to attack areas where insurgents were believed to be hiding. An unknown number of unarmed civilians have reportedly been killed during some of these helicopter attacks [8].

On 28 January 1998, a military cooperation agreement was signed between Rwanda and Zimbabwe, which has a major arms supply arrangement with China. It was announced that Zimbabwe would be involved in a training program for the Rwandese army and police. The timing and contents of this program have not been disclosed. Amnesty International is concerned about certain types of practices which might be reinforced by this training program, given the Zimbabwean police and military's own record of human rights violations. In particular, members of the Zimbabwean security forces were involved in shootings and beatings of Zimbabwean citizens in January 1998 during and after civil disturbances. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is reported to have provided military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and transport, to RPA soldiers operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and to the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo (AFDL), Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, - which went on to form the current Congolese army. The AFDL assisted by RPA soldiers were responsible for the extrajudicial execution and "disappearance"of tens of thousands of unarmed civilians, including Rwandese refugees, in the DRC in 1996 and 1997. A Zimbabwean company has collaborated with a Chinese arms supply company to facilitate arms supplies to the AFDL.

The United States of America (USA) remains a close political and military ally of the Rwandese Government [9]. The US authorities should clarify the relationship between the training they have supplied to members of the RPA in 1996 and 1997 and the RPA's counter-insurgency operations in 1996, 1997 and 1998 during which grave human rights violations have been committed. The US authorities should also clarify the exact role of US military personnel reportedly present in Rwanda -whether contracted by the US government or by private companies.

Recent arms supplies to armed opposition groups operating in Rwanda remain clandestine. Given the continuing arms embargo against members of the former Rwandese armed forces imposed by the UN on 17 May 1994 - more than one month after the genocide began - these forces can only receive new supplies of weapons through illicit means. Nevertheless, they appear to have been able to obtain weapons with relative ease, due to the proliferation of small arms in and around the Great Lakes region, the existence of networks of trafficking, and the close alliances between Rwandese armed opposition groups and armed groups operating in neighbouring countries, such as Uganda, DRC, Burundi and Angola. For example, in early 1998, there was a reported attempt by Sudanese government forces to bring together members of Rwandese armed opposition groups in exile, a Ugandan armed opposition group, the West Nile Bank Front, and DRC armed opposition groups, in the Garamba national park in northeastern DRC, near the borders with Uganda and Sudan.

In addition to arms which some members of the former Rwandese army brought back into Rwanda from exile, armed opposition groups operating inside Rwanda are known to have captured arms from attacks on RPA military positions. The escalation of the armed conflict in Rwanda - aggravated by killings of civilians by the RPA during counter-insurgency operations - has further fuelled the demand for arms by the armed opposition groups.

In April 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1161 (1998), deciding to revive the UN Commission of Inquiry which had been set up in September 1995 to investigate supplies of arms and other equipment to the ex- Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR), the former Rwandese armed forces. The Commission of Inquiry had produced three reports, the last of which was finalized in 1996, but this report was not made public by the UN Security Council until a full year later, in December 1997. It contained detailed recommendations for follow up to the work of the Commission of Inquiry, which have not been implemented.

Amnesty International has supported the work of the Commission of Inquiry since its creation in 1995. It welcomes the resumption of its work and is continuing to cooperate with the Commission. However, Amnesty International urges the UN Security Council to broaden the Commission's mandate, in recognition of the fact that significant political, military and human rights developments have taken place in the region since the Commission last broke off its investigations [10]. In particular, it should be recognized that it is not only the ex-FAR and associated armed groups but also RPA soldiers who are carrying out grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law - violations which have increased in frequency and gravity since the end of 1996. The mandate should reflect the fact that members of the armed opposition groups in Rwanda (whether composed of ex-FAR or other elements) are acquiring some of their arms and ammunition from capturing them from the RPA.

The commission should also carry out in-depth investigations into arms and military equipment supplied to the current Rwandese security forces and armed opposition groups by or through the security forces and armed opposition groups of Burundi, the DRC and Uganda, as well as through other neighbouring countries. Close links are maintained between these forces and their counterparts in Rwanda, and the porous borders between these countries allow arms and military equipment to be transferred easily within the region. This broader perspective could make a significant contribution towards addressing the regional dimensions of the conflict in Rwanda and recognizing the devastating effects of arms transfers - whether legal or illegal - in fuelling massive human rights abuses in several countries in the region.

The UN Security Council should ensure that the Commission of Inquiry is given adequate political and financial resources to include these components in its mandate and should request the full cooperation of the governments concerned. Amnesty International urges UN member states to fulfill their responsibility to make the necessary financial contributions to ensure that the Commission can carry out its work effectively.

III.3 Killings of unarmed civilians by RPA soldiers

"Les militaires arrivent, ils brûlent, ils razzient, ils pillent. Notre maison a été brûlée, et nous avons pris la fuite. Et comme le malheur n'arrive pas seul, ma mère a été tuée [...] A 65 ans, elle n'a pas pu se sauver lorsque les hommes en armes approchaient, et elle s'est cachée dans un ravin. C'est alors que l'un d'entre eux l'a tuée d'une balle dans la tête [...] Personne n'ose pointer du doigt les assassins parce qu'ils ont la force des armes."

"The soldiers arrive, they burn, they raid , they loot. Our house was burned, and we fled. And as misfortune is always followed by further misfortune, my mother was killed [...] At 65 years old, she couldn't run away when the men with arms approached, and she hid in a ditch. That was when one of them shot her in the head [...] No one dares point the finger at the assassins because they have the strength of their arms."

Anonymous testimony from Rwanda, April 1998

Thousands of unarmed civilians have been extrajudicially executed by RPA soldiers in the context of military search operations in the northwest. These operations are undertaken ostensibly to apprehend the insurgents, but in most cases, they have already left the scene by the time the army arrives. In some cases, armed Tutsi civilians have taken part in killings of primarily Hutu civilians, with the active or passive cooperation of the army; there have also been reports of RPA soldiers distributing arms to the local Tutsi population.

On 23 December 1997, a military operation was undertaken in Nyamutera commune in Ruhengeri. A number of people died as their houses were burned, including two sisters, Liberata and Alphonsine, and Alphonsine's two young children - a boy aged five and a girl aged two.

In early January 1998, an unknown number of people were killed during and following clashes between RPA soldiers and members of an armed opposition group in Raba secteur, Rushashi commune, in Rural Kigali. Many civilians tried to flee the area to escape the fighting. Some elderly men and women who were unable to leave were reportedly killed in their homes by RPA soldiers during a military operation on around 6 January. The victims reportedly included Bendantunguka and Bahizi, both in their seventies, Sembagare and Kimonyo, both in their eighties, and the wife of Ndumiwe, aged about 60.

On 13 January 1998, following a period of intensive military operations in search of insurgents in Kinigi commune, in Ruhengeri, RPA soldiers reportedly surrounded Kinege cellule in Gisasa secteur, and killed more than 60 people, including Jaffet Kanyarwunga, aged 61, his two wives Sifora, aged 63, Marthe, aged 57, and their four children, Kayihura, aged 71, Ndahayo, aged 14, and Justine Mukabarera, aged 23. A number of RPA soldiers and insurgents were also reportedly killed in the fighting which followed.

On 7 and 8 February 1998, around 100 civilians were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers searching for insurgents in Bushobyo, Shonyi and Rugonero, in Kanama commune, in Gisenyi. Among the victims were Pierre, a builder, Victor, a former print worker, Ndayambaje, a peasant, and Jeanne, a woman trader.

Local sources in Gisenyi have reported that populations displaced by the fighting and killings have been encouraged by RPA soldiers to return to their home areas on the grounds that security has returned. During a public meeting in Busogo secteur, in Mukingo commune, Ruhengeri, on 19 February 1998, a local RPA commander reportedly told the displaced population: "Il faut aller mourir là chez vous et non venir contaminer les autres". ("You should go and die there at home and not come and contaminate the others"). Many have had no choice but to follow these orders. In early February 1998, dozens of peasants who had returned to Basa secteur, in Rubavu commune, Gisenyi, having been told the area was calm, were rounded up by RPA soldiers and taken away in a military vehicle to the gendarmerie. In the early hours of the following morning, local residents heard the sound of gunfire around the gendarmerie for about two hours. The peasants did not return - it is presumed that they are dead.

From the end of February through March and April 1998, reports of armed conflict intensified in the central préfecture of Gitarama (see also below). On around 13 March 1998, following clashes between RPA soldiers and members of an armed opposition group at a commercial centre at Kayenzi, Gitarama, during which several people described as "infiltrators" were reportedly killed, RPA soldiers reportedly rounded up a number of local residents and accused them of assisting the armed opposition. At least seven people - two women and five men - were reportedly shot dead by soldiers in Kayenzi secteur, in Kayenzi commune.

Around early April 1998, an unknown number of people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers in Kanyamatembe, in Kanama commune, Gisenyi. The victims included Gasyomvono, aged 15, Ringira, aged 13, Birategetse, aged 72, Anastasie and her 17 year-old son Jules; soldiers reportedly killed Anastasie when she protested that they were taking her son away.

Around 150 people were reportedly killed during a military operation on 12 May 1998 in Birembo secteur, in Giciye commune, Gisenyi. All the victims were described as unarmed civilians who were deliberately targeted by RPA soldiers. They included elderly people such as Rubyeyi, aged 84, Bayazana Tamari, aged 76, and Bagirurwimo, a local responsable de cellule (official) aged 67, and young children, such as Uwamahoro, aged nine. The soldiers reportedly also carried out looting in the area and burned more than 30 houses.

In May 1998, RPA soldiers surrounded several areas in Gakenke secteur, in Gatonde commune, in Ruhengeri. Scores of unarmed civilians were reportedly killed, including at least 40 people in Bukekera cellule - among them many elderly men and women and young children. The victims included Hiram Mpayimana, aged 60, his son François Cyubahiro, aged 34, Jaffet Mvukiyehe, aged 80, and his wife Régine, aged 75, Alfred Sebatware, a teacher in his thirties, Atalie, a woman aged 45, and three brothers, Antoine and Zacharie Bipfuyekubaho, both in their sixties, and Bavakure, in his fifties. RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the area with helicopters. It is not clear whether the above victims were killed in the helicopter attack, or whether they were shot dead by soldiers in their homes. Many houses were also burned.

Killings in Mukingo, Ruhengeri

The commune of Mukingo, in Ruhengeri, has been the scene of relentless violence, particular throughout January and February 1998. Several hundred civilians are reported have died during this period; many RPA soldiers and fighters of armed opposition groups have also been killed. Between 30 January and 24 February 1998, one local source counted more than 350 houses which had been burned, in at least six different secteurs.

In the aftermath of a military operation in Shingiro and Muhingo secteurs on 21 January 1998, more than 200 dead bodies were counted, around half of them young children and babies. The victims also included around 50 young men who had been taken to one side by RPA soldiers after they had gathered the population in Mucaca cellule, in Shingiro secteur. The soldiers then reportedly tied the men's arms behind their backs and shot them dead.

On 24 January 1998, more than 120 people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers assisted by local armed Tutsi civilians in several cellules in Nyabirehe secteur. Some of the victims were killed with bayonets and knives; others had their heads crushed with large stones or rocks. Yet others, mainly women and children, were reportedly burned alive in their homes, including more than 20 people in Gahira cellule. Firearms were apparently not used. A local source described how the victims -particularly the men- were tied with their arms behind their backs to prevent movement. They were made to rest their heads on a large stone then they were hit on the head with another large stone. Witnesses who arrived on the scene soon afterwards reported seeing traces of blood and hair on rocks in the area. Simon Kagano, in his fifties, was among the victims who had his head crushed in this way. Rukangagara, a man aged about 75, died from multiple knife injuries. Amnesty International has received the names of more than 50 other victims of this massacre.

Amnesty International has also received the names of more than 120 people reportedly killed during military operations in Mukingo in February - including more than 20 in Rwinzovu secteur on 8 February; more than 70 in Shingiro, Kimonyi, Muhingo, Gikoro, Rwinzovu, Gataraga and Nyabirehe secteurs on 9 February; and more than 20 in Gataraga and Shingiro secteurs on 23 February. The majority of the victims were reportedly killed with knives, metal bars and stones.

On 21 February 1998, there were fierce clashes between RPA soldiers and insurgents following an ambush in Gikoro secteur by an armed opposition group in which around 20 RPA soldiers were reportedly killed. During a military operation to pursue the insurgents, RPA soldiers reportedly burned more than 50 houses in Gikoro and neighbouring secteurs. Many local residents fled the area for safety but some were unable to. Thus at least four elderly people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers near the commune offices of Mukingo: Nyiramarora, aged 76, Nyirabugese, aged 84, and Sebakara and Sebicyirare, both in their nineties.

Fighting between RPA soldiers and insurgents has continued in Mukingo since March 1998 and further killings of unarmed civilians have been reported. For example, at least eight people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers during a military operation in Rwinzovu secteur on 3 May 1998. The victims included Harelimana, aged 62, Serugali, aged 72, Gahutu, aged 12, and Mahirwe, aged 2. Soldiers reportedly also carried out widespread looting of cattle and other livestock belonging to local residents.

Killings in Rubavu, Gisenyi - January 1998

Amnesty International has received detailed information from several independent sources about the massacre of more than 300 unarmed civilians during military operations in Muhira and Rugerero secteurs, in Rubavu commune, Gisenyi, in the first half of January 1998. The worst killings appear to have taken place at Keya, in Muhira secteur, on 11 January. This military operation appears to have been undertaken in response to an attack by an armed opposition group on 10 January in the neighbouring commune of Nyamyumba, in which several people were killed and local government offices and vehicles set on fire.

On around 5 January, local authorities in Gisenyi held a public meeting in which they reportedly warned the population that they would be punished if they did not denounce insurgents in the area. Attendance at the meeting was compulsory - soldiers fetched people from their homes to take them to the meeting, even those who were sick. During and after the meeting, soldiers reportedly killed around 30 people in the area. Some of those who were led away by soldiers under the pretext of taking them to the meeting were reportedly killed along the way. For example, Sebazungu, his wife and several other relatives were reportedly burned alive in a house in Murara secteur.

In the morning of 6 January, scores of people were reportedly killed in Rugerero secteur, some in their houses, others outside. On around 11 January, a further 30 people who had fled to the neighbouring commune of Nyamyumba to escape the violence were reportedly killed there. Some -such as Thérèse Sukiranya, an elderly woman Suzanne and her daughter Nyirahumure - were reportedly shot dead and their bodies burned; they were later buried in mass graves. Other bodies were found on the riverbank.

On 11 January, RPA soldiers carried out a further military operation in Muhira secteur. Among those killed in their homes were Wenceslas, aged 42, and his brother Joseph Twagiramungu, aged 34, who were reportedly ordered to kneel and were shot dead on the spot.

Soldiers then surrounded Keya cellule and killed between 200 and 300 people there. According to one witness, the soldiers rounded up the inhabitants and gathered them in three places, separating the men, the women and children. After taking any money the victims carried on them, the soldiers reportedly shot them dead. Others were killed in their homes. The soldiers then reportedly piled up the dead bodies in houses and set fire to them.

Amnesty International has received a list of the names of more than 200 victims of those killed at Keya, including Emmanuel Rutikanga, a judicial official, and his wife Thérèse Mujawayezu, a primary school teacher - both in their thirties-, and their four children; Frida Mukamwezi, a former nurse in her twenties; Angéline Ndavakure, a widow aged 45, and her six children; Alphonse Mihigo, a schoolteacher aged 43, his wife Philomène Murekatete, aged 39, and their seven children, the youngest four years old; Dismas Sinumyavo, aged 68, his wife Cécile, aged 65, their sons Vincent and Vianney - as well as Vianney's wife Florida and their six children - and their five daughters, Dative Uwimana, Pélagie Uwamahoro, Consolée Mukamuhire, Illuminata and Béata; Spiridion Ndimubanzi, a carpenter aged around 70, his wife, and their four youngest children; Jean, aged 70, and his wife Margarita, aged 69; Ignace, aged 53, his wife Thérèse, their six sons Janvier, Jean-Damascène, Théogène and Kigingi, all in their twenties, Pierre, aged 18, Edouard, aged 17, their daughter Nyiramuha and two daughters-in-law Innocentia and Maria, all in their twenties, and their four grand-children, the eldest only four years old; Magdalene Nyirangaruye, aged 60, and her daughter Midari, aged 40; Mushamburere, aged 43, his wife, Régina, and their seven children; Godefroid, aged 48, his wife Astérie, and their eight children.

Three people who survived were reportedly killed in the following days as they returned to the area to try to collect their belongings.

In the morning of 12 January, RPA soldiers surrounded Rugerero secteur and went from house to house, reportedly shooting at any person who happened to be in the area and killing more than 30 people. Among the victims were Emmanuel Mirasano, aged 57, former bourgmestre (local government official) of Rubavu, and around 20 people who had sought refuge in his home, including Blandine Nyiragire, her husband and four children (the youngest only six months old), Théogène, aged 14, and five other children who had been orphaned after their parents were killed during military operations in August 1997. Emmanuel Mirasano's cousin, Dieudonné Iyamuremye, aged 32, who lived in Gisenyi town, visited the scene of the massacre in Rugerero on 13 January. He was killed at his home in Gisenyi three days later, on 16 January, along with his brother Janvier Kwisanga, aged 22. Dieudonné Iyamuremye may have been specifically targeted because he had witnessed the immediate aftermath of the massacre and had disclosed some of the information.

On 14 January, five RPA soldiers came to the home of an elderly woman, Elisa Ntamakiriro, aged around 70 or 80, in Rasamaza cellule, in Muhira secteur. The soldiers reportedly ordered her to undress in front of her house and shot her in the mouth. They also killed Pontien Turimubumwe, aged 22, who had been living with Elias Ntamakiriro after his own mother and sister had been killed in August 1997.

Rubavu had been already the scene of extensive violence since October 1997, following a period of heavy fighting between RPA soldiers and members of armed opposition groups. Local sources claim that nearly 400 people were killed there between October and December 1997, most of them in Bulinda and Murara secteurs, others in Rugerero, Muhira and Gisa. The sources have attributed most of the killings of civilians during this period to RPA soldiers. Amnesty International has received the name of more than 150 of the victims, including men, women and children, in some cases whole families. RPA soldiers and armed opposition fighters were also killed.

Further information on killings in Bulinga, Gitarama, in December 1997 and April 1998

In its report "Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict" published on 19 December 1997, Amnesty International reported a number of killings in Bulinga commune, in Gitarama, during and following an attack by armed groups on the cachot (local detention centre) on 3 December. The organization has since gathered further information on events which took place in the following days. The helicopter attack by the RPA - which immediately followed the attack by armed groups in Bulinga - took place not in Bulinga itself, as initially reported, but in the neighbouring commune of Nyabikenke.

On 4 December, a number of people were killed in Bulinga in what appeared to be an RPA reprisal operation for the attack by the armed groups. The victims in Remera secteur included Kanyogote and eight other people who were at his home, including his grandson; Mathias Niwanshuti, his wife and children; Rusatsi's two sons and the son of a woman called Languida.

On 11 December, RPA soldiers reportedly killed a number of people in Nyarutovu secteur, including Jean Gashumba, Eulade Ntawirinda, Virginie, Ruberakurora and Nsabimana. This appeared to be a reprisal operation by the RPA following an attack on 10 December attributed to an armed opposition group (see below).

During December, RPA soldiers also killed a number of detainees who had been freed from Bulinga cachot on 3 December, some of whom had not reported their release to the local authorities, as they had been required to do. The victims included Alphonse, Semanwa, Gaheto - a carpenter - and an electrician known as Makanika. On 13 December, a former teacher, Narcisse Nsengiyumva, and Célestin Uwizeyimana, known as Kibuye, were reportedly killed by members of the security forces in the presence of a local civilian official. Thomas Ngendahimana - a former local official -, his wife Dative Kakuze and his son Anaclet Kayitano- all former detainees who had been told to register at the local office after their release - were killed on around 6 December. Others were killed in the cachot: several detainees including Désiré Degeri - a former accountant -, Rugwizangoga and Mbarubucyeye were reportedly called out by soldiers and shot dead. Other victims included a former teacher, Boniface Rugwizangoga, and his wife Perpétue Nyirabakiga, who were reportedly killed behind the local government offices on around 26 December. Relatives of some detainees were also targeted; Florent Ntabashwa, aged around 20, whose father had been in detention, was shot dead at his home in early December after he failed to reveal his father's whereabouts to soldiers who questioned him.

In late December, two primary school teachers, Jean-Baptiste and Kabano, were reportedly picked up by military and civilian authorities as they were walking along the road. They were arrested and detained in the cachot at Bulinga. The following day, they were reportedly no longer there. The day after, their bodies were found in a ditch; they had been killed with hammers and clubs.

On 9 or 10 April 1998, there was another attack on the cachot at Bulinga, the exact circumstances of which are not confirmed. A number of detainees who were released during the attack returned to the commune office to register, as requested by the local authorities. At least 12 of those who returned were reportedly killed, including Jean-Baptiste Havugimana - a teacher -, Sylvère Habyarimana, Léonidas Ntamashakiro, Jean-Damascène Munyampirwa, Fidèle Kamonyo, Epaphrodite Ntampaka and Jean Ntabashwa.

Controversy over the Nyakimana cave massacre

In its report of 19 December 1997 ,"Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict", Amnesty International reported that many unarmed civilians, estimated by local sources to number between 5,000 and 8,000, were killed by RPA soldiers in a large cave at Nyakimana, in Kanama commune, Gisenyi, between 23 and 28 October 1997. Amnesty International's account of this massacre has been called into question by representatives of the Rwandese Government. Since publishing its report on 19 December, Amnesty International has gathered further information which confirms that the events at Nyakimana took place in the circumstances described. However, as originally stated, the total number of victims remains unknown as the bodies have not been recovered; neither has it been possible to ascertain how many were directly killed by RPA soldiers and how many may have died of starvation, thirst or other causes.

Following extensive publicity of reports of this massacre, representatives of foreign governments and international organizations were invited to visit the site by the Rwandese authorities and were shown entrances to the cave. However, neither the Rwandese authorities, nor any foreign government, nor local or international organizations have carried out an investigation into the deaths which occurred inside.

Among those taken to the cave entrance in December 1997 was David J.Scheffer, the US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, who was visiting Rwanda for the primary purpose of investigating the massacre of more than 300 Congolese refugees by an armed opposition group at Mudende, Gisenyi (see below). Like others who were escorted to the site by RPA soldiers, he was not able to carry out any in-depth investigation. Yet in his report of 16 December 1997, he concluded: "There is no visibly credible evidence that thousands of civilians were killed by RPA forces at the volcanic caves [...]. However, there is evidence that humans have died in the caves." The report states: "The smell of death [...] was not as overpowering as I have experienced at grave exhumations where there are hundreds of bodies [...] If there were thousands of dead bodies in the caves, the smell of death would have been much more powerful and the flies more numerous. I also doubt the RPA could have, or would have desired, to enter the caves in order to commit such large-scale killings." The report recommends that US representatives in Rwanda continue to monitor the RPA presence at the cave openings, as well as the number of civilians returning to the area around the cave, and stand prepared to examine human remains in the caves when security permits. Six months later, the US government is not known to have followed up this recommendation.

Amnesty International appreciates that widespread insecurity in the area and lack of the necessary technical equipment may have prevented an immediate investigation inside the cave. However, such an investigation remains critical to establish the truth about the events and to inform the families of the victims. Amnesty International is calling for an urgent independent investigation into this case and for foreign governments or inter-governmental organizations, including appropriate United Nations agencies, to provide the necessary technical, financial and security resources to undertake it. The Rwandese authorities should provide their full cooperation to enable the full truth to be told. Amnesty International remains ready to correct its earlier statements should an independent investigation demonstrate that they were inaccurate.

III.4 Killings of unarmed civilians by armed opposition groups

Killings of unarmed civilians by armed opposition groups have also increased in recent months. The exact composition, leadership and organization of these groups remains un- known. They are believed to include members of the ex-FAR and associated militia who participated in the genocide in 1994, but the proportions of old and new combatants are unknown.

While in some cases, Tutsi civilians appear to be the specific target of their attacks, in an increasing number of incidents, Tutsi and Hutu have been killed without distinction. Some Hutu civilians have been specifically targeted for their alleged role as collaborators or informants of the authorities, others for refusing to join the armed groups - there are regular reports of forcible recruitment. Civilian authorities at the local levels - such as responsables de cellule or conseillers de secteur -have also been targeted. Ambushes in which vehicles are set on fire and passengers killed indiscriminately remain a regular tactic of the armed opposition. Public buildings, such as local government offices and schools, have also been attacked. Residents of the areas where the armed groups operate have reported that written messages are often found in various locations, warning of imminent attacks.

In the night of 10 December 1997, several people were killed in Nyarutovu secteur , in Bulinga commune, in Gitarama, in an attack attributed to an armed opposition group. The victims included Joseph Nzirorera, Boniface Musoni - responsable de cellule (localofficial) of Kinigi -, Augustin Harindintwari and Révérien Ntubugaruka. These killings took place in the aftermath of an attack on the cachot at Bulinga on 3 December and reprisal killings attributed to the RPA (see above).

Armed opposition groups are believed to have been responsible for several attacks in the préfecture of Rural Kigali in late 1997, in particular in Rushashi commune. For example, on 17 December 1997, a local official, Jean-Damascène Bimenyimana - conseiller de secteur of Minazi - was killed, along with his mother, Judith Dusengimana. It is believed he was targeted because he was a government official; he had reportedly denounced suspected insurgents and organized their arrest.

On 27 December 1997, armed men killed around 28 members of three families in Kabaya secteur, Nyakinama commune, in Ruhengeri. Some of the victims were suspected of having disclosed the whereabouts of armed groups to the RPA. Also in late December, at least nine people suspected of being close to the authorities were reportedly killed in Mburabuturo, Nkuli commune, Ruhengeri, in Murambi and Gitega in Gaseke commune, Gisenyi, and in Bumba, Karago commune, Gisenyi.

Six people accused of collaborating with the RPA were reportedly killed by an armed group in Rwinzovu secteur, Mukingo commune, in Ruhengeri, on around 9 January 1998. The victims include Ayinkamiye - a woman in her twenties -, Bamenyakunda, aged 22, and Théophile Tegereza, aged 17.

Armed opposition groups are believed to have been responsible for the death of around 40 people in an attack on a bus carrying workers of a brewery in Gisenyi on the morning of 19 January 1998. The bus was carrying around 80 passengers - most of them employees of the Brasserie et limonaderie du Rwanda (BRALIRWA), the main national brewery and lemonade company - when it was ambushed on the main road, a few kilometres from the brewery, in Nyamyumba commune. The assailants reportedly shot at the tyres of the bus then poured petrol over it and set it alight. Many passengers were trapped inside and were burned alive. By the time people came to the scene, many of the bodies were unrecognizable as they had been burned to cinders. Around 10 people were shot dead outside the bus as they tried to escape. In total, around 40 people were killed, including both Hutu and Tutsi; at least as many were seriously injured. The victims included Jean Munyamashara, Barnabé Ruberwa, Gonzalve Karangura, Athanasie Muhimpundu, Bishirandora, Marie Masengesho, Adamu and his wife, Maisha Munyakazi, Vénuste, Ignace Habyarimana, Godefroid, Jean-Damascène and Aimé. Most of the people interviewed by Amnesty International attributed this attack to armed opposition groups. However, a few claimed that those responsible for the attack may have been RPA soldiers.

Within a period of just two days, around 100 civilians were killed in two separate attacks attributed to armed opposition groups. On the evening of 5 February 1998, more than 40 civilians were killed and more than 20 injured in an attack by an armed opposition group in Nyamutekera and Kabatezi cellules, in Jenda secteur, Nkuli commune, in Ruhengeri. Among the victims were Sebahutu, Mucocori, Rudatinya, Nzabarinda and Gaudence. The following day, reprisal killings were reportedly carried out by Tutsi civilians assisted by RPA soldiers; the number of victims of the reprisal killings is not known. On the night of 6 to 7 February 1998, members of an armed opposition group killed a further 50 to 60 civilians, men, women and children, both Hutu and Tutsi, at a settlement of displaced persons at Byahi, just north of Gisenyi town. The victims were reportedly killed with machetes, bayonets and knives. Many others were wounded.

On the night of 29 to 30 March 1998, nine people were reportedly killed by members of an armed opposition group in Nyabikenke commune, in Gitarama. The victims included Charles Komeza and his wife Laurence Nyirampundu, both in their seventies, Fidèle Nkejabagabo and his two sons. It is believed that Charles Komeza had been particularly targeted because he was believed to be collaborating with the authorities. His body and that of his wife were reportedly found decapitated.

During their visit to Rwanda in February 1998, Amnesty International gathered further information on the massacre of more than 300 Congolese refugees by armed opposition groups in Mudende, Gisenyi, on 11 December 1997 [11]. At Gihembe refugee camp in Byumba, northern Rwanda, where the refugees were transferred after the attack, they interviewed witnesses of the massacre and many refugees whose close relatives had been killed. One man, who had been shot in the leg, described watching the attack from the window of a building in the camp. An elderly woman, whose eldest son and two grand-daughters aged 2 and 3 had all been killed, had watched the killings from a hiding place under a bed in the health centre. More than 100 people were in the health centre at the time; she said she was the only survivor. She stayed under the bed until the following morning. The victims of the massacre included Kwitegetse and her 18 year-old son, Nyirakamodoka and her five-year-old son Mavuo, Edouard, aged 2, Domina, aged 36, and her two-year-old daughter, Nyirabagisha and her two children aged under 2, Midagu, aged 72, Rutsibuka, aged 70, Joli, aged 10, Nyarameteri, aged 45, Kyarankotsa, aged 30 and her two-year-old son, and Nyarabukara, aged 16.

In addition to the above cases, the Rwandese News Agency has frequently reported other cases of killings attributed to "infiltrators". In many cases, it has not been possible to verify the exact circumstances and scale of these incidents or confirm the identity of the perpetrators.

III.5 Killings where the identity of the perpetrators has not been established

The identity of those responsible for many deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians has not been established. Often there are no clear indications as to their identity or motives, making investigations difficult. In other cases, there are conflicting claims and interpretations as to whether RPA soldiers or members of armed opposition groups were responsible for particular incidents.

A wave of killings took place in Rushashi commune, Kigali Rural, in November and December 1997 and January 1998. Many local civilian authorities were among the victims. For example, on 13 November, 12 people were killed when several houses were attacked in Gatare secteur, Rushashi commune. The victims included Athanase Rugwizimbaraga -the conseiller de secteur (local government official) of Gatare -, his two wives and three sons. There are contradictory reports as to whether the killings were carried out by members of an armed opposition group or by RPA soldiers.

On 25 December 1997, a few days after clashes between RPA soldiers and armed groups, more than 50 people were reportedly killed in several different locations in Raba secteur, Rushashi commune, in Rural Kigali. Some were killed with firearms, others with traditional weapons. The victims included Albert Mivumbi and his children, Matako, his wife and three children, Rukera, his wife and two children, the responsable de cellule (local government official) of Mutara, the wife of the responsable de cellule of Bikonde and her four children. The identity of the perpetrators has not been confirmed.

On 7 January 1998, a former teacher and local government official, his wife and children were killed by armed men in military uniform in Muyongwe secteur, Tare commune, in Kigali Rural. Their 12-year-old son was the only survivor. The identity of the perpetrators and the motives for the killing are not known.

On 2 January 1998, a priest Abbé Jean-Marie Vianney Nsengumuremyi was shot at while driving his car in Rugerero secteur, in Rubavu commune, Gisenyi. He survived with serious injuries to his leg and thigh. The attack was carried out by about 10 unidentified armed men. It is not clear whether Jean-Marie Vianney Nsengumuremyi was specifically targeted and if so, why. Several other vehicles were attacked along the same road in the following days.

Some attacks have been publicly and officially attributed to armed opposition groups, but reliable sources have indicated that RPA soldiers may have been responsible. One such case was an attack on a convent at Busasamana, in Mutura commune, Gisenyi, in the night of 7-8 January 1998, in which six nuns of the Sisters of the Resurrection and three other people were attacked with machetes. Five nuns were killed outright: Sisters Berthilde Mukamuhire, Epiphanie Gasigwa, Césarine Uwimana, and Xavéra Mukagakwaya -all in their early thirties - and Félicité Benimana, aged 41. Two others were gravely injured and left for dead. One of them, Sister Devota Rwangeyo, who was shot in the head, died from her injuries in hospital a few weeks later, in early February. Three other people - a guard who worked at the convent and the wife and brother of the parish catechist - were also killed. Despite advice that they should evacuate the area due to widespread insecurity in Mutura, the nuns had insisted on staying there in order not to abandon the local population; they apparently believed that they would not be targeted, as they viewed themselves as neutral and not involved in politics. One possible explanation for why they were targeted may be that they had reportedly provided lodging at the convent to people whose houses had been burned by RPA soldiers.

On 28 January 1998, André Ndikumana, a former judge, and his servant, Joseph Nyampeta, were strangled in their home in Cyangugu, southwestern Rwanda. The perpetrators reportedly wore military uniforms but their faces were concealed. Just a few weeks before his death, André Ndikumana had started working as an interpreter and representative for Avocats sans frontières, Lawyers Without Borders, a Belgian non-governmental organization working in Rwanda to provide legal assistance to victims and defendants in the trials of those accused of participation in the genocide. It is unclear why he was killed. Some believe it may be linked to his work for Avocats sans frontières. Several other lawyers working for the organization have been victims of human rights violations; one "disappeared" in January 1997, another was arrested in September 1997 and is now in prison on charges of participation in the genocide; several others have been threatened. Another theory is that André Ndikumana was killed in the context of a property dispute; a few weeks before his death, his house, which had been illegally occupied, had been returned to him.

On 31 January 1998, a Croatian Catholic priest, Father Vjeko Curic, was killed in central Kigali. A man - described by some as wearing military uniform, by others as wearing civilian clothes - shot him several times in the chest. Before he died, Father Vjeko, who carried a gun for his own protection, had time to fire one shot which wounded the aggressor on the leg. The aggressor was seen running away from the scene. According to some sources, he was taken to hospital; according to others, he was apprehended and left in the custody of a local official, but reportedly escaped soon afterwards. Whichever version is correct, no progress is known to have been made in official investigations into the assassination of Father Vjeko, despite a high level of publicity surrounding his death and the potential availability of several witnesses to the killing.

Father Vjeko had been living in Rwanda for more than 15 years, based in the diocese of Kabgayi, in Gitarama. He was known for helping both Tutsi and Hutu communities. Several senior members of the Rwandese Government attended his funeral. Father Vjeko had been threatened and narrowly escaped attack on several previous occasions, and knew he was at risk. To date, Amnesty International is not in a position to confirm any of the reasons for his assassination which have been advanced; they include reports that he possessed extensive information about human rights abuses, potential disputes with soldiers who had reportedly put pressure on him to provide houses for them, whereas his program of housing assistance was directed towards vulnerable groups, and tensions among colleagues over the financial budget he managed.

On 26 February 1998, around 10 people were killed in Bihembe secteur, in Bicumbi commune, Rural Kigali. The victims included Habimana, his wife and their five children. The killing may have been related to steps which Habimana had just initiated to claim back his property. However, there is insufficient evidence to indicate who was responsible.

On 13 May 1998, an unknown number of civilians were killed in Mukirangwe and Nyarutembe secteurs in Nyamutera commune, Ruhengeri. Among the victims were several elderly men and women including Hélène Nyiragahinda, aged 86, Ancile, aged 66 and partially blind, Nyirahire, François Kimonyo, and others including Ragwiba, Patricie and Athanasie.

Ezechiel Ndibwami, a judge at the Tribunal de première instance (court of first instance) in Ruhengeri, was killed in the night of 27-28 May 1998 at his home in Ruhengeri town; he had been decapitated. The identity of the perpetrators has not been established. The motive for his killing may be connected with his functions as a judge in trials of people accused of participation in the genocide in 1994.

Killings in Gitarama

At the end of February 1998, violence flared up again in several communes in Gitarama préfecture. During March and April, there were clashes between RPA soldiers and members of armed opposition groups and reports of killings of unarmed civilians by both sides in several communes, including Bulinga, Mushubati, Nyakabanda, Kayenzi and Rutobwe. Some examples are given above, of cases where evidence pointed to the involvement of either RPA soldiers or armed opposition groups.

In addition, on 6 March, 11 people were killed in Mara secteur, in Rutobwe commune, including Rukeratabaro, his two sons Gérald and Adrien, his daughter and his grandson, and several members of the family of Gisagara. At least 10 civilians from Cyubi secteur, also in Rutobwe were reportedly killed between 9 and 13 March, including Sylvère Karera, his wife Marthe, his son Gaetan, his daughter Mélanie and his father, Makashi. The identity of the perpetrators of these killings is not confirmed. In the night of 8 to 9 March, nine other people were killed in Murara, also in Rutobwe; the victims included Blandine, a woman in her eighties, several schoolchildren, and Kamananga, aged about six. In this case, local sources have identified several local RPA soldiers who they believe may have been involved in the attack.

On 10 April, more than 20 people were reportedly killed with traditional weapons after being made to gather inside a house in Musambira commune, in Gitarama. They included Gérard Habimana, his wife Nyirakimonyo and their three children; Benoit Murihano, his wife Mukankinzi and their five children, Catherine Urayeneza, her two sons and two daughters; and Bélancile Mujawayezu. The killings were attributed to insurgents. However, some local sources have claimed that they were carried out with the complicity of RPA soldiers from the region who may have been acting in revenge for the killing of members of their own families during the genocide.

The following evening, on 11 April, the préfet of Gitarama, Désiré Nyandwi, narrowly escaped being killed as his car was shot at in Nyamabuye commune. His driver was killed, as were several other people travelling in two separate vehicles which were reportedly set on fire; the victims included three women. The identity of the perpetrators is not confirmed.

Discoveries of unidentified dead bodies

A number of mostly unidentified dead bodies have been discovered in various parts of Rwanda. This phenomenon appeared to intensify in Kigali and its outskirts around the end of December 1997 and January 1998. One man counted 12 unidentified bodies found in the streets of Kigali over a three-week period, around Christmas and New Year. Some had had their throats slit, others had been decapitated, others had been knifed in the back. Around November 1997, eight bodies were reportedly found near a Roman Catholic youth centre in Gikoro, in Kigali; the bodies bore gunshot wounds. If the families of the deceased can't be identified or located, the bodies are simply buried. In most cases, it is believed that the victims were not killed on the spot where they were found, but that their bodies were dumped there. The government has stated that it is investigating these deaths but the conclusions of its investigations are not known.

One of the rare cases where a body found in these circumstances is known to have been identified is that of Placide Rurangirwa, a man in his thirties from Ruhengeri, who was last seen on 1 January 1998 at Gisozi, near a military camp in Kigali. His dead body was discovered the following day.

Dead bodies have also been found in other parts of the country. In late December 1997 and January 1998, more than 30 unidentified bodies were found in three separate locations in the eastern region of Umutara (see Part II.3 above). In the regions affected by the armed conflict in the northwest, the discovery of dead and sometimes mutilated bodies is a common occurrence. According to local residents of Gisenyi, bodies are often found washed up on the shores of Lake Kivu.

IV. THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO DENUNCIATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

IV.1 The government's response to Amnesty International

In February 1998, Amnesty International held meetings with Rwandese government authorities and members of the security forces, including several senior officials in the President's Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Military Prosecutor and the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie. Amnesty International delegates raised the organization's concerns about the human rights situation in Rwanda, as well as specific cases of killings and "disappearances", including some of those mentioned above.

The reactions of the authorities varied. Some officials appeared genuinely committed to improving the human rights situation and assured Amnesty International that investigations into cases of killings and "disappearances" were underway, but highlighted that especially with "disappearances", it is often difficult to reach clear conclusions about the identity of the perpetrators. Others reacted in a more hostile manner, accusing Amnesty International of publishing false and unverified information in an attempt to tarnish the image of the Rwandese Government; they claimed that Amnesty International was working with opponents of the government. One official, referring to the organization's recent reports on Rwanda, warned that Amnesty International would get itself into a difficult situation if it continued publishing such reports.

Overall, the authorities claimed that the human rights situation was not as bad as portrayed in Amnesty International's and other organizations' reports and that significant steps were being made towards ensuring greater protection of human rights. They claimed that most killings of unarmed civilians were carried out by armed opposition groups. In cases attributed to RPA soldiers, they claimed that those killed were not civilians, but insurgents, or civilians actively supporting the insurgents. They stressed the difficulty in distinguishing civilians from insurgents, claiming that insurgents deliberately mingle with the local population. However, they did not acknowledge that even if some of those described as civilians were in fact insurgents, government forces have a legal responsibility not to kill anyone who does not pose an immediate threat to life, who is unarmed or is hors de combat.

Some authorities recognized that there had been cases where RPA soldiers had extrajudicially executed unarmed civilians. They claimed that such cases were followed up and those responsible brought to justice. The Military Prosecutor claimed that no known case of human rights abuse was left uninvestigated or unpunished. However, despite repeated requests from Amnesty International, the authorities have never provided details of the exact number of such cases where RPA soldiers have been arrested, charged and tried in connection with human rights violations, nor their identity or the specific crimes of which they were accused.

Among the few exceptions were two RPA soldiers who were summarily executed in January 1998 for their alleged role in two murder cases [12]. The authorities justified these summary executions - which took place without any form of judicial procedure - on the grounds that they would act as a deterrent. They provided assurances that summary executions would not continue.

In response to criticism of its research methodology, Amnesty International repeatedly asked for specific examples of cases which the authorities believed had been wrongly portrayed, and in what way. The authorities generally proved reluctant or unwilling to provide specific examples but continued to reiterate that Amnesty International's information was false. In response to assurances that the government was investigating all reported cases of extrajudicial executions, Amnesty International raised several examples of well-documented massacres attributed to RPA soldiers in 1997 and 1998 but received no reply from the authorities as to the progress or results of their investigations into these cases.

Since April 1998, relations between Amnesty International and the Rwandese Government have deteriorated. A diplomatic representative of the Rwandese Government refused to meet Amnesty International's Secretary General, on the grounds that the government was reviewing its relations with the organization. Nevertheless, Amnesty International will continue to seek to establish a meaningful dialogue with representatives of the Rwandese Government, in the belief that ongoing discussion on specific cases of human rights abuses and on effective ways of preventing further abuses is essential for the short and longer-term future of human rights protection in Rwanda.

IV.2 Restrictions on the UN Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda

The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda (UNHRFOR) was set up by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. According to the agreement between the Rwandese Government and the UN, its tasks include carrying out investigations into violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including possible acts of genocide; implementing programs in the area of administration of justice; working with others to re-establish confidence and facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons and the rebuilding of civil society; monitoring the ongoing human rights situation, helping redress existing problems and preventing possible human rights violations.

Since 1997, the UNHRFOR has experienced increasing difficulties in operating in the country. Widespread insecurity has meant that UNHRFOR staff can no longer carry out close monitoring of the human rights situation in certain areas; the regions where the largest numbers of killings of civilians and "disappearances" are taking place are now mostly inaccessible. For example, UNHRFOR staff rarely venture away from the towns or main roads in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Tight security precautions have remained in place since five staff members of UNHRFOR were killed in Cyangugu, in southwestern Rwanda, in February 1997 [13].

Relations between the UNHRFOR and the Rwandese Government have gradually deteriorated. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, visited Rwanda in December1997. In a statement issued at the end of her visit, she described the human rights situation as "bleak" and denounced serious human rights abuses by government forces and armed opposition groups. This statement was strongly criticized by the Rwandese Government who accused her, among other things, of gross misrepresentation of facts about the human rights situation.

The UNHRFOR suffered a further major setback in May 1998. On 7 May, the Rwandese Government decided to expel the UNHRFOR's press and information officer on the basis of criticisms he had expressed regarding the public execution of 22 people in Rwanda on 24 April. The government also decided to suspend the operation's activities until a review of its mandate was completed and requested that the head and deputy head of UNHRFOR return to Geneva for talks on the future of UNHRFOR. By early June, no formal agreement had been reached on the review of the mandate and all the UNHRFOR's activities remained frozen while discussions continued between the Rwandese authorities and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, with no immediate sign of a breakthrough.

The Rwandese Government had requested a joint review of the UNHRFOR mandate and suggested changes which involved removing the monitoring and reporting components of its work. It has argued that the task of monitoring should now be carried out not by an international organization, but by local organizations, including a newly-established but not yet functional National Commission for Human Rights. However, in the present situation in Rwanda, Amnesty International believes that it is unrealistic and in some circumstances impossible for Rwandese organizations to carry out this work, primarily for security reasons. For many months, local human rights organizations have been unable to investigate reported human rights abuses in many of the areas affected by the armed conflict; even investigations in other parts of the country are undertaken at great risk. Furthermore, there are as yet no clear guarantees that the National Commission for Human Rights or other human rights bodies set up by the government will be able to function freely, independently and impartially.

Amnesty International is particularly concerned about the Rwandese Government's pressure on the UNHRFOR to drop its monitoring work because UNHRFOR is one of the very few international organizations left monitoring the current human rights situation in Rwanda. For several years, under increasing difficulties and constraints, it has documented and published reports on human rights abuses by government forces and armed opposition groups. These reports form an essential part of the overall analysis of the human rights situation in Rwanda for the international community, including foreign governments and the media. Although in recent months, the UNHRFOR's reports have become rarer, its presence in the country is crucial in ensuring at least a minimal level of international scrutiny of the human rights situation, as well as providing assistance to Rwandese governmental and non-governmental organizations on the protection and promotion of human rights.

Amnesty International believes that in order to establish transparency and commitment to human rights, the Rwandese Government should allow the UNHRFOR to continue to perform all the tasks in its current mandate - including and especially monitoring ongoing human rights abuses - and should provide full cooperation to ensure that it can carry out these tasks. Amnesty International also encourages the UNHRFOR to continue and expand its programs of assistance to local human rights organizations and to other national institutions - including the judiciary - whose role it is to protect and promote human rights. Amnesty International believes that the two types of functions - monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation, and helping rebuild and strengthen local human rights organizations and institutions - are interlinked, as the reconstruction of a Rwandese society based on respect for human rights must necessarily include the explicit recognition of serious, ongoing human rights problems, where they exist, and the identification and implementation of measures which will help prevent further violations.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Amnesty International believes that despite the increase in grave human rights abuses in Rwanda in recent months, effective measures can still be taken by those in power to prevent further killings and "disappearances" and to begin restoring respect for human rights in Rwanda. Foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations also have a critical role to play in curbing these violations and persuading the Rwandese authorities that it is in their interests to implement the measures below. Amnesty International reminds all parties concerned that the human rights abuses illustrated in this report represent serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, in particular Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

The recommendations below are aimed in particular at preventing further "disappearances", extrajudicial executions and deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians. They reiterate and elaborate on some of the recommendations contained in earlier Amnesty International reports, the majority of which, regrettably, have not been implemented to date. Amnesty International also urges the authorities of Rwanda to adopt the appended 14-point programs for the prevention of "disappearances" and extrajudicial executions.

V.1 Investigation and prevention of "disappearances"

Agents of the Rwandese Government cannot be automatically held responsible for all cases of "disappearances" in Rwanda. However, the authorities have a responsibility to investigate all cases reported to them and take appropriate judicial and preventive action. In particular, Amnesty International refers the Rwandese Government to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 47/133 on 18 December 1992. Amnesty International is also urging foreign governments to assist the Rwandese Government by providing appropriate resources or expertise, as appropriate, in particular to assist with investigations.

Amnesty International appeals to the Rwandese Government to:

make clear that "disappearances" constitute a grave violation of human rights and that those found responsible for "disappearances" will be brought to justice;
undertake prompt and thorough investigations into cases of reported "disappearances" and keep the families of the "disappeared" informed of the progress and outcome of these investigations;

if the "disappeared" person is found to have died, an investigation should be carried out to establish the cause of death. The family should be allowed access to information relating to the death and should be allowed to be represented in the investigation. The body of the deceased should be restored to the family wherever possible;

allow international human rights and humanitarian organizations full access to all civilian and military detention centres to facilitate attempts to trace the "disappeared" and verify whether they are in detention. The authorities should keep systematic and accurate records of the whereabouts of detainees, including their transfer from one detention centre to another, and make these records publicly available;

ensure that no detainees are held in secret or unofficial detention centres;
stop the practice of detaining civilians in military detention centres.

V.2 Investigation and prevention of extrajudicial executions

The Rwandese authorities have denied that extrajudicial executions form part of government policy and have claimed that in instances where they have occurred, they have been the isolated actions of undisciplined soldiers. Nevertheless, the government remains accountable for all human rights violations committed by agents of the state, including killings of unarmed civilians by RPA soldiers in the context of the armed conflict.

The right to life is guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, both of which have been ratified by Rwanda. The killings of civilians which have taken place in the context of the armed conflict in Rwanda are also a violation of international humanitarian law, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

Amnesty International appeals to the Rwandese Government and the security forces - in particular those in command of the RPA - to implement the following measures fully and urgently in order to spare the lives of unarmed civilians who are taking no part in the armed conflict:

prohibit extrajudicial executions by members of the Rwandese security forces and ensure full implementation of the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions;

publicly and officially condemn extrajudicial executions, at the highest level, whenever they occur;

carry out thorough and independent investigations into reports of extrajudicial executions, make public the results of these investigations and ensure that individuals found responsible for ordering or carrying out extrajudicial executions are immediately suspended from their duties and brought to justice;

Amnesty International welcomes the fact that some members of the security forces have been arrested in connection with extrajudicial executions and urges the government to ensure that such steps are taken as a matter of routine, and not only on exceptional occasions. The government should disclose the number and identity of RPA soldiers arrested for alleged participation in extrajudicial executions, including details of the specific crimes of which they are accused and the progress of their case files. If charged, the individuals should be given a public trial in accordance with international standards of fairness, and without recourse to the death penalty;

ensure strict control over the chain of command in the RPA and instruct commanders at all levels to restrict the use of lethal force to situations where it is strictly unavoidable in order to protect life - as specified in Article 3 of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials - and then only to the minimum extent required under the circumstances. Officials should be instructed that they have the right and duty to refuse to obey any order to participate in an extrajudicial execution;

remind members of the security forces at all levels that it is their duty to protect the civilian population of Rwanda in its entirety;

take measures to prevent killings by armed Tutsi civilians and investigate reports of RPA soldiers' collaboration in such killings, including reports of distribution of arms to the population. RPA soldiers should intervene wherever possible to prevent such killings;

ensure that all members of the security forces are familiar with and trained in international standards on the conduct of law enforcement officials, including: the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Guidelines for the effective implementation of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.

V.3 Facilitating human rights investigations

Amnesty International appeals to the Rwandese authorities to allow and facilitate investigations by local and international human rights organizations into human rights abuses in Rwanda, whether committed by armed opposition groups or by the security forces. They should allow unrestricted access to all parts of the country and to civilian and military detention centres and provide their full cooperation in investigations into killings of unarmed civilians, "disappearances" and other human rights abuses.

In particular, Amnesty International urges the Rwandese Government to allow the UN Human Rights Field Operation to continue operating in the country and to enable it to carry out all the tasks currently in its mandate, including monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation.

V.4 Prevention of deliberate and arbitrary killings by armed opposition groups operating in Rwanda

Deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians and hostage-taking by armed opposition groups not only represent grave violations of international humanitarian law, but contribute to yet further violence by provoking reprisals by the Rwandese security forces and armed civilians in which yet further unarmed civilians are killed.

Leaders of armed opposition groups have an obligation to:

stop killing unarmed civilians and make clear to those under their command that deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians will not be tolerated;
instruct all those under their command to respect basic principles of international humanitarian law, as laid out in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. In particular, they should prevent the killing of non-combatants and those taking no direct part in the conflict. Suspected or real collaboration with the authorities can never be a justification for targeting unarmed civilians;

investigate and denounce deliberate and arbitrary killings committed by those under their command and provide public information about steps taken to prevent further such killings;

cooperate with investigations by the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda to identify and bring to justice those who played a leading role in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

V.5 Action by foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations

To date, few foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations have taken significant action to try to prevent a further deterioration of the human rights situation in Rwanda, or even publicly acknowledged the scale and gravity of ongoing human rights. Most of those who have made statements about the human rights situation have tended to restrict their comments to denunciation of abuses by armed opposition groups, while playing down or remaining silent on human rights violations by the Rwandese security forces. Amnesty International is appealing to foreign governments - including regional governments - as well as intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, to:

make every effort to obtain accurate and independent information on the current human rights situation in Rwanda and ensure that policy decisions are based on a full picture of the situation;

publicly condemn the widespread human rights abuses taking place in Rwanda and in particular, the deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians by all parties to the conflict;

exert whatever influence they can over the Rwandese Government, security forces and armed opposition groups to respect international human rights and humanitarian law and implement the recommendations listed above;

request the Rwandese Government to provide regular and up-to-date information on action taken to prevent further "disappearances" and extrajudicial executions, including details of the progress of investigations and action taken to bring to justice those found responsible;

provide appropriate assistance to the authorities in carrying out such investigations, in cases where investigations are hampered by lack of resources or expertise;

in particular, assist in initiating and carrying out independent investigations into specific cases of large-scale killings, such as the reported massacre of as many as several thousand people in Nyakimana cave, in Kanama, in Gisenyi, in October 1997; provide the necessary expertise and equipment for such investigations to be carried out as soon as possible and ensure that the findings are made public;
urge the Rwandese Government to lift the suspension on the activities of the UNHRFOR, to allow it to continue operating in the country and enable it to carry out all the tasks currently in its mandate, including monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation;

prevent supplies of light weapons and other types of military, security or police equipment to Rwanda, or allied forces, which would be used by the Rwandese security forces or by armed opposition groups to commit human rights abuses. Given the persistent and well-documented patterns of arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians by all parties to the conflict in Rwanda, it is clear that in the present situation, such equipment is likely to contribute directly to further human rights abuses.
Security equipment classed as "non-lethal" (such as military transport, including armoured vehicles and helicopters) is also being used to facilitate human rights abuses, especially in remote areas of the country, and should not be supplied to either side.

Governments which decide to authorize the transfer of other types of military, security or police equipment or services to Rwanda - on the basis that they are certain no serious human rights abuses will result from these transfers - should only do so if the use of those transfers will and can be monitored effectively. If serious human rights abuses are carried out using such transfers, the supply contracts should be cancelled immediately.

support the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry into arms transfers to the former Rwandese armed forces and urge the UN Security Council to extend its mandate to cover all arms transfers which are being used for grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights standards in Rwanda. This would include a mandate to investigate and report on transfers to the current Rwandese security forces, as well as to armed opposition groups. In view of close political and military relations between countries in the region, the Commission should also carry out in-depth investigations into arms and military equipment supplied to Rwanda from or through the security forces and armed opposition groups of Burundi, DRC and Uganda, as well as other neighbouring countries.

-ensure that training they may be providing to members of the Rwandese security forces includes training in international human rights and humanitarian standards and in the practical implementation of these standards.

****
(1) See Amnesty International reports "Rwanda: Ending the Silence" (25 September 1997, AI Index AFR 47/32/97) and "Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict" (19 December 1997, AI Index AFR 47/43/97).

(2) Rwanda is divided into 12 préfectures (regions), which are divided into communes (districts), in turn divided into secteurs (sectors); secteurs are further divided into cellules (cells). The French terms are used throughout this report to enable precise references to the locations.

(3) See in particular Amnesty International news releases "Rwanda: 23 public executions will harm hope of reconciliation" (22 April 1998, AI Index AFR 47/12/98), "Rwanda: Major step back for human rights as Rwanda stages 22 public executions" (24 April 1998, AI Index AFR 47/14/98) and Urgent Action UA 126/98 (22 April 1998) and update (27 April 1998).

(4) See Amnesty International Urgent Action 248/97 (31 July 1997, AI Index AFR 26/01/98) and updates of 11 August 1997, 12 August 1997 and 12 September 1997.

(5) See in particular "Rwanda: Ending the Silence" (25 September 1997, AI Index AFR 47/32/97) and "Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict" (19 December 1997, AI Index AFR 47/43/97). These reports also provide background information on the armed conflict taking place in the northwest of Rwanda.

(6) For examples of arms supplies to the former Rwandese armed forces in 1994 and 1995, see the Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Arming the perpetrators of the genocide" (13 June 1995, AI Index AFR 02/14/95).

(7) RPA officers had previously attended an aviation and helicopter training course in South Africa in October 1996, as mentioned in the Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Ending the Silence" (25 September 1997, AI Index AFR 47/32/97).

(8) Some examples are given in the Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict" (19 December 1997, AFR 47/43/97).

(9) Some details of military relations between the USA and Rwanda are contained in the Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Ending the Silence" (25 September 1997, AFR 47/32/97).

(10) Major developments since 1996 include the attacks on the refugee camps in the former Zaire, carried out by the AFDL and RPA soldiers, in which tens of thousands of Rwandese refugees were killed or "disappeared"; the subsequent change of government in the former Zaire - now Democratic Republic of Congo - after the AFDL and its allies overthrew the government of former President Mobutu; the forced repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese refugees from the former Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi; and the significant escalation of the armed conflict inside Rwanda.

(11) For details of this massacre, see Part III.2 of the Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict" (19 December 1997, AI Index AFR 47/43/98).

(12) For details of these cases, see Amnesty International Urgent Action 17/98 (19 January 1998, AFR 47/03/98) and update (3 February 1998, AFR 47/06/98).

(13) For details, see Part II.10 of Amnesty International's report "Rwanda: Ending the Silence", 25 September 1997

(AI Index AFR 47/32/97). Six people accused of taking part in the killing of the five UNHRFOR members were sentenced to death by a court in Cyangugu in late May 1998.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 19:17 0 comments
Labels: Rwanda
Open Letter from Professor Reyntjens to Hassan Jallow.
ANTWERP

11 January 2005

Mr. Hassan B. Jallow

Prosecutor, ICTR
P.O. Box 6016
Arusha, Tanzania

Dear Mr. Jallow,

When discussing the need to prosecute RPF suspects during a conversation we had in September 2004, you told me you were about to review the evidence and make a determination on this issue. With the ICTR’s completion strategy in mind, I contacted you again around the end of the year to inquire about progress. On 6 January 2005 you informed me that you were unable to disclose whether you had come to a decision or what that decision would be. Of course, I accept and respect your position.

However, having co-operated with the ICTR and your office since 1995, the failure to prosecute RPF suspects puts me before a grave moral dilemma. During a previous visit to Arusha in April 2003, I met with the “Special Investigations” team, which has gathered compelling evidence on a number of massacres committed by the RPF in 1994. These crimes fall squarely within the mandate of the ICTR, they are well documented, testimonial and material proof is available, and the identity of RPF suspects is known. If they are left unprosecuted, the ICTR will have failed to eliminate one of the root causes of genocide and other crimes - impunity. Indeed, it is precisely because the regime in Kigali has been given a sense of impunity that, during the years following 1994, it has committed massive internationally recognised crimes in both Rwanda and the DRC. Article 6(2) of the Statute explicitly rules out immunity, including for Heads of state or government or for responsible government officials. This principle is contravened when, as is currently the case, a message is sent out that those in power need not fear prosecution. In addition, by meting out victor’s justice, the ICTR fails to meet another stated objective, namely to "“contribute to the process of national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace”.

Under these circumstances, the ICTR risks being part of the problem rather than of the solution. While I remain committed to the cause which is at the heart of the mandate of the ICTR, on ethical grounds I cannot any longer be involved in this process. I shall, therefore, not be able to co-operate with the OTP unless and until the first RPF suspect is indicted.

In order to avoid possible misunderstanding, there is one point I must make clear. I do not intend with this position to exert pressure on you or your office. Not only would such an attempt be futile, but it would also run counter to my own conviction, as I have in the past denounced the pressures, and indeed the blackmail, exerted on the Prosecutor by the Rwandan government. Your office must function in total independence and not be influenced by my personal moral considerations.

Allow me to wish you a prosperous and productive new year.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Filip Reyntjens
Posted by WNJ Editor at 19:09 0 comments
Labels: ICTR, Rwanda
Book's allegations called 'ridiculous.'
National Post
March 31, 2005
By Isabel Vincent

The United Nations former special envoy to Rwanda has denounced Canadian general Romeo Dallaire's role during the 1994 genocide as "a total fiasco" in his memoirs, which will be released in Canada next week.

Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, a former career diplomat from Cameroon and the leader of the United Nations Mission for Assistance to Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993 and 1994, also accuses General Dallaire of aiding the rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi-dominated group that toppled the Hutu regime in July, 1994.

General Dallaire, author of his own bestselling memoirs about his time in Rwanda -- Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda -- was recently appointed to the Senate. He could not be reached for comment yesterday. His assistant in Rwanda yesterday dismissed the allegations in the new book.

In a news conference in Paris yesterday for his book Le Patron de Dallaire Parle: Revelations sur les derives d'un general de l'ONU au Rwanda (Dallaire's Boss Speaks), Mr. Booh Booh also said Gen. Dallaire did not report to him the events of April 6, 1994, that resulted in the beginning of the Rwandan genocide.

On that day, the former Rwandan president Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was killed in a plane crash near Kigali.

The event triggered mass killing in the country as the Rwandan military, helped by Hutu civilians, went on a rampage, killing some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus by June, 1994.

"I wrote the book to denounce the megalomania of a UN general who likens himself to General [Douglas] MacArthur," Mr. Booh Booh said in a press statement released by his French publisher, Editions Duboiris yesterday.

"I don't know how Mr. Booh Booh can make any of these accusations since he never came to UN headquarters in Kigali after April 6," said Major Brent Beardsley, a researcher at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute and personal staff officer to Gen. Dallaire in Rwanda from July, 1993, until May, 1994. Major Beardsley is also co-author of Gen. Dallaire's book.

"I can categorically deny that we gave intelligence to the RPF," he said. "The idea that we had any kind of intelligence to give in the situation we were in is ridiculous."

According to Shake Hands With the Devil, Gen. Dallaire struggled for months to convince UN officials in New York that ethnic violence was growing in Rwanda and called for reinforcements that never arrived.

"Booh Booh never helped the situation," Maj. Beardsley said. "He never came up with political solutions to try to break the political stalemate. He had no political plan, no political mission."

Indeed, Mr. Booh Booh is portrayed as a do-nothing diplomat in Gen. Dallaire's book.

''To my surprise and chagrin, he turned out to be a proper gentleman who kept diplomatic working hours," Gen. Dallaire wrote of his former boss. "He was not involved in helping me deal with the fallout of the massacres and the propaganda wars they were provoking.

"He was rarely in his office before 10, took a full two-hour lunch and left the office before 5. He made it clear that he was not to be tracked down and disturbed on the weekends unless there was a dire emergency."

According to a report on the Rwandan genocide by Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization, Mr. Booh Booh played down the escalating violence in the months before the genocide in his briefings to UN headquarters in New York.

"In preparing briefings for the Security Council, the Secretariat favored Booh Booh's interpretation, which gave no sense of the systematic and ethnically based nature of the killing," the Human Rights Watch report says.

Among the other accusations in Mr. Booh Booh's book are that Gen. Dallaire did not inform him and the United Nations of the assassination of 10 Belgian officers under his command.

The murder of the Belgian officers on the eve of the genocide is one of the most controversial events related to Gen. Dallaire's tenure as force commander of UNAMIR.

Maj. Beardsley dismissed the accusation yesterday, calling it "a big piece of fiction." According to Maj. Beardsley, Mr. Booh Booh is well known as an "incompetent" leader who was sent to Rwanda by his friend, the then secretary-general Boutros-Boutros Ghali. He rarely showed up at UN headquarters in Kigali and on April 7, 1994, as the country plunged into chaos, he took over an entire floor of a Kigali hotel.

"He was there to milk the UN system, and Dallaire was loyal to him like a good soldier," said Maj. Beardsley, who alleges Mr. Booh Booh used the UN's budget in Rwanda to buy a Mercedes from Germany and Persian carpets for his residence in Kigali while Gen. Dallaire could not obtain an ambulance or military vehicles for his soldiers.

The UNAMIR force lacked even the most basic supplies, such as paper and desks, he said.

Mr. Booh Booh also claims in his book that Gen. Dallaire had set up microphones at the UN headquarters in Kigali to secretly tape his conversations.

Maj. Beardsley laughed when he heard the accusation.

"Where would we get microphones?" he said. "I sat there some days without paper. I wiped my backside with old Maclean's magazines."

Mr. Booh Booh was eventually fired as special envoy to Rwanda because he left the country in May, 1994, about a month into the genocide, without UN permission.

Although many military and UN analysts dismissed the allegations against Gen. Dallaire in Mr. Booh Booh's book, they all said they are eager to read it.

"Booh Booh's book is probably the only other first-person account of what went on within UNAMIR," said Major-General (retired) Lewis Mackenzie, a former UN commander of peacekeeping in Sarajevo.

"If Romeo was planting listening devices, good for him," Gen. Mackenzie said.

"If he had more experience with the UN, he should have gotten on a plane to New York and had Booh Booh's ass fired."
Posted by WNJ Editor at 18:37 0 comments
Labels: Canada, Rwanda, UN, UNAMIR
ICTR Seems Unaware of Contempt.
Hirondelle News Agency
19 October 2007

As charges of false testimony or of pressuring a witness called before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda finally start to appear in Arusha, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has already tried several of these acts considered as "contempt of the tribunal".

Since 1993, nearly twenty cases have been brought before The Hague tribunal and several convictions have been delivered. Lawyers, defendants, witnesses and journalists have been prosecuted, creating a jurisprudence closely observed by non-governmental organizations and the International Criminal Court (CPI). Because the cases of contempt primarily relate to the protection of witnesses.

The most renowned of the cases before the ICTY led to the sentence to four months in prison, in May 2005, of Beqë Beqaj, found guilty "to have knowingly and deliberately pressured a witness". Alerted by the protected witness B1, the prosecutor had placed the telephone of the latter under surveillance, and intercepted a call from Beqë Beqaj and concluded that he had acted on behalf of two defendants, the Albanian commanders from Kosovo Fatmir Limaj and Isaak Musliu.

Strangely, the two men were later acquitted of the charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, notably for lack of relevant evidence presented by the prosecution. However, in this case, as in that presently against Ramush Haradinaj, the former Prime Minister of Kosovo, the prosecutor has to issue tens of summonses to appear and faced witnesses that became mute on the stand.

In September, the prosecutor opened an investigation, still in progress, for contempt, after a witness refused to answer the prosecution’s questions, and then left the Netherlands at night, between two hearings.

In addition to this case, several lawyers were prosecuted for having revealed the names of protected witnesses. Sentenced to pay 4000 Dutch guilders, the lawyer of General Blaskic, Ante Nobilo, his fine was lowered in appeal. The defendant Dusko Tadic had asked for, without success, the revision of his trial after the sentence of his lawyer, Milan Vujin, to pay 15 000 guilders, for intimidation of witnesses.

More recently, The Hague tribunal prosecuted six Croatian journalists, accused of having revealed the identity of a protected witnesses and the contents of closed session hearings. Among these defendants, Josip Jovic, editor of the weekly magazine Slobodna Dalmacija, was sentenced to pay 20 000 euros. The journalist had published extracts of the closed session testimony of Croatian President Stjepan Mesic, who had testified under a pseudonym in the trial of General Blaskic.

But the severity of the sentence, which can go up to seven years in prison and 100 000 euros in fine, especially aimed at punishing these provocations towards the tribunal. Josip Jovic had received an order from the judges to cease any publication, but the journalist had denounced in his columns a decision "filled with arrogance" qualified as "aggression against law" and a few days later had published, "in spite of the incurred risks", new extracts of the closed session testimony of the Croatian president. The judges had estimated that it "does not belong to persons, not even journalists, to decide to publish, with the contempt of such orders, of information of which they estimate are of public interest ".

However, the decision of the judges also reveals the abuses observed within the two tribunals in the protection procedures concerning the representatives of countries called to testify and protected by "national security". If tomorrow, "Jacques Chirac, Bill Clinton or Paul Kagame were to testify on the witness’ stand, under a pseudonym and in closed session, the orders of the tribunal would undoubtedly fall on deaf ears", assures a journalist.

The prosecution for contempt also occasionally demonstrated ruthless practices. Thus, in the Milosevic case, the witness Kosta Bulatovic had been prosecuted for having refused, with vehemence, to be questioned by the prosecutor, a question "of honour" he asserted, in the absence of Slobodan Milosevic, then sick. Instead of judging the case as being “red handed", the judges had led a conventional trial, without worrying about being at the same time judges and parties to the case, and the man was sentenced to four months in prison and two years probation, without the appeal judges finding, later, matter for conflict of interest.

For the tribunal of the former Yugoslavia, the prosecutions for contempt aim at "protecting the interests of justice". Before the ad hoc tribunals, Nuremberg had already planned to sanction "the disturbers". But have disturbers never pressed the tribunal in Arusha? If several investigations were opened, none has, to date, led to a conviction. In the Kajelijeli case, the judges had estimated, in 2001, that any interference with the witnesses could be sanctioned "only if it is abusive". An interpretation that is very different from that used at the ICTY.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 18:34 0 comments
Labels: Croatia, ICTR, ICTY, Kosovo, Rwanda, Serbia
Mozambique pushes ahead with $5 billion refinery.
Reuters
20 October 2007

By Charles Mangwiro

MAPUTO (Reuters) - Mozambique and U.S. firm Ayr Logistics have sealed a $5 billion deal for the construction of an oil refinery in the energy-hungry southern African nation, Mozambican officials said on Thursday.

The refinery, which will be based in Nacala-a-Velha in the country's impoverished Nampula province, received government approval earlier this month. It is expected to produce 300,000 barrels of refined fuel a day when operational in 2015.

Mozambican Energy Minister Salvador Namburete told Reuters about a third of the production would be used to supply the domestic market and the remainder exported, primarily to other nations in southern Africa.

"Our hopes for the project are very high. It will have a strong social and economic impact not only in the country but also within the southern African region, given the strategic nature of its production," Namburete told Reuters.

The refinery, which will be about 70-percent owned by Ayr Logistics, a firm registered in Texas, could help ease an energy crunch in Mozambique, which has enjoyed an economic boom since the end of a 17-year civil war in 1992.

The former Portuguese colony has limited energy supplies, making it reliant on foreign oil and gas. It also has faced rising petrol prices and frequent shortages at pumps, prompting fears that its economic growth could slow.

Some 450 Mozambicans will work at the refinery, which will be located near Nacala, one of the deepest water ports in Africa. Crude oil for the refinery is likely to be unloaded at the port and then transported to the facility.

It is expected that an undisclosed number of foreign workers will assist with the training of staff at the refinery.

Editor's Note: Ayr is also involved in constructing a large silcon refinery in South Africa and hospitals in Ethiopia. They also do work with the US Army Corps. of Engineers.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 17:47 0 comments
Labels: Mozambique, Oil, United States
GOSS Claims North Not Involving South in Oil Policy.
Gulf News
By Abdul Nabi Shaheen, Correspondent
October 20, 2007

Sudan's Federal State Minister for Energy and Mining Angelina Teny has called for the appointment of representatives from the Government of Southern Sudan in the team assigned to market and sell Sudan's oil on international markets.

In an exclusive interview with Gulf News, the Sudanese official said: "[The Government of Southern Sudan] GoSS was not allowed any representation at the strategic stages of oil production and overseas marketing. GoSS is only represented through the so-called [oil accounts committee] which divides the quotas based upon figures."

Excerpts of the interview:

Q. What are SPLM's plans for developing Southern Sudan? And what are your priorities at this stage?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


ANGELINA TENY: As I'll speak in my capacity as [Sudan People's Liberation Movement] SPLM member and not as a Federal State Minister, I would like to say that SPLM has a conviction that it will meet its objectives in building a new Sudan through sustainable and balanced development and fair distribution of wealth not only in Southern Sudan but in the whole of Sudan.

This will be done through 'Peace through Development', a slogan adopted by SPLM. As for the South, SPLM is currently working for the reconstruction of health, education, and power sectors and all infrastructure destroyed by the war.

What are the efforts being exerted by GoSS and SPLM to make unity attractive or to maintain unity between southern and northern Sudan? What are your plans for that?

SPLM's philosophy is based upon building a united Sudan and solving all its problems. The movement is working for unity and not separation as some alleged.

SPLM believes that Nivasha agreement is valid for solving Sudan's political, economic and developmental problems. As a result, we often enter into a heated discussion with our ruling partner, the National Congress Party [NCP], about the completion of the implementation of all articles of the agreement on the forefront of which is the dispute over Abyei, the demarcation of borders between the North and the South, and the oil dossier. ...

SPLM is also working for ... a democratic transfer as this would have a significant role in making unity attractive for all Sudanese.

If the ruling partners, SPLM and [NCP], succeed in implementing the articles stipulated in the peace agreement regarding a democratic transfer according to the timetable [before] the elections in 2009, it will pave the way to make Sudan's unity an attractive option.

Who is then responsible for making Sudan's unity an attractive option when the scheduled referendum on unity and separation will be carried out, the National Congress Party or SPLM?

The responsibility of making unity attractive falls mainly on the Sudanese people themselves who should monitor the performance of the government. The responsibility in making unity attractive falls on the southern government who should enlighten its citizens about the importance of unity and the dangers of separation.

The biggest role in making unity an attractive option for southerners lies on the shoulders of the federal government in Khartoum. The government has to change many of its negative behaviours. We believe that [NCP], is procrastinating in the implementation of the Nivasha peace agreement, a matter that makes unity not an attractive option for the citizens of southern Sudan.

The most important reasons here is the non-withdrawal of the army from oil production facilities in southern Sudan though the withdrawal date was set for July 9. ... According to the [Nivasha] agreement, most of the responsibility for protection [of oil facilities] falls on SPLM and army.

What about the fate of northerners who are members of SPLM and investment companies that belong to the northern Sudanese operating in the South, in case the South became an independent state, and what will be the fate of investments of northern Sudanese in the South?

SPLM is a national party and aims at transforming Sudan into a democratic state. ... Even if two states are formed in the North and the South, SPLM would maintain presence in the two states.

What are the differences between SPLM and NCP on issues of oil, estimated production and fair distribution?

GoSS is suspicious about the figures announced by the federal government in Khartoum regarding the volume of oil production, which is gradually increasing. GoSS is uncertain about the oil production figures released by the federal government and also feels that its quota is not fair. ...GoSS was not given any representation at the strategic stages of oil production and overseas marketing.

Is it true that you are 'kept away' regarding oil, as Deng Alore, the Cabinet Affairs Minister said, though you are the State Minister for Energy?

If GoSS is not represented in the oil production and marketing strategic phases and I'm a minister based in Khartoum and all facts and information are with personnel working on the ground, and if we have no genuine partnership at all oil process stages as I have mentioned, this means I was kept absent.

Some see that that GoSS and SPLM are working on attracting investment from African countries like Kenya, Uganda and South Africa at the expense of investments from Arab countries, an indication of your rejection of Arabs?

There is absolutely no rejection of ... Arab investment. Before the formation of the National Unity Government based upon Nivasha accord and before the formation of GoSS, the former southern Sudan's government maintained good relations with some GCC states. People believe that the South is having more investment relations with African states than the Arabs because the South is adjacent to these African states and its ports are nearer.

Do you welcome GCC companies to operate and invest in oil and petrochemicals in southern Sudan?

We do welcome these companies and grant them legal guarantees. Southern Sudan has huge investment opportunities at the oil and petrochemical sectors as all refineries are based in the North.

What are the investment opportunities available to businessmen and investors from the UAE in particular?

Southern Sudan is rich in untapped mineral resources. Kaboita in Southern Bahar Al Gazzal state and Al Booma in Upper Nile state are rich in gold ... GoSS urged investors from the UAE in particular, to benefit from the investment opportunities in southern Sudan.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:39 0 comments
Labels: Oil, SPLM, Sudan, United Arab Emirates
Pak., Iran talks on IPI enter final phase
The Hindu
20 October 2007
October 2007

Editor's Note: Finalizing this deal would be a big boost for Iran. Pakistan and India, both supporters of the US (at least in part), would not be keen on the US attacking Iran and disrupting this project. The lost of Pakistan's regional support, especially from a vastly predominant Muslim country, would be a political blow.

Talks between Pakistan and Iran on technical details of a gas pipeline involving the two countries and India on Friday entered the "final phase" as most issues relating to the project have been been resolved.

Tehran's Special Representative for the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, Ghanimi Fard, called on Pakistan Petroleum Minister, Amanullah Khan Jadoon, and expressed satisfaction at progress on the project and said its early implementation would strengthen and expand economic and trade relations in the region.

On-going negotiations between Iranian and Pakistani officials here on the $7 billion pipeline project have entered the "final phase" as most issues linked to it have been resolved, state-run APP news agency said without giving details.

Fard and Jadoon discussed measures to promote cooperation in the oil and gas sector between the two countries. Jadoon said such cooperation would open new vistas for the mutual advantage for both sides.

He invited Iranian companies to avail of investment opportunities to set up oil refineries as well as petro-chemical and oil and gas exploration projects.

Fard said the IPI pipeline project would bring the member states closer.

Pakistan and Iran are close to finalising a gas purchase agreement for the pipeline during the on-going talks here, media reports said.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:21 0 comments
Labels: India, Iran, Oil, Pakistan
Kurds Demand US Defense
Washington Post
19 October 2007

Kurdish leaders said yesterday the United States is obliged by a U.N. resolution to defend them in the event that Turkish forces invade northern Iraq in pursuit of members of a Kurdish rebel movement.

They also said they will continue to sign oil contracts with international companies while awaiting passage of an Iraqi oil law, despite objections from Baghdad and the State Department.

"The U.S. forces are mandated by the United Nations to protect Iraq's sovereignty and defend Iraq's people," said Qubad Talabani, the Kurdistan Regional Government's representative in Washington.

But Mr. Talabani, who was accompanied by the head of the Kurdistan government's foreign relations department, said he is worried the United States might not fulfill that commitment.

"We would like stronger reassurances by the United States that they would defend the Iraqi people, be it in the south, north or center, if they were threatened in any way," Mr. Talabani told editors and reporters at The Washington Times.

The officials likely referenced Security Council Resolution 1546, which gives multinational forces in Iraq the authority "to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq."

In an accompanying letter, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said the international force will "undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security" in Iraq.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said at a later press conference that the United States wants to help end a wave of attacks inside Turkey, but there is a lack of solid information as to where the Kurdish rebels operate from.

Kurdistan claims the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, has splintered into a number of factions and that the militants staging attacks in Turkey are based in that country. The Turks claim the PKK — identified by the United States as a terrorist group — is operating from bases in northern Iraq.

"We want to help the Turks with the PKK," said Mr. Gates. "We recognize that Turks are being killed by this organization.

"It is partly a matter of intelligence and how specific the information we can get is. I think that if we were to come up with specific information, that we and the Iraqis would be prepared to do the appropriate thing."

Frustrated by constant PKK attacks, which have left 40,000 dead in the last 20 years, Turkey on Wednesday authorized its troops to cross into northern Iraq to hunt down the militants. Thousands of Kurds took to the streets yesterday to protest that decision, the Associated Press reported.

Ankara called on the United States to defuse the situation by detaining and extraditing PKK members from northern Iraq. But the United States has a very limited military presence in Kurdistan because of the relative security and stability in the region.

A State Department official said there has been no formal request from Turkey to arrest PKK members and noted that Washington has encouraged Turkey and Iraq to cooperate on the issue.

Mr. Talabani and Falah Mustafa Bakir, foreign relations minister in the regional government, warned that the economic and political haven that Kurdistan has provided in Iraq easily can be disrupted if Turkey invades.

"There will be dire consequences. This is the only safe and secure part of Iraq that is supporting the U.S. efforts," said Mr. Talabani, who is the son of Iraqi president Jalal Talabani.

Mr. Bakir said 80 percent of the large-scale investment in Kurdistan comes from Turkey, and that there are between 200 and 300 small, medium and large Turkish companies working in Kurdistan's public and private sector.

Any military incursion would probably cause those investors to leave, he said.

With its own government, security forces and controlled entry points, Kurdistan has pushed forward with its economic development while avoiding most of the ethnic, sectarian and criminal conflict that is killing thousands elsewhere in Iraq.

On Sept. 8, the regional government signed a production-sharing agreement with a subsidiary of Hunt Oil Co. of Dallas and Impulse Energy Corp. to explore for oil in the Kurdistan region of Duhuk. The deal was criticized this week by the State Department.

"Hunt Oil has been advised of U.S. policy urging companies not to sign oil contracts with the Kurdistan Regional Government until [an Iraqi] national oil law is passed, as well as the potential political and legal risks inherent in such a contract," spokesman Tom Casey said Tuesday.

But Mr. Talabani said Washington cannot expect Kurdistan just to sit on its hands. "Why should we be put on hold? This is a success story for Iraq. The United States should be pleased," he said.

He said his government will continue to sign contracts with any American companies that are interested. Kurdistan is "open for business," he said.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:07 0 comments
Labels: Iraq, Kurdistan, Oil, Turkey, United States
Blackwater attempted to take Iraqi military aircraft out of Iraq; US Congress wants answers.
Associated Press
19 October 2007

Blackwater USA tried to take at least two Iraqi military aircraft out of Iraq two years ago and refused to give the planes back when Iraqi officials sought to reclaim them, according to a congressional committee investigating the private security contractor.

Democratic Rep. Henry Waxman, chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, wants the company to provide all documents related to the attempted shipment and to explain where the aircraft are now.

In a letter sent Friday to Erik Prince, Blackwater's top executive, Waxman said he learned of the 2005 attempt from a military official who contacted the committee. That official is not identified in the letter, nor is the type of aircraft.

Waxman also is seeking a sweeping amount of information about Blackwater's business, including its contracts with the federal government, profits made since the company was founded a decade ago, Prince's personal earnings since 2001, and details about the payments to the families of Iraqis killed by Blackwater personnel.

Blackwater spokeswoman Anne Tyrrell said the company is cooperating with the committee but declined to comment further.

When Prince testified before the oversight committee on Oct. 2, he was asked to disclose financial data but declined to do so in an open setting, noting it would give his competitors an unfair edge.

"We're a private company and there's a key word there — private," Prince said.

In addition to his seven-page letter to Prince, Waxman also sent letters Friday to Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice seeking more information on Blackwater and its overseas operations.

Blackwater and two other security contractors share a $571 million (€400 million) annual contract to protect diplomats and others in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and other countries. The Iraq share of the contract accounts for about $520 million (€364 million) and the bulk of that total goes to Blackwater.

Waxman wants Rice to supply the oversight committee with particulars about a 2004 contract Blackwater received from State on a noncompetitive basis in 2004. He also wants investigative reports and any other documents related to the discharge of weapons and improper or unprofessional behavior by Blackwater personnel.

From Gates, Waxman wants records and individuals with specifics about a Sept. 16 shooting in Baghdad involving Blackwater guards that left 17 Iraqis dead and a Dec. 24, 2006, incident in which a Blackwater guard killed an Iraqi security worker.

The guard, Andrew Moonen, was subsequently flown out of Iraq and fired by Blackwater. The Justice Department is continuing to investigate the case.

In all three letters, Waxman wants the information provided by Nov. 2.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:01 0 comments
Labels: Iraq, Private Military Companies, United States
Kagame Blames UNSC.

Kagamé critique l'ONU
Uploaded by LiliTheKing
Posted by WNJ Editor at 05:31 0 comments
Labels: Kagame, Rwanda, UN, UNAMIR
Reports of killings and abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, April - August 1994.
Amnesty International
20 October 1994
AI Index: AFR 47/016/1994
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470161994?open&of=ENG-RWA

1. Introduction

The Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA)(1), Rwanda's new national army which until July 1994 was the armed wing of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), has the reputation of being much better organized and disciplined than the security forces of the former government(2) it overthrew in July 1994. Soldiers and militia of the former government are reported to have killed 500,0000 or more members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group and its opponents from the majority Hutu ethnic group between April and July 1994. Given the horrendous scale of massacres committed by forces loyal to the former government, there could never be any comparison between those massacres and other human rights abuses committed by the RPA(3). Nevertheless, this fact should not be allowed to prevent the truth about alleged RPA abuses from being uncovered and, where appropriate, action being immediately taken to bring those responsible to justice and to prevent such abuses from recurring. Although it is generally unclear whether human rights abuses by the RPA are ordered or condoned by top government and security officials, it is incumbent on them to take action to prevent the abuses and to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

Reports of abuses by the RPA have already been exploited as political propaganda by supporters of the former government. This report may also be exploited for partisan propaganda by some of the very people who were responsible for genocide between April and July 1994. However, Amnesty International considers it unacceptable to allow killings and other human rights violations by the RPA to pass in silence with the risk that they could escalate and continue unchecked.

Amnesty International has known for several years that the RPF closely monitored and controlled movements of foreigners in areas under its control. Journalists and representatives of humanitarian organizations rarely talked to Rwandese citizens under RPF control without an RPF official being present. This ensured that before the new government came to power on 19 July 1994 very limited information about abuses by the RPA could be gathered or made public by independent observers. However, Amnesty International has received numerous reports of human rights abuses committed by the RPA since the war in Rwanda began in October 1990. These have included hundreds of deliberate and arbitrary killings(4) or possible extrajudicial executions(5), and "disappearances" of captured combatants and unarmed civilians suspected of supporting the former government. There have also been reports of civilian supporters of the RPF being allowed to kill opponents. In addition to these killings, many prisoners held by the RPA have been subjected to a particularly painful form of tying known in Uganda as kandoya(6) or "three-piece-tying", with the victim's arms tied above the elbows behind the back. Kandoya sometimes results in permanent injury and constitutes a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, prohibited under the terms of international human rights agreements.

In August 1994, several weeks after the RPF and others proclaimed a new government, Amnesty International representatives visited Rwanda to hold talks with government and security officials, and to collect information about human rights abuses which have occurred before and after the new government came to power. President Pasteur Bizimungu and other government officials assured the organization's representatives that the government was determined to bring an end to impunity for human rights violators in Rwanda. During their visit, Amnesty International's representatives collected testimonies regarding allegations of serious human rights violations by the RPA, particularly those committed since April 1994. Amnesty International also interviewed Rwandese asylum-seekers in neighbouring countries and found substantial evidence of severe ill-treatment and attempted execution by the RPA, in addition to numerous testimonies about killings and other abuses which were so consistent in dates, places and names of victims as not to be dismissed as anti-RPA/RPF propaganda. Amnesty International is concerned that the authorities are not known to have conducted independent and impartial inquiries to establish the full truth about these allegations with a view to identifying those responsible and bringing them to justice.

Amnesty International is now making public some of the information it has collected in order to draw the attention of the Rwandese authorities and the international community to them. These allegations are very grave and require immediate action so as to ensure that members of the security forces and government supporters are not led to believe that they can continue to violate human rights with impunity. This will significantly contribute to ensuring that the cycle of violence and other human rights abuses is broken. Amnesty International is calling on the international community to assist the Rwandese authorities to accomplish this urgent task. Amnesty International is also urging the international community to deploy human rights monitors in Rwanda who could investigate any further reports of abuse over the coming months. Evidently it is also vital that objective information be available on the public record about the human rights situation in Rwanda so that refugees can make an assessment based on sound information of whether their safety will be guaranteed or not when they return home.

At the end of September 1994 Amnesty International submitted the concerns contained in this report to the Rwandese authorities. The organization was still awaiting a response from the authorities at the start of October.

2. Deliberate and arbitrary killings by the RPA

Reports received from Rwandese eye-witnesses and others suggest that hundreds - possibly thousands - of unarmed civilians and captured armed opponents of the RPF have been summarily executed or otherwise deliberately and arbitrarily killed since countrywide massacres and other acts of violence flared up after the death of former President Juvénal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994. Many of the killings took place in a series of arbitrary reprisals mainly against groups of Hutu civilians, some of which occurred in some cases before 6 April, but mainly afterwards in the northeast. There were also sporadic deliberate and arbitrary killings as the RPA took control and, uncovering evidence of genocide, took indiscriminate revenge on unarmed Hutu civilians. There were also deliberate executions carried out in the course of "screening" process(7). There have also been reports of revenge killings by Tutsi supporters of the RPF.

Many of these killings by the RPA, which appear to have gone largely unreported, appear to have taken place in northeastern Rwanda in mid-April 1994. Others have occurred in southern and western Rwanda once the RPA took control of these areas in May and June 1994. There are also reports that the RPA, as well as RPF supporters, were responsible for numerous killings of unarmed civilians in August and September 1994 in southeastern Rwanda. Some corpses of the victims were reported to have been dumped in the Akagera river which flows along the border between Rwanda and Tanzania. The floating of corpses in the Akagera river is reminiscent of the hundreds or even thousands of bodies of people reportedly massacred by former government forces and militia in May and June 1994, which floated downstream to Lake Victoria.

In mid-September the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said that it had received dozens of testimonies from refugees who had fled from the area, alleging that the RPA had carried out numerous killings, forcing many people who had returned to the area to flee. The UNHCR suspended repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries. A controversy soon arose when some other UN agencies expressed or implied doubt over UNHCR findings. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent several dozen soldiers to monitor the situation. The Rwandese Government denied that its soldiers had been involved in any massacres and agreed to cooperate with a UN investigation team which was reported to have began its work in early October 1994.

2.1 Deliberate and arbitrary killings in northeastern Rwanda

Amnesty International representatives received numerous disturbing reports of deliberate and arbitrary killings in April and May 1994 of unarmed civilians by units of the RPA in northeastern Rwanda. Witnesses reported that such killings took place at Nyabwishongwezi and Kagitumba in Byumba prefecture's Ngarama district (commune). At both locations the killings reportedly took place at public meetings to which local people had been summoned by the RPA. RPA soldiers were reported by eye-witnesses to have used guns, grenades, bayonets and hoes to kill their unarmed victims. Accounts by the eye-witnesses portray a striking consistency of dates and places of the killings.

Several dozen witnesses reported that members of the RPA arrived in Kagitumba on 12 April 1994. At first the fighters were reportedly very friendly to the local population and promised that the RPA was determined to protect the local people who were then summoned to a public meeting at Gishara. On 13 April unarmed civilian men, women and children gathered at Gishara in Kagitumba. RPA officials reportedly began addressing the crowd and suddenly without provocation or warning they opened fire on the crowd and threw grenades at the crowd. It is unclear how many people were killed. However, from accounts of eye-witnesses, dozens are likely to have been killed in the incident.

One 36-year-old man present told Amnesty International representatives that RPA fighters seemed friendly at first, only to open fire on civilians without warning or provocation. He said most of the people in Nyabwishongwezi had only arrived there recently, having fled from other parts of Rwanda. Other inhabitants of Nyabwishongwezi were Rwandese nationals who had recently been expelled from Tanzania where they had been living for some years. Government soldiers had withdrawn from the area several weeks earlier. When RPA forces occupied the area in February 1994 the local population first fled but was convinced by the RPA to return. The witness explained that in March the RPA called the first public meetings during which RPF officials told people that they had nothing to fear. At one such meeting in April the RPA fired a rocket and threw grenades into the crowd. Others were shot and killed, while others sustained severe injuries. The RPF continued to deny that any killings had occurred in Kagitumba. But people did not believe them and continued to flee from Nyabwishongwezi. RPA fighters reportedly started a man-hunt for the Hutu, killing many using bayonets and guns. More extensive killings reportedly occurred on 15 April. The witness said he saw RPF soldiers hunting for civilians in the fields. He said that among those killed were his 30-year-old wife, Jovans Nakabonye, who was shot. The others, including his 12-year-old daughter, Felicita Busingye, were bayonetted to death. Those killed included a four-year-old child known as Yankunda.

One 56-year-old survivor of the killings at Gishara in Kagitumba and in Nyabwishongwezi narrated how his family and friends were slaughtered by the RPA. He said he and others were summoned to a public meeting on 13 April 1994 at Gishara. He said, "We had been told that men, women and children must attend. They said they would kill hippos for us and needed some representatives from among us to go hunting with the soldiers. Twelve of us were taken behind a house of "tailleur" (tailor) Muziga and they said they wanted to talk to us. They asked us to indicate who among us knew how to shoot or was a soldier. We said none of us knew how to shoot and that all soldiers had left. All of a sudden we heard a grenade explosion". He said many people were killed including his wife, Anastasia Mukamurigo, his 10-year-old son Nkwaya, and 20-year-old daughter Mukazaza. Others killed by the grenade and gunshots included Azaria Ukuyemuye, a director of Nyabwishongwezi primary school, and his wife, Anne Maria, and a Roman Catholic nun known as Helène from Muyanza parish in Byumba.

The witness then fled from Kagitumba to Nyabwishongwezi. On 16 April 1994 RPA forces came to the area while he was at the home of Sinamenye, in Rwantanga village in Nyabwishongwezi. Sinamenye's house was surrounded by six RPA soldiers, two of whom entered the house asking for the home owner and identity papers. They confiscated the papers and told Sinamenye to go to a soldier at the entrance to collect valid papers. The soldier assaulted him with a bayonet and he fell. They then shot and killed him. The soldiers told Sinamenye's son, Bampora, to walk away and shot him in the back. The survivor said he was one of the few who managed to run away from the scene of these killings.

2.2 Deliberate and arbitrary killings in southern Rwanda

Amnesty International representatives who visited Burundi in July 1994 received reports of both deliberate executions and cases of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to which civilians from southern Rwanda said they had been subjected by RPA soldiers after they took control of Bugesera in southeastern Rwanda. The witnesses, some of whom had themselves narrowly survived execution and bore the marks of blows to their heads, had fled to northern Burundi from the area of Mututu in Butare prefecture's Muyira district and from parts of rural Kigali prefecture.

Towards the end of May 1994 RPA soldiers were reported to have carried out numerous arrests of Hutu who had returned to their homes in the Mututu area from Burundi. Virtually all those arrested were subjected to "three-piece-tying"(8). In one incident a unit of about 10 soldiers and armed Tutsi civilians who had recently returned from exile are reported to have arrested and tied up all adult men and teenage boys in Mututu. They were first held in the compound of one Rutekeleza before being killed. Those executed included Leodomir Kazadi whose head was reportedly smashed with a blunt weapon, possibly a hoe. Other victims were reportedly killed in the same way. These and other killings caused many people in the area to flee to Burundi. There were claims that some of those who tried to escape were shot as they tried to cross River Akanyaru on the border with Burundi.

Around early June 1994 about 100 men, women and children were reportedly arrested by the RPA in the same area and detained in a compound for about a day. They were then moved towards Muyira district when the eye-witness who spoke to Amnesty International representatives and at least six of his close relatives managed to escape. All bore scars caused by "three-piece-tying". The witness and others returned to the area after the RPA had left only to find that dozens of those who had remained in the custody of the RPA had been killed. Bodies were still tied and heaped in an open pit in the compound of one Gakwayiro, near the Mahwa river. All the victims, including the witness' neighbours, Senama and Kareje, were male adults and youths.

A woman formerly resident in Burenge, in rural Kigali prefecture's Ngenda district, testified that she and many others had been hiding in sorghum fields after the RPA took control of the area, only returning home when they heard that the RPA had stopped killings. They handed themselves over to the RPA and were taken to a "screening" centre at Rutonde. On the second day young men were taken away and her husband was taken away on the third day. A man who had been taken away with her husband reportedly returned and reported that those taken away, including her husband, had been tied up, hit on the head and killed, and that their corpses were being thrown into the river. She alleged that some of the women detainees were taken away by RPA soldiers and raped: she thought they were killed afterwards. She tried to escape with her child strapped to her back but was subsequently recaptured with several other women escapees by RPA soldiers. The soldiers killed two other women with blows to the head and also killed her child. She was hit on the head with a nail-studded club but survived. The scars caused by blows, in particular by nails, were clearly visible.

2.3 Deliberate and arbitrary killings in western Rwanda

Around 5 June 1994 four members of the RPA killed 13 Roman Catholic priests, including the Archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumva, and three other bishops, at Byimana, a few kilometres south of Kabgayi Roman Catholic church near Gitarama. The RPF subsequently declared that the combatants had been assigned to the bishops as their bodyguards. On 9 June RPF leaders announced that one of the killers had been shot dead by fellow soldiers as he fled and that the other three had escaped. RPF leaders explained that the combatants seemed to have carried out the killings because they suspected the priests of complicity in the killing of members of their families, including some of the Tutsi who had fled to Kabgayi.

A priest who survived the killings gave a different version of the incident. He said that the RPF took control of Kabgayi on 2 June, arrested the priests and took them to a mission at Byimana. On 5 June some of the soldiers who had been guarding the priests entered the room where the priests were being held and opened fire. The surviving priest escaped through a door at the end of the room. The next day he was found by RPA soldiers who told him that the killings had been an accident. The soldiers reportedly detained him, insisting that he accepted the soldiers' version of the killings. He was released when he said he would agree to the RPA's version and he escaped.

Members of the government told Amnesty International representatives in August that the three escapees had never been found. The RPF's explanation that its soldiers had killed the priests to avenge the killing of their relatives appeared to be guess-work rather than based on any statement made by any of those involved. It is not clear whether any formal investigation or judicial inquiry had been carried out: indeed, the priest's testimony above suggests that evidence was deliberately suppressed.

People suspected of killing RPF supporters appear to have been deliberately executed by the RPA. For example, a returning refugee was killed on 27 August 1994 at a checkpoint at the edge of the United Nations (UN) "safe zone" by RPA soldiers. The circumstances suggest that returning refugees may have been extrajudicially executed or that the soldiers may have used excessive lethal force in breach of international human rights standards. According to the report, the RPF soldiers stopped a convoy of five British army trucks carrying approximately 200 returning Hutu refugees at a checkpoint 40 kilometres east of the border town of Kibuye as they were crossing from the UN "safe zone" into territory controlled by the Government of Rwanda. One of the passengers fled and was reportedly pursued by approximately 15 RPA fighters. Witnesses heard five bursts of automatic gunfire and said that when the soldiers returned they said that they had killed the man who fled. Three other men in the convoy were detained.

Amnesty International subsequently wrote to the Rwandese authorities seeking clarification about the circumstances of this killing and the identities and whereabouts of those detained and called on the RPA to issue standing orders about the circumstances in which soldiers could use firearms, which would prevent such killings. Amnesty International also wrote to the United Nations seeking clarification about a statement reportedly made by the spokesman of the UNAMIR suggesting that RPA soldiers were justified to shoot the fleeing man. The organization expressed concern that if correctly reported, the spokesman's statement was inconsistent with the UN's own fundamental international standards on the intentional use of lethal force. The organization had not received a response from the Rwandese Government by the start of October 1994. A senior UN official replied in early September 1994, saying that the UNAMIR spokesman had been misquoted, and that his exact words were: "This man was fleeing and, in these situations, if one runs, he can expect that someone will shoot". However, the UN official did not explain whether UNAMIR had investigated the killing to determine whether the man had been extrajudicially executed or not. The official added that UNAMIR had initiated an investigation concerning the other three persons arrested, but had not obtained any specific information about their whereabouts.

3. Abductions and "disappearances" by the RPA

There have been numerous reports of abductions and "disappearances" carried out by the RPF since April 1994. There are fears that those who were abducted or "disappeared" may have been killed and their bodies secretly disposed of.

Amnesty International has received reports that a medical doctor known as Dr Canisius, and former head of Byumba Hospital was abducted in May 1994 by the RPF. He was apparently accused of being a member of the Interahamwe (predominantly Hutu militia loyal to the former government) and had expressed his fear for his life to some of his friends prior to his abduction. He and his wife and children were allegedly taken away by the RPF and they were never seen again. There have been unconfirmed reports that Dr Canisius and his family were killed and buried in a mass grave in Byumba. Some of his colleagues have inquired about him from the RPF but the authorities have not revealed any information about the fate of the doctor and his family.

Amnesty International representatives visiting Rwanda in August 1994 were informed that several hundred soldiers who were left at a school complex known as Groupe scolaire in Butare "disappeared" soon after the town fell to the RPA at the start of July 1994. Part of the complex had been turned into a make-shift hospital by former government forces. The representatives learned that former government soldiers had been severely wounded or disabled in battle and were left behind by their retreating colleagues. Amnesty International found in the abandoned make-shift hospital one decomposed body of a soldier whose head had been smashed allegedly by RPA soldiers before death.

There were further reports of "disappearances" in July 1994 of about 600 people from a camp for the displaced at Rango, several kilometres south of Butare. Amnesty International representatives were told that the RPA was thought to have killed and buried those who had "disappeared" in mass graves in a valley next to the Groupe scolaire in Butare. However, Amnesty International's representatives were prevented from going to the valley by RPA soldiers manning a roadblock on the road leading to the valley on the grounds that it was a military security zone. As a result, neither the "disappearances" nor the mass graves could be confirmed by Amnesty International.

4. Recommendations to the Rwandese Government

The RPF and the new Rwandese Government have usually denied that their combatants have carried out serious human rights violations. In some instances they have acknowledged that abuses have occurred but explained that they were not committed as part of RPF or government policy. Government officials told Amnesty International representatives visiting Rwanda in August 1994 that two RPA soldiers had been executed by official order in mid-1994 , one for murder and another for rape. The authorities said the soldiers were tried by the RPA military court in accordance with the RPA Operation Code of Conduct. The authorities said they were holding in custody more than 60 RPA soldiers accused of criminal offences.

While welcoming government action to bring those responsible for human rights abuses to justice, Amnesty International is concerned that the RPA violated the ultimate fundamental right to life in order to punish persons accused of human rights abuses. It is unclear whether their offences had been the subject of any independent and impartial investigations. Furthermore, those convicted had, according to RPA officials, no right of appeal, although the decision to carry out the sentence had to be made by the RPA High Command.

For government action and statements to be taken seriously by the people of Rwanda, particularly members of the security forces, it is essential that immediate action be taken in response to the allegations of human rights violations by the RPA described in this report. To this effect Amnesty International is recommending the implementation of its 14-Point Program for the Prevention of Extrajudicial Executions and for the Prevention of "Disappearances"(9). It is also recommending:

4.1 In addition to accepting responsibility for carrying out impartial investigations into past killings of civilians and captured armed opponents, it is urgent that the new government set up a commission of inquiry with specific responsibility to investigate reports of human rights violations both in areas under the RPF's control before July 1994 and in the whole country since then. The commission of inquiry should be composed of people known for their independence and impartiality and should be asked to investigate the allegations mentioned in this report and those reported elsewhere, either published by other organizations or the media, or made by private individuals. The commission could also ask United Nations investigators to assist in carrying the inquiries. All investigations should be consistent with the standards set forth in the UN Principles on the Prevention and Investigation of Extrajudicial, Arbitrary and Summary Executions and the UN Manual on their implementation(10).

4.2 The investigating body should be given powers to summon any witnesses, regardless of their position in the government or the security forces, to testify. Its terms of reference should include making recommendations on any action to be taken against those responsible and prevent a recurrence of the abuses. The findings of the inquiry should be made public as soon as it has been completed. The findings should then be submitted to a competent, independent and impartial court of law to try those found by the inquiry to have been involved in perpetrating the abuses.

4.3 The international community, particularly governments and the United Nations, should assist the Rwandese Government with the human and material resources the Rwandese authorities require to carry out these investigations in accordance with international standards, just as it should be assisting with investigations into the crimes against humanity committed before July 1994 mostly by soldiers and supporters of the former government. Furthermore, the international community should assist the Rwandese Government to build a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to protect and promote human rights. The international community must not make excuses for or turn a blind eye to human rights violations committed by the RPA or other institutions or officials of the new government on the grounds that they are not "as serious" as those committed by its predecessor.

4.4 The government should take immediate steps to avoid a recurrence of the killings of civilians and captured armed opponents in which members of the security forces have been implicated. These steps should include training in international standards and explicit instructions made publicly to all security personnel to the effect that firearms may only be used with lethal intent when strictly unavoidable and in order to protect life. All killings by the security forces must be the subject of an inquiry to establish if this standard has been respected or violated. Members of the security forces responsible for unlawful killings should be brought to justice in legal proceedings which satisfy international minimum standards.

Amnesty International is requesting the Rwandese Government to make public the identities of RPA soldiers in custody and details of their cases. Amnesty International demands that the soldiers be given prompt and fair trials and that in no case should anyone of them be sentenced to death or executed. The organization also requests the Rwandese authorities to reveal the identities of those of its combatants and others who have been executed and the offences of which they were convicted.

4.5 All allegations of extrajudicial executions and of similar deliberate and arbitrary killings before July 1994 by security personnel should, as a matter of course, be the subject of an impartial, independent and thorough inquiry. The inquiry should establish the reasons for and circumstances of the killings, make its conclusions public, and recommend action to be taken against the security personnel who have either ordered or carried out the killings. Failure by the authorities to open an inquiry into killings of this sort is likely to be interpreted by observers and other members of the security forces as indicating government approval or condonement of violence by security personnel against civilians.

4.6 The names of all those taken into custody and any subsequent transfers or releases should be recorded and the Ministry of Justice notified. In the absence of any functioning court or legal procedures similar to habeas corpus, this will bring an end the current practice whereby government officials or private individuals must at present simply request the Minister of Defence for information about their whereabouts and wait indefinitely for a response. This provides no effective safeguard for detainees who may be at risk of "disappearance" or ill-treatment.

4.7 The Rwandese Government should use the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials as basic texts for the training of security personnel in human rights, in addition to training about the basic humanitarian standards contained in the Geneva Conventions. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials stipulates that law enforcement officials (whether police or military) should respect and protect human dignity and defend and safeguard human rights. In addition, members of the security forces should receive training in international human rights standards and in the provisions of national legislation both concerning the use of firearms and force, and concerning detention procedures and the treatment of prisoners.

4.8 The authorities should prohibit the security forces from ill-treating any citizen, including political opponents, and should investigate all allegations of such behaviour, including the use of kandoya and nail-studded clubs. Official silence on the brutality to which suspected opponents of the government have been subjected has led some to believe that the authorities are implicated, there being no other explanation for their refusal to pursue the reports published by human rights groups and the media. Those who have committed such violations should be brought to justice.

4.9 The Rwandese authorities should not deny or explain away, without thorough independent investigation, allegations of serious human rights violations by their security forces.

4.10 The security forces which have responsibility for arrests and detentions should as a matter of priority be placed under effective judicial and administrative control to comply with national and international law and accountable for their actions not only to the RPA internal hierarchies, but to the courts under the rule of law.

****

(1) The RPF/RPA was formed and is dominated by exiled members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group. They and, or their parents fled to neighbouring countries such as Uganda in the wake of massacres of Tutsi by Hutu before and after independence in 1962.

(2) The former government and its security forces were dominated by members of the majority Hutu ethnic group.

(3) Former government security forces and militia are believed to have carried out massacres of 500,000 or more members of the Tutsi ethnic group and members of the Hutu ethnic group opposed to the government and the killing of Tutsi since 6 April 1994 when the plane carrying Rwanda's President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundi's President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down. Amnesty International has published numerous reports of the massacres and other human rights abuses which have occurred in Rwanda since the war in Rwanda began on 1 October 1990. More recently, on 23 May 1994, the organization published a report about the massacres which began on 6 April 1994 entitled, Rwanda: Mass murder by government supporters and troops in April and May 1994, AI Index: AFR 47/11/94.

(4) "Deliberate and arbitrary killings" are those committed by armed opposition groups in violation of the internationally recognized norms of humanitarian law, including executions and other killings of prisoners and non-combatants.

(5) An extrajudicial execution is an unlawful and deliberate killing carried out by order of a government or with its acquiescence. In the case of Rwanda, killings by the RPA are considered as extrajudicial executions from the time RPF members became government officials on 19 July 1994.

(6) This manner of tying can be used as a method of restraint, but also be used deliberately to inflict pain and coerce prisoners during interrogation. After protests against its use in Uganda in 1986, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni banned the practice by Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1987. Its use by NRA soldiers nevertheless continued to be reported subsequently.

(7) The RPA has been recording the identities and places of origin of people returning from places inside Rwanda or from neighbouring countries where they had fled as a result of the war. There have been reports that returnees suspected of involvement in the massacres of RPA supporters or sympathizers have been arrested or even killed during or after the screening process.

(8) In August 1994 the Rwandese Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Major General Paul Kagame (a former senior officer of Uganda's NRA), told Amnesty International representatives that "three-piece-tying" had been abolished and those found responsible would be punished. However, this form of tying was reported to be still in evidence in August with detainees bearing wounds around the elbows caused by ropes or flex used.

(9) Amnesty International has developed a 14-Point Program for the Prevention of Extrajudicial Executions, published in March 1993, AI Index: POL 36/02/93, and another one for the Prevention of "Disappearances", adopted by Amnesty International in December 1992, to call attention to the official steps needed to end these abhorrent human rights violations. The programs consist of a series of detailed measures which should be taken by all governments. Amnesty International believes that the implementation of these measures is a positive indication of a government's commitment to stop extrajudicial executions and "disappearances" and to work for their eradication.

(10) By Resolution 1989/65 on 24 May 1989 on "Effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions", the UN's ECOSOC called on all governments to take into account and respect a series of Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions. The Principles give some guidance on procedures for investigation and suggest that if the established investigative procedures (for example of the Procuracy) are inadequate, governments should establish independent commissions of inquiry.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 05:18 0 comments
Labels: Rwanda
Rwanda: Alarming Resurgence of Killings
Amnesty International
12 August 1996
AI INDEX: AFR 47/13/96
DISTR: SC/CC/CO/GR
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470131996?open&of=ENG-RWA

SUMMARY

While unarmed civilians continue to be massacred in Burundi at the hands of the security forces and armed groups, a pattern of alarming similarity is emerging again in neighbouring Rwanda, only two years after the genocide there which claimed as many as one million lives in 1994.

The first half of 1996 has been marked by a sharp escalation of killings by members of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) and by armed opposition groups. Between April and July especially, violence directed against unarmed civilians has intensified, claiming more than 650 lives. The exact number of victims may be substantially higher as many people remain unaccounted for; other cases simply go unreported.

In some cases, the evidence available points overwhelmingly to the responsibility of the RPA, in other cases to armed opposition groups believed to be allied to the former Rwandese government forces and interahamwe militia responsible for the massacre of hundreds of thousands of people in 1994. However, in many cases, responsibility for recent killings is difficult to establish: many of these attacks are attributed to a third category of perpetrators, often referred to as “unknown armed assailants” or simply “criminal elements”.

Amnesty International believes that both the RPA and the armed opposition bear responsibility for the grave human rights abuses taking place in Rwanda. Their respective responsibility for the killings should be exposed and measures taken to prevent further grave human rights abuses. This report concentrates on the violations of the right to life and threats to physical integrity by both parties. It includes examples of killings which have occurred in recent months - mostly between April and July 1996 -to illustrate the brutal manner in which both government forces and other armed groups are massacring civilians in their efforts to destroy support for their opponents.

In the present climate in Rwanda, each killing carries with it the real prospect of reprisal. The number of victims rises with each incident. Urgent action is needed to prevent a further spiralling of violence if Rwanda is to be saved from a repetition of its own recent past, or from becoming a mirror of the violence which is tearing apart neighbouring Burundi.

This report concludes with a set of recommendations which Amnesty International is urging all those concerned to implement immediately. Amnesty International fears that killings in Rwanda are unlikely to stop unless the Rwandese Government and those controlling armed opposition groups take immediate action to prevent further human rights abuses. The international community - particularly foreign governments who have an influence over the parties concerned, as well as the media and non-governmental organizations in these countries reporting on Rwanda - also has a duty to press for action which will prevent further massacres in Rwanda.

This report summarizes an document (7865 words), : RWANDA Alarming resurgence of killings (AI Index: AFR 47/13/96) issued by Amnesty International on 12 August 1996. Anyone wishing further details or to take action on this issue should consult the full document below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. The context

III. Extrajudicial executions by RPA soldiers


III.1 Patterns of extrajudicial executions
III.2 Extrajudicial executions during military “cordon and search” operations
III.3 Extrajudicial executions of local officials
III.4 Extrajudicial executions of detainees

IV. Deliberate and arbitrary killings by armed opposition groups

V. Killings by unidentified individuals

VI. The repression of truth

VIII.Recommendations



I. INTRODUCTION

While unarmed civilians continue to be massacred in Burundi at the hands of the security forces and armed groups, a pattern of alarming similarity is emerging again in neighbouring Rwanda, only two years after the genocide there which claimed as many as one million lives in 1994.

The first half of 1996 has been marked by a sharp escalation of killings by members of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) and by armed opposition groups. Between April and July especially, violence directed against unarmed civilians has intensified, claiming more than 650 lives. The exact number of victims may be substantially higher as many people remain unaccounted for; other cases simply go unreported.

In some cases, the evidence available points overwhelmingly to the responsibility of the RPA, in other cases to armed opposition groups believed to be allied to the former Rwandese government forces and interahamwe militia responsible for the massacre of hundreds of thousands of people in 1994. However, in many cases, responsibility for recent killings is difficult to establish: many of these attacks are attributed to a third category of perpetrators, often referred to as “unknown armed assailants” or simply “criminal elements”.

Amnesty International believes that both the RPA and the armed opposition bear responsibility for the grave human rights abuses taking place in Rwanda. Their respective responsibility for the killings should be exposed and measures taken to prevent further grave human rights abuses. This report concentrates on the violations of the right to life and threats to physical integrity by both parties. It includes examples of killings which have occurred in recent months - mostly between April and July 1996 -to illustrate the brutal manner in which both government forces and other armed groups are massacring civilians in their efforts to destroy support for their opponents.

In the present climate in Rwanda, each killing carries with it the real prospect of reprisal. The number of victims rises with each incident. Urgent action is needed to prevent a further spiralling of violence if Rwanda is to be saved from a repetition of its own recent past, or from becoming a mirror of the violence which is tearing apart neighbouring Burundi.

This report concludes with a set of recommendations which Amnesty International is urging all those concerned to implement immediately.

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II. THE CONTEXT

Up until recent months, most incidents of killings of unarmed civilians in Rwanda were concentrated in the areas to the west of the country, bordering Zaire. By July 1996, individual killings and massacres were continuing in the western préfectures (Rwanda is divided into 12 préfectures (regions), which are divided into communes (districts), in turn divided into secteurs (sectors); secteurs are further divided into cellules (cells), the smallest administrative entity.) The French terms are used throughout this document to enable precise references to the locations of the incidents described. of Gisenyi, Kibuye and Cyangugu, but had also spread to central parts of the country, such as the préfectures of Gitarama and Rural Kigali. Killings have also been reported in the southeastern préfecture of Kibungo, near the border with Tanzania, and, less frequently, in several other préfectures.

These killings of unarmed civilians are occurring against a backdrop of increased insurgency by armed groups based primarily in Zaire, but also in Burundi and Tanzania. These groups, believed to be composed of, or allied with the former Rwandese government forces and militia, operate from the areas surrounding the refugee camps in these three countries. (Around 1.1 million Rwandese refugees are still living in refugee camps in Zaire, close to the border with Rwanda, since their flight in July 1994. A further 527,000 are living in Tanzania and around 70,000 in Burundi.) The presence of these refugee camps so close to the border continues to pose a significant security threat, both for residents living in Rwanda and for refugees themselves, as well as for the local population in host countries.

It is rumoured that some armed groups have also launched operations from within Rwanda in 1996. In June 1996 a hitherto unknown group calling itself Peuple en armes pour la libération du Rwanda (PALIR), People in Arms for the Liberation of Rwanda, was reported to have issued a statement announcing the creation of an armed front within the country, the Front de résistance intérieure (FRI), Interior Resistance Front. Amnesty International has not been able to confirm the existence or nature of this group.

The positions of the parties to the conflict have become increasingly entrenched. In response to reports of continuing insurgency, the RPA has stepped up its presence in the areas most directly affected. Military reinforcements have been sent especially to the préfectures bordering Zaire, where the population is predominantly from the Hutu ethnic group and residents are often suspected of collaborating with or sheltering insurgents who carry out incursions from Zaire or Burundi. Civilian patrol groups have been organized to ensure security at night, especially on the shores of Lake Kivu, to pre-empt attacks by groups thought to be operating from Idjwi Island (situated on the Zaire side of the border). In certain areas, for example in the préfecture of Cyangugu which borders Zaire to the west and Burundi to the south, there have been reports of battles of a military nature between the RPA and armed opposition groups, sometimes involving prolonged exchange of fire and mortar attacks. The areas where these armed clashes are occurring are often inaccessible to independent observers for reasons of security. The total number of casualties among soldiers and insurgents is unknown.

However, the killings of concern to Amnesty International are of a different nature: the victims are unarmed civilians. They include men, women, the elderly, young children and babies. The victims may have been targeted because of their ethnic origin, out of personal revenge, or because they were suspected of collaborating with “the enemy”. Others simply happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, as in the case of those killed or seriously injured by land mines. Some individuals have been assassinated because they have tried to expose the truth, either about crimes committed during the genocide in 1994 or about current human rights violations in Rwanda. However, many of the victims are peasant families living in areas where infiltrations are reported or suspected. They find themselves caught in the violence of both sides.

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III. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS BY RPA SOLDIERS


III.1 Patterns of extrajudicial executions

During the first half of 1996 there has been a noticeable increase in extrajudicial executions by the RPA in correspondence with an increase in attacks by armed opposition groups. (For an overview of the pattern of extrajudicial executions and other human rights violations in Rwanda in 1995, see Amnesty International reports Rwanda: Two years after the genocide -human rights in the balance (April 1996, AI Index AFR 47/02/96); Rwanda and Burundi - The return home: rumours and realities (February 1996, AI Index AFR 02/01/96) and Rwanda: Crying out for justice (April 1995, AI Index AFR 47/05/95).) While the Rwandese Government has acknowledged that isolated cases do occur and has assured Amnesty International that soldiers found responsible for human rights violations have been arrested, it has so far failed to address the broader pattern of extrajudicial executions by RPA soldiers and to prevent further killings. There seems to be a certain resignation to what is described as “the inevitability of occasional casualties in the context of efforts to combat insurgency”. In reality, the need to “fight the enemy” may have been used as a pretext for eliminating individuals, or whole groups of individuals, whose presence or influence is perceived as a political obstacle or threat to those in power.

Extrajudicial executions by RPA soldiers in 1996 have followed various patterns. Scores of people have been shot dead during military “cordon and search” operations. Individual detainees have been shot dead at close range while allegedly trying to escape, with little or no effort to apprehend them without the use of lethal force. In other cases, individuals such as local officials and other educated people - mainly Hutu - have been assassinated in circumstances which lead Amnesty International to believe that they were targeted specifically because of their social or political position or even because of their ethnic origin. Some also appear to have been targeted because of their attempts to expose or limit human rights violations by government or security authorities. Not all those targeted in this way by the security forces have been killed. Many have been arrested on accusations of having participated in the genocide and have joined the prison population of more than 80,000 held mostly without charge and all without trial in grossly overcrowded prisons and detention centres.

There have also been reports of involvement of RPA troops in human rights violations in Burundi, in particular in the northwestern province of Cibitoke. Several sources, including refugees who fled the area due to the violence, reported that RPA soldiers assisted the Burundi security forces in massacring unarmed civilians in Cibitoke in June 1996.

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III.2 Extrajudicial executions during military “cordon and search” operations

In July 1996 there were several massacres of unarmed civilians during “cordon and search” operations, intended to uncover suspected insurgents, members of the former government forces and interahamwe militia. Amnesty International recognizes the need for the Rwandese Government to apprehend individuals who have been responsible for crimes against humanity and who continue to instil fear in the population of Rwanda. However, this should not provide government forces with a licence to use lethal force against unarmed individuals who pose no threat to life at the time of the operations.

Senior government officials have issued statements which sought to justify or excuse these human rights violations. They have stated explicitly that military operations would be launched in areas where there had been attacks on civilians. On 4 July 1996, in a speech to commemorate the second anniversary of the victory of the Rwandese Patriotic Front over the former Rwandese government forces, the Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Major General Paul Kagame, announced that action must be taken to stop the killings being carried out by the perpetrators of the genocide, and that “we must find a remedy whatever its cost [...]. It is important that everything legal be done to stop this. This will definitely cause casualties, injuries. There is no doubt about this and no one should fear this.” Similar public statements have been made by the President, the Minister of Interior and other senior officials.

The chain of command when extrajudicial executions are committed is not always clear. However, even if explicit orders were not issued from the highest level, senior government and security officials must bear the ultimate responsibility for disciplining those found responsible and ensuring that such killings are prevented.

Between 5 and 13 July 1996 an estimated 170 people - the vast majority of them civilians - were killed in several locations in the northwestern préfectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, during operations by the RPA to search the area for insurgents. These killings are summarized below.

On 5, 9 and 10 July 22 people were reportedly killed in Muhungwe secteur, Karago commune, in Gisenyi. On 9 and 10 July around 100 others were killed in several different secteurs in the communes of Giciye (Gisenyi) and Nyamutera (Ruhengeri). The victims were shot by RPA soldiers who reportedly suspected them of being infiltrators, even though they included young children. One man said that his four sons were all killed, the youngest of whom was only 10 years old. Many of the victims were reportedly shot while trying to flee. Others - including a group of around 3,000 men - were rounded up by soldiers and led away to a confined space, where they were deprived of food and water. Some described being severely beaten and kicked by RPA soldiers. They were interrogated and made to denounce infiltrators in the area. It is not clear what happened to all those who were rounded up in this way. Some are known to have been released, some were killed, some are presumed to be still in detention; others remain unaccounted for.

On 13 July, in Bayi secteur, Ramba commune, at least 47 civilians were killed during a military operation. Following an attack in which an RPA soldier was shot dead, allegedly by infiltrators who escaped, RPA soldiers rounded up a group of peasants who were working the land and shot them all dead. The victims included three children and two babies. The authorities claimed that the victims had been caught in cross-fire between RPA soldiers and infiltrators.

These operations took place in the aftermath of several reported attacks by insurgents on civilian and military targets in late June and early July, including an attack in Giciye commune - believed to have been carried out by an armed opposition group - in which an estimated 28 people were killed (see Part IV below).

In the préfecture of Rural Kigali, Rushashi commune has experienced a sudden increase in killings since June 1996. On 2 July, nine people were killed during an RPA search operation in Gatare secteur. The search operation began early in the morning, in several different secteurs. It appeared to intensify after the RPA apprehended two individuals reported to be members of the former Rwandese army, one of whom subsequently escaped. In the course of questioning local residents about the presence of these two men in the area, RPA soldiers arrested eight men and led them away to a banana plantation where they were shot dead. A ninth man, suspected of having provided accommodation to the two soldiers of the former army, was also killed. This search operation took place one week after eight people were killed by unidentified armed assailants in the same commune (see Part V below). The extrajudicial executions by the RPA may have been in reprisal for these earlier killings in the same area. However, Amnesty International is not aware of any evidence that the individuals killed by the RPA had participated in the earlier killings or were posing any threat to life at the time.

On 10 and 11 April 1996, at least 40 people were killed in several locations in the préfecture of Gisenyi after an RPA soldier was shot dead by an armed individual at a military post at Muramba, Satinskyi commune. The victims included at least nine detainees from the communal detention centre at Muramba, who were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers on 10 April. More than 30 civilians were killed during subsequent military search operations on 11 April in the communes of Gaseke and Satinskyi. The following day, on 12 April, soldiers fired into the air at the market place at Gatega, creating a panic but no deaths. However, that same morning, a local trader, Patricie Banguwiha, was assassinated at her house, reportedly by soldiers who also looted her home.

On 7 April 1996, eight civilians (three men, four women and one baby) were killed in Kavumu secteur, Gisovu commune, in the préfecture of Kibuye, after an RPA soldier was shot dead by an unknown assailant. According to the authorities, the eight people died in a shoot-out between RPA soldiers and interahamwe. However, witnesses stated that the victims were all shot by RPA soldiers who fired into the fleeing crowd. The civilians who died included Alphonsine Barekayo, Espérance, Pélagie Mukaremera, Myavu, Félicité Nyirahabimana, Semayira, Sibomana, and an 18-month-old baby.

On 4 April 1996, 34 people were killed in Rutsiro commune, in the préfecture of Kibuye, following the alleged discovery by RPA soldiers of a secret meeting of suspected interahamwe. The victims included 17 civilians, among them two children, aged 12 and 15, and two babies.

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III.3 Extrajudicial executions of local officials

Local officials who have been assassinated have included several bourgmestres (district administrators), conseillers de secteur (sector administrators), judicial officials and other figures who occupied positions of authority in the local community.

On 7 July 1996, in the communes of Rushashi and Tare, in the préfecture of Rural Kigali - five days after the search operation of 2 July described above - 18 people were assassinated. These killings were not part of a search operation. The victims were specifically targeted in three separate but related attacks which occurred within one hour. The victims included several local officials and their relatives and colleagues: Vincent Munyandamutsa, bourgmestre of Rushashi commune; Laurent Bwanacyeye, director of Rwankuba secondary school; Léopold Murekezi, head of studies at Rwankuba secondary school; Théobald, the school driver; Carine, a primary school teacher; Floribert Habinshuti, assistant prosecutor in Rushashi; his wife Emilie Kayitesi, his son Eric Habinshuti and daughter Ernestine Ingabire, both of primary school age; his nephew Olivier Uwimana; his sister-in-law Egidia Ingabire and his cousin Eugène Surwumwe.

All the victims, except Vincent Munyandamutsa, were killed on their way back from a ceremony of ordination of a priest in Rulindo, in the commune of Tare. They were travelling in two separate cars when they were ambushed in separate locations and shot dead. Four were killed in one ambush and 13 in the other. Independent local witnesses believe they were killed by soldiers.

Vincent Munyandamutsa had also been invited to the ceremony but was unable to attend. He was stabbed to death as he was returning home on his motorcycle from a meeting at a trading centre. He was killed three kilometres away from his home. Witnesses reported that soldiers had prevented them from intervening. Soldiers had been seen on the road leading to his house minutes before the attack; local residents said this was not normally a patrol route. In the weeks preceding this attack, Vincent Munyandamutsa had reportedly been threatened and accused of collaborating with interahamwe - even though he had been given an award by the government for protecting his commune from the genocide in 1994. Vincent Munyandamutsa was known to have opposed human rights violations under the previous government of Rwanda, as well as under the current government.

Although bodies of victims are often left where they fall, efforts are sometimes made to conceal the abuses. For example, Elie Dusabumuremyi, bourgmestre of Nyabikenke, in the préfecture of Gitarama, and a former teacher, “disappeared” on 11 July 1996 on his way home from a meeting with local officials. (See Amnesty International Urgent Action 180/96, dated 18 July 1996.) He has not been seen since. Traces of blood were found in the area where local residents had heard his screams but his body was not found. Two military trucks carrying soldiers were seen nearby; they were apparently waiting for him and ambushed him. Local residents who attempted to rush to the scene were stopped by gunfire. Elie Dusabumuremyi is feared dead. He leaves behind his wife and their first new-born baby.

Government authorities are reported to have launched investigations into these and other incidents. The conclusions of these investigations are not known.

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III.4 Extrajudicial executions of detainees

Over recent months, a pattern of killings of detainees by the security forces has emerged. Most of these killings have occurred while detainees were held in communal detention centres (cachots) before being transferred to the central prisons.

The single largest incident occurred in the night of 19-20 May 1996, when at least 46 detainees were killed in an attack on the communal detention centre at Bugarama, in the préfecture of Cyangugu. The real number of victims may be higher as apparently not all detainees had been registered. The detainees died from injuries caused by gunshots and grenades. The authorities blamed the killings on infiltrators, who had launched two previous attacks in the same area in the preceding days: one on 18 May on the communal office and detention centre at Karengera, in which several detainees were freed, and another on 19 May on the communal office at Nyakabuye. The authorities claimed that the infiltrators were trying to free the detainees at Bugarama and that during a confrontation with RPA soldiers, the infiltrators threw grenades into the detention centre.

However, it appears unlikely that infiltrators would have attacked detainees they allegedly intended to free. At the same time, it was reported that only one RPA soldier was injured. According to some reports - later suppressed by the authorities - , detainees had been threatened by the guards, shortly before the alleged attack, and made to confess that they were interahamwe. It is claimed that certain prisoners were then shot by guards, while others died when grenades where thrown in through cell windows. UN human rights observers and local human rights organizations who visited the site reported that the signs on the detention centre building indicated an attack from the inside. There was no evidence that an attack had been launched from outside the building. It appears that these extrajudicial executions of detainees may have been a reprisal attack by RPA soldiers following the previous attacks by opponents, described above.

There have been other cases where individual prisoners have been shot dead at close range by soldiers or prison guards, allegedly while trying to escape. Several such cases have been reported in particular in the préfectures of Kibuye and Gitarama. Amnesty International is not aware of any government investigations into these deaths. The prisoners - most of whom are detained on the basis of vague accusations of having participated in the genocide - are labelled as “génocidaires”, with the implication that because they are killers themselves, their death is not a serious matter. Apart from violating the basic right to life, this attitude disregards the fact that these detainees have not been charged or tried and therefore not been found guilty; furthermore, many have been arrested on the basis of unsubstantiated denunciations.

There have also been a number of deaths in detention, as a result of intolerable prison conditions amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In July 1996 the prison population reached more than 80,000. An increase in mass arrests since April 1996 - linked to the launch of an operation for registration for identity cards - led to yet further overcrowding in detention centres across Rwanda. There was a marked deterioration in conditions in the communal detention centres, as many central prisons, filled to several times their capacity, could not accept any further transfers. Amnesty International delegates who visited Rwanda in May 1996 investigated the deaths of 22 detainees at the communal detention centre at Kivumu, in the préfecture of Kibuye, on 11 May. The authorities claimed that the deaths were caused by fighting which broke out among the detainees. After visiting the detention centre and speaking to detainees who had witnessed the deaths, Amnesty International believes that the 22 detainees died as a result of lack of air and extreme heat in the grossly overcrowded cells. Prison guards had refused to open the door, even though they heard detainees screaming for air and water. The victims, all men, included Rucekeri Gasekero, Ruwanzabo, Shirigame and Safari.

Similar conditions have been observed in other detention centres in Kibuye and in several other préfectures, including Butare and Kibungo. As communal detention centres continue to fill up and the rate of arrests increases, further deaths in detention can be expected.

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IV. DELIBERATE AND ARBITRARY KILLINGS BY ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS

Armed opposition groups have continued to carry out deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians, often in the context of cross-border incursions which intensified in the first half of 1996. The victims have included vulnerable individuals such as the elderly, children and very young babies. They are almost always killed at night, often in their homes. Some of these killings are characterized by especially brutal methods. Victims are subjected to mutilation; some are reportedly decapitated.

The victims of these attacks are often described as “genocide survivors” or “witnesses” - a shorthand term for members of the Tutsi ethnic group who stayed in Rwanda during the genocide in April to July 1994 and are likely to have witnessed killings by the Hutu-dominated former army and militia during that period. This may not be the only motive for these attacks. Some of the killings are attributed to cases of personal revenge. Some may also form part of a long-term plan by forces loyal to the former Rwandese leaders to gradually destabilize and eventually overthrow the Rwandese Government.

Below are some recent examples of such killings. (Examples of deliberate and arbitrary killings in 1995 can be found in the following Amnesty International reports: Rwanda and Burundi - The return home: rumours and realities (February 1996, AI Index AFR 02/01/96) and Rwanda: Arming the perpetrators of the genocide (June 1996, AI Index AFR 02/14/95).) Amnesty International has collected evidence of several other killings attributed to armed opposition groups in addition to those cited below.

On the evening of 27 June 1996 in the préfecture of Gisenyi, 28 people, including several children, were killed and six injured in Giciye commune, Nyamugeyo secteur, Kiruma cellule and Rubare secteur, Kinihira cellule. The victims were attacked with guns, grenades, machetes and clubs, by around 30 assailants who split into three groups. Those who died are thought to include Tutsi survivors of the 1994 genocide as well as several Tutsi refugees who had lived in Zaire for several decades and had recently returned to Rwanda. The victims included Furaha, Kabanyana, Gahuru, Gasominari, Gatari, Kayitare, Nyirantege, Ndayambaje, Nyirabasirimu, Murwanashyaka, Munyangabe, Mukarusagara and her one-year-old baby, Kinomero, Rubuza, Rudahunga, Rwagasore, Rwamunigi, Nyirangofero, Nzitonda, Senga, and Muhundaza. Those injured included two elderly people, Mvutse, aged 67, and Bushati, aged 64, and three children, Bugega, aged eight, Nkurunziza, 18 months old, and a two-week-old baby, Musabyimana, whose body was riddled with shrapnel. Survivors of the attack claim to have recognized some of the assailants as residents of the area, including one man alleged to be a soldier of the former Rwandese army. They reported that the perpetrators, as well as some local residents who could have provided testimony of the attack, fled the neighbourhood after the killings and did not return the following day.

On 18 June, in the late evening, in the western préfecture of Kibuye, at least 13 civilians, including children, and one RPA soldier were killed in Bunyamanza, in Gitsimbwe secteu, Rwamatamu commune. Three children and one baby were reportedly injured. Those who died included Séraphine Uwampinka, Callixte Kabandana, Vestine Nikuze, Concessa Nyiransabimana, Consolata Habumugisha, Anastasie Mukandamira, Claude Tuyisenge, Ruyonza, Mahoro, Ngendahimana, Mutungirehe, Berthe, Saveri and Kayitare. Survivors of the attack said that they recognized the voices of some of the assailants and identified them as their neighbours before the genocide. The assailants, estimated to number around 40, had reportedly split into several groups and had distracted the attention of the local military patrol by appearing to attack another area.

The number of casualties resulting from landmines has also increased in 1996. The majority of these incidents have occurred in the areas of Rwanda bordering Zaire and are thought to be the work of supporters of the former Rwandese Government operating within this area or from Zaire.

For example, on 25 January 1996, in the middle of the day, in Kayove commune, préfecture of Gisenyi, Jean de Dieu Dushimiramana, a 24-year-old student, stepped on a mine which had been laid at the entrance to the toilets in the building where he was preparing his exams. His foot was blown off. He died in hospital the same day.

In March 1996 a mine explosion in Ramba commune, also in Gisenyi, killed three men in their twenties who were in a minibus on their way to a ceremony for installing a new district administrator.

On 20 April 1996 a mine exploded under a car in Mushesha cellule, Gitambi secteur, Bugarama commune, in the préfecture of Cyangugu, and killed four men: Emmanuel Munyantwali, conseiller of Nzahaha secteur, and three employees of the government-owned cement company, Jean-Pierre Kompanyi, Védaste and Segasagara.

The fear which these deliberate and arbitrary killings have instilled in the Tutsi population has caused a number of Tutsi to flee from their homes. In several areas, Tutsi fearing for their safety have left their houses and sought refuge in local government buildings, in some cases after receiving threats.

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V. KILLINGS BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS

Many killings of civilians have been carried out by armed groups or individuals whose identity is difficult to verify. Interpretations as to the identity of the perpetrators and the motives of these attacks abound and there are usually several contradictory versions of the same events. Some believe that the unidentified assailants are members of the interahamwe or soldiers of the former Rwandese army attacking from refugee camps in neighbouring countries or who have infiltrated deeper into Rwanda. Others believe that some of these killings may have been carried out or instigated by members of the RPA, or by armed individuals allied to the RPA; however, few dare to offer this interpretation publicly. Others portray the perpetrators as armed criminals whose primary motive is robbery. Sometimes one can infer the identity of the perpetrators from that of the victims, but even then, there can be conflicting explanations as to why particular individuals may have been targeted.

Whatever the truth in each case, the result is that civilians who have taken no part in armed conflict, including young children and the elderly, are being terrorized and killed or maimed in many parts of Rwanda. The increasing confusion surrounding these attacks means that investigations are difficult and the perpetrators know that there is little likelihood that they will be brought to justice.

In the examples mentioned below, Amnesty International has not been able to attribute responsibility for the killings conclusively. Only independent and impartial investigations may establish whether the RPA or armed opposition groups were responsible for these killings.

On the evening of 24 June 1996, eight members of a peasant family were massacred in the préfecture of Rural Kigali, Rushashi commune, Minazi secteur, Nyabitare cellule. Those killed included Languida Nyiramakuba, Simon Butururu, an elderly farmer, his wife Sophie Mukandutiye, their son Jean-Paul Ruvuzandekwe and daughter-in-law Nyirabugore, and their three daughters Mukampamira, Nyirabazimaziki and Daria Uriwenuwe. The only survivors of the attack were a 12-year-old boy and a six-month-old baby girl. The victims were killed in their homes with guns and bayonets by a group of armed men in military uniform, whose identity has not been established. Some believe the victims were survivors of the genocide, and that at least some of them may have been targeted because they had denounced certain individuals for crimes committed during the genocide. Others believe that the killings were motivated by disputes over possessions or property.

On 27 June and 2 July, at least three other individuals were shot dead in apparently separate incidents in the same commune of Rushashi, in unclear circumstances.

On 18 July, in Kibilira commune, in the préfecture of Gisenyi, 12 people including several children were killed. Amnesty International has not been able to verify the identity of the perpetrators. Some were described as members of the former Rwandese army; the identity of others is not known.

The number of killings of local government officials is increasing week by week. In many of these cases too, the identity of the perpetrators is in doubt. Some sources in Rwanda state that these attacks are carried out by Hutu armed groups who may be targeting officials whom they accuse of collaborating with the Tutsi-dominated government. Other sources say that some of the killings are carried out or ordered by Rwandese Government or security authorities.

On the evening of 10 May Anne-Marie Mukandoli, bourgmestre of Karengera commune, in the préfecture of Cyangugu, was shot dead by unidentified men in military uniform while she was alone at home. She had been appointed to the post of bourgmestre towards the end of 1995. Two of her neighbours were reportedly arrested after the assassination for failing to intervene at the sound of gunfire.

In the early hours of the morning on 20 May unidentified assailants threw two grenades into the bedroom of André Nvumba, a magistrate at Murambi High Court (Tribunal de première instance), in the préfecture of Byumba, and his wife Catherine Mukamusoni, while they were sleeping. One of the grenades exploded, tearing through the bed and seriously injuring Catherine Mukamusoni. She has deep wounds on her legs and feet and may never be able to walk unaided. André Nvumba sustained lighter injuries on his leg. The reasons for the attack are not clear. The couple had reportedly been threatened and harassed by interahamwe even before the genocide began in April 1994. André Nvumba may have been targeted for cooperating with the current authorities. On the other hand, the attack may have been related to his position as a magistrate dealing with sensitive issues.


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VI. THE REPRESSION OF TRUTH

The confusion surrounding attacks such as those described above is not accidental. It appears to be in part the result of attempts to protect members of government forces who have carried out human rights violations. In certain cases of suspected involvement of members of the RPA in human rights violations, there has been a campaign of misinformation to obstruct independent investigations and obscure the truth.

It has been extremely difficult to establish the exact proportions of killings perpetrated by the RPA and those perpetrated by former government forces or interahamwe militia over the last few months. These difficulties arise in part from the nature of the attacks and in part from seemingly deliberate concealment by the government. Military authorities have sometimes denied or delayed access by independent investigators to the sites of particular killings, claiming that the area was unsafe. In some cases, evidence may have been destroyed before access was permitted.

The general public perception, influenced by media reports both inside and outside Rwanda, is that the groups referred to as interahamwe are responsible for most if not all of the recent killings, and that most of the victims are “genocide survivors” or “witnesses”. The Government of Rwanda has been quick to denounce many of the recent killings as soon as they have occurred, exposing them as the work of interahamwe or claiming that civilians were caught in cross-fire between interahamwe and RPA. Evidence to substantiate these assertions is sometimes scarce. In some cases, these public denunciations, for example on the government-controlled Radio Rwanda, appear to be deliberately calculated to pre-empt suspicion of RPA involvement by presenting these killings as attacks by armed government opponents. Amnesty International believes that independent investigations should be carried out to establish responsibility for each incident, unless there is incontrovertible evidence as to the identity of the perpetrators.

In some instances, it seems likely that members of the RPA were in fact responsible for killings which were publicly attributed to opposition groups, as in the case of the killing of at least 46 detainees at the communal detention centre at Bugarama in Cyangugu (see Part III.4 above).

The tendency to blame all attacks on the interahamwe and to portray most of the victims as “genocide survivors” or “witnesses of the genocide” has had wide-ranging effects. The government and its supporters use the official media to blame virtually all killings on interahamwe. Subsequent independent reports that some of these killings were actually extrajudicial executions committed by the RPA or groups allied to the security forces are discredited apparently without verification. Official media reports are further amplified by some non-governmental organizations and some officials of foreign governments or intergovernmental organizations.

Individuals and organizations inside Rwanda who dare to speak out about human rights violations by government forces are subjected to persistent intimidation, threats, arrests and other forms of harassment, and are publicly and personally branded as “génocidaires” or defenders of interahamwe. Members of human rights organizations, journalists and judicial officials have been especially targeted. This increasing repression concerning freedom of speech has had a devastating effect on human rights activists and other individuals in Rwanda who attempt to expose human rights violations. Those who have defied this repression and continued to speak out about the current human rights situation in Rwanda live in a state of constant fear for their lives. An increasing number no longer dare to issue public statements after seeing others arrested, assaulted or killed simply for expressing their opinions. Those foreign organizations which identify some of the perpetrators of killings in Rwanda as government agents or supporters are branded as supporters of those responsible for the genocide or “revisionists”.

The manipulation of information about the situation in Rwanda has succeeded in whipping up the population’s fears about attacks by interahamwe, thus heightening the level of suspicion within communities. Senior government officials have delivered speeches on the national radio appealing to the population to help hunt down infiltrators.

Amnesty International believes that no effort should be spared to identify and bring to justice those responsible for these attacks. However, serious attempts should be made to protect unarmed individuals from being killed, assaulted or arrested in the process and to institute safeguards against such abuses. The present climate in Rwanda is already leading to false denunciations and could further encourage people to take the law into their own hands, especially in areas most affected by infiltrations.

The actions of certain associations of survivors of the genocide appear to have led to an increase in human rights abuses in this context. Amnesty International appreciates the need for local organizations in Rwanda to campaign for the protection of vulnerable sectors of the society who saw their families wiped out during the genocide, and believes that some of these organizations are playing an important role in the aftermath of the tragedy of 1994. However, some of the associations which have emerged more recently, and which are believed to be close to government authorities, have contributed to the campaign of misinformation. They have rightly drawn attention to cases where survivors of the genocide have been victimized but have implied that these are the only types of killings occurring. Some of these organizations have either denied or attempted to justify human rights violations by the RPA and other government forces or supporters. They have put strong pressure on the government to take tough action - involving human rights violations - against suspected infiltrators or insurgents and have accused it of not providing sufficient protection for Tutsi sectors of the community. Such statements not only ignore the serious human rights violations being carried out by government forces but appear to provide a kind of legitimacy to human rights violations against Hutu. The memory of the genocide is being twisted for political ends. This has the adverse effect of alienating Hutu and others who played no role in the genocide.

Some of these groups of survivors have played a leading role in denouncing individuals as participants in the genocide. This has led to numerous arbitrary arrests, without the accusers being required to substantiate their allegations or the accused being given an opportunity to challenge the basis for their arrest. In some cases, denunciations have led to death. In a case reported in May 1996 a man who presented himself for registration for his identity card at Kibilira commune, in Gisenyi, was accused by a group of Tutsi survivors of being an interahamwe. He was beaten to death by soldiers.

Amnesty International has been campaigning continuously for those suspected of involvement in the genocide of 1994 to be brought to justice. Sadly for the victims and for those detainees who are innocent, more than two years on and with more than 80,000 people in custody, justice remains an elusive prospect. All suspects have the right to be charged and tried according to procedures which are fair and impartial and based on sufficient evidence, in conformity with international standards. Amnesty International is concerned that individuals whose guilt has not been established by a court of law are being subjected to unlawful punishment. Crucial evidence and information, such as the identity of those who carried out arrests, are being lost, thus reducing prospects for fair trials or even convictions in an impartial court of law. Amnesty International is appealing to the Rwandese authorities to stop the practice of imprisonment as a substitute for justice or as a weapon for reprisals.

Manipulation of the international community

Attempts to conceal government responsibility for certain human rights violations has affected international perception of the human rights situation in Rwanda. Reports of killings of Tutsi survivors of the genocide and witnesses are broadcast across the international airwaves but the media remains almost silent about killings of Hutu civilians by the RPA. The absence of freely-available information about these human rights violations confirms a widely-held perception among some foreign governments, non-governmental organizations and media that human rights violations by the current government forces are negligible. The result is that many governments are consciously or unconsciously turning a blind eye to the emergence of another human rights crisis in Rwanda. For example, at the June 1996 meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the Cameroonian capital Yaoundé, a draft resolution on Rwanda, which included concerns about prison conditions and a request to the Rwandese Government to embark on speedy trials of suspects, was not adopted, due to objections by the Rwandese representatives which prevented consensus. The Rwandese delegation reportedly claimed that the situation in Rwanda was under control and did not merit discussion or an OAU resolution.

The guilt felt by the international community for failing to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 may also explain their readiness to accept any reports of new killings by the forces which carried out the genocide and their reluctance to condemn - or even acknowledge - current human rights violations being perpetrated by the present Rwandese Government. Some seem to believe that the extent of massacres committed by the Hutu-led Rwandese Government in 1994 can excuse the smaller number of abuses or reprisal attacks by the Tutsi-led government. The international community should seek to obtain independent information about the present human rights situation on which to base its assessment. It should be reminded of the grave risks of ignoring advance warnings of a rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in a country where political and ethnic tensions remain extremely high, and should not forget the incalculable cost of having done so under the previous Rwandese Government.

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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Amnesty International fears that killings in Rwanda are unlikely to stop unless the Rwandese Government and those controlling armed opposition groups take immediate action to prevent further human rights abuses. The international community - particularly foreign governments who have an influence over the parties concerned, as well as the media and non-governmental organizations in these countries reporting on Rwanda - also has a duty to press for action which will prevent further massacres in Rwanda.

Recommendations to the Rwandese Government and security force officials

- issue immediate and public instructions to all members of the security forces that the killing of unarmed civilians or captured combatants constitutes a grave violation of human rights and humanitarian law and will not be tolerated;

- ensure that these instructions are adhered to at all times;

- carry out prompt, independent and impartial investigations into each report of extrajudicial execution or deliberate and arbitrary killing and publish the findings;
- ensure that the individuals found responsible for carrying out or ordering extrajudicial executions or “disappearances” are brought to justice within a reasonable time, in a trial which conforms to internationally-accepted standards of fairness and without recourse to the death penalty;

- investigate reports of deliberate and arbitrary killings by armed opposition groups, including by seeking the cooperation of the authorities in neighbouring countries, with a view to identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice;

- provide protection for sectors of the population most at risk, regardless of their ethnic or political affiliation, profession or background;

- institute safeguards against arbitrary arrests and ensure that sufficient evidence is produced against an individual before any arrest is carried out;

- refrain from making public statements which may incite the population to carry out false denunciations or acts of violence;

- ensure that human rights activists are protected from human rights violations and are able to exercise freedom of speech without fear of being arrested, ill-treated, made to “disappear” or extrajudicially executed;

- ensure freedom of access to sites of killings and other human rights violations - immediately after the incidents have occurred - to independent investigators, including members of Rwandese human rights organizations and United Nations human rights observers.

Recommendations to leaders of armed opposition groups

- issue immediate instructions to those under their command to stop carrying out deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians. Make it clear that these human rights abuses will not be tolerated;

- investigate and denounce deliberate and arbitrary killings committed by those under their command and provide public information about steps taken to prevent further killings of unarmed civilians.

Recommendations to foreign governments and inter-governmental organizations

- actively seek to obtain independent and balanced information on the current human rights situation in Rwanda;

- acknowledge that grave human rights abuses are being carried out in Rwanda both by government forces and by armed opposition groups;

- urge that the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda (UNHRFOR) carries out independent and exhaustive investigations with a view to establishing responsibility for killings in Rwanda; call for their findings to be made public and widely available both inside and outside Rwanda to contribute to the provision of objective and impartial information and to further encourage the Rwandese authorities to take measures to prevent further killings; urge that these reports avoid the use of ambiguous language in cases where there is clear evidence of responsibility for specific human rights abuses; call for the UNHRFOR to follow up all cases of suspected extrajudicial executions with the Rwandese Government and to report publicly on the results of investigations and on the level of cooperation of the Rwandese Government;

- urge the Rwandese authorities to carry out independent investigations into the killings of civilians perpetrated both by the security forces and by the armed opposition and insist that the results of these investigations are publicly disclosed, so that the public inside and outside Rwanda can have a true and accurate picture of the current human rights situation and so that measures can be taken to bring to justice those found responsible;

- use their influence on the Rwandese Government and on opposition groups to urge them to prevent further killings of unarmed civilians;

- use their influence on the Rwandese Government to urge them to ensure that human rights activists are protected from human rights violations and are able to exercise freedom of speech and carry out investigations without fear;

- encourage intergovernmental organizations of which they are a member to take seriously the deteriorating human rights situation in Rwanda and seek measures to help prevent further human rights violations there.

Recommendations to international media and non-governmental organizations

- acknowledge that grave human rights abuses are being carried out in Rwanda both by government forces and by armed opposition groups;

- assist the international community in obtaining information about human rights abuses in Rwanda;

- take measures to denounce these abuses and seek corrective measures by putting pressure on decision-makers in their country to use their influence to halt the deterioration of the human rights situation in Rwanda.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 05:10 0 comments
Labels: Rwanda
vzw SOS RWANDA-BURUNDI asbl Buzet, le 7 juin 1998.

Rue Paul Pastur, 31,

B - 6230 BUZET

Tel. / Fax : +32 071 84 59 31)

LISTE DES MEMBRES DU FPR-INKOTANYI / APR SOUPCONNES D'AVOIR PREMEDITE ET COMMIS DES CRIMES CONTRE L'HUMANITE QUI SONT DE LA COMPETENCE DU TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNATIONAL POUR LE RWANDA (T.P.I.R.)

DOSSIER N° 1

Juin 1998

ABREVIATIONS ET SIGLES



APR Armée Patriotique Rwandaise

ARIB Association de Réflexion et d'Information sur le Burundi

CDR Coalition pour la défense de la République

CICR Comité International de la Croix Rouge

CLADHO Comité de Liaison des Associations Rwandaises de Défense des Droits de l'Homme

CLIIR Centre de Lutte contre l'Impunité et l'Injustice au Rwanda

CND Conseil National pour le Développement (Parlement rwandais avant 1994)

CNRS Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques

COM-R Commission parlementaire belge d'enquête sur les événements du Rwanda

CRAD Comité Rwandais d’Action pour la Démocratie

DMI Directorate Military Intelligence

FPR Front Patriotique Rwandais

FRD Forces de Résistance pour la Démocratie

GOMN Groupe d'Observateurs Militaires Neutres

LICHREDOR Ligue chrétienne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda

LIDEL Ligue Indépendante pour la Défense des Libertés Publiques

MINUAR Mission des Nations Unies pour le Rwanda

ONG Organisations Non Gouvernementales

ORINFOR Office Rwandais d'Information

SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA Solidarité Internationale pour les Réfugiés Rwandais

TPIR Tribunal Pénal International sur le Rwanda

UFE Union des Français de l'Etranger

USA United States of America

PRESENTATION



Le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU a décidé de "créer un tribunal international chargé uniquement de juger les personnes présumées responsables d'actes de génocide ou d'autres violations graves du droit international humanitaire commis sur le territoire du Rwanda et les citoyens rwandais présumés responsables de tels actes ou violations commis sur le territoire d'Etats voisins entre le 1er janvier et le 31 décembre 1994 (...) " (Résolution 955, 1994).

La mission du TPIR se ramène à trois objectifs :

Mettre fin à la culture de l'impunité ;

Contribuer à la réconciliation de tous les Rwandais ;

Assurer la paix et la sécurité dans la Région des Grands-Lacs.

Eu égard à cette mission, force est de constater que, jusqu'à présent, le TPIR semble s'intéresser exclusivement aux personnes appartenant au groupe ethnique hutu présumées d'avoir commis des crimes graves contre des membres du groupe ethnique tutsi.

Pourtant, ce n'est plus un secret pour personne : des membres tutsi du FPR-INKOTANYI/APR ont commis des crimes semblables contre des membres du groupe ethnique hutu. " Le Front Patriotique ne s'est pas seulement révélé excellent stratège en matière de guérilla, il a aussi démontré ses facultés de séduction, de manipulation de l'opinion étrangère. Alors qu'il est évident que toutes les étapes de son offensive dans le Nord, puis de sa conquête du pays, se sont accompagnées, comme dans toute guerre et malgré la discipline très stricte imposée par le général Kagamé, de brutalités à l'encontre de la population civile, il réussit toujours à les dissimuler ou à les minimiser. Ainsi par exemple, lorsque les enquêteurs représentants quatre organisations de défense des droits de l’Homme se rendirent au Rwanda, ils passèrent de longues journées à s'informer sur les nombreuses exactions commises du côté gouvernemental, mais ne séjournèrent que quelques heures dans les zones contrôlées par le FPR, sans jamais avoir exigé (ou obtenu) de s'entretenir sans témoins avec de simples citoyens " (BRAECKMAN C., Rwanda. Histoire d'un génocide, Fayard, Paris 1994, p.287).

Dans sa conférence du 19 mars 1998 tenue à l'Université Libre de Bruxelles à Bruxelles, Louise Harbour, Procureur du TPIR, a annoncé publiquement que les enquêtes continuent.

Mais comment expliquer qu'aucun membre du FPR-INKOTANYI/APR n'ait été inquiété? En effet, les crimes dont se sont rendus coupables les membres du FPR-INKOTANYI/APR ont été suffisamment dénoncés par diverses sources auxquelles le Tribunal accorde généralement foi. Citons à titre indicatif :

René DEGNI SEGUI :

" Ce qui est certain, c'est que le FPR s'est rendu coupable d'exécutions sommaires. Par exemple, le 9 juin 1994, des éléments du FPR ont exécuté plusieurs religieux dont deux évêques et l'Archevêque de Kigali. Une évacuation de Tutsi à la paroisse Saint-Paul, effectuée par le FPR le 16 juin 1994, entraîne la mort de plusieurs personnes " (Rapport du Rapporteur Spécial des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda, 5A/49/508 ; S/1994/1157 du 13 octobre 1994, pages 6 et 7, n°22).

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL :

" Amnesty International reste préoccupée par tout un éventail de violations des droits de l'Homme au Rwanda (...). Cependant, il ne faudra pas oublier que le FPR a lui-même été responsable de massacres de civils non armés et sans défense ". (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Rwanda. L'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise responsable d'homicides et d'enlèvements, avril-août 1994. Index AFR 47/16/94- 20 octobre 1994).

En 1996, Amnesty International relève encore : " In reality, the need to fight 'the enemy' may have been used as a pretext for eliminating individuals or whole groups of individuals, whose presence or influence is perceived as political obstacle or threat to those in power " (AI, Rwanda, Alarming resurgence of killing, 12 august 1996, p.3). Plus loin, le même rapport poursuit : " in other cases, individuals such as local officials and other educated — mainly Hutu — have been assassinated in circumstances which lead Amnesty International to believe that they were targeted specifically because of their social or political position, or even because of their ethnic origin" (p. 4).

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Le rapport de Human Rights Watch d’octobre 1997, dans son chapitre VII, cite les noms des présumés coupables :

Commander " David "

General Gaston Muyango

Commander " Godfrey " Kabanda

Lt-colonel or Colonel Cyago (Kiago)

Commander or Lt-colonel " Wilson "

Colonel " Richard "

Major " Jackson " Nkurunziza (or Nziza)

Commander " Joseph "

Colonel " Dominic Yugo ".

CENTRE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPUNITE ET L'INJUSTICE AU RWANDA (CLIIR) :

" Quand on parle du génocide rwandais, la population de Byumba ne pense qu'à celui des Hutu de cette région par les troupes du FPR. C'est celui auquel elle a assisté dès l'avancée des troupes du FPR. Les massacres sélectifs et systématiques et les différentes techniques de torture infligées aux populations civiles de Byumba, mais aussi de Ruhengeri, entre 1990 et 1994 avaient jeté les survivants sur les routes de l'exode. En 1994, on estimait à environ un million les déplacés de guerre qui étaient entassés dans des camps de fortune de Nyacyonga aux portes de la capitale Kigali et dans les préfectures de Byumba, Kigali et Ruhengeri. Leurs témoignages faisaient état de massacres systématiques de civils hutu, de femmes éventrées, d'hommes castrés, d'enfants morts la tête fracassée, etc. Ces témoignages auraient pu rester "incroyables " si on ne les avait pas entendus durant le génocide rwandais d'avril à juin 1994 et pendant celui des réfugiés rwandais au Congo-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996 jusqu’à présent !

Pendant tout son parcours pour la conquête du pouvoir, le FPR s'est rendu coupable de massacres systématiques de populations civiles hutu dans les préfectures de Byumba, Kibungo, Kigali, Butare et Gitarama. Dans la seule préfecture de Gitarama, 18.000 victimes ont été recensées nommément pour les trois premiers mois du régime du FPR. Rassemblés dans des simulacres de réunions, les gens étaient triés par groupes ethniques, et les Hutu systématiquement éliminés. Les cadavres ont été brûlés, jetés dans des rivières ou encore entassés dans des charniers ".

Le CLIIR continue :

" Pour parler de chiffres, grâce au Recensement de toute la population de 1991, on peut estimer à 7.831.663 habitants la population du Rwanda avant avril 1994, hormis les réfugiés tutsi qui vivaient dans les pays voisins du Rwanda ou ailleurs dans le monde. En novembre 1995, le Ministère rwandais de la Réhabilitation et de l'Intégration sociale, en collaboration avec le HCR, chiffrait la population à 5.304.060 habitants, y compris les anciens réfugiés rapatriés estimés à 800.000. On arrive à 4.504.060 habitants permanents d'avril 1994. A la même date, on dénombrait 1.793.403 réfugiés rwandais dans les camps au Zaïre, au Burundi et en Tanzanie, ainsi que 77.317 personnes qui étaient rentrées dans le courant de l'année 1995. La population disparue ou décédée était alors estimée à : 7.831.663-(4.504.060+1.793.403+77.317) = 1.456.883 personnes.

Si les victimes du génocide d'avril à juillet 1994 sont estimées entre 500 et 800.000 personnes, à qui imputer les personnes manquantes (entre 656.883 et 956.883) si ce n'est au Général Kagame, à son armée et à sa milice tutsi ? " (CLIIR, Mémorandum adressé le 20 janvier 1998 aux Parlementaires européens à l'occasion de la visite du Général Paul Kagame, janvier 1998).

James GASANA

Lors d’une conférence de presse à Pampelune (Espagne) le 12 mars 1997, James Gasana a présenté le coût en vies humaines de ce conflit qui se prolonge aujourd’hui :

- d’octobre 1990 à début février 1993 20.000

- durant l’offensive FPR de février 1993 40.000

- d’avril à juin 1994 1.180.000

d’abord le génocide anti-tutsi

ensuite les massacres du FPR au départ de Byumba…

- de juin à août 1994 400.000

massacres essentiellement de Hutu dans le centre et le sud du pays.

- d’août à décembre 1994 580.000

poursuites des massacres précédents, au Rwanda même

contre les élites et la population masculine

- Le total des morts durant l’année 1994 2.160.000

+ les décès de réfugiés par épidémies et malnutrition au Zaïre en

juillet-août 1994 +/- 100.000

Ce montant inattendu rejoint néanmoins l’estimation publiée en décembre 1994 par le Ministère de l’Intérieur, Département du recensement de la population à Kigali, et qui parle de 2.101.250 morts. A ces chiffres, il faudrait ajouter les victimes des exterminations perpétrées au Zaïre par l’AFDL de Kabila dont les soldats rwandais et ougandais ont constitué le fer de lance. Il s’agit probablement de plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes (La Commission d’enquête de l’ONU a jusqu’ici été empêché de procéder aux investigations).

Filip REYNTJENS & Serge DESOUTER :

" Le FPR s'est rendu coupable de crimes odieux, et cela depuis qu'il a entamé la guerre en octobre 1990. Ces violations des droits de l’Homme n'ont jamais pu faire l'objet d'enquêtes sérieuses ". La constatation de ces deux chercheurs se passe de commentaires puisqu'ils ajoutent: " Nous estimons en effet qu'il existe trop d'indications sérieuses et concordantes de crimes contre l'humanité commis par le FPR et son armée (APR) pour continuer à ne pas vouloir savoir " (S. DESOUTER & F. REYNTJENS, Rwanda. Les violations des droits de l’Homme par le FPR/APR. Plaidoyer pour une enquête approfondie, Working Paper, Anvers, 1995, p.3).

Cette inertie de ne pas enquêter sur les crimes commis par les membres du FPR-INKOTANYI/APR serait sans doute due à ce que "les occidentaux répugnent de mettre en cause le FPR " (LIBERATION, 27/02/1996).



REPORTERS SANS FRONTIERES (RSF):

" Le chantage qui consiste à dire qu'on ne pourrait pas dénoncer aujourd'hui ce qui se passe, les manquements à la liberté de la presse et généralement les manquements aux droits de l’Homme dans un pays comme le Rwanda sous prétexte que ça voudrait dire qu'on nie le génocide ou qu'on serait révisionniste, est inacceptable " /.../ "si on n'a pas affaire à un génocide rampant aujourd'hui au Rwanda, on a affaire à des massacres d'une telle ampleur qu'il est impossible que la communauté internationale ne dise rien " (R. MENARD, RSF, Conférence de presse de Reporters Sans Frontières, International Press Center, Bruxelles, 11 décembre 1995).

Eric GILLET :

" Il y a un révisionnisme sur le génocide que nous connaissons tous, auquel nous pensons tous évidemment, qui est celui de le nier. Mais il y en a un autre qui consiste à réécrire l'histoire dans un certain sens et qui permet de justifier aujourd'hui qu'on s'en prenne aux Hutu de manière collective. Cela aussi, c'est une forme de révisionnisme " (E. GILLET, Conférence de Presse de RSF, IPC, 11 décembre 1995).



La poursuite et la traduction des criminels de tous bords devant les tribunaux permettraient à tous les parents et les proches des victimes de faire le deuil et d'honorer la mémoire des leurs. Alors seulement pourra être envisagée la réconciliation nationale dans la mesure où, sans distinction d'appartenance ethnique, tous les criminels auront répondu de leurs actes devant la justice.

C'est dans ce cadre que le présent travail se propose d'identifier des personnes susceptibles d'être poursuivies comme auteurs, coauteurs ou complices des violations graves commises sous le couvert du FPR-INKOTANYI/APR. Ces violations étant peu médiatisées, les noms repris ci-après sont le résultat d'une exploitation des rapports des organisations des droits de l’Homme, des communiqués de mouvements politiques et d'associations humanitaires, d'articles de journaux ou de divers témoignages de première main.

Nous invitons quiconque possédant des informations et des témoignages sur des personnes présumées coupables de violations graves des droits de l’Homme qui se seraient produites au Rwanda et dans toute la Région des Grands-Lacs de nous les transmettre pour un travail ultérieur.

SOS RWANDA-BURUNDI


1. SHALITA Willis : 10

2. KIMENYI Alexandre: *

3. NTARE Simon: *

4. MUSARE Faustin: *

5. NDAYAMBAJE Damas: *

6. ABIMANA Mathias: *

7. RUTAYISIRE Wilson (Major): *

8. HIGIRO Prosper: *

9. KAYONGA Charles (Colonel): *

10. RUTAREMARA Tite: *

11. MUTIKIRI Mathias: *

12. RWABUKAMBA Vénuste: *

13. MUVUNYI Augustin: *

14. RUTAZIBWA Privat (Abbé): *

15. KAGAME Paul (Général-Major): *

16. KARAKE KARENZI (Colonel): *

17. MUROKORE (Lieutenant-Colonel): *

18. GAKUBA Théodore (Lieutenant): *

19. RUZIBIZA James (Capitaine): *

20. IBINGIRA Fred (Colonel): *

21. HAVUGIMANA Emmanuel (Sergent): *

22. CAMARADE Innocent (Sergent): *

23. NGAMIJE Pie (Sergent): *

24. UWAMUNGU Jacques (Caporal): *

25. RUTSINDURA Epimaque: *

26. NSAGUYE Wellars: *

27. RURANGIRWA Jean-Damascène: *

28. COSMA (Lieutenant): *

29. MURENZI (Lieutenant): *

30. NGABOYISONGA Kizito: *

31. RUGAMBWA (Major): *

32. KABERA Assiel: *

33. GATERA (sous-lieutenant): *

34. MUSHIMIRE Eric (Soldat de l'APR) : *

35. RURANGANGABO Anselme: *

36. OKWIRE (Capitaine): *

37. KALISA (Afandi, Lieutenant ou sous-lieutenant): *

38. DIEUDONNE: *

39. ZIGIRA (Major): *

40. DANY (Capitaine): *

41. BAGABO (Lieutenant): *

42. MBANDA Steven: *

43. MUHIGIRWA Jean Bosco (Lieutenant): *

44. KAZINTWALI KADAFI (Lieutenant-Colonel): *

45. RUKWAKWA Joseph (Capitaine): *

46. KABANDA Charles: *

47. MUGEMANGANGO Paul: *

48. RUKANGIRA Emmanuel: *

49. BINGINKOMO Augustin: *

50. KANYESHYAMBA: *

51. MUHIRE Egide (Militaire de l'APR) : *

52. KABERA Cyprien: *

53. RUTAREMARA Jill (Capitaine): *

54. KAJEGUHAKWA Valens: *

55. SAM KAKA alias KANYEMERA (Colonel): *

56. KAZURA (Major): *

57. NZIZA Jackson alias NKURUNZIZA Jacques (Major): *

58. GASHAYIJA (Officier 'Afandi' de l'APR). *

59. ADAMO (Lieutenant) : *

60. MUTERAHEJURU Gilbert (Militaire de l'APR): *

61. KALISA Martin : *

62. BOSCO (sous-lieutenant de l'APR): *

63. BAGABO (Lieutenant): *

64. KIZURI et JOSELINE: *

65. TWAGIRA: *

66. RWAKAGEYO: *

67. KABANDA Ildephonse: *

68. KARENZI Gilbert: *

69. MUGABO Innocent: *

70. BAYIHORERE Idrissa et HARUNA: *

71. MUKALIMBA Gloriose alias MAMA DIDI: *

72. RUZIMA: *

73. NICYABERA Béatrice: *

74. KAYITARE: *

75. NGOGA Charles (Colonel): *

76. ZIMURINDA Jean-Bosco (Sous-Lieutenant): *

77. MUGABO Francis: *

78. NKUBITO (Major): *

79. KWIKILIZA (Major): *

80. GAKWERERE (Capitaine): *

81. KABERA (sous-lieutenant): *

82. RUGIRA (Lieutenant): *

83. BAGIRE (Colonel): *

84. KABUYE Rose (Major): *

85. SEKAMANA Jean-Damascène (Major Gendarme): *

86. GUMISILIZA (Major): *

87. KARERA Denis (Major): *

88. BIRASA John (Major): *

89. MUHATSE Ignace : *

90. GAHIMA Gérard: *

91. NZARAMBA (Colonel): *

92. RUTEMBESA (Soldat): *

93. RWANYINDO: *

94. BIZIMANA (Soldat): *

95. KARAKE Assoumani: *

96. KAGABO Amini: *

97. Maman KEZA: *

98. MUSONI Protais: *

99. BIHOZAGARA Jacques: *

100. MAZIMPAKA Patrick: *

101. KAYUMBA NYAMWASA (Général de brigade): *

1. SHALITA Willis :

Vivant aux USA, il est un des rédacteurs en chef de la revue IMPURUZA dont certains écrits ne sont que des appels à la haine ethnique. L'on peut citer notamment les poèmes "Nsingize Gisa " (Que j'exalte Gisa) et " Wihogora Rwanda " (Ne pleure pas, ô Rwanda) parus dans la revue IMPURUZA nrs 15 (juillet-août 1990) et 17 (novembre-décembre 1990). " Ce texte constitue une exhortation à la conquête du pouvoir par les armes, mais surtout à l'élimination physique des Hutu ", (Eugène Shimamungu, Idéologie du génocide. Deux textes d'Alexandre Kimenyi in " Rwanda: Points de vue, n° 17 Novembre-Décembre 1996, p.14). Dans le document " Le Rwanda: Nécessité d'une justice juste et impartiale ", signé le 05/12/1995 par J.-P. Edouard Komayombi, Médecin à l'Hôpital Universitaire de Leipzig et Président de l'Association culturelle germano-rwandaise " AKAGERA-RHEIN e.V ", il y est dit à la page 9: " Dans IMPURUZA n°15, p.94, on y trouve également le plan d'exterminer et d'écarter les Hutu dans la gestion du pays ainsi que la non-cohabitation lorsqu'on dit: '...je prie encore ces personnes pour qu'elles partent en paix[vers l'Océan Indien]avant qu'il ne soit trop tard. C'est à notre tour d'habiter le Rwanda. Nous viendrons avec l'idée d'un écrivain Virgile qu'il a attribué à Anchise s'adressant à Enée: Epargner ceux qui se soumettent et dompter les superbes... ".



2. KIMENYI Alexandre:

Parti avec une bourse du Gouvernement pour faire des études aux USA dans les années 72, il n'est jamais rentré. Il est actuellement professeur à l'Université de Californie (Sacramento). Il est l'un des fondateurs de la revue IMPURUZA paraissant aux USA. Certains de ses écrits sont chargés d'idéologie génocidaire. Deux de ses poèmes ont été analysés par Eugène Shimamungu, Docteur en Sciences du langage et qui fait partie de l'Unité de recherche (1030) associée au CNRS en France. Le premier poème d'Alexandre Kimenyi est intitulé " Nsingize Gisa " et est paru dans IMPURUZA n° 17 de décembre 1990. Shimamungu en fait ce constat: " Par delà l'extrême antipathie que l'auteur développe envers l'ethnie Hutu, ce texte constitue une exhortation à la prise du pouvoir par les armes, mais surtout à l'élimination physique des hutu " (Shimamungu E., art. cit., p.14). Plus loin, Shimamungu fait remarquer: " Ce texte d'une extrême méchanceté envers les hutu constitue l'une des pièces importantes qui montrent l'intention d'extermination des Hutu depuis le début de la guerre en Octobre 1990. " (Shimamungu, art. cit., p.15). Au sujet du second poème: " Wihogora Rwanda " (Ne pleure pas ô Rwanda), Shimamungu fait ce commentaire: " Tout en déplorant les massacres en masse du côté tutsi, l'auteur exhorte à la vengeance et à l'accomplissement du plan d'extermination et du nettoyage ethnique (l'exil ou la mort) " (Shimamungu, art. cit., p.14).



3. NTARE Simon:

Avant la prise du pouvoir par le FPR, il était chargé des Affaires Politiques dans le Bureau du Président du FPR. Le 06 mars 1993, dans un document adressé à " FORUM PAIX ET DEMOCRATIE " que présidait feu Gapyisi Emmanuel à Kigali, NTARE Simon a reconnu les massacres perpétrés par le FPR en ces termes: "la vérité est qu'il y a eu des morts (...) et il est salutaire pour la population civile de sauver sa peau plutôt que de mourir sous les balles des combattants, quitte à vivre dans le dénuement le plus extrême. " (in La Voix du Réfugié Rwandais, n° 004, Octobre 1995, p.5). Il peut être considéré comme complice dans les actes de violations des droits de l’Homme commis sous le couvert du FPR/APR.



4. MUSARE Faustin:

Directeur de cabinet au Ministère de l'Intérieur dans le Gouvernement du FPR, il est le fils de Sakagabo et originaire de la Commune Muhazi, Préfecture de Kibungo. Il est impliqué dans des massacres qui ont eu lieu dans sa commune natale. L'asbl SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA a recensé nommément 18 personnes tuées sur ordre de Musare entre le 28 Mai et le 15 septembre 1994. Musare voulait venger un certain Karayiga Eliézer, mort en Avril 1994. (SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA ASBL , Le non-dit sur les massacres au Rwanda, dossier n°1, p.29).



5. NDAYAMBAJE Damas:

A la tête d'un groupe d'Inkotanyi, il a lancé une attaque sur l'Hôpital de Gishali. Ils ont achevé des malades. Ils ont ensuite assassiné le docteur NTORANYI, sa femme Espérance et leurs 3 enfants. (SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA n°1, p.30).



6. ABIMANA Mathias:

Bourgmestre de la Commune Mabanza, Préfecture de Kibuye, il est impliqué dans l'assassinat de civils innocents pour le fait seulement qu'ils soient hutu. Son cas a été soulevé par la Communauté Rwandaise de l'Allemagne lors de la rencontre de Bonn. (Voir le cas de Kabera Assiel).



7. RUTAYISIRE Wilson (Major):

Directeur actuel de Radio-Rwanda. Il était Directeur de Radio Muhabura qui émettait en ondes courtes lors de la guerre menée par le FPR. Cette radio a, tout au long de la guerre, appelé à la haine ethnique par des programmes approuvés par le Major Rutayisire. L'Ambassadeur SWINNEN qui était à Kigali jusqu'au 06/04/1994 dit à ce sujet que "la radio du FPR n'était pas non plus toujours sereine. " (COM-R, 1-21). Le ministre Léon Delcroix, dans son audition du 18 juin 1997, faisant allusion à un entretien avec M. Bizimana, ministre de la Défense, affirme de la RTLM qu'elle est " un contrepoids à la radio du FPR ; selon lui, il s'agissait du pendant de la radio FPR " (COM-R 1-85, p.785).

" Wilson was at or near sites in south Kivu, Haut-Congo, and Equateur during periods when massacres took place. Several reports indicate that he may be responsible for a special unit of RPA composed primarily of experienced Rwandan soldiers, that has been implicated in several large massacres in Congo.(38)

Wilson was in Kisangani during military intervention that took place at Byaro, Kasese I, and Kasese II that likely resulted in thousands of refugee deaths. According to Aid workers in Kisangani, Wilson was responsible for training and inciting the local Congolese population south of Kisangani to launch attacks against refugees. He was a commander for RPA operations in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997, when massacres took place. He was in Mbandaka until approximately may 24, 1997 when he was reportedly replaced by Commander David.(39)

Wilson has striking facial scarification and, in addition to English, speaks Kiswahili typical of Uganda. He claims to be from Uvira, in Eastern-Congo and is described as professional and intelligent by many who dealt with him on refugee issues. Wilson reportedly often went by the alias " Khadafi " in Rwanda as an RPA officer.(40) (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: Democratic Republic of the Congo, What Kabila is hiding. Civilian killings and impunity in Congo; Oct. 1997, vol. 9, n°5)



8. HIGIRO Prosper:

Originaire de Nyakabuye, Commune Rusumo, Préfecture de Kibungo, il est l'instigateur des massacres dans cette commune. Plus de 1500 personnes ont péri dans ces massacres selon les témoignages de l'asbl Solidaire-Rwanda, p.23 à 25.



9. KAYONGA Charles (Colonel):

Originaire de Muzizi, dans la Commune Rukara, il a fait massacrer avec son bataillon plus de 900 personnes dans cette commune lors de l'avancée du FPR en 1994. Voici quelques cas relevés par l'asbl SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA:

¨ A Nyakabuye : 40 paysans ont été massacrés dont NYIRABAHIRE (38 ans), MAJYAJYARI (70 ans), et NZARAMBA (68 ans) qui ont été brûlés dans leurs huttes.

¨ A Kiyenzi : 83 personnes ont été brûlées dans leurs maisons dont RWIVANGA et 16 membres de sa famille, GATANAZI (45 ans) et MUNYAKAYANZA (38 ans).

¨ A Ryamanyoni : 62 personnes ont été massacrées dont MBWAYISWA, GACACA (50 ans), NYIRANEZA (27 ans), NZABONALIBA (45 ans), tous éventrés et NSANZUMUHIRE (57 ans), brûlé vif.

¨ A Rukara, dans les localités de Butimba, Ryakirenzi, Mitungo et Buyonza, 204 paysans ont été massacrés.

¨ A Gahini où le FPR a établi son quartier général et un camp de déplacés, 178 personnes ont été exécutées dont 57 enfants. Voici quelques noms des suppliciés par "agafuni " (sorte de houe fortement usagée): Ruvugabigwi (45 ans, Pasteur); Gasana Georges (51 ans, enseignant) ; Mpangaza (mère du Dr Gatera); Gatera Ildefonse (45 ans, Agent de l'hôpital); Bagabo Martin (54 ans, Assistant Médical); Kajeguhakwa Samuel (67 ans, Commerçant); Gacakure François (46 ans, professeur) ; et 58 enfants âgés de 4 à 6 ans.

¨ A Nyawera, dans les localités de Mwiri, Cyanyabugahe, et Nyakabungo, 77 paysans ont été fusillés.

¨ A Kawangire, 119 personnes ont été massacrées par le FPR dont Karimunkwaya Nathanaël, père de Kayombya Robert, homme d'affaires bien connu au Rwanda. A Rwimishinya, 231 personnes ont été massacrées; rassemblées au marché de Karambi, elles ont été fusillées (p. 33 à 35).

Nommé à la tête du bataillon de 600 militaires du FPR emmenés dans la capitale dans le cadre des accords d'Arusha, il s'est illustré dans des attaques contre des populations civiles dont les tueries de Gishushu en face du Parlement rwandais, dans les bâtiments dans lesquels logeaient ses militaires. Avec Karake Karenzi, ils sont soupçonnés d'avoir semé le terrorisme dans la capitale à l'aide des commandos formés et infiltrés déjà depuis longtemps. Le 06/04/1994, il est impliqué dans l'attentat contre l'avion du Président HABYARIMANA. Le 08/04/1994, il lance ses hommes qui opèrent un nettoyage autour du CND (Parlement) et tuent notamment l'adjudant-chef Alain Didot, son épouse Gilda et l'adjudant-Chef René Maier (François MISSER, Vers un nouveau Rwanda : Entretiens avec Paul Kagame, Ed. Luc Pire et Karthala, Bruxelles et Paris 1995, p.81. MISSER cite Jean François DUPAQUIER de "l'Evénement du Jeudi ".

Durant son séjour au CND, le Colonel KAYONGA avait eu le temps de dresser des listes des intellectuels à assassiner. Ainsi, les militaires qui ont assassiné Emmanuel Bahigiki et toute sa famille et ceux qui se trouvaient chez lui "au moins 16 personnes " selon S. DESOUTER et F. REYNTJENS, avaient été envoyés probablement par le Colonel KAYONGA. C'était le 16/04/1994. (S. DESOUTER et F. REYNTJENS, Rwanda, les Violations des Droits de l'Homme par le FPR/APR, Anvers, juin 1995, p.18). Cette liste reprenait les intellectuels à en croire le témoignage reproduit par S. DESOUTER et F. REYNTJENS: " CRAD a très vite publié une liste de 18 personnes hautement qualifiées assassinées avec 160 autres, surtout à Remera-Kigali " (op. cit., p.19).



10. RUTAREMARA Tite:

Membre-fondateur du FPR, il en a été l'un des plus hauts responsables. Actuellement député du FPR à Kigali. Originaire de Kiramuruzi, commune Murambi, préfecture de Byumba, il est l'instigateur de massacres dans cette commune. Solidaire-Rwanda a recensé 2426 personnes connues, massacrées dont: Mutaganzwa Aloys (31 ans, agent de CARE-USA), Nyambwana Madeleine (48 ans, mère du Bourgmestre); Icyitegetse (29 ans, Catéchiste), Mukambibi Christiane (62 ans), Mukakalisa Peruth (45 ans, Chanoine), Urayeneza (39 ans), Uwimana Eugène (33 ans, agent de Care-USA) ...

Les personnes étaient rassemblées puis exécutées. Les lieux de rassemblement sont: le bureau communal sis à Gakenke, le terrain de football de Gakoni, l'école primaire de Kiziguro où il existe une fosse commune contenant près de 2.000 corps, le rocher de Kareba à Gorora, secteur de Murambi 2, le terrain de football de Nyabisindu, le bureau du secteur Rwankuba, Gabiro... Beaucoup de personnes ont été jetées mortes ou vivantes dans le lac Muhazi. (SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA , dossier n°1, p.32 à 33). Signalons que les massacres ont commencé avec l'arrivée des soldats du FPR dans la région le 11 avril 1994.

Dans un entretien qu'il a accordé au journaliste François MISSER en janvier 1995, RUTAREMARA reconnaît que le FPR avait des brigades à l'intérieur du Rwanda. " Selon RUTAREMARA, il y avait déjà des représentants de l'intérieur du Rwanda en son sein [FPR] car fin 1987, dit-il, 36 cellules du Front avaient déjà été constituées à l'intérieur du pays même "... (François MISSER, op. cit., p.155). Le Dossier n°2 de l'asbl SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA présente une documentation détaillée sur l'essence, le fonctionnement, la formation militaire et idéologique de ces brigades et fournit des exemples concrets de leur composition et de leur organisation. Ce dossier présente également des listes de victimes de certains membres de ces brigades. Il est dès lors plus facile de comprendre aujourd'hui le terrorisme qui a ravagé le Rwanda, surtout la région du Mutara avant 1990, sur tout le territoire rwandais depuis le déclenchement de la guerre, spécialement la pose de bombes et de mines et l'assassinat de personnalités politiques depuis 1992.

RUTAREMARA est en outre soupçonné dans l'assassinat du Ministre GATABAZI Félicien en 1993. En effet, ce leader du Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), ordinairement allié politique du FPR, commençait à prendre ses distances (Voir Vénuste NSHIMIYIMANA, Prélude au génocide rwandais, Ed. Quorum, 1995, p.92). Le FPR l'a mis dans le collimateur depuis que ce ministre, alors en charge du Ministère des Travaux Publics, avait fustigé ce Front en lui reprochant d'avoir détruit la centrale hydroélectrique de Ntaruka en préfecture de Ruhengeri. En outre, dans le meeting de son parti tenu à Butare trois jours avant son assassinat, GATABAZI avait clairement condamné la prise du pouvoir par les armes envisagée par le FPR. Le jour de son assassinat, il avait passé toute la journée à l'hôtel Méridien avec certains membres de l'opposition politique au MRND, dont RUTAREMARA Tite. GATABAZI est rentré dans la soirée après avoir marqué son désaccord sur un plan machiavélique qui lui aurait été soumis par ses partenaires politiques. C'est vers 21 heures 30 que le groupe lui téléphone pour une autre mise au point. GATABAZI sort de chez lui avec son escorte. De retour, ses assassins l'attendaient à l'entrée de son domicile.



11. MUTIKIRI Mathias:

Originaire de la Commune Murambi. Bras droit de Rutaremara Tite dans les massacres de Murambi depuis 1994 (Voir Rutaremara Tite).



12. RWABUKAMBA Vénuste:

Homme d'affaires Tutsi de Rwamagana (Centre commercial), il est l'instigateur des massacres dans les communes Muhazi et Kayonza. (Solidaire-Rwanda, Le non-dit sur les massacres au Rwanda, dossier n°1, Bukavu, octobre 1994, p.37).



13. MUVUNYI Augustin:

Originaire de Kiyenzi, Commune Rukara, il est le bras droit du Colonel Charles Kayonga dans le massacre des populations civiles de la commune Rukara. (SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA, Dossier n°1, op. cit., p.37).



14. RUTAZIBWA Privat (Abbé):

Complice de Paul Kagame dans le sabotage des Accords d'Arusha et dans la reprise de la guerre en Avril 1994. Il est l'un des extrémistes Tutsi qui ont été pour la solution militaire au moment où se déroulaient les négociations de paix d'Arusha. En effet, dans une lettre datée du 30 novembre 1993, l'Ambassadeur du Rwanda à Bujumbura à l'époque, Sylvestre Uwibajije, informait le Gouvernement Rwandais des préparatifs de la guerre par le FPR. Textuellement, il disait: " Les participants à la réunion dirigée par l'Abbé Rutazibwa (du FPR) ont souhaité que les jeunes réfugiés rwandais cessent de se faire enrôler par les burundais afin que le FPR puisse les enrôler en son sein pour la guerre imminente et décisive qu'il compte lancer contre le Rwanda (...) ".

Cette reprise des hostilités serait entre autre motivée, selon l'Ambassadeur, par le fait que "le FPR serait confronté à des déchirements internes nés de la difficulté de pouvoir caser dans les différents postes des ministères qui lui reviennent, des milliers d'intellectuels qui ont vivement milité pour la cause du FPR. "



15. KAGAME Paul (Général-Major):

Actuel vice-président du Rwanda, Président du FPR, Ministre de la Défense et Commandant Suprême (High Commander) de l'APR, il est considéré par les médias occidentaux, et à juste titre comme "l'homme fort de Kigali ". Il est sans conteste "le vrai chef du Rwanda " (Le Soir du 20/01/98). Propulsé à la tête des combattants du FPR après la mort du Général-Major Fred Rwigema depuis octobre 1990 jusqu’à présent, il est le premier responsable de tous les massacres à grande échelle commis par le FPR/APR. Ces massacres ont été exécutés sous ses ordres. Parmi ces crimes, on peut entre autres signaler:

¨ Massacres des populations des communes de Byumba frontalières à l'Uganda et déplacement de plus de 35.000 autres en 1990. Le nombre de victimes tombées sous les bombes du FPR dans cette période n'est pas connu, un black-out ayant été fait à ce sujet. Quelques rares témoignages signalent des exécutions massives dans les Communes Muvumba et Ngarama, et à Ngondore dans la commune Kiyombe entre 1990 et 1992.

¨ Déportation de milliers de Rwandais vers l'Ouganda : " Le FPR a déplacé de force des centaines, peut-être des milliers de personnes du Rwanda en Ouganda pour se créer des zones de protection " (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Qui a armé le Rwanda ? in LES DOSSIERS DU GRIP, Bruxelles 1994, p.16).

¨ Le 23/01/1991: Attaque du FPR dans la ville de Ruhengeri. Plus d'une centaine de personnes furent tuées à cette occasion. " Le FPR a également attaqué des objectifs clairement civils. Le 1 décembre 1991, ils ont attaqué un camp abritant 6.000 personnes déplacées à Rwebare. Ils prirent le camp d'assaut à partir de trois zones au bon milieu de la nuit, tuant 19 personnes et en blessant 34 autres. Une semaine plus tard, le FPR attaqua le petit hôpital de Nyarurema pour la troisième fois depuis le début de la guerre, tuant 6 infirmières et patients. D'autres objectifs civils comprenaient des écoles, des marchés et des maisons " (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, op. cit., p.44).

¨ Le 8/02//1993: Attaque généralisée dans les préfectures de Byumba et de Ruhengeri. Environ un million de personnes furent déplacées sans compter des centaines de milliers d'autres tombées sous les bombardements et les massacres des combattants du FPR. Plus de 40.000 morts selon les observateurs.

¨ Le 25 février 1993, dans une lettre adressée par le Comité préfectoral de Ruhengeri aux Missions diplomatiques accréditées au Rwanda, on y lit que le FPR s'est livré à des tueries aveugles de la population civile. " Après les avoir entassés dans les habitations abandonnées ou dans des salles de classe et après les avoir torturées en leur crevant les yeux ou en les mutilant, le FPR tue ses victimes soit à la grenade, soit par balles ou par armes chimiques dont seuls les INKOTANYI garde le secret macabre. Partout où le FPR est passé ou se cantonne, ce sont les lamentations, les pleurs et la désolation. Les populations de Ruhengeri et de Byumba sont actuellement l'objet d'un véritable génocide. En effet, les femmes enceintes meurent éventrées, des enfants et des femmes sont tués au couteau, des hommes sont mutilés et meurent à la suite de l'épuisement de sang ".

Parmi les victimes, la lettre signale entre autres :

¨ François BARENGAYABO, vice-président de la Cour d'Appel de RUHENGERI et ses trois fils qui ont été massacrés avec une trentaine d'autres personnes du quartier de NYAMAGUMBA dans la Ville de Ruhengeri.

¨ MUNYANEZA Jean Bosco, Substitut du Procureur Général près la Cour d'Appel de Ruhengeri avec et autres personnes qui étaient chez lui, tués après des tortures atroces.

¨ 500 personnes environs rassemblées en Commune Kidaho et fusillées.

¨ BAREZI Nicodème, premier Bourgmestre de la Commune Nyamugali et son épouse tués par la fameuse "akandoya ".

¨ GASANA Thaddée, Bourgmestre de la Commune Kinigi et Monsieur Elasto NTUYENABO, grand commerçant à Ruhengeri et à Kigali.

Les combattants du FPR ont en outre violé des filles et des femmes avant de les tuer notamment dans le secteur Gicuba de la Commune Nyamugali.

¨ L'Union des Français de l'Etranger (U.F.E) lors de son Assemblée Générale tenue à Kigali le 08/03/1993, a fait le constat suivant: " ...il s'avère que les agissements et les techniques adoptées par le FPR ressemblent étrangement à ceux employés par les régimes totalitaires. Les meilleurs exemples sont les massacres de civils à Kinigi, Nkumba, Ruhengeri, Shashi, Karwasa, Ngarama, Bwisige et notamment à Kidaho où un groupe important a été rassemblé de force avant d'être exécuté. Cette violence explique le million de déplacés de guerre qui fuit devant l'armée de "libération "... du FPR pour mourir à petit feu dans les camps très rudimentaires. "

¨ Le Comité de Liaison des Associations Rwandaises de Défense des Droits de l'Homme(CLADHO), dans son rapport rendu public à Kigali le 16 février 1993 dénonçait les "expéditions punitives " perpétrées par les maquisards du FPR notamment dans la Ville de Ruhengeri, où "plusieurs dizaines de civils ont été regroupés dans des maisons et massacrés ".

¨ Ces massacres commis par le FPR ont été également dénoncés, dans la même période, par la Ligue Indépendante pour la Défense des Libertés Publiques (LIDEL), la Ligue Chrétienne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda (LICHREDOR), une centaine d'intellectuels de la Ville de Butare signataire d'une lettre de dénonciation du génocide perpétré par le FPR au Rwanda.

¨ L'ambassadeur belge SWINNEN qui était accrédité au Rwanda à cette époque, a livré un témoignage émouvant à ce sujet devant la Commission spéciale Rwanda du Sénat Belge au mois de Mars 1997: " Il y a eu des incidents pour lesquels le FPR fut considéré comme responsable. Je pense à une attaque contre un hôpital ou à l'offensive de mars 1993 (sic). Le FPR a provoqué le malheur car, en pleine négociation d'Arusha, des dizaines de milliers de personnes se sont déplacées. Elles vivaient dans des conditions misérables " (COM-R 1-21, p.219). Ces camps étaient des vrais mouroirs. Un témoin européen a signalé que dans les camps de déplacés, dont celui de Nyacyonga, (aux portes de la Ville de Kigali), on enterrait toutes les deux heures une personne. (S. DESOUTER & F. REYNTJENS, op. cit., p.31).

¨ Dans sa dépêche du 12 mai 1994, RFI parlant de ce qui se passait au Nord du Rwanda dans la préfecture de Byumba, disait: " Partout le sol est couvert de centaines de milliers de cadavres en attente d'être ensevelis par des bulldozers ougandais. "

- Colette Braeckman, parlant de l’offensive du FPR : " Au moins 200.000 personnes ont été tuées en six semaines. Le HCR fait état de tirs délibérés sur les réfugiés fuyant le pays, des villageois rassemblés dans les écoles et mis en pièces à coups de machettes et des gens jetés vivants, pieds et poings liés, dans la rivière Akagera ". (LE SOIR du 19 mai 1994).

¨ Dans les dossiers n°1 et 2 de l'ASBL SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA, les témoignages des réfugiés des camps de Tanzanie laissent apparaître plus de 17.000 victimes du FPR dans son avancée à l'Est du pays vers la frontière de Rusumo.

¨ Plusieurs dizaines de milliers de personnes ont été forcées de se déplacer et ont été massées dans des camps de concentration dans tout le pays aux fins d'élimination physique de populations civiles sans qu'il y ait traces de leur assassinat. Plusieurs centaines parmi eux ont été massacrés soit dans les camps, soit au cours de ces déportations forcées. C'est le cas des camps de concentration de Rwamagana, Kabuga, Byumba...

- " Devant l’Ecole Saint-André, le FPR a parqué 12.000 réfugiés au lendemain de la prise de la capitale. La Croix-Rouge, dont c’est le mandat , a exigé à trois reprises auprès du FPR de pouvoir rendre visite et recenser les prisonniers de guerre. Elle n’y a eu accès que le 14 juillet dernier. A ce jour, (…), le CICR n’a recensé que 113 prisonniers de guerre en tout et pour tout le Rwanda ". (LIBERATION du 25 juillet 1994).


" Les informations émanant de témoins oculaires rwandais indiquent que des centaines, voire des milliers de civils non-armés et d’opposants du FPR, faits prisonniers ont été sommairement exécutés, ou tués de manière délibérée et arbitraire, depuis la recrudescence des massacres et des autres actes de violence qui ont fait suite à la mort de l’ancien président Juvénal Habyarimana, le 6 avril 1994. Nombre des homicides s’inscrivent dans un cycle de représailles arbitraires dans le nord-est du pays (Byumba), parfois dès avant le 6 avril 1994, et visant essentiellement des groupes de civils hutu " (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Rwanda. L’Armée Patriotique Rwandaise responsable d’homicides et d’enlèvements, avril-août 1994, Londres, octobre 1994, AI, AFR 47/16/94, page 4).


Au mois d’août 1994, " environ 60 personnes rentrant de la zone turquoise ont été exécutées à l’Ecole agro-vétérinaire de Butare " ". (F. Reyntjens, Sujets d’inquiétude au Rwanda, octobre 1994, p. 3).


" Le 29 août, une coopérante d’une ONG internationale a vu plusieurs milliers de cadavres récents autour et dans une église à Mbyo, entre Gako et Nyamata dans le Bugesera ". ". (F. REYNTJENS, Sujets d’inquiétude au Rwanda, octobre 1994, p. 3).


A Save (Butare) " Des membres de la population affirment qu’environ 1750 personnes auraient été tuées ", la MINUAR y a vu au moins " une cinquantaine de cadavres ". ". (F. REYNTJENS, Sujets d’inquiétude au Rwanda, octobre 1994, p. 3).


En septembre 1994, la MINUAR " a dénombré une centaine de cadavres à Kayumba au nord de Nyamata dans le Bugesera ". (F. REYNTJENS, Sujets d’inquiétude au Rwanda, octobre 1994, p. 3).

¨ Dans son communiqué rendu public le 08/12/1995 après sa fuite, MUSANGAMFURA Sixbert, ex-Chef des Services de Renseignements sous le régime du FPR parle de 312.726 personnes massacrées d'une façon sélective et délibérée par l'APR depuis sa prise de pouvoir en juillet 1994 jusqu'en juillet 1995. Il a parlé de 173 fosses communes connues.

¨ Faustin TWAGIRAMUNGU, ex-Premier Ministre du FPR, dans un communiqué fait à Bruxelles le 24/11/1995, affirme: " Pour les massacres de 200.000 personnes par l'APR, nous détenons des preuves irréfutables appuyant nos propos. " Rapportant ses propos la Wallonie parle de plus de 250.000 personnes massacrées par le FPR /APR depuis sa prise de pouvoir en juillet 1995. (LA WALLONIE du 28/11/1995).

¨ Dans leur document n°3 de mai 1997, James Gasana et Nkiko Nsengimana (résidents en Suisse), Promoteurs du Projet " Nouvelle Espérance pour le Rwanda ", révèlent ce qui suit: " Dans la préfecture de Byumba particulièrement dans la région du Mutara, promue récemment au rang de préfecture, les conflits de propriété seraient peu nombreux. Ils ont été réglés depuis avril 1994 par le commandement de l'APR compétent : Par les massacres" (p.11).

¨ Assassinat de trois Evêques par l'APR à Gitarama en juin 1994 par l'APR. Il s'agit de: Mgr Vincent Nsengiyumva, archevêque métropolitain de Kigali; Mgr Thaddée Nsengiyumva, évêque de Kabgayi et Président de la Conférence des Evêques du Rwanda; Joseph Ruzindana, évêque de Byumba. C'est par une triste erreur que les militaires du FPR ont tué ces évêques, a affirmé le Colonel Frank MUGAMBAGE. (DE STANDAARD du 06/06/1995). Pourtant le Parlement du FPR a refusé l’inhumation de ces évêques dans la dignité. Le Soft international n°727 du 6 au 12 février 1998 publié à Bruxelles a signalé que le Père franciscain Vjecko Curic, " un prêtre croate, a été criblé de balles à Kigali. Il était le 3 juin 1994 à Kabgayi lors de l'assassinat des évêques par l'armée du FPR ". LE MONDE du 5 février 1998 signale qu'il a été tué de 8 balles dans la poitrine, et qu'il a blessé son assassin avec l'arme qu'il portait avant de mourir. L'information a été publiée également dans le SOIR du 2 février 1998, dans LA LIBRE BELGIQUE du 4 février 1998. Plusieurs autres sources n'ont pas hésité à parler de l'élimination d'un témoin gênant.

¨ Un autre témoignage sur les massacres massifs du FPR/APR nous vient du journal français "Libération " du 27/02/1996 : " En s'appuyant sur des listes de victimes et en recoupant des témoignages, " Libération " est en mesure d'avancer que le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), l'ancien mouvement rebelle Tutsi au pouvoir à Kigali depuis juillet 1994, est responsable de 100.000 morts Hutu depuis 22 mois ". D'après les témoignages recueillis par le journaliste Stephen Smith qui a fait le reportage, témoignage corroboré par d'autres témoignages: " Au camp de Gabiro (ndlr: au Parc National de l'Akagera dans la préfecture de Byumba), les corps étaient brûlés et les restes enterrés au bulldozer ". Le témoin disait qu'en cinq jours, il avait compté plus de mille cadavres. " Les gens arrivaient vivants, on faisait l'" ingoyi " (le ligotage des coudes dans le dos) et puis on les tuait d'un coup précis sur l'os frontal du crâne. "

¨ Ces camps d'extermination du Mutara sont confirmés par le Journal britannique " SUNDAY EXPRESS EXPRESSO " du 21/04/1996.

¨ Massacres de plus de 8000 réfugiés dans les camps de Kibeho en avril 1995. Ils ont été dirigés par le Colonel IBINGIRA qui a bénéficié d’une complète impunité.

¨ Massacres des rescapés des massacres des camps de Kibeho. Le journal " LIBERATION " du 23/06/1995 titrait: " 60.000 déplacés disparus au Rwanda ", avec sous-titre: " Deux mois après la tuerie du camp hutu de Kibeho, des milliers de réfugiés manquent à l'appel ". Citant les sources de l'Integrated Operation Centre (IOC), la Centrale humanitaire des Nations-Unies, le journaliste Philippe Ceppi de ce journal dit: " La banque de données de l'IOC a beau faire et refaire ses comptes, son total reste sempiternellement le même: 60.000 déplacés se sont volatilisés dans la nature ". Pour Randolph Kent, Directeur du Bureau de coordination humanitaire des Nations Unies au Rwanda (UNREO), cité par Libération du 23 juin 1995: " Quels que soient les chiffres de départ, il reste que plusieurs dizaines de milliers de gens ont disparu. " Et plus loin il dit: " Il est évident qu'un certain nombre de gens sont morts ".

¨ Les massacres des réfugiés dans l'île d'Iwawu au lac Kivu.

¨ Le rapport du consultant GERSONY parle de plus de 30.000 morts par l'Armée de KAGAME.

¨ " Des soldats de l'APR ont exécuté de façon extrajudiciaire un certain nombre de responsables locaux. En juillet, 18 fonctionnaires locaux, leurs proches et leurs collègues ont été assassinés dans la préfecture de Kigali. Citons les noms de Vincent MUNYANDAMUTSA, maire de Rushashi, Laurent BWANACYEYE, Directeur de l'école secondaire de Rwankuba, et Floribert HABINSHUTI, Substitut du Procureur de Rushashi ". (Amnesty International, op. cit., p.306).

¨ Prisons et cachots mouroirs. Entre autre, Amnesty International a signalé qu'entre mai et octobre 1996, 39 prisonniers sont morts par suffocation à Kibuye.

¨ Massacres de plus de 500.000 hutu dans les camps et les forêts de l'ex-Zaïre. Le Général-Major Paul KAGAME a été on ne peut plus clair sur le rôle de son armée dans la conquête de l'ex-Zaïre et donc de l'extermination de milliers de réfugiés hutu du Rwanda et du Burundi et de nombreux Zaïrois. " Dans une interview que publie, aujourd’hui, un journal sud-africain, le vice-président et ministre rwandais de la défense, Paul Kagame reconnaît que ses troupes sont impliquées dans la mort de centaines de réfugiés dans l’est de l’ex-Zaïre. Mais pour Paul Kagame, il ne s’agit pas de massacres, mais de tueries dues à la guerre. Kagame rejette la responsabilité de ces morts sur l’ONU qui n’a pas su faire le tri entre les vrais réfugiés d’une part et d’autre part les miliciens interahamwe et les soldats de l’ancienne armée rwandaise. Kagame justifie l’intervention de ses soldats dans l’ex-Zaïre pour empêcher une invasion planifiée de son pays. L’Armée rwandaise a donc agi, selon lui, par légitime défense ". (Télétext RTBF I, Dimanche 26/10/1997, à 13 heures). Une mission de l'ONU conduite par l'expert des Droits de l'Homme Roberto Garretton, estime que les massacres de réfugiés Hutu commis de septembre 1996 au Printemps 1997 par les troupes de Laurent-Désiré Kabila peuvent être qualifiés de "crimes contre l'humanité " et qu'une prochaine mission devra déterminer si "un génocide a été planifié ". Ce rapport met également en cause les alliés Tutsi rwandais. (Le Monde du 13 et du 14 juillet 1997). Emma BONINO, Commissaire Européen à l'Action Humanitaire, estime à "environs 230.000 " les réfugiés disparus et qui ont certainement "succombé à la faim, aux maladies et aux massacres systématiques ". (Le Monde du 10/07/1997). Pour elle, un nombre équivalent à " toute la population du Luxembourg manque à l'appel ".

¨ A l'occasion de la visite au Parlement Européen de Paul Kagame le 20/01/1998, les FRD dans leur communiqué n°037/98 du 18/01/1998, ont rappelé les massacres commis par l'APR après le séjour au Rwanda, du 28 août au 1er septembre 1997, du Président de la Commission pour le Développement et la Coopération: 18 cas de massacres totalisant plus de 10.000 victimes ont été recensés dont:

· " Le massacre, par fusillade et jet de grenades, par l'APR de 8000 personnes, début novembre 1997, dans la grotte de Nyakinama en commune Kanama, préfecture de Gisenyi, où elles avaient trouvé refuge pour échapper aux massacres du marché de Mahoko et des collines environnantes depuis août 1997 ".

· " La mort de 30 personnes brûlées vives par l'APR à Gikoro, commune Mukingo (préfecture de Ruhengeri) le 15 novembre 1997 après les avoir rassemblées dans une maison soit disant pour une réunion. "

· Au sujet des tueries de Mudende le 11 décembre 1997, les FRD sont d'avis qu'elles "cachent une opération malveillante mais subtile du régime en vue de s'attirer la sympathie de la communauté internationale qui commençait à découvrir sa vraie nature ".

· Quant à l'ARIB, dans son communiqué du 20/01/1998, elle accuse Paul Kagame d'avoir :

" participé, en tant que planificateur, auteur coauteur ou complice, entre 1990 et 1994, en territoire rwandais, au massacre de milliers de réfugiés burundais, à cause de leur appartenance ethnique.

· " En territoire zaïrois (Kivu), entre octobre 1996 et mai 1997, ordonné le bombardement des camps de réfugiés burundais et le massacre systématique des réfugiés burundais partout où son armée les trouvait; ces massacres étaient ethniquement orientés ";

· " en violation du territoire burundais et de la souveraineté nationale, ordonné le massacre de civils burundais non armés, pour cause d'appartenance ethnique, en particulier dans la province du Nord et Nord-Ouest ";

· " participé, en tant que planificateur, auteur, coauteur ou complice au plan criminel d'assassinat, dans la nuit du 6 au 7 avril 1994 et dans l'espace territorial rwandais, du président de la République burundaise, Son Excellence Cyprien NTARYAMIRA, ainsi que de sa délégation ".

- Dans son journal radiodiffusé du 12 novembre 1996, la RTBF rapporte que les attaques du 25 au 26 octobre 1996 sur les camps de réfugiés se font à l’arme lourde à partir du Rwanda et que ces armes étaient placées sur le mont Muhe (Gisenyi), et ce au moment où le camp de Kibumba était attaqué déjà depuis le 21 octobre 1996.


Kagame, en tant que commandant suprême de l’APR, est très gravement mis en cause par le Rapport de Human Rights Watch d’Octobre 1997 qui accuse cette Armée, fer de lance de l’AFDL de Kabila, d’avoir perpétré des massacres en masse de réfugiés hutu. Chaque fois que l’APR est citée sans nommer de responsables, c’est le général Kagame qui est mis en cause. Chaque fois que l’APR commet des massacres sans qu’un commandant des opérations ne soit spécifié, c’est le commandant en chef, le général Kagame, qui en assume la totale responsabilité et en endosse l’entière culpabilité. " The presence of the Rwandan troops on the Congolese territory was confirmed by Rwandan vice-president Paul Kagame during an early July interview with the Washington Post(10). And again, on September 9, 1997, when Kabila publicly thanked Rwanda for its help during the war in an official visit to Kigali(11). Civilian refugees were often caught on areas of combat between these Rwandan forces and others backing the ADFL as they fought the FAZ and the ex-FAR opponents. In addition to death due to crossfire however, refugees describe numerous examples of indiscriminate attacks of refugee camps, including the use of mortars and heavy machine-guns and the attacks on the Kibumba refugee camp in north Kivu(12-13). These attacks on camps in eastern Congo marked the beginning of a series of attacks of refugees and temporary camps set up as refugees fled westward into the interior of Congo.


" During a July 1997 interview with the Washington Post, Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame claimed that the Rwandan Government had planned and led the military campaign that dispersed the refugee camps in eastern Congo and ousted former President Mobutu(21). According to the Washington Post, Kagame was unequivocal concerning his objectives. The impetus for the war, Kagame said, was the Hutu refugee camps. Hutu militiamen used the camps as bases from which the launched raids to Rwanda, and Kagame said the Hutus had been buying weapons and preparing a full-scale invasion of Rwanda


Kagame said the battle plan as formulated by him and his advisors was simple. The first goal was to ’dismantle the camps’. The second was to ‘destroy the structure’ of the Hutu Army and militia units based and around the camps, either by bringing the Hutu combatants back to Rwanda and ‘ dealing with them here or scattering them’(22). Kagame’s third objective was to topple Mobutu. Congolese President Kabila confirmed Rwanda’s military assistance in Congo during the war. Similarly, Kagame’s stated objective of destroying " the structure " of the ex-FAR provides a possible explanation for the active pursuit of refugees, former military, and militia across Congolese territory to areas of minor strategic importance, such as Mbandaka.


Despite the public recognition of military involvement, both Kabila and Kagame have denied that any civilian massacres took place by troops under their command.(24) Both during the war and up to the present, however, the identities of many commanding officers and strategists of the ADFL and its allies were kept secret. Throughout the seven-month military campaign, senior officers in the field were often out of uniform and many used only their first names in public. Similarly, ranks were apparently confused or intentionally simplified to avoid identification of the military hierarchy : many officers of Katangese or Angolan origin were given or assumed the rank of " general ", while numerous Ugandan and Rwandan officers were known only as " commander " or " colonel " followed by their first name only. It is possible that many of these first names were used in public are pseudonyms. ".(HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH : Democratic Republic of the Congo, What Kabila is hiding. Civilian killings and impunity in Congo ; oct. 1997, vol. 9, n°5) Devant toutes les malversations internationalles et cette volonté délibérée de dissimuler l’identité exacte des officiers directement responsables des massacres sur le terrain, deux personnes dont l’identité et la responsabilité ne laissent planer aucun doute, KABILA et surtout KAGAME, constituent la réponse à la question posée par le titre de ce chapitre VII du Rapport : " WHO IS IN CHARGE ? " (QUI ACCUSER ?)



16. KARAKE KARENZI (Colonel):

Originaire de la Commune Buringa, fils de Sezibera, il fit massacrer 120 personnes du secteur Kabare de cette commune pour, disait-il, venger son frère Kayigi François mort à Kigali en avril 1994. (SOLIDAIRE-RWANDA, dossier n°1). Officier du FPR envoyé à Kigali d'abord comme officier de liaison avec le GOMN puis comme agent de liaison avec la MINUAR dans le cadre des Accords d'Arusha.

¨ Depuis son arrivée dans la capitale, Karake Karenzi a activé les fameuses "cellules " et d'autres commandos infiltrés pour commettre des assassinats de toutes sortes. Il est soupçonné entre autres d'avoir commandité les assassinats de leaders politiques hutu: Gapyisi Emmanuel, Bucyana Martin, Gatabazi Félicien, Rwambuka, Ingabire Alphonse (Katumba), Joseph Mutombo...

¨ Des attentats commis entre 1993 et avril 1994 peuvent également lui être attribués, dont notamment le plasticage du siège de la CDR à Gisenyi, l'attentat contre le Dr Higiro, membre du Comité Exécutif du Parti CDR résidant à Nyanza, l'attentat contre des écoliers dans la Commune Taba dans la Préfecture de Gitarama et qui a fait une centaine de morts parmi les élèves de l'école primaire.

¨ On le soupçonne également d'avoir eu l'idée macabre de détruire Radio Rwanda en 1993. Jean Marie Vianney Higiro, ex-directeur de l'ORINFOR, et actuellement Visiting Assistant Professor à Miami University aux USA, l'écrit en ces termes: " Un officier du FPR a tenté de recruter un journaliste pour poser une bombe dans les installations de Radio-Rwanda à Kigali, lui promettant en échange trois millions de francs rwandais et une protection. Ce dernier a non seulement refusé, mais prévenu". (Jean Marie Vianney HIGIRO, Distorsions et Omissions dans l'ouvrage ' Rwanda. Les médias du génocide', in Dialogue n°190, avril - mai 1996, p.167).

¨ Les journaux de l'époque le soupçonnaient également d'avoir posé, par l'intermédiaire d'une certaine Mukagaga Emma Marie, une bombe qui avait alors détruit partiellement la poste centrale de Kigali. La fille dont il est question était agent de la poste à Kigali et était souvent en compagnie de Karake à l'Hôtel Méridien où logeait cet officier.

¨ Après la victoire du FPR en 1994, le Colonel Karake a été affecté à la DMI où il s'est illustré par des tortures, des enlèvements de personnes et leurs disparitions. Il est connu pour avoir organisé des plans d'extermination massive des Hutu par le truchement du phénomène des " infiltrés ". " Le Col. Karenzi Karake est un 'policier tortionnaire à la DMI' ". (CLIIR, Communiqué n°24/97 du 05/12/1997).

¨ Le 01/12/1997, il a été affecté comme Commandant du Secteur militaire de Gitarama. L'objectif qui lui était assigné était " détruire coûte que coûte Gitarama, 'berceau de la Révolution de 1959 ' ".(CLIIR, op. cit.;)

¨ Le 03/12/1997, poursuit le CLIIR, " la formule d'infiltrés " est évoquée dans l'attaque de la Commune Bulinga, région de Ndiza d'où est partie la REVOLUTION DE 1959 et d'où est originaire le père de Karenzi qui était enseignant dans cette commune. La riposte a fait des dizaines de morts.

¨ Le 09/01/1998, il a été " transféré à Ruhengeri pour continuer l'extermination des hutu commencée par son prédécesseur Lt Colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa ".(CLIIR, Communiqué du 27/01/1998).



17. MUROKORE (Lieutenant-Colonel):

Commandant du 21ème Bataillon, il a organisé l'attaque simulée de l'aérodrome de Gisenyi le 08/10/1997. Il en a profité pour exterminer la majorité des habitants hutu des communes environnant cette ville dont ceux de Rwerere et Rubavu. Il est également cité dans l'extermination des réfugiés Hutu dans les camps et les forêts de l'ex-Zaïre. (CLIIR, Communiqué du 17/11/1997).



18. GAKUBA Théodore (Lieutenant):

Avec son collègue, le capitaine Ruzibiza James, ils ont menacé le capitaine Hategekimana Théoneste des ex-FAR qui a échappé à un attentat le 06/06/1997. Le 20/05/1997, le Préfet de Gitarama avait, dans une lettre manuscrite envoyée au Premier Ministre Rwigema, lancé un SOS pour le Capitaine Hategekimana qui était constamment menacé par les deux Officiers de l'APR. Le 24/10/1997, le capitaine Hategekimana a été tué avec son escorte . Selon le CLIIR, dans son communiqué n024/97 du 05/12/1997, le capitaine Hategekimana " constituait un obstacle à l'implantation des escadrons de la mort et des groupes de tueurs du DMI à Gitarama. Cet attentat est l'oeuvre de la 'Special Branch'. Celle-ci ne parvenait pas à implanter rapidement ses structures d'appui, chargées de simuler des attaques des " infiltrés hutu ".



19. RUZIBIZA James (Capitaine):

Complice du Lieutenant Gakuba Théodore dans l'assassinat du Capitaine Hategekimana (Voir Gakuba Théodore).



20. IBINGIRA Fred (Colonel):

Depuis 1994, il s'est rendu célèbre dans les massacres de populations civiles. A la tête du 157ème bataillon, il a fait massacrer des populations depuis le nord-est de Byumba (en commune Muvumba) jusqu'à Cyangugu (sud-ouest) en passant par les préfectures de Kibungo, Kigali-Rural, Gitarama, Butare... Des centaines de milliers de personnes sont tombées sous les balles des soldats de son bataillon. Le 17/10/1994, il est impliqué dans l'assassinat du Père canadien Claude Simard. Ibingira était alors Commandant du secteur militaire Butare-Gikongoro.

En avril 1995, il dirige les massacres de Kibeho qui ont fait ± 10.000 morts selon certaines sources. Pour ce dernier crime, il fut jugé le 19/12/1996. Le jugement fut prononcé le 19/12/1996. Ce procès fut qualifié de simulacre par les organisations de défense des droits de l'Homme Human Right Watch/Africa et la Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme dans leur déclaration du 30/12/96. Après les massacres de Kibeho, il " a été relevé, et prétendument mis aux arrêts de rigueur. Le 04 juillet 1995, il a participé à la réception donnée par la présidence rwandaise pour commémorer le premier anniversaire de la 'libération' de Kigali. Présents en nombre, aucun diplomate, défenseur des droits de l’Homme ou responsable d'une organisation humanitaire n'a protesté. " (Libération du 27/02/1996).

Vers la fin de l'année 1996, il est parmi les officiers de l'APR ayant coordonné le bombardement des camps des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre avec le Major Gumisiliza et le Major Karera. Selon le communiqué spécial des FRD du 16/07/1997, le plan spécial d'extermination systématique des réfugiés rwandais et des autochtones hutu congolais mis au point par Kagame a été exécuté par "ses proches collaborateurs dont certains font partie de ses escadrons de la mort appelés par le régime 'action group' ". Il s'agit notamment de:

¨ Colonel James KABARERA, commandant en chef des opérations militaires de l'ex-Zaïre ;

¨ Colonel IBINGIRA, qui commandait le front Nord-Kivu de l'ex-Zaïre ;

¨ Colonel MUROKORE: Il commandait le front sud Kivu dans l'ex-Zaïre.

¨ Colonel NZARAMBA: Commandant de la Brigade 211, qui opérait normalement dans les préfectures de Gisenyi et de Ruhengeri. Il a soutenu les soldats de l'APR ressortissants de Masisi et de Rutshuru dans l'attaque des camps de réfugiés hutu (FRD, Communiqué spécial du 28/10/96).

En 1997, au mois de juin, IBINGIRA est à la tête de la Brigade 402 qui couvre le secteur militaire de la ville de Kigali-ville et Kigali rural. Depuis qu'il est en charge de la sécurité de ces deux préfectures, l'insécurité a doublé dans la capitale Kigali. Il a utilisé le stratagème des infiltrés pour ensuite opérer des rafles qui visent des Hutu et ensuite les faire disparaître (voir CLIIR, Communiqué n° 7/96 et 21/97).

Il est impliqué dans l'assassinat de 47 ex-membres des FAR. Voici comment les FRD le rapportent dans leur Communiqué Spécial du 29/03/1997: " ... 47 ex-membres des FAR récemment rentrés du Zaïre et résidant en commune Rubungo sous la haute surveillance de la 402ème Brigade/APR commandée par le célèbre Col. Ibingira (" le massacreur " de Kibeho en avril 1995) sont portés disparus. La Radio Nationale a confirmé cette disparition mystérieuse dans son bulletin du 26 mars 1997, une manière d'admettre leur exécution sans aucune forme de procès ".



21. HAVUGIMANA Emmanuel (Sergent):

Militaire de l'APR originaire de Nyanza-Butare, il a assassiné à Kigali, l’homme d'affaires hutu Mathias Hakizimana originaire de Butare. Il a été aidé dans cette cruelle besogne par un groupe comprenant les sergents Innocent Camarade et Pio Ngamije, les Caporaux Uwamungu Jacques et Rutsindura Epimaque, le civil Nsaguye. Tout le groupe a été présenté devant la justice. (Le Journal Le Partisan, n°28 de juin II 1995).



22. CAMARADE Innocent (Sergent):

Militaire de l'APR né à Bujumbura au Burundi. Co-auteur dans l'assassinat de Mathias Hakizimana. (Voir Havugimana Emmanuel).



23. NGAMIJE Pie (Sergent):

Militaire de l'APR né à Kanombe, Kigali, il est coauteur dans l'assassinat de Mathias HAKIZIMANA. (Voir Havugimana Emmanuel).



24. UWAMUNGU Jacques (Caporal):

Militaire de l'APR, originaire de Mubuga, Préfecture de Gikongoro. C'est lui qui a ligoté Mathias Hakizimana avant de l'assassiner. (Voir Havugimana Emmanuel).



25. RUTSINDURA Epimaque:

Caporal de l'APR, il est coauteur dans l'assassinat de Mathias Hakizimana. (Voir Havugimana Emmanuel).



26. NSAGUYE Wellars:

Originaire de Butare, il est coauteur dans l'assassinat de Mathias Hakizimana. (Voir Havugimana Emmanuel).



27. RURANGIRWA Jean-Damascène:

Entrepreneur habitant à Kicukiro, Kigali-Ville. Il a juré qu'aucun hutu ne peut habiter près de lui, surtout s'il habite une maison en ciment (" Nta muhutu ufite inzu y'isima uzantura iruhande "). Pour cela, il a fait emprisonner ou a fait éliminer tous les Hutu des environs de chez lui. (Le Journal Le Partisan n° 28, juin II, 1995).



28. COSMA (Lieutenant):

Il est impliqué dans des attentats contre certaines personnes dont notamment l'agression du journaliste MUTSINZI Edouard le 29/01/1995. Mutsinzi Edouard a été attaqué par un commando de cinq tueurs devant son domicile à Nyamirambo. Il a été laissé pour mort. Des coups reçus, notamment à la tête, l'ont rendu complètement infirme." Ses deux voisins directs (Lieutenants Cosma et Murenzi présents près du lieu du crime) ne sont pas intervenus avec leurs soldats de garde, malgré les coups de feu tirés ". (CLIIR, Communiqué n°03/96 du 12/07/1996).



29. MURENZI (Lieutenant):

Sa non-assistance, comme celle de ses gardes, au journaliste Mutsinzi Edouard le rend suspect dans cette agression (Voir cas du lieutenant COSMA).



30. NGABOYISONGA Kizito:

Militaire de l'APR. Le 24/06/1996, il a tenté d'assassiner le Père SIMOENS, responsable de l'orphelinat de Cyotamakara en Commune Ntyazo, Butare, après la messe du soir. Ne pouvant atteindre Simoens, Ngaboyisonga, ancien de l'orphelinat de Nyanza que dirigeait en ce temps le Père, a néanmoins tiré sur deux sacristains Jean Baptiste (qui est allé alerter le père Simoens) et Tite qu'il a trouvé dans la chapelle. Ce criminel a tenté lui aussi de se suicider. (CLIIR, Note pour information à tous nos partenaires, 22/03/1997).



31. RUGAMBWA (Major):

Le 02/03/1997, il y a eu une attaque sur la route Ruhengeri-Gisenyi. Deux véhicules ont été endommagés et 4 personnes sont mortes dont Iyamuremye Edouard. Du 03 au 5 mars 1997, il y a eu une opération meurtrière de ratissage et de fouille pour rechercher des infiltrés. Elle a fait plus de 500 victimes dans 7 secteurs avoisinants la ville de Ruhengeri à savoir: Musanze, Kabaya, Gahondogo et Gashangiro de la commune Kigombe; Kabere et Kitabura de la commune Nyakinama et Kimonyi de la commune Mukingo. Seuls 150 cadavres ont pu être décomptés officiellement à cette occasion ; d'autres ont été chargés dans des camions vers une destination inconnue. Une source américaine de l'Organisation de défense des droits de la personne, Human Rights Watch, affirme avoir reçu des témoignages fiables portant sur plus de 130 victimes, dont 6 d'une même famille parente du Colonel Kanyarengwe (alors Président du FPR). Quelques jours avant le début de cette intense répression, Dominique Bakunzibake, bourgmestre des années 60, avait été assassiné par des éléments armés inconnus. Lors des cérémonies de sa levée de deuil, l'armée a procédé à un massacre en tirant sur la foule rassemblée en cette circonstance. (FRD, Communiqué n° 029/97 du 08 avril 1997). Pour avoir fait usage de la force contre des populations civiles inoffensives en prétextant des infiltrés, le Major Rugambwa aurait été arrêté, mais c'était un simulacre pour calmer la population de la région.

" D'après l'expertise médicale faite par le Dr Karemera, directeur de l'Hôpital de Ruhengeri, certaines personnes ont été tuées avec des armes à feu, d'autres avec des armes blanches ". (CLIIR, Note d'information..., 22/03/1997).



32. KABERA Assiel:

Préfet de Kibuye. Il a fait emprisonner des gens et en a fait tuer d'autres tout simplement parce qu'ils étaient hutu. Son cas a été soulevé lors de la rencontre de la Communauté Rwandaise résidant à Berlin avec une délégation de parlementaires venue de Kigali. Ces parlementaires comprenaient entre autres: Madame Patricie Hajabakiga, Mme Agnès Mukabaranga, Ngarambe et Isaïe Mpayimana. La rencontre a eu lieu sur invitation de l'Ambassade du Rwanda à Bonn le 22/06/1997. Dans son rapport 1997, Amnesty International révèle l'ingérence des autorités locales dans le fonctionnement de la justice. Entre autres exemples: " Fidèle MAKOMBE, procureur de Kibuye a été passé à tabac en mai par des soldats de l'APR: Il avait protesté contre l'ingérence des autorités locales dans le fonctionnement de la justice et refusé, en l'absence de preuves suffisantes, d'ordonner certaines arrestations et mises en détention ". (Amnesty International, Rapport 1997, p.304). Durant le premier trimestre de 1997, il y a eu une attaque de l'école secondaire privée de Nyange par des malfaiteurs. 6 Elèves ont été tués avec un gardien de nuit et il y a eu plusieurs blessés. Cet assassinat n'est pas le premier dans cette préfecture de Kibuye et le CLIIR a rappelé à cette occasion " que cette préfecture est gouvernée par le Préfet Kabera Assiel, un des membres des 'ESCADRONS DE LA MORT' issus des milieux extrémistes du FPR ".



33. GATERA (sous-lieutenant):

Officier de l'APR, Commandant de la Brigade Judiciaire de Remera, Kigali-Ville. Il a couvert les escadrons de la mort qui ont assassiné des centaines de personnes dans le secteur Remera, commune Kacyiru, surtout au lieu dit " Kimicanga ", notamment à partir de septembre 1994. Ce groupe de tueurs étaient entre autres composé des militaires de l'APR : Mushimire Eric, Rurangangabo Anselme, Ruzigama Emmanuel, Karuranga, Muhizi, Mbonyinshuti Sylvestre, Gataza Habib et des civils miliciens de l'APR: Ntare Nicolas, Kayihura Jean Pierre, et Sinderibuye P. Célestin. Ce groupe est en outre protégé directement par le Colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa, Chef d'Etat-major de la Gendarmerie Nationale. (CLIIR, Un modèle typique d'" Escadron de la mort " soutenu par la Gendarmerie Nationale, 22/03/1997).



34. MUSHIMIRE Eric (Soldat de l'APR) :

Membre de l'Escadron de la mort du secteur Remera, Kigali-Ville. Le 21/01/1997, il a arrêté arbitrairement le nommé Gatete Fidèle, fils de Mwongereza Damascène qui a disparu depuis lors. Entre le 1er septembre et le 31/12/1994, il a, avec son groupe de tueurs, assassiné Nyirandimbati Généreuse avec ses deux fils, sa belle fille et ses petits enfants, soit 7 victimes d'une même famille! Il était entre autre en compagnie du militaire Rurangangabo Anselme et ont été aidés également par les " locataires " de chez Hategekimana Gallican. Le 31/12/1994, le groupe de Mushimire a massacré 9 personnes dont Nibarere, épouse de Munyakazi (fils de Habiyambere) avec ses 4 enfants et sa belle-mère. A la même date, ils ont tué Madame Nyirakimonyo Vénantie, ses filles, ainsi que 3 autres personnes. (CLIIR, Un modèle typique..., 22/03/1997).



35. RURANGANGABO Anselme:

Membre de l'Escadron de la mort du secteur Remera. Complice du soldat Mushimire Eric dans l'assassinat de centaines de personnes de Kimironko dans le secteur Remera (Voir MUSHIMIRE Eric).



36. OKWIRE (Capitaine):

Les militaires Mushimire Eric et Rurangangabo Anselme sont sous son commandement. Il couvre tous leurs assassinats (Voir MUSHIMIRE Eric).



37. KALISA (Afandi, Lieutenant ou sous-lieutenant):

Ancien Commandant de la Brigade de Remera, Kigali-Ville, il a couvert tous les assassinats qui ont eu lieu à Kimironko, secteur Remera entre juillet et septembre par des escadrons de la mort. Muté pour la Brigade de Nyarugenge, dans Kigali-Ville, " il avait été chargé d'intercepter les personnes " libérées par le Magistrat Gratien Ruhorahoza, qui a été lui-même enlevé par les militaires de l'APR et porté disparu (CLIIR, Un modèle typique d'escadron de la mort, 22/3/97).



38. DIEUDONNE:

Ex-soldat de l'APR reconverti dans l'enseignement, il a tiré, en date du 02/02/97 sur le Père canadien Guy PINARD, Curé de la Paroisse Kampanga à 16 km de Ruhengeri, alors que celui-ci célébrait la messe. Le Père est mort sur-le-champ. Cet assassinat a eu lieu au moment de la communion quand le Père était en train de distribuer l'Eucharistie. Quand les chrétiens ont tenté de l'appréhender, le meurtrier a tiré en l'air pour les dissuader et a réussi à s'enfuir. Le fait qu'il ait gardé son arme, alors qu'il n'était plus un militaire actif, pousse beaucoup d'observateurs à croire à un attentat commandité. Le Père Guy PINARD aurait été tué parce qu'il était un témoin gênant des massacres commis par l'APR dans cette région de Ruhengeri. (CLIIR, Note d'information à tous nos partenaires, 05/02/1997).



39. ZIGIRA (Major):

Il est gendarme (G5 chargé de la politique). Il est impliqué dans l'assassinat du Père canadien Claude Simard, le 17/10/1994, dans sa paroisse de Ruyenzi dans la préfecture de Butare, au sud du pays. Le Capitaine Zigira était alors Préfet de Butare et le Colonel Ibingira était alors commandant du secteur militaire Butare-Gikongoro. Les deux officiers sont soupçonnés d'être de mèche avec ces assassins. D'après des enquêtes menées par le Capitaine Tim ISBERG d'Edmonton (Canada), ce sont des soldats de l'APR qui ont tué le Père Claude Simard à coups de marteau qu'ils ont abandonné sur place. C'était vers le soir du 17/10/1994. Ils étaient venus à bord d'une camionnette Toyota bleue. Le Capitaine Zigira est également responsable de massacres massifs de civils hutu déplacés de guerre qui avait été encerclés lors de la prise de Butare au début du mois de juillet 1994 (CLIIR, Note d'information à tous nos partenaires, 05/0201997. Même cas que le Major Sekamana).



40. DANY (Capitaine):

Officier de l'APR, commandant des opérations militaires en juillet 1994, il est , avec le Major ZIGIRA, responsable des massacres massifs de civils hutu encerclés lors de la prise de Butare au mois de juillet 1994. (CLIIR, Note d'information, 02/02/1997).



41. BAGABO (Lieutenant):

Il a arrêté et mis en prison illégalement l'ex-conseiller à la Cour d'Appel de Nyabisindu, NKUNDIMFURA Anaclet. Celui-ci a été libéré sur injonction du Conseil des ministres le 24/07/1995. Le 21/04/1996, le bourgmestre de Nyabisindu MBANDA Steven a reproché aux autorités d'avoir libéré Nkundimfura dans un discours d'un extrémisme notoire. (CLIIR, Dernières nouvelles du Rwanda..., 13/04/1996).



42. MBANDA Steven:

Bourgmestre tutsi de la Commune Nyabisindu, il sème la haine entre les ethnies, en invitant les Tutsi à se venger sur des Hutu. Son discours du 21/04/1996 va dans ce sens . " Ce discours extrémiste et incitateur caractérise la plupart des bourgmestres tutsi mis en place par le nouveau régime. " (CLIIR, Dernières nouvelles du Rwanda et limogeage de deux préfets de Cyangugu Rutihunza Théobald et de Gisenyi Zilimwabagabo Charles, 13/06/96).



43. MUHIGIRWA Jean Bosco (Lieutenant):

" Jeune tutsi rapatrié du Burundi, était réputé être un grand tortionnaire de villageois (qui se faisaient rafler souvent la nuit par l'APR) " (CLIIR, Dernières nouvelles du Rwanda et limogeage de deux préfets de Cyangugu Rutihunza Théobald et de Gisenyi Zilimwabagabo Charles, 13/06/96). Responsable militaire de la zone de Kivumu (Rambura et Nyange), dans la préfecture de Kibuye, il est responsable de la mort de 22 détenus dans les cachots communaux de Kivumu. Le Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Défense des Droits de l'Homme (CLADHO) lors de sa mission du 27 au 29 novembre 1994, avait pu constater qu'il y avait 2 cachots: celui qu'il a visité se trouve dans les locaux de la commune Kivumu, et l'autre, celui de l'APR se trouve un peu plus loin dans une maison privée gardée par des militaires de l'APR et que les membres du CLADHO n'ont pas pu visiter (CLIIR, Dernières nouvelles ..., 13/06/1996).



44. KAZINTWALI KADAFI (Lieutenant-Colonel):

Commandant du secteur militaire de Butare, il a arrêté et emprisonné, le 02/05/1996, le Substitut du Procureur Célestin Kayibanda qui était en fonction depuis décembre 1994. Cette arrestation cadre avec le plan du FPR de l'épuration de magistrature rwandaise. (CLIIR, Epuration ethnique de la magistrature rwandaise, avril 1997). Le Procureur Général près la Cour d'Appel de Nyabisindu, Kabanda, adepte de ce plan, a tenté plusieurs fois de faire endosser en vain à Kayibanda le crime de génocide par de faux témoignages fabriqués par l'intermédiaire des " syndicats des délateurs ". En date du 09/01/1998, Kazintwali fut nommé Commandant-Adjoint de la Brigade de Gitarama-Kibuye. A cette occasion le CLIIR a fait le commentaire suivant: " Le Général Paul Kagame continue de jongler sur les mutations des principaux commandants militaires de l'APR impliqués dans le génocide, les crimes de guerre et dans les massacres de civils non armés après la victoire du FPR ". (CLIIR, Communiqué du 27/01/1998).



45. RUKWAKWA Joseph (Capitaine):

Officier de l'APR, il a tabassé le Procureur Fidèle Makombe et l'IPJ Binombe du Parquet de la République de Kibuye, sous l'instigation du Préfet Kibuye Kabera Assiel qui voulait que le Parquet arrête des citoyens innocents. (CLIIR, Epuration ethnique de la magistrature rwandaise, avril 1997).



46. KABANDA Charles:

Procureur Général près la Cour d'Appel de Nyanza, il collabore avec " les syndicats de délateurs ", système qui lui permet de jeter des milliers de Hutu en prison où ils meurent lentement. (CLIIR, Syndicat de délateurs..., mai 1997).



47. MUGEMANGANGO Paul:

Procureur de la République à Gitarama; il collabore avec les syndicats de délateurs, système qui lui permet de jeter des milliers des hutu en prison où ils meurent lentement. (CLIIR, Syndicat des délateurs ..., mai 1997).



48. RUKANGIRA Emmanuel:

Procureur de la République à Kigali, il collabore avec des syndicats de délateurs. Ce système lui permet de jeter des milliers de hutu en prison où ils meurent lentement. (CLIIR, Syndicat de délateurs ..., mai 1997).



49. BINGINKOMO Augustin:

Membre d'un grand syndicat de délateurs originaires du secteur Mukingo, commune Kigoma, Préfecture Gitarama. Ce syndicat comprend en outre: Rukimirana Uzziel, Rudasingwa Alexis, Nyirasoni Costasie, Ntakirutimana, Mukagare Aloysie, Mukantabana Marthe, Nshiyemubanzi François, Habyalimana Alexis, Habarurema Annonciata, Mbabariye Evariste, Mukamwezi Marie-Anne, Uzalibara Martin, Nkundimana Laurent, Nsabimana Vincent, Ubumwe Béatrice. Les victimes de ce syndicat entre juin 1994 et avril 1995 s'élèvent à 521 tués dans le secteur Mukingo, 220 dans le secteur Ngwa, 198 tués dans le secteur Kigoma, 127 tués dans le secteur Gasoro, 116 tués dans le secteur Kiruli et 110 tués dans le secteur Remera. (CLIIR, Syndicat de délateurs..., mai 1997), soit au total 1233 victimes.



50. KANYESHYAMBA:

Membre d'escadron de la commune Mukingi-Gitarama. Il opère en compagnie de Fidèle Mupagasi et Sylvestre Nyirabukara. Entre juillet et décembre 1994, leurs victimes s'élevaient à 831 réparti comme suit : cellule Nyakabuye : 205 tués, Mahembe: 124 tués; cellule Gitanga: 88 tués; Gasharu: 243; Gakomeye: 122 tués; Nyarusange: 49 tués. Ces massacres de Gitarama ont été dénoncés par l'Association Human Right Watch/Africa dans son rapport intitulé: " La Suite du génocide au Rwanda, septembre 1994 ". Ce rapport parle entre autre des centaines des civils hutu invités dans une réunion par les soldats de l'APR le 19/06//1994 dans la cellule Nyagakombe, secteur Rugogwe, Commune Mukingo, puis fusillés. Matata Joseph a pu identifier quelques victimes du massacre de cette réunion du 19/06//1994 à Rugogwe: Bizimana Michel, Niyongize Mathilde, Gahima: agent de l'hôpital de Byimana, Sekimonyo Michel... En tout, 27 victimes ont été identifiées. (CLIIR, Extrait du rapport de Matata Joseph sur la responsabilité du FPR dans le génocide, juin 1997).



51. MUHIRE Egide (Militaire de l'APR) :

Il est impliqué dans l'assassinat du Préfet P. Claver Rwangabo, de son fils Rwangabo Christophe et de son chauffeur dans la nuit du 04/03/1995. Garde du corps du Préfet, il a survécu miraculeusement à l'attentat alors que la voiture avait été criblée de balles (MATATA Joseph, Rapport sur l'assassinat du préfet de Butare, Kigali 15/03/1995).



52. KABERA Cyprien:

Militaire du bataillon Cyangugu. Il est impliqué dans l'enlèvement et l'emprisonnement de personnes dont notamment les membres de la famille de feu Rutabagisha Amiel (Intego n° 11 du 31/05/1996).



53. RUTAREMARA Jill (Capitaine):

Militaire de l'APR. Un des champions de la politique d'ethnilandisation du Mutara (Ere de la Liberté, n° 34).



54. KAJEGUHAKWA Valens:

Propriétaire de l'Entreprise Rwandaise des Pétroles qui eut longtemps le monopole de la fourniture des produits pétroliers aux services publics et à l'armée, Kajeguhakwa tissa des relations de corruption qui lui permirent de détourner des sommes colossales en devises. Redevable de plusieurs centaines de millions au fisc et aux banques rwandaises, la justice procéda à la saisie de ses biens et entama de les vendre aux enchères. Kajeguhakwa a alors rejoint le FPR en août 1990 pour revenir avec lui attaquer le Rwanda. Il quitta le Rwanda en gardant un ressentiment très fort contre le juge Hategekimana Jean, président du Tribunal de première instance de Kigali qui avait prononcé le jugement de liquidation de ses biens et contre les curateurs, dont Rwananiye Daniel qui dirigeait ceux-ci.

Quand le FPR reprit la guerre en avril 1994, Kajeguhakwa aurait envoyé ses escadrons de la mort pour tuer ces deux hauts cadres. Rwananiye fut égorgé chez lui à Kicukiro avec sa femme et ses 4 enfants. C'était le 09 avril 1994. Dans la même nuit, le juge Hategekimana et toute sa famille furent également assassinés.



55. SAM KAKA alias KANYEMERA (Colonel):

Chef d'Etat-major de l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR) de juillet 1994 à janvier 1998, Kanyemera participa à tous les assassinats qui ont eu lieu dans les préfectures de Byumba et de Ruhengeri sur les populations civiles. Le cas le plus connu est celui de la commune Cyungo dans la préfecture de Byumba. Le 06 avril 1994, le Colonel Kanyemera, qui était avec ses hommes dans la "zone démilitarisée " dans la Commune Cyungo-Byumba, mis au point un appât qui a bien fonctionné : la population de cette commune en proie à la famine parce que la guerre l’avait empêché de cultiver, avait grandement besoin d'une aide en nourriture. Les hommes de KAKA invitèrent tous les cadres de la commune à une réunion à Kimiryi. L'ordre du jour était de mettre sur pied le programme de distribution de la nourriture. Plus d'une vingtaine de personnes répondirent à l'appel. Elles furent tuées dans la salle dans laquelle elles s'étaient rassemblées. Le lendemain, avant que la nouvelle ne se répande, l'on invita tout jeune qui savait lire et écrire à une réunion ayant le même objet et l'on ajouta que les jeunes distributeurs seraient payés à l'heure. Comme c'était les vacances, tous les jeunes de la commune et même des communes environnantes se précipitèrent en masse. Ils furent tous tués sur ordre de SAM KAKA. Le jour suivant, les hommes de KAKA sillonnèrent la commune. Ils tuèrent toutes les familles qui avaient des enfants dans l'administration à Kigali et ailleurs. La même opération fut réalisée également dans les communes avoisinantes de Nyamugali et de Tumba. Il a été aidé dans cette sinistre tache par un certain MUKWIYE de Kinihira, Commune Cyungo et actuellement responsable des services de sécurité à Byumba. Le Colonel KAKA est coordinateur de la constitution des escadrons de la mort, avec pour mission d'assassinat des leaders rwandais en exil. Leur formation a été réalisée au camp militaire de Kigali en janvier et février 1996. Le recrutement des jeunes se fait par le Major KAZURA. La majorité proviennent de l'Université Nationale du Rwanda à Butare.



56. KAZURA (Major):

Responsable du recrutement et de la formation des escadrons de la mort à envoyer à l'extérieur pour éliminer les leaders hutu en exil (Voir SAM KAKA).



57. NZIZA Jackson alias NKURUNZIZA Jacques (Major):

Originaire de Bufumbira (Uganda), il était adjoint du Général-Major Paul KAGAME dans les services de sécurité de la NRA, armée ugandaise. Il est surtout connu pour avoir fait assassiner 3 évêques à Kabgayi, dix prêtres, plusieurs religieux et religieuses ainsi que de nombreux laïcs en juin 1994. En juillet, quand le FPR a pris le pouvoir, Jackson NZIZA est nommé Ambassadeur à Nairobi au Kenya. Il ne tarde pas à activer les réseaux de renseignement qu'il avait tissés lorsqu'il était officier de renseignements de la NRA. La sûreté kenyane ne tarde pas à tendre ses filets et il est pris en flagrant délit. Il est alors expulsé. En 1996, lors des attaques des camps de réfugiés au Zaïre, NZIZA est cité comme assassin du Général KISASE Ngandu, Commandant des forces de l'AFDL. Il était aussi chargé de la sécurité dans la capitale, Kinshasa, selon un communiqué spécial des FRD du 11/07/97.

" An officer reported to be Major Nkurunziza (also referred to as colonel or Commander " Jackson ") was seen by numerous sources in Maniema, south Kivu and Haut-Congo near sites where refugees were concentrated and/or massacres took place. Jackson, according to Congolese and aid workers also known as " the Exterminator ", speaks Kiswahili of Ugandan as well as fluent English and Kinyarwanda.(42) In early April, Jackson was a commander in the Shabunda area where he told aid workers that his mission was to eliminate ex-FAR and Interahamwe. During this period, humanitarian sources saw mass-graves and decomposing bodies of what they state were civilian refugees in the Shabunda and neighbouring areas. Corroborating sources state that Jackson was at barriers south of Kisangani during mid to late April 1997 when massacres allegedly were taking place at refugee camps in the area. He was in Kisangani until mid-may and later in south-Kivu and Maniema as late as July 1997 during a period in which UNHCR was organising voluntary repatriation.(43) He was seen again in Kisangani as recently as early September 1997.(44) (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH : Democratic Republic of the Congo, What Kabila is hiding. Civilian killings and impunity in Congo ; oct. 1997, vol. 9, n°5).



58. GASHAYIJA (Officier 'Afandi' de l'APR).

Il est responsable de la disparition de RUTAYISIRE Georges, qu'il a fait arrêter dans la commune Nyarugenge, dans la Ville de Kigali le 18/07/94. RUTAYISIRE Georges est originaire de la commune Cyimbogo, Préfecture de Cyangugu. (CLIIR, Rapport sur la situation des droits de l'Homme au Rwanda, 31 mars 1995).



59. ADAMO (Lieutenant) :

Il a arrêté à son domicile KALIMUNDA Gérard, commerçant bien connu dans la ville de Kigali et originaire de Gisenyi. KALIMUNDA Gérard est porté disparu depuis lors. (CLIIR, Rapport sur la situation des droits de l’Homme au Rwanda, 31 mars 1995).



60. MUTERAHEJURU Gilbert (Militaire de l'APR):

Il est coauteur de l'arrestation et de la disparition de RUTAYISIRE Georges. (Voir GASHAYIJA).



61. KALISA Martin :

Bourgmestre de la commune Musambira depuis la prise du pouvoir par le FPR. Il a fait arrêter l'ancien bourgmestre de Musambira, Nyandwi Justin, en l'accusant d'avoir soutenu des massacres dans sa commune.

Il faut rappeler que Nyandwi avait dû fuir de chez lui le 20/04/1994 quand il a été attaqué par les Interahamwe et avait été destitué de sa fonction de bourgmestre le 18/06/94. Il n'a pu rentrer chez lui que le 20/08/1994. Arrêté le 09/01/1995 et transféré à la prison de Gitarama, il a disparu depuis (CLIIR, Communiqué du 31 mars 1995).



62. BOSCO (sous-lieutenant de l'APR):

Il a arrêté et fait emprisonner le sous-préfet KOLONI de Ruhango qui avait été réintégré dans ses fonctions en août 1994. Le sous-préfet Koloni a été assassiné avec toute sa famille, le 27/07/1995. De fortes présomptions pèsent sur la complicité du sous-lieutenant Bosco dans cet assassinat (MATATA Joseph, Arrestations et détentions arbitraires, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



63. BAGABO (Lieutenant):

Commandant de l'APR dans la sous-préfecture de Ruhango, il a fait arrêter le juge NKUNDIMFURA, qui était Conseiller près la Cour d'Appel de NYABISINDU, depuis son arrestation le 19/12/1994 celui-ci est porté disparu. (MATATA Joseph, Arrestations et détentions arbitraires, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



64. KIZURI et JOSELINE:

Ces deux ABAKADA (Cadre) du FPR du quartier de Gakinjiro (Ville de Kigali) ont arrêté le nommé Kolimba le 04/02/1995. Ils l'ont emmené au quartier de Kiyovu-Rugenge et l'ont enfermé dans un sanitaire (WC). Ils sont revenus chez lui à Gakinjiro, ont torturé sa femme et ses enfants et ont pillé la maison. Kolimba est depuis lors porté disparu. (MATATA Joseph, Arrestations et détentions arbitraires, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



65. TWAGIRA:

Cadre du FPR rapatrié d'Uganda, il a arrêté le commerçant Gaspard Harerimana et est revenu nuitamment avec des militaires pour piller le stock de ce commerçant qui depuis lors est porté disparu. Ce Twagira fut par la suite muté vers Gisenyi. L’arrestation de Harerimana a eu lieu au mois d'août 1994. (MATATA Joseph, Arrestations et détentions arbitraires, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



66. RWAKAGEYO:

Cadre du FPR rapatrié d'Uganda, il a arrêté plusieurs personnes dans le secteur Rusororo, Commune Rubungo, et les a passées à tabac avant de les emmener dans le cachot de la sous-brigade de Kabuga. Depuis lors, certaines d'entre elles ont disparu dont Célestin Kabanda et Jean de Dieu Rwamakuba tous deux originaires de la cellule Ruyonza, secteur Rusororo, Commune Rubungo. Leur arrestation avait eu lieu le 13/02/1994 (MATATA Joseph, Exactions et avidité des cadres du FPR, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



67. KABANDA Ildephonse:

Cadre du FPR originaire de Butamwa, Préfecture de Kigali, il a été désigné pour diriger la commune Taba dans la Préfecture de Gitarama. Durant le peu de temps qu'il a passé à la tête de cette commune, il a fait exécuter plus de 100 personnes avant d'être éloigné par le Préfet de Gitarama. (MATATA Joseph, Exactions et avidité des cadres du FPR, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



68. KARENZI Gilbert:

Cadre du FPR dans la commune Tambwe, préfecture Gitarama, il a fait enlever l'homme d'affaires Rudasingwa Gérard pour s'approprier ses biens. Rudasingwa est porté disparu depuis le jour de son arrestation, soit le 04/08/1994. Le même sort fut réservé à Munyeshuri de la même commune pour que l’on s'approprie sa maison. (MATATA Joseph, Exactions et avidité des cadres du FPR, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



69. MUGABO Innocent:

Il est complice dans la disparition de Rudasingwa et Munyeshuri. (MATATA Joseph, Exactions et avidité des cadres du FPR, Kigali 31 mars 1995. Voir Karenzi Gilbert).



70. BAYIHORERE Idrissa et HARUNA:

Ces deux cadres sont impliqués dans la disparition de nombreuses personnes du secteur Nyamirambo dans la ville de Kigali. Cela en 1994 et 1995. (MATATA Joseph, Rapports et témoignages attestant la persécution contre les Hutu, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



71. MUKALIMBA Gloriose alias MAMA DIDI:

A la tête d'une association de délateurs, elle est à la base de nombreuses disparitions de personnes qualifiées d'"ibipinga " (nom péjoratif pour désigner les Hutu) dans le secteur de Gasyata de la ville de Kigali, dans la seconde moitié de 1994. Les autres membres de cette association sont : Félicité, Ntaganda, Pierre Nshongore et Damascène du secteur Gasyata. (MATATA Joseph, Rapports et témoignages attestant la persécution contre les Hutu, Kigali 31 mars 1995).



72. RUZIMA:

Secrétaire communal de la commune Tambwe, il a fait éliminer plus d'une centaine de personnes de cette commune en 1994 et 1995. (CLIIR, Les syndicats des délateurs, mai 1997).



73. NICYABERA Béatrice:

A la tête d'un syndicat des délateurs, cette dame a fait éliminer beaucoup de personnes pour le simple fait qu'elles étaient Hutu, en 1994 et 1995. Cela a eu lieu dans le secteur Remera, cellule Nyamagana, Commune Kigoma. Les autres membres de cette association sont: Sebugwiza, Mpayimana et Epimaque Habiyambere, tous du même secteur. (CLIIR, Les syndicats des délateurs, mai 1997).



74. KAYITARE:

Du secteur Gakenke, Cellule Kiramuruzi, commune Murambi. Il a fait éliminer beaucoup de personnes de cette commune en les dénonçant injustement aux militaires qui les fusillaient sur-le-champ, cela dans la seconde moitié de 1994 et en 1995. (CLIIR, Les syndicats des délateurs, mai 1997).



75. NGOGA Charles (Colonel):

De juillet 1994 à début 1996, le Colonel NGOGA était commandant du secteur militaire Gitarama-Kibuye. Il y introduit "la formule d'infiltrés hutu " qui lui permit de faire massacrer en toute légalité et "légitime défense" des milliers de Hutu de ces 2 préfectures. " Le Colonel NGOGA s'est rendu responsable de la mort de plus de 18.000 civils Hutu dans la seule préfecture de Gitarama entre juillet 94 et juin 95" (CLIIR, Communiqué n° 17/97 du 27/06/1997). Il est nommé par la suite Commandant du secteur militaire de Ruhengeri-Gisenyi. Il y introduit la même formule jusqu'en août 1996 où il a été remplacé par le Colonel Nzaramba. Il a organisé, dans la nuit du 28 au 29 juin 1996, le massacre de 28 personnes dans le secteur Nyamugeyo, Commune Giciye dans la sous-préfecture Kabaya (Préfecture de Gisenyi). Du 04/07/96 au 12/08/96, l'APR a mené des "opérations de représailles " qui ont fait des centaines de morts. Ces opérations ont été condamnées par Human Rights Watch, FIDH et Amnesty International en date du 26/07/96. En août 1996, le Colonel NGOGA est transféré au Commandement de la Brigade de l'Est.

En tant que Commandant du secteur militaire Ruhengeri-Gisenyi, il organise des ratissages qui ont coûté la vie à plusieurs milliers de personnes de ces deux préfectures. Quelques exemples tirés des rapports du Centre de Lutte contre l'Impunité et l'Injustice au Rwanda: " Le 06/08/1996, les victimes des ratissages organisés par le Colonel NGOGA étaient de plus de 675 personnes civiles sans armes, dont Kanyarwanda Juvénal qui était percepteur des impôts, Mbuzamarero, préfet des études à l'école secondaire de Kagogo, quatre victimes membres de la famille du député Maniraguha Lucie et beaucoup d'étudiants en vacances. Cela s'est passé en commune Nyamutera, dans la préfecture de Ruhengeri " (CLIIR, Communiqué n° 4/96, 14/08/1996 ; FRD, Communiqué n° 16/96 du 07/10/96).



76. ZIMURINDA Jean-Bosco (Sous-Lieutenant):

Engagé dans l'armée Patriotique Rwandaise en avril 1994, il a été nommé sous-préfet de la sous-préfecture de Kiyumba en remplacement du sous-préfet Koloni Placide assassiné le 27/07/1995. Membre des escadrons de la mort, il est impliqué dans plusieurs crimes dont :

¨ Les massacres de civils hutu dans les régions du Bugesera et de Gitarama Sud en juin 1994.

¨ L'assassinat, dans la nuit du 27/07/1995, du sous-préfet Koloni Placide, son épouse Immaculée Nyirambibi, ses deux filles Umutoniwase Marie-Claire (15 ans) et Carine Uwamahoro (9 ans) et sa domestique Séraphine Murekatete.

¨ L'assassinat du Bourgmestre de Nyabikenke, Elie Dusabumuremyi, dans la soirée du 11/07/1996 par des militaires à bord de deux véhicules de l'APR. Les occupants d'un des deux véhicules venaient tout juste de s'entretenir avec le sous-préfet Zimurinda.

¨ Assassinat en mai 1996 de Gasana François, responsable de la cellule Kabeza, secteur Ngoma, Nyabikenke.

¨ Assassinat de Rwubaka Benoît, tué en juin 1996, le jour de sa nomination à l'issue d'une réunion dirigée par le Bourgmestre et le sous-préfet Zimurinda.

¨ Il est l'un des auteurs des tracts qui invitaient la population Tutsi de Nyabikenke à se regrouper sur de petits centres, dans le cadre d'un plan d'élimination lente des Hutu (CLIIR, Communiqué n°17/97)



77. MUGABO Francis:

Membre des escadrons de la mort du DMI, il a été envoyé à Nairobi, au Kenya, comme membre de l'Ambassade du Rwanda dans ce pays. Il avait une mission d'assassiner Seth Sendashonga, ex-ministre du FPR et qui a démissionné pour protester contre l'extermination des populations civiles par l'APR. Mugabo tira sur lui le 26/02/1996 et le blessa à l'épaule. Son neveu qui était dans la même voiture fut atteint de plusieurs balles dans l'abdomen. Il en est mort fin avril 1997 à Nairobi. (CLIIR, Note sur le sort des réfugiés rwandais au Kenya, 22/07/1997).



78. NKUBITO (Major):

Impliqué dans l'assassinat de plusieurs personnes dans la préfecture de Gitarama. Le 13/09/1996, ce major avait menacé les populations des communes Rutobwe et Runda de represailles au cas où il y aurait des infiltrés. Sitôt dit sitôt fait. Des infiltrés furent inventés de toutes pièces. Ainsi, le 05/07/97 dans la nuit, 16 personnes furent assassinées en commune Nyakabanda, Gitarama, par des militaires de l'APR. Parmi les victimes, on peut citer: Musabyimana Thaddée, Directeur de l'école secondaire privée "la Fraternité de Ndiza "; Nkundabatware Jean Baptiste, coordinateur de l'ASBL "Compagnons Fontainiers Rwandais " (COFORWA), tué lui aussi avec sa femme et ses cinq enfants; le 04/07/1997, trois autres personnes ont été tuées dans la commune Mushubati, près de la ville de Gitarama (CLIIR, Communiqué n°17/97).



79. KWIKILIZA (Major):

Il fait partie de l'équipe du Major Nkubito. Ils ont tous les deux proféré des menaces à l'encontre des populations de Gitarama avant d'y organiser des tueries. (CLIIR, Communiqué n°17/97).



80. GAKWERERE (Capitaine):

Fils naturel du Colonel Ndungutse, bien connu dans l'armée ugandaise, la NRA. Il a organisé des embuscades dans la commune de Rushashi et qui ont coûté la vie en date du 07/07/1996 au Bourgmestre de la Commune de Rushashi, au Procureur près le Parquet de Rushashi, sa femme et ses deux enfants ainsi que le Directeur d'une école secondaire et leurs compagnons, soit au total 18 personnes. (CLIIR, Communiqué n° 17/97).



81. KABERA (sous-lieutenant):

Dans la soirée du 16 janvier 1997, il a tiré sur le Député Burakari Evariste à Rutare dans la préfecture de Byumba. Burakari était membre du Parti Libéral. Il aurait été abattu parce qu'il avait été témoin de massacres de civils hutu par le FPR lorsqu'il était Bourgmestre intérimaire de la commune Rutare pendant la période d'avril à août 1994. Kabera a été condamné à 52 mois de prison ferme. (CLIIR, Communiqué n°15/97)



82. RUGIRA (Lieutenant):

Il accompagnait le Sous-Lieutenant Kabera lors de son forfait. Il a été condamné à un an avec sursis (CLIIR, Communiqué n°15/97).



83. BAGIRE (Colonel):

Sous sa direction en tant que commandant du secteur militaire Ruhengeri-Gisenyi, 110 paysans ont été massacrés dans la commune de Kanama à l'aube du 12/09/1995 ainsi que le Bourgmestre de Kanama, Setako Célestin et le conseiller du secteur Kayove Abraham Rukebesha. C'était en représailles de la mort du Lieutenant Ruraza tué dans une embuscade dans la soirée du 11/09/1995. Suite à cette extermination de populations civiles sans armes, Bagire a été muté "à titre de sanction " et fut nommé Conseiller du Général KAGAME. (CLIIR, Communiqué n°21/97 du 13/09/1997).



84. KABUYE Rose (Major):

Elle a été Préfet intérimaire de la Préfecture de Kigali-rural de fin avril à juillet 1994. Durant cette période, elle a ordonné, à partir de son quartier général de Kabuga, des massacres de paysans hutu dans les communes Bicumbi, Gikoro, Rubungo, Gikomero et Kanombe. Elle fut, après, nommé Préfet de la préfecture de la ville de Kigali où elle a soutenu et encouragé les escadrons de la mort et les milices Tutsi contre les Hutu. Elle a tenté de réinstaurer le permis de résidence obligatoire malgré une forte opposition de son ministre de l'Intérieur Seth Sendashonga qui a démissionné en août 1995. Elle est impliquée dans les violations les plus graves du droit de propriété par la gestion anarchique des fonds recueillis des maisons confisquées par l'APR. Rose Kabuye et Kayumba Nyamwasa sont impliqués dans l'assassinat du président Juvénal Habyarimana (F. REYNTJENS, Rwanda. Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire, Institut Africain CEDAF, Bruxelles, Ed. L'Harmattan, Paris, 1995, p.44. Voir aussi Kayumba Nyamwasa).



85. SEKAMANA Jean-Damascène (Major Gendarme):

Officier de renseignements (G2 Intelligence), il est impliqué dans la plupart des exécutions sommaires, disparitions, tortures, séquestrations, arrestations arbitraires et détentions illégales qui ont secoué les préfectures de Kigali-ville et Kigali-Rural en 1997 (CLIIR, Communiqué n°16/97).



86. GUMISILIZA (Major):

Il est impliqué dans des assassinats de civils Hutu depuis 1994. Responsable du secteur militaire de Cyangugu, il est parmi les officiers qui ont conduit les bombardements des camps de réfugiés hutu dans l'ex-Zaïre en septembre 1996. (CLIIR, Communiqué n°7/96 du 08/11/1996 et Communiqué n°18/97 du 15/07/1997).



87. KARERA Denis (Major):

Impliqué dans des massacres des Hutu dans la zone de Byumba entre avril et juillet 94, avec le Major Birasa qui était sous ses ordres, ils ont massacré, en date du 28/04/1994, 1500 paysans Hutu qui s'étaient réfugiés dans les bâtiments du Diocèse de Byumba. Le Major Karera a été promu Directeur de la Police Communale. En 1996, il dirigeait la zone Sud de Cyangugu-Bugarama. Il a escorté 30 camions de marque TATA remplis de soldats de l'APR qui ont été acheminés au Sud-Kivu depuis le 21/09/1996 par la province burundaise de Cibitoke. Il a conduit les bombardements des camps de réfugiés hutu dans la région de Bukavu les 22 et 23/09/1996. Dans ces bombardements, les personnes suivantes, qui y ont trouvé la mort, ont pu être identifiées:

¨ NTIRUSERURWA Marcel : Ancien Bourgmestre de Gishoma

¨ KAMANZI Meschac : Ancien Bourgmestre de Gishoma.

¨ BIMENYIMANA: Commerçant de Bugarama.

¨ MABWIRE: ex-comptable de Bugarama

¨ Le Pasteur MULINDABIGWI Philippe de l'Eglise de Pentecôte

¨ GATABAZI Vénuste: Ancien député du MRND

Plusieurs milliers de victimes n'ont pas pu être identifiées, faute d'enquête. (CLIIR, Communiqués n°7/96 du 8/11/1996 et n°18/97 du 15/07/97. CLIIR, L'APR est-elle en guerre contre la population civile ?, mai 1997).



88. BIRASA John (Major):

Voir Major KARERA Denis.



89. MUHATSE Ignace :

Directeur de la prison de Kigali en 1997, il s'est illustré dans la torture des détenus. Il est impliqué aussi dans les massacres de Kibeho d'avril 1995. Il était le collaborateur immédiat du colonel Fred Ibingira. (Voir Fred IBINGIRA).



90. GAHIMA Gérard:

Directeur de Cabinet au Ministère de la Justice en 1997, il est impliqué dans des tueries aveugles contre la population hutu depuis avril 1994 (CLIIR, Communiqué n° CL08/97/mj du 18/03/1997).



91. NZARAMBA (Colonel):

Il a succédé au Colonel Ngoga à la tête du secteur militaire Ruhengeri-Gisenyi depuis le mois d'août 1996. Il a continué sur la même lancée en prétextant la recherche des infiltrés pour éliminer des populations civiles dans bon nombre de communes de Ruhengeri et de Gisenyi. A la tête de la 21è Brigade, il a lancé des attaques dans des camps de réfugiés Hutu au Zaïre depuis novembre 1996. Le communiqué du CLIIR du 20/01/98 précise à son endroit : " Nommé commandant du secteur militaire de Gisenyi, il a commandité les massacres de populations civiles dans le Nord-Ouest depuis le retour forcé des réfugiés rwandais jusqu’à présent. Il est co-responsable, avec le colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa, du massacre de plus de 8.000 habitants de Kanama dans la grotte de Nyakinama entre le 24 et 27 octobre 1997. Ces deux colonels ont décidé, sur autorisation militaire du général Kagame, de bombarder et gazer cette population ".



92. RUTEMBESA (Soldat):

Complice dans la disparition du Docteur Lieutenant Mugemanshuro des ex-FAR. Mugemanshuro était originaire de la commune Kigembe et travaillait au centre de santé de Gikondo tenu par les Soeurs Pallotines, au moment de son enlèvement. (CLIIR, Que sont devenus les militaires des ex-FAR intégrés dans l'APR ou récemment rapatriés des camps de réfugiés, mai 1997).



93. RWANYINDO:

Ex-responsable du secteur de la cellule Kagunga, il est complice de l'enlèvement et de la disparition du Lieutenant Mugemanshuro Alfred en février 1997. (Voir Rutembesa).



94. BIZIMANA (Soldat):

Avec quatre de ses collègues non autrement identifiés, ils ont arrêté le Lieutenant Nsengiyumva François de Mpanda, secteur Gitega, commune Mukingi, Préfecture Gitarama. Il était de retour de la zone Turquoise (Kibuye). Il a été arrêté le 12/08/1994 à 9 heures du matin par les quatre soldats qui tenaient la barrière de Rambura entre les communes Mabanza et Kivumu, dans la Préfecture de Kibuye. Depuis lors il est porté disparu. Bizimana fut muté à Butare au lieu d'être puni. (CLIIR, Que sont devenus les militaires des ex-FAR intégrés dans l'APR ou récemment rapatriés des camps de réfugiés, mai 1997).



95. KARAKE Assoumani:

Militaire de l'APR de la section criminologie, il a convoqué en date du 28/11/1995 Léodomir Ngirinshuti, ex-Adjudant des FAR. Celui-ci se présenta le 29/11/1995 et disparut dès ce moment. Léodomir Ngirinshuti habitait le secteur Rwampara, commune Nyarugenge, dans la préfecture de la Ville de Kigali. Il avait quitté les FAR depuis 1980 pour cause de maladie (diabète). (CLIIR, Que sont devenus les militaires des ex-FAR intégrés dans l'APR ou récemment rapatriés des camps de réfugiés, mai 1997).



96. KAGABO Amini:

Chauffeur au PNUD, il est impliqué dans l'assassinat de Madame Uwimana Vénéranda dans la soirée du 06/11/1996 vers 19 heures. En effet, c'est ce Kagabo qui conduisait Uwimana. Par un jeu de phares après avoir déposé Madame Uwimana, un premier coup de feu a été tiré, comme si un signal venait d'être donné. KAGABO est un réfugié rapatrié du Burundi et était de connivence avec "une jeune employée sans fonction " qui semblait attendre une "éventuelle place vacante " au Bureau du Personnel dirigé par Madame Uwimana. (CLIIR, Note pour information à tous nos partenaires, 22 mars 1997).



97. Maman KEZA:

Tenancière d'un restaurant à Mumena, secteur Nyamirambo, Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali, elle est impliquée dans l'assassinat du journaliste Appolos Hakizimana, originaire de la commune Mabanza, Kibuye, et propriétaire du journal indépendant UMURAVUMBA. Les deux hommes qui ont abattu le journaliste étaient accompagnés quelques minutes plus tôt par Maman Keza, qui a rebroussé chemin quand elle a vu Hakizimana. Elle est soupçonnée d'avoir servi d'indicatrice à ces tueurs. C'était dimanche le 27/04/1997, vers 21 heures. Hakizimana vivait en insécurité depuis qu'il était journaliste indépendant. En date du 08/08/1996, Amnesty International avait lancé "une action urgente " lors de sa détention arbitraire dans la Brigade judiciaire de Muhima du 30/07 au 16/08/1996 par la "Military Police " de l'APR. En date du 21/03/1997, autour de 19 heures, il a failli être enlevé par deux agents du DMI (Directorate Military Intelligence), CLAUDE et EMILIEN qui l'ont forcé à monter dans leur voiture. Le journaliste a crié très fort et ses ravisseurs se sont sauvés. L'assassinat de Hakizimana est lié à la ligne éditoriale de son journal UMURAVUMBA. Il avait par exemple dénoncé le fait que dans le procès simulacre du Colonel Ibingira, l'on ait oublié de comptabiliser les mois qu'il avait passés sur le front au Zaïre (on disait qu'il est en prison alors qu'il avait été envoyé exterminer les réfugiés hutu au Zaïre après en avoir massacré 8.000 autres à Kibeho).



98. MUSONI Protais:

Préfet de Kibungo depuis 1994, il a organisé des éliminations massives de paysans hutu pour permettre aux paysans tutsi de trouver des terres et des maisons d'habitation. Cette politique d'"ethnilandisation ", il l'a poursuivie notamment avec l'extermination de bon nombre de réfugiés Hutu rentrés des camps de Tanzanie. Musoni a été nommé Préfet de Kigali-Ville à la fin de l'année 1997. Voici ce que le CLIIR dit de lui : " Nouveau préfet de Kigali-Ville. Il était précédemment préfet de Kibungo où il a réussi une épuration ethnique depuis avril 94 dans le sillage du colonel Ibingira. Ce dernier a conquis cette région au prix d'une gigantesque épuration ethnique contre les populations hutu de Byumba, Kibungo, Kigali-Rural, le sud de Gitarama et Butare. Le préfet Musoni Protais est un ancien commissaire du FPR pour la mobilisation politique de 1990 jusqu'en 1993. Eminent idéologue du noyau extrémiste du FPR, il vient de réussir l'implantation d'un tutsiland dans la préfecture de Kibungo où des milliers de réfugiés hutu rapatriés de force de Tanzanie (en décembre 1996) ont été massacrés ou portés disparus " (CLIIR, Communiqué n°26/97 du 27/12/1997).



99. BIHOZAGARA Jacques:

Un des concepteurs du plan d'ethnilandisation, il fut à l'origine de la création de la Préfecture de Mutara. Il y installa des Tutsi rentrés de l'Uganda après avoir nettoyé la région de ses éléments hutu. Dans les milieux de Kigali, le Mutara était connu sous le nom de "Royaume de BIHOZAGARA". Celui-ci était alors Ministre de la Réhabilitation et de la Reconstruction avant de passer à la tête du Ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports.



100. MAZIMPAKA Patrick:

Il a remplacé Bihozagara à la tête du Ministère de la Réhabilitation et de la Reconstruction et a poursuivi la politique d'"ethnilandisation ", avant d'être nommé Ministre à la Présidence de la République.



101. KAYUMBA NYAMWASA (Général de brigade):

Il est impliqué dans l'assassinat du Président Habyarimana. Une des sources a affirmé au professeur Reyntjens que " le coup aurait été fait par des éléments de l'APR et un ou plusieurs Libyens encadrés par le Major Rose Kabuye (...) et par le colonel Kayumba (à l'époque chef du DMI) " (F. REYNTJENS, Rwanda. Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire, Institut CEDAF, Bruxelles, Ed. L'Harmattan, Paris 1995, p.44). A côté de ce couple, il faut ajouter le nom du capitaine Ruzahaza comme ayant fait partie de cette équipe de tueurs.

Après la victoire du FPR, il a été nommé chef d'Etat-major Adjoint de la Gendarmerie Nationale. En 1996, il a été nommé Commandant du Secteur militaire Ruhengeri-Gisenyi. Il a organisé, dans cette région, des massacres et des destructions massives de populations civiles qui ont été bombardées aveuglément par des hélicoptères notamment celles des communes Giciye, Karago, Gaseke, Satinskyi de la Préfecture de Gisenyi; Ndusu et Gatonde de la Préfecture de Ruhengeri. Entre le 05 et le 13/11/1997, cette attaque aérienne a fait des milliers de morts. Le déroulement de cette attaque meurtrière est décrit dans le communiqué n° 23/97 du 04/12/1997 publié par le CLIIR. Le 09/01/1998, il a été nommé chef d'Etat-major de l'APR après l'extermination des civils hutu de Ruhengeri et Gisenyi. (CLIIR, Communiqué du 27/01/1998).

" Il a toujours été chef de la DMI et a commandé des unités de tueurs chargées de 'massacrer des civils Hutu non armés' loin derrière le Front dans la Zone conquise par le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) " (CLIIR, Communiqué 23/97 du 04/12/1997). En mai 1997, il est affecté comme commandant des opérations militaires dans le Nord-Ouest du Rwanda. Sa tactique consiste à simuler une attaque d’infiltrés et à passer ensuite aux ratissages meurtriers. Le bilan de ses deux premiers mois de service dans cette région est très lourd. Selon le CLIIR :

¨ Le 09/05/1997, un convoi militaire est attaqué dans le secteur Gitwa, en commune Nkuli (Ruhengeri). En représailles, l'APR organise des opérations qui, entre le 09 et 12/05, ont coûté la vie à 1400 personnes civiles (440 dans les secteurs Ryinyo, 325 dans les cellules Kinyobo et Gatovu du Secteur Gitwa, 253 dans le secteur Mukamira, 148 dans le secteur Gatovu et 98 dans le secteur Rukoma). (CLIIR, Communiqué n° 23/97 du 04/12/97).

¨ Le 11/05/1997: L'APR a massacré 35 personnes dans la commune Cyabingo (Ruhengeri) dont un inspecteur scolaire, des enseignants et des commerçants qui assistaient à une réunion dans le secteur Rutore.

¨ Le 16/05/1997: 175 personnes sont massacrées par l'APR dans le secteur Muhororo de la commune Cyabingo, sous prétexte de représailles contre les infiltrés qui auraient attaqué le détachement militaire campé au Bureau communal de cette commune.

¨ Du 27 au 30/05/1997, 9 personnes ont été abattues par l'APR dans la cellule Rwankeli du secteur Gitwa (commune Nkuli-Ruhengeri) lors d'une vérification des cartes d'identité. Les militaires de l'APR ont ordonné aux victimes de courir avant de les abattre comme des lapins en les qualifiant d'infiltrés. L'une des victimes est un habitant du secteur Gatovu.

¨ Le 08/06/1997: 23 personnes sont tuées dans plusieurs secteurs de la commune Nkuli, dont deux hommes, une famille de 11 personnes, une famille de 6 personnes dont une femme et ses 3 enfants, cela suite aux opérations de ratissage de l'APR.

¨ Le 09/06/1997: Dix hommes ont été abattus dans les secteurs Cyuve, Gasanze et Mubona de la commune Kigombe alors qu'ils sortaient d'une réunion organisée par l'APR au stade de Ruhengeri. Au cours de cette réunion, les hommes (à partir de 15 ans), et les femmes ont été séparés. Les femmes furent relâchées à 17 heures 30, les hommes à 19 heures. C'est en rentrant que les dix victimes ont trouvé la mort.

¨ Le 10/06/97: 294 personnes sont massacrées dans quatre communes de Ruhengeri. Gatonde: 143 tués dont le conseiller du secteur Munanira, Kinigi: 80 tués, Nyamutera: 40 tués, Ndusu: 31 tués. Ces massacres faisaient suite " à une attaque des infiltrés aux bureaux des communes Gatonde et Nyamutera "

¨ Le 16/06/97: Le corps d'un employé du Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM) qui avait été arrêté par les militaires de l'APR a été retrouvé en état de décomposition dans le secteur Muhoza, en commune Kigombe (Ruhengeri).

¨ Les 24 et 27 octobre 1997, le colonel Kayumba organise les massacres des grottes de Nyakinama. Voici le scénario tel que tiré du communiqué du CLIIR n° 22/97 du 24/11/97: " La situation s'est envenimée le 08/08/1997 avec les massacres de l'APR qui ont fait plus de 300 morts au Marché de Mahoko, des centaines d'autres habitants ont été tués sur la route et sur des sentiers qui conduisent au marché et dans les secteurs voisins: Kayove, Bisizi, Kanama et Karambo. Plus de 200 détenus du cachot communal de Kanama ont été abattus par les soldats de l'APR dans l'après-midi du 08/08. Les commerçants du centre de négoce de Mahoko, qui avaient échappé à la mort pendant le massacre de la journée du 08/08, ont été assassiné dans la nuit du 08 au 09 août et pendant la journée du 09/08/1997. Certaines familles ont été ciblées et exterminées sur base de listes. Les inspecteurs de Police Judiciaire (IPJ) des communes Kanama et Nyamyumba ont été tués. Plus tard dans la journée du 08/08, les soldats de l'APR ont tué entre 200 et 300 détenus du cachot communal de la commune Rubavu (voisine de Kanama). Dans la soirée du 08/08 et le 09/08, des soldats ivres de l'APR se sont livrés à des pillages dans ces mêmes secteurs. Des troupes armées de l'APR ont fait mouvement dans la région et des témoins ont rapporté avoir entendu des tirs de mortiers. Un blindé placé devant le marché de Mahoko a tiré dans la foule. Ce sont tous ces massacres qui ont fait fuir la population des quatre secteurs situés dans le voisinage de Mahoko et du bureau communal. L'APR avait déclenché ces massacres le 08/08/97 vers 10 heures à la suite d'une invasion des magasins et des restaurants de Mahoko par des éléments non identifiés armés et munis de petites radios walkies-talkies que les responsables militaires ont qualifié d'"infiltrés hutus ". Avant de se réfugier dans la grotte, ces habitants avaient trouvé un refuge tranquille (fin août 1997) dans les secteurs montagneux de Mukondo et Kigarama éloignés de la route asphaltée et situés à l'autre bout de la commune Kanama près de la forêt naturelle de Muhungwe. L'administration communale avait dû les rejoindre et travailler sur place dans le secteur de Kigarama. Entre-temps, les bâtiments communaux et ceux du collège APEFOK servirent de camp militaire d'où l'APR continuait à lancer ses attaques contre des civils non armés sous prétexte de "pourchasser " des infiltrés hutu. Vers mi-octobre, les militaires de l'APR sont allés attaquer les habitants (de ces 4 secteurs) réfugiés dans les secteurs lointains de Mukondo et Kigarama et les ont forcés à retourner chez eux dans la zone violente qu'ils avaient fuie. A la moindre contestation, les militaires tiraient dans la foule et ce fut à coups de mitraillettes que les habitants fuirent vers la grotte de Nyakinama située dans le secteur Kayove à l'autre bout de la commune Kanama. Plusieurs familles déplorent de nombreux morts tués dans les collines de Mukondo et Kigarama. Le colonel Kayumba a été nommé, en janvier 1998, chef d'Etat-major de l'APR en remplacement du colonel Sam Kaka.

" Depuis qu'il a été affecté dans le Nord-Ouest du Rwanda comme chef des opérations militaires (Brigade 211), les attaques simulées et les massacres de civils non-armés ont décuplé. Les témoins estiment que plus de 100.000 Hutu ont été tués par l'Armée depuis l'arrivée du colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa. Ce dernier est impliqué dans le génocide rwandais dans les zones conquises par le FPR où ses équipes de tueurs faisaient disparaître plus de 6.000 cadavres par semaine dans les deux sites de crémation qu'il avait installés à Masaka (près de la capitale Kigali) et à Gabiro dans le parc de l'Akagera " (CLIIR, Communiqué du 20/01/98).

La chaîne de télévision française France-2, dans journal télévisé rediffusé sur TV5 mardi le 3 mars 1998, a interviewé le colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa sur le terrain des opérations dans le nord du pays en commune Kinigi (Préfecture de Ruhengeri) et rapporte ceci: "…Preuve qui ne trompe pas, c’est le chef d’état-major qui dirige les opérations sur le terrain. Aux accusations qui, font de son armée une machine de répressions sanglantes, il répond sans détour: "Quand je parle de neutralisation, en fait, mon objectif est de les frapper sur le champ de bataille et de les tuer, pas les arrêter. Quand je vais en opérations, je n’y vais pas pour faire des arrestations. Je dis à mes soldats: vous devez parfaitement viser, vous devez tirer pour tuer, pas pour arrêter. Je suis en opérations, je ne fais pas un travail de police ici. Mais en même temps nous avons des prisonniers…"

Le reportage arrête ici les propres termes de ce chef d’état-major. Ce reportage a été réalisé par E. MONIER/R. MOTTE-M. TREILLET/P. GOLDMANN.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 01:55 0 comments
Labels: Kagame, Rwanda
19 October, 2007
Rwanda: Ending the Silence.
Amnesty International
25 September 1997
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR470321997

I. INTRODUCTION

At least 6,000 people - the majority unarmed civilians - are reported to have been killed in Rwanda between January and August 1997. The real figure is probably considerably higher [2]

By August 1997, killings were continuing on a virtually daily basis. The victims include many returnees who were among the hundreds of thousands of Rwandese refugees forcibly returned from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC - formerly Zaire) and Tanzania in November and December 1996. Soldiers of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) and armed groups believed to be composed of or allied to members of the former Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) - the former Rwandese armed forces - are deliberately targeting unarmed men, women and young children, hunting them down in their homes. Many people have "disappeared" and their families do not know whether they are alive or dead.

Fighting between the RPA and armed opposition groups is reported to have intensified. Whole regions in the northwest of the country have become virtually inaccessible because of the insecurity and travel restrictions imposed by the authorities. Few independent human rights observers are able to go there; as a result, the perpetrators of human rights abuses are able to carry on killing without independent witnesses.

Within days of the return of the first wave of refugees from the former Zaire in November 1996, killings and arbitrary arrests were already being noted [3]. However, it was not until early January 1997 that the rate of killings escalated sharply, especially in the northwestern préfectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi [4]. Killings and "disappearances" in other parts of the country have also increased. The level of arrests countrywide has continued to rise, reports of ill-treatment have become more frequent and prison conditions have continued to cause the deaths of hundreds of prisoners as the total prison population in acknowledged detention centres has exceeded 120,000. Trials of those accused of participation in the genocide began in late December 1996; by August 1997, more than 140 people had been tried, resulting in at least 65 death sentences, many of them imposed after unfair trials [5].

Once again, death has become almost a banality in the lives of ordinary Rwandese. The population of Rwanda is living in a state of fear, knowing that whatever their ethnic origin or their perceived affiliation, they may become targets of arbitrary violence by one side or the other. Most are too afraid to speak about the situation for fear of being killed. Those who are lucky enough to escape with their lives may face the prospect of arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and prolonged detention in life-threatening conditions. Staff working for international organizations have not been spared; several assassinations of foreign nationals as well as Rwandese employees of international organizations have meant that the essential work of humanitarian and human rights organizations has been severely disrupted and the populations most in need are not receiving adequate assistance.

The real level of human rights abuses continues to be played down both by the Rwandese authorities, who claim to have control over the situation, and, seemingly, by the international community. International media reports on the current human rights situation in Rwanda remain rare and most foreign governments appear to be turning a blind eye to the worsening human rights situation and continue advocating the repatriation of Rwandese refugees from neighbouring countries.

Amnesty International is publishing this report now to highlight the scale and gravity of the human rights abuses taking place in Rwanda and to bring this information to the attention of those who could bring about positive changes. The information included in this report is based in part on the findings of an Amnesty International delegation which visited Rwanda in January and February 1997 and in part on testimonies gathered from a variety of sources inside and outside the country in subsequent months. The case examples mentioned - most of which occurred between January and August 1997 - represent only a fraction of the total number of reported human rights abuses during this period.

II. PATTERNS OF KILLINGS

1996 was marked by a pattern of serious human rights abuses, including hundreds of extrajudicial executions by the RPA and deliberate and arbitrary killings by armed opposition groups [6]. The situation has deteriorated further in 1997. This can be attributed in great part to the mass forcible return of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese refugees from the former Zaire and Tanzania in November and December 1996. Most of these refugees are from the Hutu ethnic group. Many are suspected of having participated in the genocide in 1994; they include members of the former government and former army (known as ex-FAR) and their families, returning to areas where thousands were massacred during the genocide in 1994.

During 1997, both the RPA and armed opposition groups have been responsible for widespread killings of unarmed civilians. However, testimonies received from the northwestern préfectures of Rwanda - where most of the violence is concentrated - consistently affirm that the majority of the killings of unarmed civilians in recent months have been carried out by the RPA.

In some cases, it is difficult to identify the perpetrators of killings. Eye-witnesses usually refer to "armed men in military uniform" but there are sometimes conflicting reports as to whether these were members of the RPA or ex-FAR. There is reason to believe that both sides are adopting a deliberate strategy of confusion so as to be able to blame attacks on each other, with little possibility of independent verification.

II.1 Killings in armed conflict - the undeclared war in the northwest

Frequent reports are emanating from the northwest of the country referring to battles between RPA forces and armed opposition groups, commonly referred to as "infiltrators" (infiltrés). These "infiltrators" are believed to be ex-FAR and interahamwe militia, many of whom were responsible for massacres during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Some sources allege that there are also groups of people who have taken up arms to fight the RPA independently from the ex-FAR.

Many sources in Rwanda, both inside and outside the government, describe the situation in the northwest as a fully-fledged war. Others cast doubt on this analysis and claim that evidence indicates that most of the casualties - on both sides - are unarmed civilians. Whatever terms one uses to describe the current situation, it is clear that armed opposition groups have intensified their attacks during 1997 - sometimes attacking in groups of more than 100 - and that in turn, the RPA has adopted a tougher line to crack down on the insurgency, amounting in some cases to a "scorched earth" policy, using the legitimate need to combat the insurgents as a pretext for massacring unarmed civilians.

Increasingly, civilian populations living in areas affected by the conflict have been made to assist the RPA in its operations to search for insurgents. For fear of being killed by the army if they refuse, some residents of these areas have reportedly begun cooperating with the authorities in these operations; this in turn has exposed them to the risk of being targeted as "traitors" and attacked by armed opposition groups. Regional civilian and military authorities often gather the population in these areas to warn them against supporting or assisting the "infiltrators", as well as to carry out identity checks - frequently resulting in mass arrests. Inhabitants of the area are effectively forced to attend these meetings; those who do not are immediately viewed with suspicion.

The authorities have used various tactics to play down the severity of the situation in the northwest. For example, on 15 July 1997, the Rwandese News Agency reported that conflicts in Ruhengeri over the previous days had claimed the lives of 100 militiamen and three RPA soldiers. A subsequent statement by the préfet of Ruhengeri mentioned that 40 civilians had also been killed in the cross-fire during the same period. On 1 August 1997, a senior government delegation, accompanied - at the government’s invitation - by foreign embassy officials, representatives of international organizations and journalists, visited Ruhengeri and presented its account of recent events in the region. Government officials claimed that 1,800 interahamwe or ex-FAR, 90 RPA soldiers and between 200 and 300 civilians had been killed during May and June. During this visit, government officials stated that the situation in the region was "calm and stable"[7].

Due to the insecurity characterizing the areas affected by armed conflict, Amnesty International has not been able to confirm the exact details of reports of armed clashes between the RPA and armed opposition groups, nor to estimate the total number of casualties among these respective forces. The organization’s concern is for the civilian victims during or following these clashes. In the days immediately after reported fighting, the civilian population living in the area is at great risk of being targeted indiscriminately by the RPA as it searches for "infiltrators". These fears have been borne out by the pattern of military search operations in 1996 and 1997. The authorities have repeatedly warned the population not to shelter or assist the "infiltrators" in any way. However, there is no evidence that the unarmed civilians who have been extrajudicially executed were involved in supporting armed groups.

II.2 Extrajudicial executions during military search operations

Thousands of unarmed civilians have been killed during military "cordon and search" operations launched by the RPA after reported attacks by armed opposition groups or clashes between RPA soldiers and "infiltrators". Reprisal killings are often carried out by the army during military operations - sometimes within hours of the attack by armed groups, sometimes in the following days. The vast majority of people killed during these military operations have been unarmed civilians who were not involved in the conflict and who posed no threat - for example elderly men and women and young children who have been killed in their homes, others in open spaces where soldiers had gathered them. The RPA’s counter-insurgency strategy is having the effect of terrorizing the civilian population living in areas where insurgents are rumoured to be hiding. In some cases, members of the RPA allegedly responsible for extrajudicial executions have been arrested but, to date, such cases have tended to be the exception. In most cases of reported extrajudicial executions, those responsible have continued to evade justice.

The préfectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi have suffered the highest number of extrajudicial executions by RPA soldiers. Amnesty International has received countless reports of unarmed civilians being killed there by the RPA, in the wake of reported attacks by "infiltrators".

During January 1997, massacres began to be reported with increasing frequency. For example, on 4 January 1997, at least 55 people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers in Nkumba commune, Ruhengeri, during a military search operation. The killings followed an attack the same day by alleged infiltrators in which one RPA soldier was reportedly killed. However, most of the victims of the reprisal killings by the RPA were civilians; eight alleged "infiltrators" were also killed.

On 20 January 1997, RPA soldiers reportedly rounded up unarmed local residents during a military search operation in Nyamugali commune in Ruhengeri and killed 28 of them. 24 were reportedly killed after RPA soldiers herded them into a building and threw in a grenade.

During the following two or three days, scores of other people - possibly as many as 100 - were reportedly killed or "disappeared" in several other communes in Ruhengeri, including Kigombe, Mukingo and Nyakinama; many were shot dead as the RPA opened fire on those fleeing.

On 3 March 1997, at least 150 unarmed civilians, and possibly as many as 280, were killed by RPA soldiers in a military search operation in the communes of Kigombe, Nyakinama and Mukingo, in Ruhengeri, one day after an attack by an armed group in the town of Ruhengeri in which several people were reportedly killed. The RPA carried out large-scale "cordon and search" operations in several locations in the area; soldiers - reportedly assisted by gendarmes - reportedly rounded up local residents from their homes, led them away and shot them or beat them to death. The authorities recognized excessive use of force in these incidents and several officers allegedly involved in this operation were reported to have been arrested after the killings.

Between 9 and 11 May 1997, at least 1,430 civilians were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers in the secteurs of Ryinyo, Kintobo, Gatore, Gatovu, Rukoma, Gitwa, Runigi and Mukamira in Nkuli commune, in Ruhengeri. Amnesty International has received a list, drawn up by local sources, of the names of around 525 victims of these massacres - including at least 90 children - primarily in Ryinyo secteur. In addition to those named, at least 553 were reportedly killed in Kintobo secteur, 127 in Gatovu secteur, 120 in Rukoma secteur and 114 in Runigi secteur. These killings were reportedly preceded by several days of fighting between RPA forces and armed opposition groups around military camps in the area.

Around the same period, 423 people were reportedly killed in neighbouring Nyamutera commune; 123 of them are reported to have been burned alive in houses which were deliberately set on fire.

Between 3 and 17 May 1997, at least 82 people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers in several locations in Karago commune, in Gisenyi préfecture during military operations. Following reported clashes between RPA soldiers and insurgents at the Kadahenda centre, in Mwiyanike secteur on the morning of 3 May, in the afternoon RPA soldiers reportedly killed 26 peasants in the area. Two days later, on 5 May, in Rurambo, also in Mwiyanike, RPA soldiers reportedly killed another 10 peasants. During a subsequent military search operation on 10 May, 26 people were killed in Kinyanja and five in Cyamabuye, in Nanga secteur. On 17 May, 15 people were reportedly killed by soldiers near a school in Ruhigiro.

On 23 May 1997, around 170 civilians were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers following clashes with armed groups in the communes of Mukingo and Nyakinama, in Ruhengeri.

From mid-May to mid-June 1997, hundreds of killings were reported from Cyabingo commune, Ruhengeri. More than 300 people are believed to have been killed by RPA soldiers during search operations in the second half of May. On 6 June 1997, in Muramba secteur, more than 115 people were reportedly killed by unidentified assailants. A week later, on 13 June, 15 children under the age of 15 were reportedly shot dead and others burned alive, allegedly by RPA soldiers. Armed groups are believed to be active in Cyabingo commune; however, most of the victims of the killings by the RPA appear to have been unarmed civilians.

Scores of unarmed civilians have been killed in churches. For example, on 8 June 1997, one day after a reported confrontation between RPA soldiers and "infiltrators" in Birunga, RPA soldiers reportedly killed at least 120 people inside a Protestant church in Cyamabuye cellule, in Nanga secteur, Karago commune, in Gisenyi. They went on to attack the houses of two community leaders and killed a further 38 people in their homes, including an 85-year-old man, Bagabo, and a 90-year-old woman, Kaje. Two other attacks on churches have also been reported: one in June 1997, on an Adventist church in Mwiyanike secteur (also in Karago, Gisenyi), in which scores of people were reportedly killed by soldiers; and another on 3 July 1997, in which at least 75 people were reportedly killed in a church in Gitera secteur, Nkumba commune, in Ruhengeri.

On 10 June 1997, at least 200 people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers in the communes of Nyamutera, Kinigi, Ndusu and Gatonde, in Ruhengeri, following attacks by unidentified armed groups on several detention centres in the area; the number of people killed in the attacks by the armed groups is not known.

Reports from various parts of Ngororero sous-préfecture, in Gisenyi préfecture, indicate that during June and July 1997, as many as 984 people may have been killed. Sources from the area reported that on 11 June, 23 were killed in Ntobwe secteur, Kibilira commune; on 13 June, around 20 people were killed in Rucano secteur, Satinsyi commune, including 10 children aged between 3 and 16 and an 8-month-old baby; on 29 June, 212 were killed near Ruhunga forest; on 2 July, nine people, seven of them children, were killed in Rucano secteur, Satinsyi commune; on 6 July, 349 people were killed in Musagara secteur, in Satinsyi commune; on 11 July, a market day in Ngororero, 19 were killed; on 12 July, 67 were killed in Rugarama secteur, Kibilira commune. In addition to these specific incidents, 149 people were reportedly killed in Gitarama secteur, 36 in Ntaganzwa secteur, and around 100 in Sovu and Musenyi secteurs. All these killings have been attributed by local sources to RPA soldiers.

On 24 June 1997, at least 68 people were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers in Kitabe and Bitenga cellules, Rukoko secteur, Kivumu commune, Kibuye préfecture. These killings were preceded by an attack the same day in which a vehicle travelling along the road from Gitarama to Kibuye was ambushed and four passengers shot dead by unidentified armed men who escaped from the scene. The four people killed in the ambush were Chen Ian, a Chinese engineer, two Rwandese mechanics, Théoneste Safari Rukundo and Jean-Pierre Hakizimana, and the Rwandese driver, Denis Ndutiye. According to local authorities, the perpetrators of the ambush were ex-FAR or interahamwe. RPA soldiers called to the scene rounded up a group of local young men and asked them to guard the vehicle and the spot where the ambush had occurred. Later that evening, a group of soldiers returned in a truck and opened fire on the men guarding the vehicle, killing at least 29 of them. The soldiers then reportedly killed more people in their homes in a nearby village, including elderly people and young children; the victims included members of the families of Ntagwabira, Habiyambere, Mbanjingabo, Ngwabije and Simpunga. In the case of Simpunga’s family, only his wife and her children were at home; they were all killed. Local residents who buried the bodies counted a total of 68 victims, all of them unarmed civilians. They believe that the real number of victims may be higher and that other bodies may have been removed from the scene.

Further killings took place in Nkuli commune, in Ruhengeri, in July 1997. On 13 July, Karekezi, an Adventist pastor, his wife, a visitor and two children were killed in Gitwa secteur, Nkuli commune. On 17 July, in Jena, also in Nkuli, a man named Ngirabuho, his wife and four children were all reportedly killed in their home. Another family - Rurandemba, his two children and his daughter-in-law - were killed in the same area on the same night.

Sources in Kanama commune, Gisenyi, have reported that on 8 August 1997, several hundred people, including many civilians, were killed in and around a busy marketplace at Mahoko. The killings - most of which have been attributed to the army - reportedly followed the arrival of a group of armed "infiltrators" who looted shops and stalls. The RPA intervened and many civilians were killed in the hours that followed as the RPA reportedly fired towards the market from two military vehicles stationed nearby. Some victims may have been killed in the cross-fire; however, others appear to have been killed indiscriminately by the security forces. The exact number of victims is not confirmed; one source estimated that around 300 bodies were counted. Some were shot in the marketplace, others in nearby streets. The victims included François Munyempame, the family of a trader named Védaste, a representative of a non-governmental organization Emmanuel Tuyisenge, and two inspecteurs de police judiciaire (judicial police inspectors). An unknown number of market traders were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers later that evening and on the following day. Between 8 and 10 August, at least 95 detainees at the communal detention centre (cachot) of the neighbouring commune of Rubavu and an unknown number at the cachot at Kanama were reportedly killed by government forces, following an attack by the "infiltrators" to try to release the detainees.

Amnesty International is seeking further information on these events of 8-10 August. On 16 August, Radio Rwanda reported that 13 members of the RPA, including six senior military officers, had been arrested in connection with the killings at Mahoko. Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paul Kagame, who visited the area on 15 August, was quoted as regretting the misconduct and calling for those responsible to face exemplary punishment.

Killings of civilians during "cordon and search" operations are not confined to the northwest. For example, on 5 February 1997, in the early hours of the morning, an unknown number of people were reportedly shot dead and others beaten to death by RPA soldiers during a search operation in Nyarubande secteur, Butamwa commune, in Rural Kigali préfecture. Some were killed in their fields as they fled. The victims included Kanyagisaka, aged around 18, Albert and his 17-year-old daughter and 15-year-old son, and Mulimanyi, aged around 26. RPA soldiers reportedly made the inhabitants of the area gather in specific locations and threatened them, especially those whose family members had served in the former Rwandese army. After the meeting, a number of people were led away to detention centres; others were ordered back to their homes. Local authorities were reportedly ordered to bury the bodies of those who had been killed.

II.3 Extrajudicial executions of ex-FAR and members of their families

In late 1996 and early 1997, a pattern of extrajudicial executions of ex-FAR and members of their families emerged, following the mass return of refugees from the former Zaire. Many ex-FAR played a leading role in the organization and execution of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. However, this does not mean that every individual who served in the former government forces and their relatives were responsible for taking part in the killings.

Even in cases where the individuals were involved in the killings, there is no justification for subjecting them and members of their family - including young children - to further human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions. In the cases below, the victims were summarily and extrajudicially executed apparently without any formal attempt having been made to investigate specific accusations against them or to bring them before a court of law.

On 18 January 1997, an ex-FAR major, Jean de Dieu Bizabarimana, his wife Perpétue, their children and several neighbours - 16 people in total - were killed in their home in Nyarutovu commune, Ruhengeri. They had been refugees in the former Zaire and had returned to Rwanda in November 1996. The following day, an ex-FAR captain and 11 members of his family - also returnees - were killed in Nkuli commune, in Ruhengeri. On 20 January 1997, an ex-FAR major, Bizavarande, four members of his family and seven other people were reportedly killed in Nyarutovu commune, in Ruhengeri.

On 21 January 1997, ten members of a family of returnees from the former Zaire were killed in their home in Rucano secteur, Satinsyi commune, Gisenyi préfecture. The victims included Stanislas Hakizimana, an ex-FAR colonel, his wife Eugénie Mukandinda, their daughters Espérance Muyawamungu, aged 21, and Josiane, aged 15, their two sons, Eric Ukoyivuze, aged 19, and Gilbert Nshimiyimana, aged 17, and three sisters-in-law, Médiatrice Muhimpundu, Alphonsine Nyiramahoro and Jacqueline Nyiramana, all in their 20s. 12 of their neighbours were reportedly also killed the same evening, including two young children, Alice and Catherine Kalimunda, aged 5 and 3.

On 21 January 1997, it was reported that two ex-FAR detainees - Lieutenant- Colonel Augustin Nzabanita and Second Lieutenant Innocent Nsabimana, both returnees from the former Zaire - had committed suicide in a brigade detention centre in Rubavu, Gisenyi. According to the authorities, the two detainees were found dead after hanging themselves in the toilet. According to other detainees, the two men were led outside by soldiers and did not reappear; they were informed that they had committed suicide the following day. The timing of the events described by the detainees differs from that described by the authorities. A description of the scene in which the two men were found hanged - provided by individuals who were at the scene while the bodies were still there - was inconsistent with the official explanation of the circumstances of their death.

On 22 January 1997, an ex-FAR major, François Xavier Uwimana - also a returnee from the former Zaire - , his six children and a neighbour were killed in Nyamyumba, Gisenyi. On the same day, another ex-FAR major, Lambert Rugambage, was reportedly taken away from a military detention centre in Kibungo préfecture by soldiers and never returned. His body was found several days later in the morgue of Kanombe military hospital in Kigali, reportedly bearing signs of severe beatings. Around the same period, an ex-FAR captain and his family - around 10 people in total - were killed in Butaro commune, Ruhengeri.

II.4 Extrajudicial executions of detainees

Extrajudicial executions of detainees by members of the security forces have continued in various parts of the country, effectively replacing the judicial process. In some cases, detainees have been shot dead allegedly while trying to escape from detention; no attempts appear to have been made to apprehend them without using lethal force. In other cases, detainees have been taken away from detention centres and subsequently executed. There have also been reports of people being shot dead by RPA soldiers at the time of their arrest.

For example, on 14 January 1997, 12 detainees - who were returnees - were shot dead by RPA soldiers at Muyira detention centre (cachot) in the southern préfecture of Butare, reportedly as they were going to the toilet. The soldiers claimed that the detainees were trying to escape. On 23 January 1997, RPA soldiers reportedly executed more than 20 detainees held in the cachot at Gisovu, Kibuye préfecture, after leading them away, supposedly to transfer them to another detention centre. On 14 February 1997, six detainees in Runda commune, Gitarama préfecture, were shot dead by soldiers, allegedly as they were trying to escape. The detainees - accused of being "infiltrators" - had been arrested the previous day during a military operation in the area.

During the night of 7 May 1997, 10 detainees in Maraba detention centre (cachot) in Butare were shot dead and several others injured. The authorities alleged that a guard shot them because they were trying to escape; however, unofficial sources claim that the guard fired directly into the cell. The guard - an RPA soldier - was subsequently arrested. Representatives of a local human rights organization investigating the killings were reportedly prevented from speaking to the other detainees and from visiting injured detainees in hospital. On 8 May 1997, 15 detainees were reportedly killed in Gatonde commune and on 10 May, another six killed in Ndusu commune, both in Ruhengeri.

Between 8 and 10 August 1997, at least 95 detainees at the communal cachot of Rubavu and an unknown number at the cachot at Kanama were reportedly killed by security forces, following clashes between RPA soldiers and armed groups on 8 August in which several hundred people were killed (see part II,2 above). Between 8 and 11 August 1997, eight detainees allegedly trying to escape from the cachot at Rutongo commune, in Rural Kigali, were reportedly shot dead by guards.

II.5 Public and summary executions

In December 1996 and January 1997, six cases of public summary executions of alleged murder suspects by RPA soldiers were reported. All of them took place on the order of military officers and in their presence.

On 10 December 1996, two men and a teenage boy were summarily executed in public by RPA soldiers in Mbuye secteur, Satinsyi commune, Gisenyi, after the population had denounced them as responsible for a murder committed two days earlier. On 21 December 1996, an ex-FAR who had been arrested soon after his return from the former Zaire and was accused of having killed four people, was tied to a tree and shot by RPA soldiers during a public meeting in Mubuga commune, Gikongoro préfecture. On 24 January 1997, two men were publicly executed by RPA soldiers in Karengera commune, Cyangugu préfecture, after being accused of the murder of a local official the previous day.

In a report dated 27 February 1997, the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda (UNHRFOR) reported that Ministry of Defence officials had stated that these incidents were regrettable and that orders had been given not to repeat such executions [8]. However, in an earlier report dated 24 January 1997, UNHRFOR reported that several civilian and military authorities had stated that the executions of 10 and 21 December 1996 were justified, given the circumstances of the case. One authority was quoted as saying that the killing of the three individuals could not be classified as a criminal offence [9].

II.6 Political killings and attacks on freedom of expression

Journalists and others who have criticized actions by government officials and the security forces have been victims of human rights violations in 1997; some have been extrajudicially executed, others arrested.

On 23 January 1997, the prison director of Gisovu prison - a newly-opened prison situated on the border of the préfectures of Kibuye and Gikongoro - and his secretary were killed by armed men in Muko commune, in Gikongoro. The prison director had had various disagreements with the authorities; in particular, he had reportedly ordered the release of a number of detainees and had expressed his disagreement with plans by local authorities to fill the prison beyond its intended capacity.

On 27 April 1997, Appollos Hakizimana - a 28-year-old journalist working for an independent newspaper, Intego, and editor of a new publication, Umuravumba, which he had founded in January 1997 - was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in Nyamirambo, in the capital Kigali, as he was approaching his house. Amnesty International believes that Appollos Hakizimana, who had previously been arrested, ill-treated and threatened on several occasions, was killed because of the critical views he had expressed as a journalist. His colleague Amiel Nkuriza, director of Intego and editor-in-chief of another newspaper, Le Partisan, was arrested a few days later, on 13 May, and is currently in prison in Kigali awaiting trial. He is reportedly facing charges of incitement to ethnic violence in relation to articles which he had been planning to publish in issues of Le Partisan newspaper which were seized by the authorities. He had also been arrested and threatened with death on several occasions in 1996 and 1997 [10].

The above events take place in a climate in which the media in Rwanda is routinely censored and criticism of government policies and practices rarely tolerated. A journalist told Amnesty International: "On est obligé d’écrire avec les mains qui tremblent" ("we have to write with trembling hands"). The three independent newspapers mentioned above are no longer being published.

Members of the National Assembly who have voiced criticisms of government policies have also been targeted. On 16 January 1997, Evariste Burakali, member of the Parti libéral (PL), Liberal Party, in his thirties, married with three children, was shot dead by an RPA soldier in Rutare, in the northern préfecture of Byumba. Soldiers first surrounded his house but when they found that he was not there, went to find him in a nearby bar. When a woman working in the bar was injured during an argument with the soldiers, Evariste Burakali drove her to the local health centre for treatment. One of the soldiers followed him and shot him three times when they reached the health centre. Evariste Burakali died later that night after being transported to a hospital in Kigali. The soldier who killed him was subsequently arrested.

Evariste Burakali had reportedly requested a personal guard and escort after his house had been attacked three times. He had had a guard previously but this protection had been withdrawn; the reason given was that Evariste Burakali lived too far from the capital.

According to friends and acquaintances, Evariste Burakali was a well-liked person, described as a "moderate" and a person of integrity. He was known for speaking out against vengeance and extremism and in favour of forgiveness. Several people who knew him told Amnesty International that they believe his assassination was political. Evariste Burakali had been critical of various initiatives during debates in the National Assembly, including aspects of the law introduced in 1996 to govern the trials of those accused of participation in the genocide. He had also been a bourgmestre (mayor) in Rutare from April to August 1994 and may have witnessed killings by RPF troops in the area during this period.

On 17 June 1997, in the early evening, Eustache Nkerinka, a member of the National Assembly, escaped what appears to have been an assassination attempt in the centre of Kigali. As he was driving home, his car was ambushed by another vehicle carrying six men, at least two of whom were armed. They forced their way into Eustache Nkerinka’s car, beat him and stole his money. As the attack began attracting attention, one of the men was reportedly heard saying to his companions that they should not kill him on the spot but that he would not be able to escape them as they knew they could always find him again. Eustache Nkerinka has reported the attack to the police. Their response is not yet known.

Eustache Nkerinka, a member of the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), Democratic Republican Movement, is known to have been critical of aspects of government policy and often outspoken during meetings of the National Assembly. His home had previously been attacked and searched on several occasions in 1995, 1996 and 1997. Despite his complaints in writing about these incidents to senior government authorities and a request for protection which was supported by the President of the National Assembly, Eustache Nkerinka was not provided with protection against the threat of future attacks.

II.7 Other killings attributed to the RPA

On 22 January 1997, Jean Boseniryo, a restaurant-owner in his sixties, was killed in Ruhengeri town. He was reportedly shot dead in the street. The identity of the perpetrators has not been confirmed but sources in Ruhengeri believe he was killed by RPA soldiers. Local residents reported that the assailants headed towards a local RPA post after the attack. They stated that an unusual number of soldiers were seen in the area just before the killing. The exact reason for the killing is not known. Some acquaintances have speculated that it may have been connected with a financial dispute with another businessman; they also mentioned that he was not well perceived among the Tutsi community as he was seen as sympathetic to "Hutu extremists". Others allege that the killing was connected with a local meeting held earlier that day, at which he had reportedly asked a question perceived as critical of the RPA.

Euphrasie Nyiramajyambere, a former bank employee aged 37, and her four children, Arthur-Aimé Rugero, aged 14, Ange Rugwiro, aged 12, Nathalie Rugorirwera and Anatole Ruberangabo, twins aged 8, were killed, allegedly by RPA soldiers, in Mukirangwe secteur, Nyamutera commune, Ruhengeri préfecture, in June 1997. The exact circumstances of the killing are not yet known but it is thought to have taken place during a military search operation. The family had been refugees in the former Zaire; Euphrasie Nyiramajyambere’s husband had died in October 1996 during an attack on Kibumba refugee camp. She had returned to Rwanda with her children at the end of 1996. They lived in Ruhengeri but owned a house in Kigali. A few months before her death, Euphrasie Nyiramajyambere had gone to Kigali to reclaim her property, which had been occupied, but had failed to recover it.

On the evening of 5 July 1997, 16 people were killed in Nyakabanda commune, Gitarama préfecture. The victims included Thaddée Musabyimana, director of a private secondary school, aged about 30, and several members of his family; Jean-Baptiste Nkundabatware, in his late 40s, coordinator of Compagnons fontainiers rwandais (COFORWA), a local non-governmental organization, his wife and five of their children - all killed in their home; Eric Basenge, a medical student, whose body was found near their house; Sylvestre Sebazungu, a primary school inspector, and a second man called Sebazungu who was accompanying him home. The authorities have blamed the killings on "infiltrators". However, local residents believe RPA soldiers were responsible for the killings. Approximately 20 soldiers were reportedly seen near the places where the killings occurred. When local residents said they heard gunfire coming from the house of Jean-Baptiste Nkundabatware, the soldiers reportedly denied that this was the sound of gunfire and left.

II.8 Deliberate and arbitrary killings attributed to armed opposition groups

Since December 1996, armed groups believed to be composed of ex-FAR and interahamwe militia have stepped up their attacks inside Rwanda. In some cases, individuals or whole families have been deliberately targeted and killed. In other cases, vehicles have been ambushed and their passengers killed by unidentified armed men. It is often difficult to verify the identity of those responsible for these attacks but they are generally believed to be members of armed opposition groups. Armed opposition groups are also increasingly aiming at military as well as civilian targets. Overall, the leaders and structures of these armed groups remain unidentified.

On 23 December 1996 and 5 January 1997, 20 people were killed in two separate incidents, both in Kazirabonde cellule, in Kagarama secteur, Taba commune, Gitarama préfecture. On 23 December 1996, Emmanuel Rudasingwa was killed in his shop, which was also a bar. Ten other people were also killed, including his 12-year-old daughter Aélique Mahoro, and nine men who were drinking in the bar. On 5 January 1997, nine other people were killed in a house in the same area, including a 3-year-old child killed in bed. The victims included a former teacher, Philippe Bajyagahe, his pregnant wife Valérie Mukakalisa, their sons Roger Mwizerwa and Samuel Niyokwizera, their daughters Alice Nyirarukundo and Jocelyne Kwizera, two servants Nadine Mukamazimpaka and Ancille Ahiboneye, and Walter Mutoni, an orphan whose parents had died in the genocide and who was being looked after by Philippe Bajyagahe’s family. The assailants, who were heavily armed, reportedly threw a grenade into the house before leaving.

In both incidents, the perpetrators are believed to have been ex-FAR. There are various hypotheses regarding the motives behind these killings. Two of the victims had indicated their willingness to testify against a defendant at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania; some believe that they may have been killed to prevent them from testifying. Another theory is that some of the victims may have been viewed by the attackers as traitors: they were known to be collaborating with local authorities to identify and denounce members of the interahamwe militia in their community.

On 11 January 1997, a group of around 60 armed men attacked a hospital in Kabaya, in Gisenyi. Three patients were reportedly killed. The same day, an attack took place on the nearby gendarmerie post, where there is an RPA position, and a local detention centre at Gaseke. On 14 January, the soldier who was on guard duty outside Kabaya hospital was killed by unidentified armed men.

On 25 January 1997, a group of armed men reportedly killed at least 24 Tutsi civilians - including children - from nine different families in Gikeri cellule, Musanze secteur, Kinigi commune, Ruhengeri. Most of the victims were killed in their homes. They included Nibagwire, aged 70, Mukamanzi, aged 17, Muhorakeye, aged 13, Batamuliza, aged 13, Masengesho, aged 5, and Nayihiki and Dusabe, both aged 4. The following day, around 140 Hutu civilians were killed in a revenge attack by armed Tutsi reportedly assisted by RPA soldiers (see part II.11 below).

On 9 February 1997, three vehicles were reportedly stopped at an unofficial roadblock in Tare commune, in Rural Kigali. The assailants reportedly asked the passengers to separate according to their ethnic origin and killed at least 11 Tutsi civilians, including three women - Espérance Uzamushaka, Christine Irambona and Jeanne Mukarwamba - and two RPA soldiers in civilian clothing.

On 19 May 1997, a vehicle carrying several members of the Rwandese security forces, including a regional police commander, was ambushed in Mabanza commune, in Kibuye. Three police officials including the commander were reportedly shot dead as they tried to escape. Moments later, a communal taxi carrying around 20 passengers was ambushed at the same spot. Only five of its passengers are thought to have survived. The rest were shot dead or burned inside the vehicle.

On 22 August 1997, at least 130 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), most of them from the Tutsi ethnic group, were killed during an attack on Mudende refugee camp, in Mutura commune, Gisenyi, in the early hours of the morning; scores of others were seriously injured. Most of the victims were reportedly killed with machetes and clubs; some had gunshot and grenade wounds. The camp housed around 8,100 refugees who had fled the areas of Masisi and Rutshuru, in eastern DRC, to escape violence and human rights abuses there by armed civilians and former government forces in 1995 and 1996; they had continued to seek refuge in Rwanda while the situation in their home area remained unsafe. After the attack on 22 August, around 4,000 refugees fled the camp and dispersed. The perpetrators of the attack are believed to be members of armed Hutu groups operating inside Rwanda. They also attacked an RPA post close to the camp and reportedly killed at least three RPA soldiers. In a statement on the killings on 26 August, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Anastase Gasana, stated that former army soldiers and interahamwe militia, recently returned from the DRC, were responsible for the killings. He stated that appropriate measures were being taken to ensure the security of refugees remaining in Mudende camp. There have been reports that following the attack at Mudende, an unknown number of Hutu civilians died in reprisal killings by Tutsi civilians (see part II.11 below) and at least 17 alleged "infiltrators" were killed by RPA soldiers.

II.9 Attacks on educational institutions

There have been a number of attacks on educational institutions in which civilians have been killed. On the evening of 18 March 1997, six students - most of them girls - and one guard were killed with guns and grenades at Nyange primary school, in Kivumu commune, in Kibuye préfecture. The attack has been officially attributed to ex-FAR or interahamwe. However, some local sources believe it was carried out by RPA soldiers, following an incident about two weeks earlier, in which a group of six or seven RPA soldiers had tried to take students away from the school, allegedly to rape or kill them. Staff at the school had managed to prevent the soldiers from entering the school. It is alleged that the soldiers then returned on 18 March in a revenge attack against the pupils and staff. Survivors of the attack on 18 March reportedly claimed that some of the assailants were RPA soldiers. Subsequently, four teachers - two men and two women - were reported to have been imprisoned. There are unconfirmed reports that one male teacher died as a result of ill-treatment. A woman who claimed to have identified some of the assailants was reportedly shot dead the day after the attack.

On the night of 27 April 1997, as many as 100 armed men reportedly attacked several educational and religious institutions and houses in Muramba, Satinsyi commune, Gisenyi préfecture, killing 22 people - most of them women. Sixteen female students were reportedly shot dead in the dormitory at the school of economics and commerce; a 14-year-old girl was killed in the convent of the Benebikira Sisters; and a 62-year-old Belgian nun, Griet Bosmans - one of the very few foreigners left in the region - was killed in the primary school of which she was the director. The assailants reportedly also attacked an RPA military post nearby. Local sources pointed out that despite the relative proximity of the RPA post, soldiers did not intervene to protect the victims during the attack. The identity of the perpetrators of the killings at Muramba has not been confirmed. Several people were reportedly arrested in connection with the attack on the school. On 2 May, Radio Rwanda reported that 19 people suspected of taking part in these killings had been killed by the security forces.

In the attacks on the schools at Nyange and Muramba, it was reported that the assailants first asked the students to identify themselves according to their ethnic origin but that the students refused to do so, and were subsequently shot at.

There have been other attacks and attempted attacks on schools since May 1997 and several cases of killings of school directors in unclear circumstances.

II.10 Attacks on staff of international organizations and other foreign nationals

Rwandese and foreign nationals working for international organizations - non-governmental organizations as well as UN agencies - have been among the victims of extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings. Some of these attacks appear to have been motivated by a desire to drive all foreign organizations out of Rwanda; the perpetrators of these killings have succeeded in creating a climate of such insecurity that these international organizations are no longer able to operate and human rights abuses can take place without any independent scrutiny. In some cases, representatives of humanitarian organizations appear to have been specifically targeted for allegedly favouring the needs of recent returnees over those of the rest of the population.

i) Killings of Rwandese nationals working for international organizations

On 18 January 1997, a driver working for the UNHCR was beaten to death by three people - one policeman, one soldier and a man in civilian clothes - in Kigombe commune, Ruhengeri.

On 19 January 1997, in Musanze secteur, Kigombe commune, Ruhengeri, two guards of the non-governmental organization Concern were shot by RPA soldiers. One of them, Epimaque Kuradusenge Habyarimana, was killed; the other was injured. The two guards had reportedly panicked at the sight of a military patrol approaching and were shot at as they tried to run away.

On 15 June 1997, Didace Nkezagera, an employee of the World Food Program (WFP) in Ruhengeri, his wife, young child and another relative were killed at night in their home in Rubange secteur, Kigome commune, in Ruhengeri. The family had been refugees in the former Zaire until the end of 1996. Just before his death, Didace Nkezagera had reportedly been questioned by RPA soldiers, on three consecutive days, about the WFP’s work in the region. He had allegedly complained previously about the diversion of food aid, claiming that it was not reaching the people for whom it was intended.

Another WFP employee, Jean de Dieu Murwanashyaka - also a returnee from the former Zaire - was arrested by soldiers on 9 June 1997 and led to an unknown destination. His mutilated body was found in the bush near Ruhengeri town, on 13 June. He had been shot through the head. His eyes had been gouged out and his ears and genitals cut off, apparently with bayonets. He left behind a young wife, pregnant with their first child. An unknown number of other people were also killed around the same date; their bodies were found scattered in the area, some had been buried, others burned.

On 19 June, Félicien Bucyekabili, a 28-year-old driver who had been working for the UNHCR since April 1997 and was previously director of a Catholic youth organization, was killed along with his wife, their son aged 7 and their daughter aged 6 when they were shot through the windows of their house in Kigombe commune, Ruhengeri.

ii) Killings of foreign nationals

Recent killings of foreign nationals began in January 1997. On the evening of 18 January 1997, three Spanish employees of the non-governmental organization Medicos del Mundo (MDM) - Manuel Madrazo Osuna, Maria Flores Sirera Fortuny and Luis Valtuena Gallego - were shot dead at their home in Kigombe, Ruhengeri. A fourth MDM employee - a USA national - was seriously injured. The identity of the perpetrators has not been confirmed. Initial reports by the authorities that several RPA soldiers had also been killed in the incident were subsequently denied. Following the killings, Jean de Dieu Mbatuyimana, a Rwandese guard working for MDM who had driven the injured American to hospital, was arrested, along with another guard. They were detained in Muhoza military detention centre. On 20 January, Jean de Dieu Mbatuyimana was shot dead by RPA soldiers, who claimed he was trying to escape. Jean de Dieu Mbatuyimana had been a corporal in the ex-FAR and had returned from the former Zaire in November 1996. Claude Dusaidi, adviser to the Vice-President and Minister of Defence, later said in a radio interview that MDM had made a mistake in employing former government soldiers.

On the same evening that the MDM workers were killed, the nearby premises of two other non-governmental organizations, Save the Children Fund (SCF) and Médecins sans frontières (MSF), were also attacked; shots were fired and goods looted but there were no casualties. The guards reportedly identified the assailants in the attack on the MSF building as RPA soldiers. There are indications that those who attacked the SCF building were also RPA soldiers.

There is no conclusive evidence as to the identity of the killers of the MDM workers. Some sources allege the perpetrators were ex-FAR, others that they were RPA soldiers. Local sources all confirmed that there was a heavy RPA presence in the area; the army had been alerted following the initial sound of gunfire at MSF and SCF and had undertaken to protect foreigners living in the immediate area. The government is not known to have provided any official explanation of these events.

On 2 February 1997, Guy Pinard, a Canadian priest in his 60s, was shot in the back and killed during a communion service in Kinigi commune, in Ruhengeri. The perpetrator was identified by witnesses as a teacher and former RPA soldier; he was later arrested but reportedly released soon after. According to acquaintances, Guy Pinard, who had been living in Rwanda for more than 30 years, was an outspoken person who had helped both Tutsi and Hutu escape massacres. He had witnessed many human rights abuses, especially in Ruhengeri. He was known to have been critical of the current government.

On 4 February 1997, five members of the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda (UNHRFOR) - Sastra Chim Chan, a Cambodian national, Graham Turnbull, a British national, two Rwandese interpreters, Jean-Bosco Munyaneza and Aimable Nsensiyumvu, and a Rwandese office assistant, Agrippin Ngabo - were killed by armed men in Karengera commune, in the southwestern préfecture of Cyangugu, after their vehicles were ambushed. All five died of gunshot wounds; four of them died at or near the place of the attack; Agrippin Ngabo died later, while being transported to hospital by aeroplane. The body of Sastra Chim Chan was found decapitated. These killings have been publicly attributed to armed groups opposed to the RPA. Five people were arrested in connection with the killings and confessed to taking part in the ambush. Two others were reportedly killed by RPA soldiers, including the alleged leader of the group.

On 27 April 1997, Griet Bosmans, a Belgian nun and school director, was killed in an attack on a school in Muramba, Gisenyi (see part II.9 above).

In addition to these cases, there have been a number of incidents in various parts of the country - including in Kigali - in which foreign and local staff of international organizations have been assaulted, beaten and threatened.

II.11 Killings by armed Tutsi civilians

In January and February 1997 in particular, there were several incidents in which scores of Hutu returnees were killed by Tutsi civilians.

Between 7 and 9 January 1997, around 20 returnees from Tanzania were beaten or hacked to death with machetes and sticks by Tutsi civilians in Rugarama cellule and a further 40 in Ruhanga cellule, both in Kigina secteur, Rusumo commune, Kibungo préfecture. The victims included men, women and children. Those killed in Ruhanga included Rugerinyange and his wife Bazizane, Paul Biguli, his wife Alvere Zirakuye and his sister Mukantakiye. The body of a 12-year-old boy, Gapira, was found hanging from a tree in Ruhanga; the bodies of Vincent Biramahire and Gasove were found in latrines, also in Ruhanga. Several people were reportedly arrested following these killings.

On 26 January 1997, in the secteurs of Musanze, Rugina and Kanyamiheto, in Kinigi commune, Ruhengeri, armed Tutsi civilians reportedly assisted by RPA soldiers killed around 140 unarmed Hutu civilians in a reprisal attack following the killing of at least 24 Tutsi civilians in the area by armed Hutu groups (see part II.8 above). The victims of the reprisal attack appear to have been killed at random; they included men, women and children. Most of them were beaten to death; other injuries were caused by grenades. Some of the bodies were found on the site of the killings, others in a nearby river or on its banks, others in latrines.

On 20 February 1997, at around midnight, 21 members of two families of refugees who had returned from Tanzania in December 1996 were killed in Nkamira secteur, Birenga commune, Kibungo préfecture. The victims included many children and a 3-month-old baby. The perpetrators were allegedly Tutsi civilians armed with guns.

In the days following the attack on Mudende refugee camp in Gisenyi on 22 August 1997 (see part II.8 above), an unknown number of Hutu civilians living in the area were reportedly killed by Tutsi civilians and their houses set on fire. According to local sources, RPA soldiers present in the area made no attempt to intervene to prevent these reprisal killings. There are allegations that some soldiers also took part in the killings.

II.12 Killings by unidentified individuals

Amnesty International has received reports of many killings where there has been no clear indication or conclusive evidence as to the identity of the perpetrators. A few examples are mentioned below.

Vincent Nkezabaganwa, President of the Conseil d’état (Council of State) and Vice-President of the Cour suprême (Supreme Court), was attacked by armed men in military uniform in his home in Gisozi, in Kigali, on the evening of 14 February 1997. Three other people who were with him at the time were also killed: a nightguard Kamali, known as Rubare, Alphonse Ngoga, who worked at the office of the Prime Minister, and Gasana, a driver. Vincent Nkezabaganwa was badly injured but did not die immediately. Soldiers reportedly accompanied him to the hospital. Later the same day, his family was told that he was dead and had already been taken to the morgue. The injuries on his dead body were described as different and more severe than those he had sustained when he was attacked at his home: while he was initially injured on his thigh, his arm and his stomach, his dead body reportedly bore signs of severe chest wounds.

On 11 May 1997, six people were killed by armed men in military uniform after their car was ambushed in Gitara cellule, Coko secteur, Mubuga commune, near the border of the southern préfectures of Butare and Gikongoro, by armed men. The victims were two female students, Denise Uwizeye, aged 24, and Pacifique Kanzayire; two priests from the parish of Cyahinda, Pascal Yirirwahandi and Isaie Habakurama; a medical assistant, Jean-Marie Vianney, and a young woman, Nyirabazungu. RPA soldiers stationed nearby reportedly did not intervene. Several people were reportedly arrested in connection with the killing but the identity of the perpetrators is not confirmed.

On 5 July 1997, two brothers - both Hutu - one a former teacher, the other a bank employee, were reportedly killed with farming implements in Gakarara secteur, Karago commune, in Gisenyi. A third man - a Tutsi - who shared their house was reportedly spared. The killers remain unknown.

On the night of 22 July 1997, ten people, including Minani, Muhutu and several members of their families, including two pregnant women, were killed by unidentified men in military uniform in Bimomwe secteur, Musambira commune, in Gitarama préfecture. The identity of the perpetrators is not known; some local sources believe the killing may have been carried out on the orders of a local RPA soldier, possibly to avenge the deaths of several members of his own family.

A number of local civilian authorities have also been killed during 1997, including several conseillers de secteur and responsables de cellule, and the sous-préfet of Ngororero in Gisenyi, Maurice Sebahunde, who was killed with two other people on 17 May 1997. These killings have generally been attributed to armed opposition groups. However, Amnesty International has not been able to confirm the identity of the perpetrators in most of these cases.

III. "DISAPPEARANCES"

The number of "disappearances" reported from various parts of Rwanda has continued to rise in 1997. In the first few weeks following the mass return of refugees from the former Zaire and Tanzania at the end of 1996, many people "disappeared", partly as a result of the chaos surrounding the return of such large numbers of people, partly as a result of arbitrary arrests. Since then, many families remain without news of their relatives who are believed to have returned during this period. They do not know whether they are alive or dead - whether they died in eastern Zaire, were arrested on return to Rwanda and are among the tens of thousands of prisoners being held in life-threatening conditions, or whether they were killed on return to Rwanda. Attempts to find the "disappeared" are further complicated by the fact that neither the Rwandese authorities nor international agencies carried out any significant registration or counting of returnees in the chaos which surrounded the mass refoulement in November and December 1996; although it is generally claimed that as many as 750,000 returned from the former Zaire, the absence of records has meant that it has been impossible to verify this figure.

For example, Simon Kagarama, a 45-year-old man who had worked as a driver for a government-run development project, "disappeared" after returning from the former Zaire in November 1996. His family were without news of him for months until a relative informed them that he had been told Simon Kagarama had been killed soon after his return, as he was making his way back through Kivumu commune in Kibuye, western Rwanda. He never reached his home area in the northern préfecture of Byumba. His death has not been officially confirmed by the authorities.

Between 13 and 17 January 1997, around 20 people, believed to include returnees from Tanzania, "disappeared" in Nyabitare secteur, Rusumo commune, in the eastern préfecture of Kibungo, after being arrested by a local government official. Those who "disappeared" included Bugayi, Karegeya, Dusabeyezu, and three brothers, Kaberuka, Nsabimana and Gasana.

In the west of the country, scores and possibly hundreds of people have "disappeared" during or following military search operations. These "disappearances" occur as the RPA carry out raids on areas where infiltrations have been reported and round up groups of young men. Some individuals have later been traced in detention centres and a number have been released. However, many remain unaccounted for. For example, in late April 1997, several hundred returnees from the former Zaire reportedly "disappeared" from Mukingo commune, Ruhengeri, after being taken to an unknown location by RPA soldiers.

Some detainees have "disappeared" while being transferred from one detention centre to another. Efforts by their families and by human rights organizations to trace them are obstructed by the lack of access to military detention centres. Given the trend towards holding civilian detainees in military detention centres, for example in Mukamira military camp in Ruhengeri, it is likely that some are held there but it is virtually impossible to confirm their whereabouts.

Donat Harelimana, a 39-year-old father of three and former university lecturer, returned from the former Zaire in November 1996. On 8 March 1997, he "disappeared" from the centre of Kigali. Attempts by his family to trace him in prisons and detention centres in Kigali have failed. By the end of June 1997, his whereabouts were still not known. The reason for his "disappearance" is not known but it is thought it may be connected with the fact that Donat Harelimana owned a property in Kigali which is illegally occupied by people believed to have close links with the authorities.

Emmanuel Burasanzwe, a local environment officer in Gisenyi and former prison director, "disappeared" on 10 August 1997 after leaving his home to attend the funeral of a friend who was among those killed on 8 August near the market at Mahoko, Kanama, in Gisenyi (see part II,2 above). He reportedly met some soldiers along the way who told him to accompany them to the local commune office. He did not return. It is thought that he may have been arrested, but by the end of August his whereabouts were still unknown.

There have also been cases of "disappearances" of a more political nature. For example, Innocent Murengezi, a defence lawyer who was involved in representing both the civil parties and defendants in trials of those accused of participation in the genocide, "disappeared" from Kigali on 30 January 1997. He had reportedly been threatened several times in relation to his work as a defence lawyer representing individuals accused of participation in the genocide; in early January, he had been warned that a group of people were intending to denounce him for participation in the genocide so that he would be arrested. Soon after his "disappearance", there were rumours that he had been arrested on his way home from the Court of First Instance in Kigali. However, his place of detention was never announced nor communicated to his family, who have remained without news ever since. Repeated attempts to establish his whereabouts or to find out whether he is still alive have been fruitless. He is feared dead. Amnesty International has raised this case several times with the Rwandese Ministry of Justice; however, no information has been provided in return on any government investigation into Innocent Murengezi’s "disappearance" [11].

"Disappearances" have also been reported following raids carried out periodically by the security forces, in particular in Kigali. The purpose of these raids is to check identity. Most of those who are stopped tend to be young men. Large-scale arrests have taken place during these raids, for example in late June 1997. Most of those arrested are reported to have been released soon afterwards. Those who are not from Kigali are ordered to return to their areas of origin. Several cases have been reported of individuals whose relatives have been unable to trace them in the areas to which they were supposed to have returned.

IV. ILL-TREATMENT AND PRISON CONDITIONS

IV.1 Ill-treatment

Reports of deliberate ill-treatment of detainees have increased during 1997. Testimonies received by Amnesty International indicate that returnees are especially harshly treated, particularly those who served at any level in the former army of Rwanda or who are suspected of collaboration with "infiltrators".

Ill-treatment is usually carried out during arrest or in the initial period of detention in the cachots communaux (communal detention centres). Those carrying out the ill-treatment include soldiers, gendarmes, and sometimes ordinary civilians in the presence of - and in some cases assisted by - members of the security forces. Beatings with sticks appear to be the most common form of ill-treatment. Some detainees have been found with fractured skulls and kidney injuries. An elderly woman - a returnee from the former Zaire - detained at Butamwa cachot in Rural Kigali reportedly had scars all over her back after being beaten to extract a confession in early 1997.

Zilpa Mukabarinda, a 25-year-old teacher at a primary school in Nyange, was violently assaulted and raped after being taken away from her home in Bwakira commune, Kibuye préfecture, on 23 March 1997. She was reportedly detained for two months then released at the end of May 1997 but has been unable to resume work because of her poor physical condition resulting from her ill-treatment [12]. Her arrest and ill-treatment occurred just five days after the attack on Nyange school (see part II.9 above).

Jean-Claude Ntidendereza, a 39-year-old veterinary worker, married with five children, has reportedly been subjected to frequent ill-treatment in a cachot in Bwakira commune, in Kibuye, since his arrest by military officials on 1 July 1997. In addition to being frequently beaten, he has suffered burns after guards reportedly melted hot plastic and rubber onto his body. The motive for his arrest is not confirmed but is believed to be linked to threats he had received from a local trader after he had refused to approve the sale of cattle, some of which he considered unfit for human consumption.

Scores of deaths in detention as a result of deliberate ill-treatment have been reported. For example, in July 1997 local sources in Kibuye préfecture estimated that at least one detainee was dying each day as a result of ill-treatment in several cachots including those in Mabanza, Kivumu and Rutsiro. After their death, the bodies of the detainees are returned to their family; it has been reported that families are sometimes made to sign death certificates claiming that the death was caused by illness.

Cases of deaths in detention have also been reported from several detention centres in the eastern préfecture of Kibungo. For example, 12 detainees held in Rusumo cachot died at the end of February 1997, reportedly because they were deprived of water and medical care after being badly beaten.

Severe cases of ill-treatment have been reported from military detention centres. Civilians as well as military are among those held in military detention centres. The extent and patterns of ill-treatment in military detention centres are more difficult to verify because of the denial of access by the authorities. However, some detainees released from military centres have reported treatment considerably harsher than that in civilian prisons. For example, one man arrested on 22 January 1997 and detained in Muhoza military camp in Ruhengeri for eight days reportedly bore severe marks of torture after having been whipped on his chest; other detainees have also had to be transferred to hospital for medical treatment after being released from Muhoza.

Several cases of ill-treatment were reported in February 1997 from a military detention centre in Shyorongi commune, in Kigali Rural. On 4 February, five detainees who had been badly beaten there in apparently separate incidents required medical treatment for their injuries. One had a fractured foot, another a fractured foot and arm.

A third detainee, André Safari, was described as having a broken knee and large scars from beatings he had been subjected to several weeks earlier in Bicumbi, before being transferred first to the military detention centre at Shyorongi then to the communal cachot; he reportedly suffered further beatings in both these detention centres.

IV.2 Prison conditions amounting to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment

Conditions in detention centres continue to be a cause of grave concern, as the total number of detainees in central prisons and cachots is estimated at above 120,000 and virtually all these detention centres are filled to several times their capacity. The number of arrests continues to rise and very few detainees are released. Despite many promises on the part of the government, little effective action has been taken to improve these life-threatening conditions, which constitute an extreme form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Several new prison buildings have been made available but these have also rapidly filled up beyond their intended capacity, as the rate of arrests continues to rise. The government’s repeated promise to release minors has not been fulfilled: children continue to be detained, in some cases in the same appalling conditions as the adults.

Many detainees are dying from diseases resulting from the extreme overcrowding and lack of hygiene and medical facilities. In some cases, detainees appear to have been deliberately deprived of medical treatment; for example in Mabanza commune, in Kibuye, around 30 detainees who had been transferred to a medical centre for treatment were reportedly returned to the cachot without having been treated, after one detainee escaped from the centre.

Juvénal Turatsinze, a 26-year-old man who had worked for the forestry department in the Ministry of Agriculture, was arrested on 26 January 1997 after returning from the former Zaire. When relatives visited him in Bwakira detention centre in Kibuye, they reported that he had developed a severe eye infection which was not being treated and could leave him blind.

Detainees also suffer from grossly inadequate supply of food. Those in the communal detention centres are entirely dependent on their relatives to bring them food; however, in many cases, their families barely have enough to feed themselves. Those who do not have relatives living nearby or able to visit them are in turn dependent on other detainees with whom they may share their food. Even for those whose relatives do bring them food, there is no guarantee that the food will reach them and often relatives are made to leave the food with guards and depart without seeing the detainee. Relatives can travel several days on foot to bring them food, without any guarantee of seeing them or being able to speak to them.

V. ARBITRARY ARRESTS

Amnesty International has received numerous testimonies from individuals whose relatives or friends have been arrested soon after their return from the former Zaire or Tanzania in late 1996 and early 1997. Given the sheer number of such arrests, the incomplete or sometimes non-existent prison records and the denial of access to certain detention centres, it is virtually impossible to verify the exact number of arrests which have taken place since that time.

Some of these arrests may be legitimate, for example in cases where the individuals are known to have participated in the genocide and where such allegations have been properly investigated. However, many arrests of returnees in recent months appear to have been arbitrary; cases where arrests are preceded by proper investigations appear to be the exception. Many individuals currently in detention claim not to know why they have been arrested. Some believe they may have been arrested simply on the basis of their former occupation or the position they occupied under the former government of Rwanda. Individuals who served in the former army or the former government - whether at the national or local levels, and regardless of whether they held high-ranking or low-level positions - are most likely to be arrested. Others are arrested apparently because their relatives had served in the former government or army. Amnesty International has provided examples of arbitrary arrests in several reports and actions published in 1996 and 1997 [13].

Large numbers of people have also been arrested in the context of military search operations. It has not been possible to obtain detailed information on all these cases as the detainees, especially in the northwest, are often held in military detention centres. Some are subsequently released, others transferred to communal detention centres. Many of these arrests appear to be arbitrary. Those arrested during these operations include mainly young men who happened to be present in the locality when RPA soldiers were searching for infiltrators; they are arrested on the basis that they may have been collaborating with infiltrators.

Arrests and other human rights abuses linked to property disputes

Arrests in the context of property disputes have become more frequent as hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned from neighbouring countries to find their properties occupied. Many of these returnees do not dare try to reclaim their houses; some have been denounced by the illegal occupants for alleged participation in the genocide as they went to eclaim their property and have been subsequently arrested. Others have been killed.

Reverend André Nyilimanzi, former youth-coordinator in the Kigali diocese of the Episcopal Church and archdeacon in Kigali east, returned from the former Zaire to Rwanda with his family in November 1996. He was arrested soon after his return. He was later released but was warned not to try to reclaim his house and properties in Ndera, Rubungo commune, Rural Kigali. He was reportedly ordered to go and live in Kanombe commune, where he also owns a piece of land.

Gracia Mukangarambe, a 38-year-old mother of seven, returned with her family from Tanzania in December 1996. The day after their return to Nyabitare secteur, Rusumo commune, Kibungo préfecture, her husband, Servilien Biramahire, was arrested, on a general accusation of participation in the genocide. During their exile, their property had been occupied by a man who claimed it had been given to him by the government; he refused to leave and threatened to kill Gracia Mukangarambe and her children; the illegal occupant’s son threatened them with a machete. One month after their return, she and her children were still living in the plastic sheeting they had brought with them from the refugee camp in Tanzania, afraid of making any further moves to reclaim their house, fearing they would be killed by the illegal occupants.

Joran Siborurema, a former engineer, married with three children, owned a house which was occupied and subsequently sold while he was in exile in the former Zaire. When he returned to Rwanda, he went to the bank, which had lent him money for the house, to complain that the house had been sold. When he returned to complain a second time on 13 January 1997, he did not return. Three days later, it was discovered that he had been arrested and was in detention in the gendarmerie post (brigade) of Remera in Kigali, accused of participation in the genocide.

On 27 June 1997, the President of the Specialized Chamber of the Court of First Instance in Kigali issued a ruling that the rent from houses within the jurisdiction of the court of Kigali belonging to individuals whose names featured on a list of 140 individuals suspected of having participated in the genocide should be temporarily seized and paid into a specific bank account in the name of the Court of First Instance of Kigali. The stated intention is to then allocate the money to a compensation fund for victims of the genocide. However, the list of names, attached to the text of the ruling, is not known to have any legal status and the basis on which it was compiled is unclear; some of the individuals on the list have not been tried and their guilt has not been proven. Effectively the authorities appear to be encouraging illegal occupation of private property belonging to individuals who may be innocent.

In response to the problems of conflict over land and property, the Rwandese Government has introduced a policy of "villagization" (habitats regroupés): new housing is being built in designated areas. Families whose houses have been destroyed, whose homes have been occupied or who are homeless for other reasons are asked to move into these houses instead of building new ones on land which legally belongs to them. The authorities have stressed that these "villages" are intended for members of all ethnic groups in need of housing. Some people have welcomed this policy as they believe that the villages could provide greater security. Others fear that in the present situation - where many Hutu are returning to find their property occupied by Tutsi -, the new "villages" would be occupied primarily by Hutu and could develop into potential "ghettoes", likely to increase ethnic tensions and separations. At the time of writing, it is still too early to judge the long-term effect of this policy.

VI. OTHER FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RETURNEES

Following the mass return of refugees at the end of 1996, the government announced that all returnees were required to attend a six-month "re-education training". Some returnees have reported that they have been unable to obtain their new identity card, find employment or register in schools or education colleges, until they have attended this training. These conditions not only have the effect of denying access to work and education to a large proportion of the population but are arbitrary and discriminatory as the re-education training program does not appear to have even begun in some parts of the country. The effect has also been to delay successful reintegration of returnees into the community.

On 5 May 1997, the Minister of Public Works and Labour issued a circular letter to all private employers, entitled "Engagement des travailleurs récemment rapatriés" ("Recruitment of employees who recently returned") informing them that it is forbidden to employ returnees until they have attended the "re-education training". Employment in the public sector has also been effectively denied to many returnees.

New identity cards were introduced in Rwanda in 1996. Many individuals have been arrested in the process of applying for the identity cards, on the basis of accusations that they participated in the genocide. Individuals who do not have an identity card are viewed with suspicion by the authorities as having been involved in the genocide in 1994. Yet many returnees are afraid of applying for their identity card in case they are arbitrarily arrested or even killed in the process. Refugees could not apply for or obtain identity cards while in exile. In recent months, raids and random identity checks have been carried out in various parts of Rwanda; some people have been arrested for not having an identity card, apparently without regard for the fact that returnees have been mostly unable to obtain one.

VII. LIVING IN FEAR AND SILENCE - THE VOICES OF THE ORDINARY RWANDESE

Ordinary Rwandese men and women, especially those in the northwest, are living in a climate of fear. Many people have fled from their homes in these regions. Local sources describe some of the villages as deserted. A woman living in Ruhengeri told Amnesty International:

"Nous nous endormons en sachant que d’un jour à l’autre, nous ne serons peut-être plus ici [...] Je sais qu’après les autres, ce sera moi."
("We go to sleep knowing from one day to the next that we may not be here [...] I know that after the others, it will be me.")

Most people are too frightened to speak out about the killings, for fear of reprisals. When asked for news about the situation in the northwest, one Rwandese woman said: "Il y fait nuit" ("It is dark there"). Another woman, whose husband - a returnee from the former Zaire - "disappeared" in Kigali in March 1997, wrote to a friend in May 1997:

"Les nouvelles sont nulles, c’est la tristesse et la douleur - que te dire? [...] Nous on attend la mort."
("There is no news, it’s just sadness and pain - what can I tell you? [...] As for us, we are waiting to die.")

The situation of the populations in the northwest is aggravated by their isolation from the rest of the country: telephone lines are often down, roads leading to and from the region are often closed and most international organizations have withdrawn from these areas. The areas are effectively sealed off from the outside world.

Individuals who have spoken about the killings have themselves been targeted and threatened. For example, in February 1997, two women who had spoken to an international organization about the killing of their husbands during a military operation in Nkuli, in Ruhengeri, in January 1997, were reportedly interrogated by soldiers and asked why they had spoken to foreigners about these events. They were reportedly led away by the soldiers and never seen again.

A human rights activist told Amnesty International that people were increasingly afraid to testify:

"On se tait pour gagner du temps [...] on préfère pousser la date de la mort."
("People keep quiet to prolong the time [...] they prefer to postpone the date of their death.")

Testimonies received from Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in particular, for example from people whose close relatives have been killed, reflect a sense of despair and appeal to the outside world for action to break the silence. A man describing the situation in Ruhengeri wrote:

"Je suis prêt à mourir - au moins j’aurai parlé, les autres meurent sans avoir rien dit."
("I am ready to die - at least I will have spoken, the others are dying without having said anything.")

Referring to the massacres which took place in Ruhengeri on 2 March 1997, he described how RPA soldiers rounded up people and led them away:

"Ramassant des gens sur leur passage - toutes couches confondues - ils furent comme des brebis amenées à la boucherie sans savoir pourquoi."
("Picking up people along the way - indiscriminately - they were like lambs being led to slaughter without knowing why.")

Amnesty International has received many reports of killings where neither the perpetrators nor the victims have been identified. The mystery surrounding these killings is accentuating the fear in the population. Unidentified bodies are often left by the roadside and people are too frightened to identify them in case they become associated with "infiltrators". For example, on 12 June 1997, in Buremeli cellule, Ntarabana secteur, Tare commune, Rural Kigali, local residents reported seeing five bodies along the road leading from Ruhengeri to Kigali. A local military official reportedly ordered the population to bury the bodies without identifying them or attempting to establish the circumstances in which they had been killed. On 18 June, a passer-by reported seeing six bodies with their arms tied floating in the Nyabarongo river in Bicumbi commune, also in Rural Kigali, while the local population looked on with a mixture of indifference and fear.

A woman living in Gisenyi stated:

"Ceux qui ne sont pas assassinés par les militaires de l’ancienne armée sont assassinés par les militaires de la nouvelle armée et vice-versa. Ce sont presque toujours les innocents - les neutres - qui sont victimes."
("Those who are not assassinated by the soldiers of the former army are assassinated by the soldiers of the new army and vice-versa. It is almost always the innocent people - the neutral ones - who are the victims.")

VIII. THE GOVERNMENT’S REACTION TO THE KILLINGS

The Rwandese Government has reacted in various ways to the upsurge in killings in recent months. Its usual response has been to claim that most if not all of the killings of civilians are carried out by "infiltrators", insurgents or other armed groups intent on destabilizing the country. In response to reports that many of these killings were in fact carried out by their own forces, some government officials have admitted that a small number of civilians may have been killed in the cross-fire but claimed that such cases were the exception - an inevitable consequence of counter-insurgency - and that the majority of those killed by RPA troops were members of armed groups. Military and civilian authorities have claimed that it is often difficult to distinguish armed insurgents from civilians and have attempted to gloss over the killings of civilians by focusing on the need to counter the insurgency. Several national and local officials who have admitted publicly that the RPA was responsible for killing large numbers of civilians, who have protested about these killings or who have privately complained about the spreading insecurity in the country have been removed from their posts.

Even in response to specific reports of human rights violations from independent human rights organizations, the government has continued to deny that the RPA has carried out widespread killings of unarmed civilians. When Amnesty International issued a statement on 19 February 1997 describing the increase in killings following a recent visit to Rwanda, Claude Dusaidi, adviser to the Rwandese Vice-President and Minister of Defence, was asked in an radio interview whether the government would launch an inquiry into reports of killings by RPA troops. He replied:

"There is no need for an inquiry as there have been no RPA reprisal killings. These are a figment in the imagination of Amnesty International [...] When you attack an army, they retaliate. We realize there are security problems [...] Maybe once in a while, civilians fall in clashes - this is regrettable but it is not the aim."

When the US-based organization Physicians for Human Rights reported that between 2,000 and 3,000 civilians had been killed by the RPA within three months in 1997, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence described the accusations as "totally exaggerated", claiming that any civilian casualties which may have occurred during clashes between RPA troops and members of armed gangs were very few. A report by the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda (UNHRFOR) in early August 1997 claiming that 2,873 people had been killed during May and June 1997 was dismissed by Claude Dusaidi as "invention".

In a statement on 26 August 1997 concerning the massacre of Congolese refugees at Mudende in Gisenyi (see part II.8 above), the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Anastase Gasana, stated:

"The Government of Rwanda takes this opportunity to denounce certain external lobbies, which have recently engaged in a disinformation campaign concerning the violence perpetrated in northwestern Rwanda by ex-soldiers and militiamen of the old regime, who were responsible for the actions of genocide committed in Rwanda in 1994. By means of both oral and written statements given wide media coverage recently, these same external circles have sought to foist on the Rwandan Patriotic Army part of the blame for the killings of civilians in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi préfectures [...] The Government wishes, in particular, to warn certain external circles that have in the past sided with Rwandan leaders advocating ideologies of exclusion and genocide. It calls on them to cease misleading international public opinion by spreading disinformation on the situation in Rwanda, which cannot possibly be the same as it was prior to July 1994."

In an interview on Radio Rwanda on 18 August 1997, Vice-President and Minister of Defence Major-General Paul Kagame gave a more detailed response to statements by the UNHRFOR and others that widespread killings had taken place in Rwanda in recent months. He stated that the security situation in the north of the country had improved and that reports of the situation there had been exaggerated and presented out of context. He claimed that human rights organizations were ignoring the fact that fighting had been taking place in the northwest and were portraying the situation purely in human rights terms. He also stated that the Rwandese Government was addressing the problem of human rights violations and had mechanisms in place to deal with group or individual excesses in the fighting; he mentioned that military courts were trying officers who had been guilty of such excesses. Indeed, in early September 1997, it was reported that four RPA officers were tried by a military court for their participation in the massacre of more than 110 unarmed civilians in Kanama, Gisenyi, on 12 September 1995 [14].

However, the public discourse of senior government officials in previous weeks contained barely-veiled threats as they attempted to show determination in combating the enemy. For example, during a press conference in Nairobi, Kenya, on 16 July 1997, the Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Paul Kagame, was asked what methods he would use to fight the insurgency. He was quoted as saying that the only thing he could foresee was to kill more of those who caused problems and that the government would use all the secret services and all the tools at its disposal to punish them [15].

The real level of deliberate violence against unarmed civilians continues to be played down. When asked in a meeting of non-governmental organizations in June 1997 to comment on the situation in the northwest of the country, a diplomatic representative of the Rwandese Government acknowledged that there was a situation of insecurity but claimed that the situation was manageable and that the military strategy was working. He said: "Life goes on."

Throughout 1997, Rwandese Government officials have continued to assert that refugees are welcome to return to Rwanda and that they can do so in safety. In a speech on 4 July 1997 to mark the third anniversary of the victory of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paul Kagame claimed that more than 90% of the questions relating to the problem of refugees had been solved, but accused certain individuals, especially foreigners, of behaving as if the problem had not been resolved and of manipulating the issue for their own interests.

IX. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

IX.1 The impact of international withdrawal

International organizations with a mandate to promote and protect human rights or to provide humanitarian assistance in Rwanda have been faced with enormous challenges during 1997. The killings of foreign nationals and of a greater number of Rwandese nationals working for international organizations have forced virtually all human rights and humanitarian organizations to withdraw their personnel from the western regions and to severely cut back or abandon their programs. The alternative could have been the death of many more of their workers.

The result has been devastating. In humanitarian terms, the populations most in need of assistance - including returnees - have not had access to basic food and medical facilities. Humanitarian agencies have been unable to carry out or monitor distribution of relief supplies. There have been reports of food supplies being diverted from their intended beneficiaries after being channelled through local authorities, which have in turn led to disputes and violence between different sectors of the population. Some reports allege that local authorities have diverted some of the supplies to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for RPA and AFDL troops there.

There is no sustained monitoring of the human rights situation in the western part of Rwanda, whether by international or local organizations. The United Nations Human Rights Operation for Rwanda (UNHRFOR) no longer has staff permanently based in these regions due to the increased insecurity in these areas. They are only able to visit a limited number of areas. Neither they nor the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are able to monitor the situation in the west. International organizations are advised only to travel there under military escort - conditions under which independent investigations into cases of human rights abuses, particularly those attributed to the RPA, are virtually impossible. The work of local human rights organizations is also severely restricted as the widespread insecurity and the fear of being targeted for their work often prevents them from carrying out detailed investigations in these areas. It is not just investigations into reports of killings and "disappearances" in these areas which are affected; these organizations are also no longer able to visit detention centres or observe trials in these areas. The risk of ill-treatment in detention and irregularities in trials is therefore heightened.

The impact of this withdrawal has been that human rights abuses have escalated, with few outside observers to testify. Effectively the populations of the western préfectures have been abandoned to a silent suffering.

IX.2 Ignoring widespread human rights violations

Amnesty International has published reports in 1995, 1996 and 1997 alerting the international community to the deteriorating situation in Rwanda and recommending measures which could help prevent further human rights abuses in the country. Other organizations - in particular the UNHRFOR - have also regularly highlighted ongoing human rights violations in Rwanda. Yet most foreign governments have chosen to turn a blind eye to the situation and little public attention is paid to the rising death toll among the civilian population in Rwanda. Some governments and their representatives in Rwanda have denied any serious human rights violations by Rwandese government forces. For example, the non-governmental organization Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) reported in July 1997 that an official of the US embassy in Rwanda "defied PHR to produce evidence of serious violations of human rights in Rwanda".

It could be argued that some governments and intergovernmental bodies have even contributed to a potential worsening of the human rights situation, for example by encouraging or forcing Rwandese refugees to return or by supplying military equipment to the very same forces who have been carrying out grave human rights violations.

i) Repatriation at any cost?

In 1997, several governments have forcibly returned refugees to Rwanda, ignoring the refugees’ fears of return and publicly available information on the human rights situation prevailing in Rwanda. For example, on 12 August 1997, Gabon forcibly repatriated around 155 Rwandese refugees who had clearly stated in the previous days that they did not want to return to Rwanda. Those forcibly repatriated included scores of ex-FAR and at least eight civilians who had been screened by the UNHCR and were said to qualify for UNHCR protection; this refoulement was condemned by the UNHCR as a "flagrant violation of the most basic human rights and humanitarian principles". The ex-FAR - thought to number 97 - were taken into military custody immediately upon arrival in Kigali. By the end of August, their whereabouts were still not known and international organizations were being denied access to their place of detention.

On 18 August 1997, a government official in Malawi stated on the national radio that repatriation of Rwandese refugees in Malawi could proceed because there is a degree of peace and stability in Rwanda. There are around 765 Rwandese refugees in Malawi. In early September, a screening process was being launched to determine which refugees could be repatriated. Rwandese refugees in Malawi - as in several other countries - have come under pressure to register for "voluntary repatriation" before the screening process has begun [16].

Despite the demonstrable risks which refugees face on returning to their country, host governments continue to ignore their international obligation to provide protection to those who seek asylum in their country. The situation in this respect has been especially grave in the DRC (formerly Zaire) since the attacks on refugee camps in October 1996. Faced with this situation, the UNHCR has generally continued to promote the repatriation of Rwandese refugees, in particular from the DRC; around 200,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda between January and mid August 1997, mostly in operations organized or facilitated by the UNHCR. Many are returning to the western préfectures, where thousands have been subjected to human rights violations since their return.

The victims of these human rights violations are the same people who fled in terror from the attacks on the refugee camps in the former Zaire in October 1996 and walked for hundreds of miles with hardly a hope of survival. Some made their way right across the former Zaire through to Congo, from where they had to flee again when fighting broke out in that country in June 1997. Some ended up in the Central African Republic or in Gabon, where they faced a further threat of refoulement. Increasingly, countries hosting Rwandese refugees and asylum-seekers - including the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Malawi, Central African Republic, Gabon, Tanzania, Kenya, Angola and others - are refusing to provide protection and are threatening to forcibly return them to Rwanda.

These refugees are now facing in their home country a fate similar to that from which they were fleeing in exile. One returnee from the former Zaire describing the situation in Ruhengeri since January 1997 said:

"Nous qui pensions l’avoir échappé belle en quittant le Zaire, nous voilà encore durement éprouvés".
("We who thought that we had narrowly escaped with our lives by leaving Zaire, here we are suffering terrible hardship again.")

Governments and international agencies promoting repatriation are clearly aware of the risks facing refugees returning to Rwanda but appear to believe that the policy of repatriation continues to be viable, on the grounds that the risks to the refugees in Rwanda are marginally lower than those they face in the DRC. Yet UN agencies such as the UNHCR and the UNHRFOR have stated clearly that they are unable to monitor the safety of returnees due to the insecurity and inaccessibility of many of the areas to which refugees are returning. UNHCR officials have also openly acknowledged that the situation in Rwanda has deteriorated. Yet these contradictions remain unresolved. It is clear that the existing policy of promoting repatriation to Rwanda must be revisited to reflect the reality which prevails in the refugees’ country of origin.

Amnesty International recognizes that international agencies working with refugees face a difficult situation, given the risks of serious human rights abuses which Rwandese refugees face if they remain in the DRC and the risks they also face if they return to Rwanda. Greater emphasis must be placed on seeking solutions which acknowledge that it is unsafe for refugees to return to Rwanda. The risks of human rights abuses in the DRC should not detract from the fact that the situation in Rwanda cannot be considered safe either; repatriation to an unsafe country should not be encouraged, whatever the circumstances. Amnesty International is calling on the government of the DRC and other countries hosting Rwandese refugees to ensure that refugees are protected while it remains unsafe for them to return to their country of origin. If the authorities of the DRC are not willing or able to provide such protection, the international community should assist, for example by deploying international civilian police personnel to help ensure the refugees’ safety.

ii) Transfers of military equipment and training

Several governments have provided military equipment and training to Rwanda during 1996 and 1997, apparently with little regard for the human rights record of the Rwandese security forces both before and during this period. Persistent and grave human rights abuses in neighbouring Burundi and the DRC do not appear to have been taken into consideration either - despite the close military links which are known to exist between the governments, security forces and armed opposition groups of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.

Amnesty International does not take a position on whether or not military, economic or cultural relations should be maintained with countries where human rights are violated, nor does it support or oppose punitive measures such as boycotts or sanctions. However, Amnesty International opposes transfers of military, security and police equipment or training where these can reasonably be assumed to contribute to human rights abuses. The organization asks governments to take the receiving country’s human rights record into account before allowing such transfers.

Thus, in 1994 and 1995, Amnesty International campaigned against arms deliveries to the former Rwandese armed forces and militia based, at that time, in eastern Zaire, on the grounds that these arms were likely to be used by those who played a leading role during the 1994 genocide to carry out further human rights abuses against unarmed civilians [17]. Amnesty International also called for close monitoring of arms supplies to the government of Rwanda. In November 1996, Amnesty International called for a cessation of transfers of light weapons and associated military equipment to the Great Lakes region, because of the persistent use of such arms for human rights abuses against unarmed civilians in Rwanda, Burundi and the former Zaire [18]. Also in late 1996, Amnesty International wrote to a number of governments, including member states of the UN Security Council, of the Organization of African Unity’s Conflict Resolution Mechanism and of the Southern Africa Development Community, warning of the dangers of further supplies of light weapons and associated military equipment to the Great Lakes region and providing details of human rights abuses committed by the various parties to the conflict, including those in Rwanda.

With regard to the current situation in Rwanda, these persistent patterns of serious human rights abuses against unarmed civilians have continued during 1996 and 1997 - both inside Rwanda and in the neighbouring DRC where RPA troops retain a presence. Amnesty International believes that transfers of light weapons and associated military equipment and certain types of training to the RPA or to other armed groups are likely to contribute to further human rights abuses.

In July 1997, the South African Government decided to resume sales of military equipment to Rwanda, despite detailed information which Amnesty International had provided on the current human rights situation in Rwanda and neighbouring countries, including examples of killings of unarmed civilians by the RPA and by armed opposition groups. South Africa’s decision to resume military sales to Rwanda was apparently taken on the basis that Rwanda has a right to defend its territory and on the understanding that the equipment would not be used outside its national borders. No regard appeared to be shown for the plight of unarmed civilians inside Rwanda. Even the claim that the equipment would not be used outside Rwanda’s borders appears hollow, given the now widely-acknowledged presence of many RPA troops in the DRC and their implication in massacres there since October 1996. Initially, sales from South Africa are to be limited to military vehicles and communication equipment. However, such equipment - though not categorized as lethal - could also be used by the RPA to facilitate human rights violations, in particular against unarmed civilians in the context of counter-insurgency operations in remote areas [19]. On 30 July 1997, it was reported that the RPA had acquired at least two military helicopters, which were directed within a short time to the northwestern préfectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. This type of helicopter - the Russian-made MI24 - is usually used for ground attack in combat but could also be used for surveillance. It has been reported that RPA officers had attended an aviation and helicopter training course in South Africa in October 1996.

The United States of America (USA) has been one of the main political and military supporters of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and the RPA even before the current government of Rwanda came to power in July 1994. In particular, the US army has been involved in an extensive training program for the RPA since 1996.

In a letter to Amnesty International in February 1997, a US diplomatic representative stated that the US military training program for Rwanda "includes such things as English language instruction, helping to develop the Rwandan military justice system, encourage effective management of defense resources, and bringing engineering, quartermaster, medical, adjutant general and ordnance officers to the US to enhance their professionalization. We have also conducted a short course in basic infantry skills for about 30 RPA soldiers. A theme in all our dealings with the RPA has been to professionalize what started as a guerrilla army, and to expose their officers to management of a multiethnic force."

According to a report from the US Department of Defense detailing US military activities in Rwanda since 1994, official US military training was provided to RPA officers since January 1994, when the RPA was still a guerrilla force. In July 1994, US military assistance was provided for humanitarian relief operations which involved cooperation with the RPA, but not training. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, the US army provided assistance for the RPA’s demining program. During this period, the US army also trained RPA officers in the USA. RPA and gendarmerie officers were trained in Rwanda in military justice issues and criminal law procedures. In July and August 1996, RPA soldiers were provided with training in "small unit leader training, tactical skills, land navigation, first aid and basic rifle marksmanship. Tactical skills training focused on tactical patrolling". The rifle marksmanship training was carried out using US M4 rifles - equipment which the report claims was not transferred to the RPA after the training.

US military assistance intensified in the months preceding the attacks in October 1996 on the Rwandese refugee camps in eastern DRC. Several sources, independently from each other, have reported seeing US military personnel on several occasions, both in Rwanda and in eastern DRC, in 1996. A report published in July 1997 by Physicians for Human Rights, a US-based non-governmental organization, states that "the number of these US military personnel has varied in witness accounts from 12 to more than 100 present in Rwanda at any given time" [20]. US officials have continued to deny that US equipment or personnel were present in eastern DRC.

Thousands of unarmed refugees were deliberately killed in the attacks on the camps in eastern DRC in October 1996, carried out by troops of the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, assisted by RPA soldiers. The leading role played by the RPA in these attacks has since been publicly acknowledged by the Vice-President and Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Paul Kagame. In an interview with The Washington Post newspaper on 9 July 1997, he talked about the critical role played by the RPA in supporting the AFDL, and more specifically in conceiving and carrying out attacks on the refugee camps in eastern DRC, ostensibly with the aim of dismantling the structures and bases of the former Rwandese army and interahamwe militia. In the interview, Paul Kagame mentioned that Rwanda had provided arms and training for the AFDL troops and that key units and commanders within the AFDL were members of the RPA.

The report from the US Department of Defense also describes training provided to Rwandese civilian and military personnel in "public information", which appears to have facilitated the Rwandese Government’s campaign to encourage refugees to return to Rwanda - even though their safety was not guaranteed. In November 1996, Rwandese civilian and military personnel were trained in "operations to assist repatriation of refugees and other displaced civilians, and in planning and conducting public information campaigns supporting refugee repatriation and reintegration". This included the production of material such as leaflets and radio messages: "the products encouraged refugees to return to a safe homeland and sought to counter the ex-FAR/interahamwe message that returnees would be killed upon their return to Rwanda." In March and April 1997, the US military "trained and helped establish the Rwandan Military Information Platoon which has the mission of producing posters and other media products for dissemination". This US-supported public information campaign played a significant role in convincing foreign governments and humanitarian organizations that it was safe for Rwandese refugees to return home, where many of them have subsequently been subjected to human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions and "disappearances".

US military training for RPA officers continued in July and August 1997. The training apparently included a human rights component, the details of which remain undisclosed. US officials have denied any US army involvement in training in counter-insurgency methods for the RPA.

Despite its close and official involvement with the Rwandese security forces, the US is not known to have publicly condemned the persistent and grave human rights violations against unarmed civilians carried out by the RPA. On the contrary, a Pentagon official was quoted as describing Rwanda’s human rights record as "surprisingly good".[21]. Amnesty International believes that the apparently uncritical political support of the USA for the Rwandese Government can only be encouraging the Rwandese authorities to believe that they can carry on violating human rights with little fear of criticism from their most important allies.

In addition, there remain questions about the close military and political links between the governments and security forces of Uganda and Rwanda, as well as between the USA, South Africa and these two countries. Previous reports have linked military support for the RPA to Uganda. Many RPA troops fought in Uganda before 1994 and the Ugandan army has reportedly provided logistical supplies and artillery training to the RPA. The USA stepped up its military support for Uganda in 1996 and has been involved in training Ugandan troops - most recently in 1997. A US diplomatic representative stated in February 1997: "This training is focused primarily on improving the professional management and operations of the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) and is provided exclusively to Ugandan military and civilian personnel". Even more recently, in July 1997, US military training in Uganda has also been undertaken in the context of an initiative to build up an African peacekeeping force. Although the South African Government has stated that it has received assurances that arms transfers to Uganda are not re-exported, in March 1997 there were reports that South African arms sold to Uganda had ended up with the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan. This raises questions about whether arms supplied to Uganda might also end up in Rwanda or in the DRC.

Zimbabwe has also been among the main military supporters of the AFDL in the DRC and has supplied arms and logistical support to AFDL troops who have been responsible for massacring thousands of unarmed civilians, including many Rwandese refugees, in eastern DRC in 1996 and 1997. Given the presence of RPA troops in eastern DRC - acknowledged publicly by the Vice-President and Minister of Defence of Rwanda in July 1997 -, it is likely that some of these arms could also find their way into Rwanda and be used by RPA soldiers there. These arms supplies are therefore likely to have contributed to grave human rights abuses both in the DRC and in Rwanda.

There have also been reports that armed opposition groups have continued to receive illicit supplies of arms and ammunition through the DRC. For example in February 1997, it was reported that Rwandese armed groups based in or around the refugee camp of Tingi-Tingi were receiving arms, uniforms and munitions.

X. RECOMMENDATIONS

Amnesty International believes that concerted action by the Rwandese authorities, with the encouragement and support of foreign governments, is essential to prevent a further slide into lawlessness and to save the lives of thousands of Rwandese civilians. Basic respect for human rights must be restored in all parts of Rwanda to enable both returning refugees and Rwandese who did not leave their country to live in safety and free of fear.

X.1 To the Rwandese Government

The Rwandese Government must be held accountable for all human rights violations committed by agents of the state. As a minimum, the government should provide public information on the circumstances of the human rights violation in question, including the number of victims, the identity of the perpetrators, the status of investigations and the action taken against those found responsible.

Amnesty International welcomes the government’s action in a number of cases where members of the security forces have been arrested in connection with participation in human rights violations and is seeking further information on the progress of judicial action against them. For example, Amnesty International welcomes reports that in early September 1997, four RPA officers were tried for their role in the massacre of more than 110 unarmed civilians at Kanama, Gisenyi, in September 1995 - even though this trial took place three years after the massacre. However, to date, it appears that such judicial actions are unusual, and that most of the perpetrators of the human rights violations illustrated in this report continue to avoid justice.

Amnesty International urges the government to study and implement the recommendations below with the aim of putting an end to these violations of human rights in the longer term.

i) Extrajudicial executions

Amnesty International reminds the government of Rwanda that the right to life, guaranteed by Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is one of the most fundamental of all human rights.

Amnesty International accepts that a government has the right to defend its country against armed aggression and that it has the responsibility to protect the civilian population against attacks by armed groups. However, this does not provide the security forces with a licence to deliberately kill unarmed civilians. Counter-insurgency operations can never be a justification for the army to extrajudicially execute unarmed civilians. Numerous testimonies from Rwanda summarized in this report indicate that contrary to the assertions of the government, most of the victims of killings in recent months are not armed "infiltrators", but unarmed civilians. These killings are in violation of international humanitarian law including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

Amnesty International appeals to the Rwandese Government to:

- prohibit extrajudicial executions by members of the Rwandese security forces and ensure full implementation of the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions;

- publicly and officially condemn extrajudicial executions, at the highest level, whenever they occur;

- ensure strict control over the chain of command in the RPA and instruct commanders at all levels to restrict the use of lethal force to situations where it is strictly unavoidable in order to protect life - as specified in Article 3 of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials - and then only to the minimum extent required under the circumstances. Officials should be instructed that they have the right and duty to refuse to obey any order to participate in an extrajudicial execution;

- remind members of the security forces at all levels that it is their duty to protect the civilian population of Rwanda in its entirety - returnees and non-returnees alike, whatever their ethnic group and social background. The UN General Assembly Resolution 34/169 adopted on 17 December 1979 with the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials states that "like all agencies of the criminal justice system, every law enforcement agency should be representative and responsible and accountable to the community as a whole";

- ensure that all members of the security forces are familiar with and trained in international standards on the conduct of law enforcement officials, including: the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Guidelines for the effective implementation of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials;

- carry out thorough and independent investigations into reports of extrajudicial executions, make public the results of these investigations and ensure that individuals found responsible for ordering or carrying out extrajudicial executions are immediately suspended from their duties and brought to justice. To date, the government has promised and/or announced investigations into many cases of alleged extrajudicial executions but, to Amnesty International’s knowledge, has not published the detailed results of these investigations;

Amnesty International welcomes the fact that some individuals have been arrested in connection with extrajudicial executions and urges the government to ensure that such steps are taken as a matter of routine, and not only on exceptional occasions. The government should take the essential next step and disclose the number and identity of RPA soldiers arrested for alleged participation in extrajudicial executions, including details of the specific crimes of which they are accused and the progress of their case files. If charged, the individuals should be given a public trial in accordance with international standards of fairness, and without recourse to the death penalty;

- take measures to prevent killings by armed Tutsi civilians, for example in the context of reprisals after attacks by armed Hutu groups. RPA soldiers should intervene wherever possible to prevent such killings and to protect the population at risk.

ii) "Disappearances"

Amnesty International appeals to the Rwandese Government to:

- make clear that "disappearances" constitute a grave violation of human rights and that those found responsible for "disappearances" will be brought to justice;

- undertake prompt and thorough investigations into cases of reported "disappearances" and inform the families of the "disappeared" of the progress and outcome of these investigations;

- if the person is found to have died, an investigation should be carried out to establish the cause of death. The family should be allowed access to information relating to the death and should be allowed to be represented in the investigation. The body of the deceased should be restored to the family wherever possible;

- allow international human rights and humanitarian organizations access to all civilian and military detention centres to enable more accurate verification of the whereabouts of those who have been reported "disappeared" and to facilitate attempts to trace them. The authorities should keep systematic records of the whereabouts of detainees, including their transfer from one detention centre to another, to enable verification;

- ensure that no detainees are held in secret or unofficial detention centres.

iii) Arrests, detention and treatment of detainees

Amnesty International appeals to the Rwandese Government to:

- allow unrestricted access to all civilian and military detention centres to relatives of detainees, doctors, lawyers, and local and international human rights and humanitarian organizations;

- stop the practice of detaining civilians in military detention centres;

- ensure that all arrests and detentions are accurately registered and make available public records of lists of detainees and their place of detention, including dates of transfers to other detention centres and the names of officials responsible for their arrest and transfer;

- release from detention those who have no case file or against whom there are no specific accusations - a promise made repeatedly by the government but not implemented. Such a move would not only ensure that innocent individuals are released, but could also have a significant impact in reducing prison overcrowding and improving prison conditions;

- take measures to prevent further arbitrary and unlawful arrests and ensure that only individuals against whom there is substantial evidence of participation in crimes are arrested. Individuals should not be arrested merely on the basis of their former occupation, because of the occupation or status of other members of their family, or because they fled Rwanda in 1994;

- ensure that prison officials and guards in detention centres are aware that ill-treatment and torture of detainees will not be tolerated and that those responsible for such treatment will be suspended from their duties and brought to justice. Prison officials should be instructed that they are obliged to refuse to obey any order to torture detainees;

- ensure that detainees who have been deliberately ill-treated and those who have developed illnesses as a result of poor prison conditions or lack of hygiene and medical facilities are immediately transferred to a hospital or medical centre for treatment and have regular access to medical care thereafter;

- fulfil without any further delay the government’s repeated promises to release from detention children, elderly and sick detainees;

- instruct all prison officials and guards not to use lethal force against detainees and that if detainees are attempting to escape, every attempt should be made to apprehend and arrest them, as opposed to the current practice of shooting them with often fatal consequences. Provision 4 of the Basic Principle on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials states: "Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force or firearms";

- ensure that prison officials and guards in detention centres are familiar with and abide by international standards on the treatment of detainees, including: the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the Rules; the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention of Imprisonment; the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty; the Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

iv) Freedom of expression

Amnesty International appeals to the Rwandese Government to:

- ensure that individuals in all sectors of Rwandese society - including human rights activists, journalists, members of parliament and local officials - can express their non-violent opinions without fear of human rights abuses;

- take measures to protect individuals who have been threatened or targeted on previous occasions and ensure that freedom of expression is restored in Rwanda.

X.2 To armed opposition groups operating in Rwanda

Deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians and hostage taking by armed opposition groups not only represent grave violations of international humanitarian law, but contribute to yet further violence by providing the Rwandese security forces with a pretext for reprisals in which large numbers of unarmed civilians are extrajudicially executed.

Leaders of armed opposition groups should:

- stop killing unarmed civilians and make clear to those under their command that deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians will not be tolerated;

- instruct all those under their command to respect basic principles of international humanitarian law, as laid out in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. In particular, they should prevent the killing of non-combatants and those taking no direct part in the conflict;

- investigate and denounce deliberate and arbitrary killings committed by those under their command and provide public information about steps taken to prevent further such killings;

- cooperate with investigations by the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda to identify and bring to justice those who played a leading role in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

X.3 To foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations

Foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations have a responsibility to take action to prevent a further deterioration of the human rights situation in Rwanda, by demanding that the Rwandese Government take steps to prevent further human rights violations as well as by providing positive and concrete support to projects which will help protect and promote human rights.

As most Rwandese are too frightened to speak out, it is imperative that the international community provides an accurate and public account of the current situation in Rwanda and that international policy decisions are based on such an account.

As a minimum, foreign governments should:

- publicly condemn the widespread human rights abuses taking place in Rwanda;

- exert whatever influence they can over the Rwandese Government, security forces and armed opposition groups to respect international human rights and humanitarian law and implement the recommendations listed above;

- request the Rwandese Government to provide regular and up-to-date information on action taken to prevent further human rights violations - in particular, extrajudicial executions and "disappearances" - including details of the progress of investigations and action taken to bring to justice those found responsible.

Transfers of military, security and police equipment

- Governments should not supply light weapons and other types of military, security or police equipment to Rwanda which may be used to commit human rights abuses by the Rwandese security forces or by other armed groups until respect for human rights has been restored throughout the country. They should recognize that, given the persistent pattern of arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians described above, such equipment is likely to contribute directly to further human rights abuses. Amnesty International urges governments to take into account the evidence that most of the victims of killings during counter-insurgency operations in Rwanda in 1996 and 1997 have been unarmed civilians, including many women and young children.

- Governments considering transfers of military, security and police equipment or training to Rwanda should insist on independently verifiable guarantees that human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law have ceased and that the equipment will not be used against unarmed civilians, before agreeing to such transfers.

- Governments should take into account that equipment classed as "non-lethal" (such as military communication equipment and vehicles) could also facilitate human rights abuses, especially in remote areas of the country.

- Governments considering military transfers to Rwanda should also bear in mind that such equipment could find its way into neighbouring countries, such as Burundi or the DRC, where widespread human rights abuses have also continued, including by RPA troops in the DRC. It is well established that there are close links between the security forces and armed opposition groups of these three countries.

Positive assistance to Rwanda which would contribute to the protection of human rights could include:

- providing human rights training to members of the Rwandese army, police and prison system, including training in international standards for the conduct of security forces and prison officials and the practical implementation of these standards. Such training should be supported with a view to increasing an effective system of accountability for human rights applicable to personnel in the army, police and prison system;

- continuing to assist the judiciary and facilitate the process of fair trials in Rwanda by providing material and human resources, including legal experts at all levels - particularly defence lawyers - and helping to train a force of Rwandese defence lawyers who will be prepared to represent defendants accused of participation in the genocide;

- assisting the prison system - directly or through non-governmental humanitarian organizations - in improving conditions of detention and ensuring that detainees have access to medical care at all times.

Refugee protection

- Governments should abide by the principle of non-refoulement at all times. No person should be forcibly returned to Rwanda if s/he may face serious human rights violations there. This principle - besides being a principle of customary international law and therefore binding on all states - is enshrined in various international treaties, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

- Given the persistent and grave human rights abuses taking place in Rwanda and the fact that many returnees have been among the victims of these abuses, foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations should recognize that it cannot be considered safe for refugees to return. In the light of overwhelming evidence that it is not safe for refugees to return, repatriation should not be promoted in the present circumstances. Governments and agencies promoting repatriation should give a public account of their assessment of the risks facing returnees. Governments should also refrain from coercing refugees or putting pressure on them in any way to return.

- Repatriating refugees to certain parts of Rwanda and not others - according to perceived security risks - cannot be considered an adequate solution, as many returnees are eventually obliged to return to their area of origin. Furthermore, while the majority of killings have occurred in the northwestern préfectures, serious human rights abuses have also occurred in other parts of the country, including areas considered "safe". Human rights violations connected with prison conditions, ill-treatment and arbitrary arrests occur throughout the country.

- The international community should agree upon a mechanism for a comprehensive and continuous assessment of the human rights situation in Rwanda, taking into account all available information. This assessment should be independent and impartial. The government of Rwanda should provide full cooperation to those carrying out the assessment and guarantee access to all areas of the country. Repatriation should only be promoted if, on the basis of this assessment, it can be concluded that the human rights situation in Rwanda has improved in a fundamental and durable way. In addition, the government of Rwanda should provide verifiable guarantees that returnees will not be subjected to human rights abuses before further repatriation is advocated.

- Any screening procedures set up to examine the asylum claims of Rwandese refugees should be fair and satisfactory and should conform with the fundamental standards for refugee determination procedures laid out in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, as well as Amnesty International’s Fundamental Standards for the Protection of Refugees. In particular, the body conducting the screening should be completely independent and impartial.

- Countries hosting refugees from Rwanda should be provided with the necessary international assistance to ensure that the refugees are protected from human rights abuses in the host country and are provided with adequate humanitarian assistance. Foreign governments should consider providing international civilian police personnel to help ensure the safety of refugees in the host country if the authorities of that country are not willing or able to protect them.

- The international community should assist host governments in identifying individuals among the refugees who may be suspected of participation in the genocide and promptly undertake thorough and independent investigations into these allegations to enable a decision to be reached on whether they should be prosecuted. In such cases, the individuals should be tried by a jurisdiction which will provide them with a fair trial, without recourse to the death penalty. This could be by the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, if appropriate, or by a national jurisdiction in the host country.
Amnesty International unconditionally opposes the use of the death penalty. As death sentences are being imposed in Rwanda for individuals categorized as having played a leading role in the genocide, the organization appeals to governments not to extradite to Rwanda individuals likely to fall within this category.

****

(1)The figure of 6,000 refers to specific cases reported to Amnesty International during this period but does not include cases where substantial information was lacking; nor does it include many other cases which may have gone unreported. On 7 August 1997, Amnesty International issued a news release entitled "Rwanda: Massacres of unarmed civilians escalate" (AI Index AFR 47/27/97) stating that at least 2,300 people had been killed between May and July 1997. Information received from various sources since that date indicates that the number killed during those three months was substantially higher.
(2) See Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Human rights overlooked in mass repatriation", 14 January 1997 (AI Index AFR 47/02/97).
(3) Extract from an anonymous testimony from Rwanda, March 1997.
(4) Rwanda is divided into 12 préfectures (regions), which are divided into communes (districts), in turn divided into secteurs (sectors); secteurs are further divided into cellules (cells). The French terms are used throughout this report to enable precise references to the locations.
(5) Amnesty International’s concerns about the first trials in Rwanda are described in the report "Rwanda - Unfair trials: justice denied", 8 April 1997 (AI Index AFR 47/08/97).
(6) See Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Alarming resurgence of killings", 12 August 1996 (AI Index AFR 47/13/96).
(7) See UNHRFOR Report of the Human Rights Situation in Rwanda and the Activities of HRFOR, May-June 1997.
(8) See UNHRFOR Status Report of 27 February 1997: "Public extrajudicial executions of two alleged murder accomplices by members of the Rwandese Patriotic Army in Karengera commune, Cyangugu préfecture, on 24 January 1997".
(9) See UNHRFOR Status Report of 24 January 1997: "Public extrajudicial executions of four murder suspects by members of the Rwandese Patriotic Army".
(10) For further information on these cases, see Amnesty International Urgent Action 199/96 (8 August 1996) and updates of 15 August 1996, 13 September 1996, 30 April 1997, 16 May 1997 and 30 June 1997.
(11) According to UNHRFOR, the Commander of the Criminal Investigations Department said that there was no further information on the whereabouts of Innocent Murengezi and the Criminal Investigations Department was no longer investigating the case (see UNHRFOR Report on the Human Rights Situation in Rwanda and the Activities of HRFOR, May-June 1997).
(12) For details of this case, see Amnesty International Urgent Action 155/97 (AI Index AFR 47/18/97).
(13) See for example Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Human rights overlooked in mass repatriation", January 1997 (AI Index AFR 47/02/97).
(14) For details of this massacre, see Amnesty International report "Rwanda and Burundi - the return home: rumours and realities", February 1996 (AFR 02/01/96).
(15) See AFP report of 16 July 1997.
(16) See Amnesty International Urgent Action 115/97, 18 August 1997 (AI Index AFR 36/04/97) and update of 9 September 1997 (AI Index AFR 36/06/97).
(17) See Amnesty International report "Rwanda: Arming the perpetrators of the genocide", June 1995 (AFR 02/14/95).
(18) See news service item "Amnesty International calls for effective action to stop arms flows to the African Great Lakes region", 4 November 1996 (AI Index 62/24/96).
(19) Armoured vehicles have been used by security forces in other countries to abduct and "disappear" civilians and carry out surveillance operations which have resulted in arbitrary and indiscriminate killings in outlying areas.
(20) See "Investigations in Eastern Congo and Western Rwanda: A Report by Physicians for Human Rights" (16 July 1997).
(21) See The Washington Post, 16 August 1997, "US military role in Rwanda greater than disclosed".
Posted by WNJ Editor at 21:58 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, Kagame, Rwanda, United States
Darfur: Rebels in Juba Looking for Unity Before Talks
MISNA
19 October 2007

Representatives of seven rebel groups in Darfur have been meeting in Juba, in south Sudan, trying to find a common position before heading to the peace talks in Tripoli next October 27 said a communiqué quoting the leader of the SLA, Jar al-Nabi Abudulkareem. According to the latter, he main points of the accord were achieved and they are especially concerned with the renunciation by the factions to head to Tripoli with separate positions. Rather, the groups are considering forming an as yet unspecified single entity having the task of backing a common stance. The leaders of the seven groups had given each other five days time to establish an agenda with which to present themselves to Tripoli and end the violence in the western region of the country – Darfur. The Juba meeting and others held in the past few days are contributing to a rapprochement of the factions and a softening of contrasts. Previously, some rebel groups ad considered the hypothesis of abandoning the Tripoli talks accusing Khartoum of continuing to foment the violence.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 21:54 0 comments
Labels: Darfur, Liberia, SLA, Sudan
Assassination of a Gacaca Court President
Hirondelle News Agency
18 October 2007

The president of a Gacaca court, Paul Rutayisire, himself a genocide survivor, was assassinated on Monday night in Kigali, it was learned from an official statement published Thursday from the IBUKA association.

Paul Rutayisire fell into an ambush while returning home; his lifeless body was found, with major trauma to his head, at dawn, according to the official statement which calls for justice and requests that the authorities track and punish these acts which perpetuate the genocide ideology.

Paul Rutayisire was president of the Gacaca court of the Karama sector in the Huye District in the Southern Province, he had been the object of threats on behalf of alleged genocidaire because of his duties as an honest judge, states the Ibuka text, principal association of Rwandan survivors.

The survivors and witnesses of the genocide have been victims of several aggressions during these last months, it was learned from a police source and from Ibuka. Mrs Mukamarora Costasie of the Gikonko sector in the Gisagara District was decapitated in the night of 31 August. She was the principal witness for the prosecution against her own son and several members of her in-laws.

In the same district, Mrs Uwantege Espérance of the Nyanza sector was found dead, killed in the night of 1 October. Her last testimony was on 26 September.

On the same day, a 100 kilometres to the south-west, in the Rusizi district, Mrs Mukabatsinda Espérance was raped before being killed. Her husband testified against his brothers and they threatened to kill his Tutsi wife.

All these cases have taken place in the Southern province, which counts to itself more 37 063 of the 78658 genocide prisoners.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:28 0 comments
Labels: Rwanda
Rwanda Reiterates its Committment to Finish the Gacaca Trials By The End of The Year.
Hirondelle News Agency
18 October 2007

The national service of the semi-traditional gacaca courts (SNJG), charged with trying the majority of the alleged authors of the 1994 genocide, still hopes that these courts will complete their work by the end of the year.

"Except in 56 administrative sectors out of the 416 of the country, the activities of the gacaca (to pronounce gatchatcha) courts are advancing at a rate which makes it possible to affirm that by the end of December 2007 all courts will have finished the cases that they have to try", the SNJG writes on its website.

"So that these 56 sectors finish with the others, it will be necessary to increase the number of seats", continues this department charged with the coordination of the activities of the gacaca courts.

According to the same source, 2008 will be devoted primarily to the official end of the activities of the gacaca courts in all of the country, the constitution of the archives and "the organization of an international conference during which Rwanda will share with the international community the experiences derived from the gacaca process ".

The department calls upon the financial backers to find a premium for the gacaca judges who work voluntarily, adds the text. These courts are presided by "honest" people designated by the community.

They must try the majority of the 80,000 genocide suspects; only a small number of "first category" defendants will be transferred before conventional courts.

The gacaca courts have the authority to sentence a person up to life prison, the maximum sentence in Rwanda since the abolition of the death penalty.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:23 0 comments
Labels: Rwanda
Rwanda: General Bizimungu Was Not Against Tutsis, According to a Belgian Priest.
Hirondelle News Agency
18 October 2007

General Augustin Bizimungu who was Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army in 1994, was not against Tutsis, stated a Belgian priest Thursday before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

"I never noticed Augustin Bizimungu having the least hostility towards Tutsis" declared Father Léopold Greindl, called by the defence of the Rwandan General prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

A member of the congregation of the White Fathers, Léopold Greindl was a missionary in Africa for thirty years, about half that time was spent in Rwanda.

In Rwanda, he build, then directed, the superior catholic institute of applied pedagogy in Nkumba, near Ruhengeri (Northern province), from 1982 to 1993.

The witness indicated to have met Bizimungu on several occasions, he was on duty in the area of Ruhengeri during most of this period.

"I never noticed something from him which could suggest racism", he explained.

Father Greindl added that he met a lot of people who knew this officer and that nobody had alleged that he had expressed anti-Tutsi feelings.

The Belgian missionary, on the other hand, stated that Bizimungu was worried by the fate of the displaced persons that the war had caused and that he preached for negotiations with the Tutsi dominated rebellion, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), then in conflict with the government.

The witness indicated that in his discussions with Bizimungu, the officer often asked the question: "What can we do to put an end to this conflict, to relieve this population which does not know what tomorrow will bring, which does not know what saint to turn to?".

Bizimungu took care of an orphanage in the town of Ruhengeri, added the witness who reported that he showed a "great social concern."

Bizimungu, who has pleaded not guilty, is on trial alongside three other officers. He is the first to present his defence in this trial which began on 20 September 2004.

In 1994, he was Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army. His co-defendants are General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, former Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie, Major François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye and Captain Innocent Sagahutu, former head of an elite battalion stationed in Kigali.

Father Greindl will be cross-examined next Monday by the prosecutor. Meanwhile the proceedings were adjourned due to the lack of a new witness.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 15:31 0 comments
Labels: ICTR, Rwanda
Ankara, London to sign strategic partnership document.
Today's Zaman
19 October 2007

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to sign a strategic partnership document with his British counterpart, Gordon Brown, during his visit to London later this month, the Prime Ministry announced on Thursday.

A similar document was signed at the time between Turkey and the United States, the two NATO allies which have been facing a troubled period in their bilateral relations. Problems have arisen between the two both due to Turkey’s intention to launch a military operation into northern Iraq in order to tackle the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases there and the recent approval of a resolution by a US House committee labeling World War I-era killings of Anatolian Armenians “genocide.” In July 2006 a “shared vision document” was unveiled by then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, now Turkish president, and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, which they said would boost what they described “the two nations’ strategic partnership.”
Britain has all along been a firm supporter of Turkey’s bid to become a full member of the European Union. It has also been a key ally of the US-led invasion of Iraq. This month, Brown announced plans to cut Britain’s troops in southern Iraq by more than half by next spring, to some 2,500, while unidentified officials have suggested all British forces could be out by the end of 2008.

Earlier this week, while warning that any Turkish incursion into Iraq would have “grave consequences” for the region, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih also said that British troops would be needed in the violence-scarred country “for some time to come.”

“We know that more British troops will withdraw from Basra, in large measure because there is confidence in the Iraqi forces in the Basra area to assume the lead in security management in the region. We still have challenges in Basra and I don’t want to underestimate the challenges ahead, but at the end of the day there has to be a point where Iraqi security services assume the lead. We can’t count on outsiders -- our friends -- forever. We definitely will need continued British support for some time to come,” Salih said on Tuesday.

Meanwhile, the Prime Ministry also announced that, during his visit scheduled for Oct. 22-23, Erdoğan will also pay a visit to the British parliament where he will hold meetings with speakers of both the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

While in Britain Erdoğan will deliver a speech at the Oxford Union, a prestigious debating society, and will explain the Turkish foreign policy’s regional and global vision, goals and priorities.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 15:07 0 comments
Labels: Turkey, United Kingdom
Defense Industry Embraces Democrats, Hillary By Far The Favorite.
The Huffington Post
17 October 2007
by Thomas B. Edsall

The defense industry this year abandoned its decade-long commitment to the Republican Party, funneling the lion share of its contributions to Democratic presidential candidates, especially to Hillary Clinton who far out-paced all her competitors.

An examination of contributions of $500 or more, using the Huffington Post's Fundrace website, shows that employees of the top five arms makers - Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop-Grumman, Raytheon and General Dynamics -- gave Democratic presidential candidates $103,900, with only $86,800 going to Republicans.

Senator Clinton took in $52,600, more than half of the total going to all Democrats, and a figure equaling 60 percent of the sum going to the entire GOP field. Her closest competitor for defense industry money is former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney (R.), who raised $32,000.

Insofar as defense workers making political donations reflect the interests of their employers, the contributions clearly suggest that the arms industry has reach the conclusion that Democratic prospects for 2008 are very good indeed. Since their profits are so heavily dependent on government contracts, companies in this field want to be sure they do not have hostile relations with the White House.

The strong support for Clinton indicates that a majority of defense industry executives currently believe Clinton is a favorite to win the Democratic nomination and, in November, 2008, the general election.

In the 2004 presidential race, defense company workers, almost all of them upper-level employees, gave George W. Bush $819,358, more than twice the $366,870 received by John Kerry. Similarly, in House and Senate races over the past 10 years, the defense industry has favored Republicans over Democrats by a 3-2 margin.

Republicans holding public office almost always provide much stronger support for weapons programs and other Pentagon spending than do Democrats.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 15:04 0 comments
Labels: United States
Clinton bucks the trend and rakes in cash from the US weapons industry Clinton bucks the trend and rakes in cash from the US weapons industry
The Independent
By Leonard Doyle
19 October 2007

The US arms industry is backing Hillary Clinton for President and has all but abandoned its traditional allies in the Republican party. Mrs Clinton has also emerged as Wall Street's favourite. Investment bankers have opened their wallets in unprecedented numbers for the New York senator over the past three months and, in the process, dumped their earlier favourite, Barack Obama.

Mrs Clinton's wooing of the defence industry is all the more remarkable given the frosty relations between Bill Clinton and the military during his presidency. An analysis of campaign contributions shows senior defence industry employees are pouring money into her war chest in the belief that their generosity will be repaid many times over with future defence contracts.

Employees of the top five US arms manufacturers – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop-Grumman, General Dynamics and Raytheon – gave Democratic presidential candidates $103,900, with only $86,800 going to the Republicans. "The contributions clearly suggest the arms industry has reached the conclusion that Democratic prospects for 2008 are very good indeed," said Thomas Edsall, an academic at Columbia University in New York.

Republican administrations are by tradition much stronger supporters of US armaments programmes and Pentagon spending plans than Democratic governments. Relations between the arms industry and Bill Clinton soured when he slimmed down the military after the end of the Cold War. His wife, however, has been careful not to make the same mistake.

After her election to the Senate, she became the first New York senator on the armed services committee, where she revealed her hawkish tendencies by supporting the invasion of Iraq. Although she now favours a withdrawal of US troops, her position on Iran is among the most warlike of all the candidates – Democrat or Republican.

This week, she said that, if elected president, she would not rule out military strikes to destroy Tehran's nuclear weapons facilities. While on the armed services committee, Mrs Clinton has befriended key generals and has won the endorsement of General Wesley Clarke, who ran Nato's war in Kosovo. A former presidential candidate himself, he is spoken of as a potential vice-presidential running mate.

Mrs Clinton has been a regular visitor to Iraq and Afghanistan and is careful to focus her criticisms of the Iraq war on President Bush, rather than the military. The arms industry has duly taken note.

So far, Mrs Clinton has received $52,600 in contributions from individual arms industry employees. That is more than half the sum given to all Democrats and 60 per cent of the total going to Republican candidates. Election fundraising laws ban individuals from donating more than $4,600 but contributions are often "bundled" to obtain influence over a candidate.

The arms industry has even deserted the biggest supporter of the Iraq war, Senator John McCain, who is also a member of the armed services committee and a decorated Vietnam War veteran. He has been only $19,200. Weapons-makers are equally unimpressed by the former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Despite a campaign built largely around the need for an aggressive US military and a determination to stay the course in Iraq, he is behind Mrs Clinton in the affections of arms executives. Mr Giuliani may be suffering because of his strong association with the failed policies of President Bush and the fact he is he is known as a social liberal.

Mrs Clinton's closest competitor in raising cash from the arms industry is the former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, who raised just $32,000.

"Arms industry profits are so heavily dependent on government contracts that companies in this field want to be sure they do not have hostile relations with the White House," added Mr Edsall.

The industry's strong support for Mrs Clinton indicates that she is their firm favourite to win the Democratic nomination in the spring and the presidential election in November 2008. In the last presidential race, George Bush raised more than $800,000 – twice the sum collected by his Democratic rival John Kerry.

Mr Edsall's analysis of the figures reveals that, over the past 10 years, the defence industry has favoured Republicans over Democrats by a 3-2 margin, making Mrs Clinton's position even more remarkable.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 15:01 0 comments
Labels: Iraq, United States
US gives 'strategically important' Ethiopia $97 million.
AFP
21 September 2007

The United States said Friday it is donating 97 million dollars (69 million euros) to Ethiopia in recognition of the Horn of Africa country's "strategic importance."

The money, channeled through USAID, is to fund agricultural and private sector development, health care, primary education and good governance, a statement said.

Ethiopia received US backing last year when it deployed troops to neighbouring Somalia to overthrow an Islamist movement accused of harbouring extremist elements.

USAID mission director Glenn Anders said: "The agreements ... fulfill and even exceed the commitments in our five-year strategic development plan ..."
Posted by WNJ Editor at 14:38 0 comments
Labels: Ethiopia, United States
UK to Increase Investment in Angola
African Oil Journal
19 October 2007

The United Kingdom plans to expand its investments in Angola’s oil sector, especially in production and supply of equipment, the British ambassador to Angola said in Luanda .

The information was given to Angolan news agency Angop by Ambassador Ralph Publicover, on the sidelines of an informal meeting with British businesspeople who traveled to Angola to analyze the market and establish commercial partnerships.

“We already have some companies in the Angolan market, such as BP-Angola, a company which has invested over US$3 billion. In the short term we want to see other companies move into the market and therefore we are supporting contacts by business missions from our country interested in investing in the Angolan market,” the diplomat said. The visit by the British businesspeople also aimed to identify potential joint venture and help UK Trade & Investment (UKTI), a British government institution that promotes international trade and the UKWAAG (United Kingdom West African Action Group) to find new trade opportunities.

The UK’s interest is due to Angola being the second largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan Africa, and because it recently became a member of the Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC).

The development of the UK’s offshore resources in the North Sea, is one of the most applauded successes of the last 30 years, and the country has played a significant role in the development of the world petrochemical and refinery industries.

UKTI and UKWAAG are working together to set up viable solutions to meet the challenges the Angolan energy sector is facing, considering the sector’s specialized areas.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 14:29 0 comments
Labels: Angola, Oil, United Kingdom
Rebels and Army Clash Again in East.
MISNA
18 October 2007

Humanitarian and press sources said that the rebels and the army have resumed clashes in the city of Goz Beïda, located in the desolate region of Ouaddaï, about 90 km. from the Sudanese border. The rebels involved are said to be members of FUC (Front Uni pour le Changement), which is said to be close to the minister of defense, Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim. On October 22, 2006, the same city was attacked by rebel groups, but the outcome is unknown. Last October 7, the president of Chad, Idriss Deby, announced a peace accord with four rebel groups in the region though some aspects of the understanding was questioned by at least some of the combatants. Further tensions followed after the kidnapping of an evangelical American missionary who is said to be held in Tibesti. Two days the administrators in the eastern part of the country were given special powers to ensure security in the eastern region which should be able to host 3,000 EU ‘peacekeepers’.

Editor's Note: See related story below.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 05:07 0 comments
Labels: Chad, EU
Former Vice President Resigns as Opposition Leader.
MISNA
18 October 2007

The former vice-president and presidential candidate Solomon Berewa has resigned as head of the current opposition party ‘Sierra Leone Peoples Party’ (SLPP). Berewa said that the constitution of the party provides for the resignation of the leader and deputy in case of defeat in a presidential election. “During my office I have contributed to the development of the country” said Berewa, asking the party “to collaborate to maintaining order and respect the current government”. Alhaji Uns, president of the coalition has expressed appreciation for Berewa’s decision and for his “interest in the wellbeing of the people more than the quest for power”. MISNA’s sources in Freetown said that the former majority party has yet to nominate a successor to the leadership of the coalition, whose command remains in the hands of the party secretary for the time being. In last September’s elections, Berewa was defeated by current president Ernest Bai Koroma (who earned 54.6% of the votes). The elections were Sierra Leone’s first after the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping contingent, which had been deployed in the country since the end of the civil war in 2002.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 05:06 0 comments
Labels: Sierra Leone
American Taken By Rebels is Not a Missionary.
MISNA
18 October 2007

The MDJT rebel movement in the Tibesti region of Chad has been holding an American man, Cash Steve Goldbold, since last October 10. The news was confirmed by the Chadian government. Goldbold has been in Chad since 1992 and is said to be a member of the evangelical church, while officially working for the Association for the Development of Tibesti, an alleged NGO. Goldbold was captured just as he was about to participate in a water basin prospecting project in Bardai which is being financed by the US embassy in Chad. The MDJT has assured that Goldbold is in good health and that it is also ready to hand him over to his country, even after accusing Goldbold of “being at the service of N’Djamena to create divisions within the movement”. The rebel group, one of several acting in the North, has asked that foreigners “not to venture” in territories controlled by its men.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 05:04 0 comments
Labels: Chad, United States
Gabon welcomes French mediation offer with Equatorial Guinea.
AFP
4 October 2007

Gabon said Thursday that it would welcome any French offer to help settle differences with Equatorial Guinea over potentially oil rich islands.

"We would not have any objection ... to a (mediation) initiative; if it were to come from President Nicolas Sarkozy, we could only welcome it as he is a friend of Gabon," Communications Minister Rene Ndemezo Obiang said.

The minister noted that the possibility of French mediation in the dispute with Malabo had been raised by the president of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema.

The two countries have been at loggerheads over the islands in the Gulf of Guinea since the 1970s. The area is widely believed to hold large reserves of oil.

When he was UN secretary general, Kofi Annan took up the issue in 2006 but no progress was made.

The Gabon minister raised again the idea of joint development of oil resources in the disputed area.

"If this idea is accepted by the Equatorial Guinea leadership, that might ... constitute an important advance in the search for a solution to this problem," the minister said.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 04:54 0 comments
Labels: Equatorial Guinea, France, Gabon, Oil, UN
Late Breaking News: UN Reportedly Replaces William Swing.
Oct 19 2007

I recieved late word from the Congo that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has appointed Alan Doss, the current Special Representative to Liberia (UNAMIL), to replace the American William Swing as the head of MONUC. I have NOT confirmed this 100% yet, so keep your eyes on the presses.

Note: It is confirmed - http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=15781
Posted by WNJ Editor at 04:49 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, MONUC, UN, UNAMIL
18 October, 2007
Kurdistan: After Adopted Motion by Turkish Parliament.
MISNA
18 October 2007

The Turkish government has noted that the motion whereby 507 out 526 Turkish parliamentarians have authorized potential military actions in Iraqi Kurdistan over the next 12 months is not expected to have any immediate effects. The Iraqi president Jalal Talabani said that he has “trust in the wisdom of our friend, prime minister Erdogan, such that we may reach an accord, activating the joint Turkish-American-Iraqi commission to resolve the issue”. Talabani has also asked the PKK to “halt military actions”. Ankara expects the international community, starting from Washington, to convince Baghdad to repress the guerrilla in the border region between the two countries. Syrian president Bashar al Assad, on a visit to Turkey, ssaid that he supports “the Turkish agenda, whose military operations are in the full rights of the government”; other capitals have issued requests for ‘moderation’. Meanwhile, al-Jazeera has reported that Turkish troops are being amassed along the Turkish – Iraqi border.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:41 0 comments
Labels: Iraq, Kurdistan, Syria, Turkey, United States
Progress Towards Peace Talks With Last Rebel Group
MISNA
18 October 2007

The rebels of the FNL (National Liberation Forces) of Agathon Rwasa, the last active in Burundi since the end of the civil war (1993-2001) that left 300,000 dead, are willing to rejoin the peace negotiations with the government of Bujumbura. MISNA sources contacted in the Burundian capital referred that the FNL accepted the role as peace facilitator of South African Security Minister Charles Nqakula, who the rebels had accused of ‘bias’ toward the government, but not that of some of his team members. Tension however remains high on the ground: the FNL is still holding Leonidas Ndereyimana, administrative representative of the Muramba sector, in the Burbanza commune, abducted three days ago by the rebels, who in exchange are demanding the release of some companions detained in national prisons.

Tension is also high within the FNL between the faction loyal to Rwasa and a dissident group, engaged in violent clashes in the past weeks. Three FNL dissidents were killed last weekend by unidentified gunmen in Bujumbura. A cease-fire was reached more than a year ago between the government and FNL, but since there has been a deadlock in negotiations for a peace accord, mainly over two rebel demands: integration into the government with ministerial roles and entirely renewed armed forces. The FNL mediator was invited to participate on Saturday in a meeting in the capital of the ‘Joint Monitoring Mechanism’, which he abandoned in July.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:40 0 comments
Labels: Burundi, FNL
No-Confidence Vote Suspended, Premier Called to Addis Ababa
MISNA
18 October 2007

A Parliament debate was suspended last night while voting was underway in a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi in Baidoa, 200km west of the capital Mogadishu.

MISNA sources contacted in Baidoa referred that the suspension occurred when Gedi was called to Ethiopia. The Somali Prime Minister, who has been in Addis Ababa for several hours, is meeting with his Ethiopian counterpart Meles Zenawi, after which there will be a press conference. Gedi’s administration was contested by Somali President Abdullahi Yussuf and a large part of his cabinet: in the past days 22 on 31 members of the transitional government signed a letter threatening to resign if Gedi did not appear in Parliament for a confidence vote. In the debate, the two parliament groups – for and against Gedi - reiterated their positions: the Premier is accused of failing to accomplish goals on the agenda (among these, draw up a constitution, carry out a census and set up functional regional administrations); Gedi’s supporters respond that the Premier still has a year and a half term to serve. According to international observers, Gedi is in a delicate political situation and with a large part of his cabinet against him he may not have the necessary 139 votes in the 275 member parliament to survive a confidence motion.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:34 0 comments
Labels: Ethiopia, Somalia
General Intends to Call the Former Spokeswoman of Carla Del Pointe.
Hirondelle News Agency
17 October 2007

A general accused of genocide intends to call as a witness the spokesperson of the former prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), announced Wednesday his lawyer.

Christopher Black, the Canadian lawyer who is defending General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, stated that he was going to file a motion to have testify Florence Hartmann, spokesperson of the former prosecutor of the ICTR, the Swiss Carla Del Ponte.

Florence Hartmann recently published a book which tells how the prosecution of war crimes attributed to the former Rwandan rebellion, currently in power, was abandoned by the ICTR at the request of the American government.

The announcement of Mr. Black follows a debate that he had caused Tuesday at the resumption of the Military II trial in which his client is on trial alongside three other officers.

Black had requested an investigation into the independence of the prosecution, to which its representative had been opposed.

"I would like that Mrs. Hartmann be called as a witness, that she be heard live" pled Black. He asserted that the lead prosecutor in this case, Ivorian Alphonse Van, had claimed that her book "was fiction".

On Tuesday, Black stated that "Florence Hartmann is a rather important personality. These allegations were not refuted by Del Ponte or by the American government ".

Questioned by the Hirondelle agency after the publication of this book, the spokesperson of the current prosecutor, for his part, had stated that his boss was not informed of any such discussions or agreements.

Former Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie, General Ndindiliyimana is on trial alongside his army colleague General Augustin Bizimungu and two other officers.

The Military II trial began on 20 September 2004. Only Bizimungu has started his defence. A witness heard Wednesday indicated that he had not taken part in meetings in the north of the country during which Hutus had been encouraged to kill Tutsis.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:33 0 comments
Labels: ICTR, Rwanda, United States
US 'to build 14 permanent bases in Iraq'
Press TV
17 October 2007

A Finnish lawmaker has revealed that the US is planning to stay in Iraq by building as many as fourteen permanent bases in the country.

Jaakko Laakso told a group of Arab journalists-- who visited the Finnish Parliament in Helsinki recently-- that "the bases are not the bases the US government plans to build on the Iraq borders with Syria, but they are permanent bases located in the heartland of the country. "

"There is no difference between Republicans and Democrats as far as these permanent bases are concerned," Laakso added, according to Arabnews website.

The Finnish MP said that it is very unlikely that the EU would criticize the permanent presence of the US in Iraq.

The Finnish lawmaker also touched on Iran's nuclear issue and said that negotiation is the only way to resolve the issue.

"I hope the next president of the US would show some sort of positive attitude and would recognize that Iranians have the right to develop peaceful nuclear technology in the framework of international treaties, "he concluded.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:28 0 comments
Labels: Finland, Iraq, United States
Sarkozy’s defence plan set to reopen old wounds.
European Voice
11 October 2007
Simon Taylor

Plans by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to give the EU its own military planning headquarters are set to reopen divisions with the UK and the US and rekindle fears that France wants the Union to rival NATO.

Sarkozy said that he wanted to give “new impetus” on European defence and that this would be a priority during France’s presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008. Jean-Pierre Jouyet, state secretary for European affairs, said in an interview with French newspaper La Croix last week (5 October that “what France wants is for Washington to recognise the need for a European defence pillar”. He added that the US must accept that the EU has its own capability for planning and carrying out operations.

But the call for an independent EU planning headquarters distinct from NATO will worry the UK and risks reopening divisive debates.

In April 2003, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt hosted a summit with his French and German counterparts on boosting EU defence capabilities, including setting up an independent EU planning headquarters in Tervuren outside Brussels. But the plan was strongly opposed by the UK which feared that it would undermine NATO by setting up rival structures.

Nicholas Burns, US ambassador to NATO at the time, said that an independent EU planning capability was the “biggest threat to the alliance”.

“This is guaranteed to stir up old passions,” said Tomas Valasek, defence and foreign policy director at the Centre for European Reform in London. He said that Jouyet’s comments clarified what French foreign and defence ministry officials had been saying privately.

The UK argues strongly that the EU does not need its own operational headquarters (OHQ) as there are five national OHQs capable of planning military operations. France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Greece all have one and the EU is able to draw on NATO’s command structure SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. The EU’s two military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo were managed from the French and German OHQs while the EU mission in Bosnia uses SHAPE. The forthcoming EU mission in Chad will be managed by the French headquarters in Mont Valérien near Paris.

As a compromise after the 2003 discussions, the EU created the operations centre within the Council of Ministers’ secretariat, which can set up a temporary operations headquarters but is limited to small missions.

Valasek said that the case for the EU to have its own operational HQ had not been made convincingly because there was no evidence that existing arrangements had not been robust enough to cope with the missions the EU has carried out.

By focusing on setting up an independent OHQ, Sarkozy also risks undermining his new commitment to work more constructively with NATO and eventually fully reintegrate into its command structures.

Valasek said that France would do better as a sign of good faith towards NATO to agree for the EU and NATO to start planning at an early stage before forces were deployed. This was essential, he said, because the lessons of recent conflicts had demonstrated the need for robust military force and a robust civilian operation. “Neither one of the two sides has what it takes to see operations through to the end,” he said.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 01:28 0 comments
Labels: Belgium, EU, France, NATO, United Kingdom, United States
RSF Maintains Rwandan Government Must Release Jailed Genocide Journalists
Rwanda News Agency/Agence Rwandaise d'Information (Kigali)
16 October 2007

Repeated verbal threats and physical attacks coupled with continued imprisonment of hate journalists Tatiana Mukakibibi and Dominique Makeli has kept Rwanda in the "red" zone of the annual Reporters Without Borders Index, the group said today.

In the Index released Tuesday, RSF ranks Rwanda at position 147 out of the 169 countries assessed. Eritrea comes at the bottom replacing North Korea with Iceland and Norway standing up as the best places for the media to operate.

"The attacks, particularly against Umuseso and Umuco, have led to very dangerous situations for the journalists who are employed by these media and have raised a lot of concern for human rights and press freedom organizations", Leonard Vincent - Head of RSF Africa Desk said to RNA when contacted.

"Furthermore, we remind the Rwandan government that Tatiana Mukakibibi and Dominique Makeli have been imprisoned for 13 and 11 years (respectively) now, abusively, and that their right to defend themselves have been openly violated ever since."

The two journalists are in jail for their roles in the 1994 Genocide that left over a million lived massacred. They both worked for state radio and along with Ms. Valerie Bemeriki and Mr. Joseph Ruyenzi. However, hate radio presenter Ms. Valerie Bemeriki has already confessed to her crimes.

The Index ranks all countries in the great lakes region as having better conditions for the media compared to Rwanda. Lawless DR Congo comes at 133 though about 4 journalists have been killed this year alone, and several other surviving with constant threat from government and militias.

Burundi - another country that remains in the spotlight over government crackdown on private media appears at position 127. But it has also moved down compared to previous years.

Despite such a risky environment for journalists, RSF's Leonard argues that the situation is much better in DRC because "pluralism is the rule, even if journalists are the regular victims of political violence and instability."

Last month, the group was up in arms over what it described as 'threats' from four government ministers who promised to get hard with the media if it continued undermining President Paul Kagame.

The President for his part has been hosting monthly press briefings at which senior government officials are often put to task to explain issues in their line of duty. Following repeated requests from journalists for a closed door meeting with the head of state, yesterday and today the scribes have been treated to a rare lengthy meet.

Information coming through from the meeting indicates that the journalists have raised case with Mr. Kagame demanding that private media are also considered for the lucrative advertisements from government departments. Such adverts are often placed in the government media and a few favourably leaning media.

The scribes also want answers on the long awaited subsidized printer whose equipment - though already in the country - is yet to be installed. Concerned officials say they are searching for a viable place to place the machine. Private newspapers have been printing in Uganda due to exorbitant prices charged by local printers.

"We'll see if it is a positive move if intentions become acts. It could at least prove that international pressure is effective to improve things", RSF's Leonard said when RNA put it to him that by meeting the media, President Kagame was a sending a positive signal uncommon in many countries.

I would be happy to notice that the Rwandan government has at least understood that there is something going wrong in Kigali, he added.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 01:24 0 comments
Labels: Rwanda
Ethiopia's 'own Darfur' as villagers flee government-backed violence.
The Independent
By Steve Bloomfield
Published: 17 October 2007

Early one June morning, in Kamuda, a village of 200 families in the remote Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia, 180 soldiers announced their arrival by firing guns in the air.

The village, they said, had been providing food and shelter for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a separatist rebel group . As the villagers froze in horror, the soldiers plucked out seven young women, all aged between 15 and 18, and left.

The following morning the youngest girl was found. Her body, bloodied and beaten, was hanging from a tree. The next day a second girl was found hanging from the same tree. A third suffered the same fate. The others were never seen again.

Shukri Abdullahi Mohammed, 48, a mother of seven children, lived in Kamuda. As she describes the fate of the seven girls – "the most beautiful girls in the village" – she tightens her headscarf around her neck to indicate the way they were killed. "I will not forget it," she says.

Days later, a 12-year-old boy from the same village was kidnapped by soldiers and gang-raped. Every night, soldiers would knock on doors looking for women to rape. "I did not want to wait until it happened to my family," said Mrs Mohammed. They left Kamuda and made their way across the porous border with Somalia, before travelling a further 300 miles by foot to the hot and humid port town of Bosasso.

About 100 Ethiopians are now arriving here every day. Their stories reveal the brutality of Ethiopia's hidden war, a brutal counter-insurgency that some aid officials believe has parallels with Darfur. Some estimates put the number of people displaced by the violence at 200,000 already.

According to accounts from refugees, Ethiopian troops are burning villages, raping women and killing civilians as part of a systematic campaign to drive them from their homes. They reported dozens of villages destroyed and accused the Ethiopian government of forcibly starving its own people by preventing food convoys reaching villages and destroying crops and livestock.

A former Ethiopian soldier who defected from the army said how he had been ordered to burn villages and kill all their inhabitants. He said the Ethiopian air force would bomb a village before a unit of ground troops followed, firing indiscriminately at civilians. "Men, women, children – we killed them all," he said.

"We were told we were fighting guerrillas – the ONLF," he said. "But we were killing farmers – they were not ONLF."

Those who managed to escape are living in a series of ramshackle refugee camps on the edge of Bosasso. Their shelters are made from pieces of cardboard and old rags, scraps of plastic sheeting and rusting corrugated iron.

Sat outside the shelters, on the grey expanse of dust and stone, voices overlap as refugees list the villages that have been destroyed. Kor u Celista, Gallaalshe, Fooldeex, Yoocaalle – places that were all once home to hundreds of families, now abandoned and empty, the huts burnt to the ground.

Abudllahi Shukri Mohammed, 30, a cattle herder from Dega Bur province tells how he was forced at gunpoint to work as a porter for a group of 300 soldiers. They took his 18 cows and made him and five other nomads carry heavy loads. After three long days marching through the Ogaden, Mr Mohammed tried to escape.

"They caught me and started beating me. They kicked me in the head and hit me with the back of their guns." With his right arm he motions the steady, repetitive smack of the guns against his body. His left arm lies limp on his lap. He has been unable to move it since the attack, his fingers fixed in an ugly formation.

"They beat me for two hours," he says, "then I fell unconscious. They thought I was dead so they left me."

Ethiopia claims it is defending itself against an insurgency launched by the ONLF in a region that has long been marginalised.

It claims villagers have been giving the fighters shelter and food. Analysts say Ethiopia has been attempting to reduce that support by emptying the countryside. Thousands have been moved to towns heavily controlled by the military. Anyone left in the villages is considered a possible ONLF supporter.

The Ethiopian military is not the only destructive force in the region. The ONLF launched its most daring assault in April. The group attacked a Chinese oil installation in Abole, killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians.

It was that attack which sparked the fresh counter-insurgency – a fierce scorched-earth policy. In the Ogaden's main towns, Jijiga and Gode, the prisons are overflowing. "They are arresting anyone who they think might have a connection with the ONLF," says one human rights worker in Bosasso. "Some are being killed if the security forces don't believe they are telling the truth."

Human rights investigators are gathering evidence of widespread use of rape, with women reporting gang-rapes by up to a dozen soldiers. In some villages, men have been abducted at night, their bodies dumped in the village the next morning.

While in Darfur, aid agencies have been able to establish camps and provide humanitarian support, they have been blocked from setting up operations in the Ogaden. The International Committee of the Red Cross has been thrown out and Medicins Sans Frontieres has also been prevented from working. Journalists trying to enter have also been banned – those that have tried have been promptly arrested.

A UN team was allowed into the Ogaden last month to investigate allegations of abuse by Ethiopian troops. Its report was not made public but the team called for an independent inquiry.

But while Khartoum's counter-insurgency in Darfur has been described by the US as "genocide" and by the UN as "crimes against humanity", international condemnation of Ethiopia has, so far, been limited. Indeed, the US has given its backing to Ethiopia. America's top official on African affairs, assistant secretary of state, Jendayi Frazer, visited one town in the Ogaden last month.

On her return to Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, she criticised the rebels and said the reports of military abuses were merely allegations. "We urge any and every government to respect human rights and to try to avoid civilian casualties but that's difficult in dealing with an insurgency," she said.

America sees Ethiopia as its principal Horn of Africa ally in the "war on terror". The US gave tacit approval for Ethiopia's Christmas invasion of Somalia which ousted the Union of Islamic Courts.

It also provided logistical and technical support for the operation and continues to help co-ordinate a response to the insurgency in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, which seeks to destabilise the transitional government, propped up by Ethiopia.

The US provides some $283m (£140m) in military and humanitarian aid to Ethiopia and has trained its military – one of the largest and strongest in Africa.

The Ogaden has become the latest flashpoint in a broader conflict in the Horn of Africa. On one side is Ethiopia and the weak transitional government of Somalia, on the other is Eritrea and two insurgent groups, the ONLF and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).

From West's favourite leader to grave-digger of democracy

Sat between a beaming Tony Blair and Sir Bob Geldof, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, could hardly have wished for a stronger endorsement. The launch of Mr Blair's Commission for Africa report in March 2005 in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, enhanced Mr Meles's position as the British Government's – and the West's – favourite African leader.

Handpicked by Mr Blair to sit on the commission, Mr Meles was viewed as the man to lead the "African renaissance". He was seen as a leader committed to development and democracy.

But within two months of the commission's report being published, Mr Meles's star began to fade. Huge street protests erupted in Addis Ababa in May 2005 following a general election which both the government and opposition claimed they had won. Security forces opened fire on protesters, killing 193 people, and thousands of opposition supporters and leaders were arrested.

More than 100 opposition leaders were put on trial for treason while the police crackdown intensified. Text messages, which had been used to organise the demonstrations in 2005, were banned. The next time Mr Meles and Mr Blair found themselves sat next to each other, at a summit in South Africa, the stiff body language and the lack of eye contact between the pair underlined the deterioration in the relationship.

Britain still gives Ethiopia £130m in humanitarian aid each year – more than any other African country. Like the US, Britain has tried to retain a relatively close relationship with Ethiopia – one of its few allies in a volatile Horn of Africa.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 01:02 0 comments
Labels: Darfur, Ethiopia, Sudan, United Kingdom
17 October, 2007
The Defense Team Requests An Investigation of the Prosecution and United States Tampering of the ICTR.
Hirondelle News Agency
17 October 2007

Defence lawyers in the trial of four officers requested Tuesday an investigation of the prosecution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), doubting of its independence.

Christopher Black (Canada), the lawyer of General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, supported by his colleagues, requested an inquiry commission, acting on mandate from the general assembly of the UN, in order to examine the allegations of interference from the American government in the work of the prosecution.

Black, who made the announcement at the resumption of the trial known as Military II, which had been adjourned since mid-June, bases himself in particular on the book "Paix et Châtiment" (Peace and Punishment) by Florence Hartmann, spokesperson of the former prosecutor Carla Del Ponte.

In this book, Florence Hartmann gives details on the intervention of the American government to the office of the prosecutor, so that it only prosecute former Hutu officials, according to Mr. Black. "Mr. Jallow (NDLR, the current prosecutor) agrees to follow the policy of the American government", affirms Mr. Black. Questioned by the Hirondelle agency after the publication of this book, the spokesperson of the prosecutor affirmed that Mr. Jallow did not have "any knowledge of these discussions or agreement".

The Canadian lawyer, who also refers to a recent letter of the prisoners opposing the transfer of cases to Rwanda, alleges that "the prosecution is trying to grant impunity to the RPF (former Tutsi rebellion in power in Kigali)" suspected of war crimes committed in 1994.

Affirming that Washington is an ally of the RPF, Black adds: "My client was targeted by the RPF, he also feels targeted by the American government which controls the ICTR by the means of the prosecution."

The counsel of the former head of the Rwandan gendarmerie requested the suspension of the trial in order to carry out an investigation.

"My client does not understand why he is here. His rights are being violated. Not only must the prosecutor be sanctioned but also the American government must explain its policies", indicated Mr. Black.

General Ndindiliyimana is accused alongside the chief of staff of the army in 1994, General Augustin Bizimungu, and two officials of the recognition battalion, an elite unit of the former Rwandan army, Major François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye and Captain Innocent Sagahutu.

Nzuwonemeye’s lawyer, Charles Taku (Cameroon), for his part raised the point that two American officials had last year taken a seat at the side of the prosecutor without authorization of the tribunal. He asserted that it was all connected. They had been excused, thereafter, at the request of the defence.

Nzuwonemeye was absent Tuesday due to health reasons.

"In appreciating the prosecution’s evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, it will be necessary to take into account the circumstances which were underlined by Taku and Black" stated, for his part, Ronnie MacDonald, the Canadian co-counsel of General Bizimungu.

The president of the chamber, Sri Lankian Judge Joseph Asoka de Silva, indicated that he was going to transmit this motion to the president of the ICTR.

"I assure you that this chamber was approached by nobody. I assure you that we will do our work on the basis of the motions and evidence that we receive", declared Judge De Silva.

The Military II trial began on 20 September 2004. Currently it is General Bizimungu who is presenting his defence. The three accused will follow.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:45 0 comments
Labels: ICTR, Rwanda, United States
Mogadishu: Fierce Battle Overnight, UN Worker Arrested
MISNA
17 October 2007

At least three people were killed and dozens wounded in a violent battle last night that lasted over half an hour between insurgents and government security forces in the centre of the Somali capital Mogadishu. Local sources referred to MISNA the fighting erupted along the main intersection of the Howlwadaag neighbourhood (central-southern Mogadishu) after insurgents attacked a police station. A heavy artillery gunbattle broke out and extended to surrounding areas, only ending on the arrival of government reinforcements. Local sources added that mortar rounds and rockets also landed in the nearby areas of Shiirkole, Siinay and Suuk Ba'ad, causing deaths, injuries and damages. The three confirmed dead – the death toll is feared to be higher – were clients of a restaurant hit by a mortar, which also wounded another seven clients. Another 30 people were wounded by mortar rounds and rockets that landed on some buildings and at the main Siinay junction in Wardhiglay. Meanwhile, United Nations sources referred that Somali security forces arrested the representative of the WFP (UN World Food Programme) in Somalia, Idris Mohamed Osman, for still unclear reasons.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:43 0 comments
Labels: Somalia, UN, WFP
North Kivu: Situation Calm, Ultimatum Extended
MISNA
17 October 2007

The situation remains calm in North Kivu (north-east Democratic Republic of Congo) after the extension by Congolese President Joseph Kabila of an ultimatum launched in the past days by the government of Kinshasa, giving the militants loyal to the pro-Rwandan dissident general Laurent Nkunda a few more days to surrender and go to centres set up for their integration into the national army. “The extension is of around fifteen days, though no precise term has been set”, said to MISNA Kemai Saiki, spokesman for the United Nations Mission in DR-Congo (MONUC), joining in the all for all to join the “brassage” (i.e. reintegration) of Nkunda’s troops into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). “The results of the past weeks were encouraging, with around 1,200 militants that left the dissident lines on a total of around 4,500. On this basis President Kabila in fact decided to give more time before turning to another option”, added Saiki, adding that regular forces continue building up in the region. After a routine meeting with ambassadors of South Africa, Belgium, United States, France and Britain in Goma, where President Kabila is on a visit, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in DR-Congo, William Lacy Swing, voiced “full support for the democratically-elected Government of President Kabila, as well as his right and his duty to protect and to assure the security of all the citizens of the DR-Congo”. He also called on Nkunda’s dissident fighters to join the FARDC and on the rebels of the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – a Rwandan-origin Hutu militia that fled to Congo after the 1994 genocide) to “go home immediately”. In this context, he called “on all actors in the region to behave like good neighbours and support the reconstruction of the DR-Congo”.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:41 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, FDLR, MONUC, Nkundabatware, North Kivu
North: Rebels Fighting With Government in Bocaranga
MISNA
17 October 2007

At least 16 people were killed in heavy fighting in the north-west of the Central African Republic (CAR) between government forces and rebels of the New Republican Forces (FRN). The news was referred in a statement issued by the rebel group, claiming that the victims included 14 regular soldiers and two rebels. According to the statement, on which there are no independent confirmations, the fighting took place on October 15 in the location of Bamara, a few kilometres from Bocaranga. MISNA sources for the moment could not confirm the presence of rebels in the area, where around ten days ago they had burned down a bridge and ambushed, apparently by mistake, a vehicle transporting nuns, who were unharmed. In total international indifference, northern CAR (mainly north-west) has for two years been theatre to attacks and fighting involving armed gangs, rebel movements and government forces. Civilians are the main victims of the violence, because accused by each side of supporting the other. A situation that according to the Coordination of humanitarian workers active in CAR, has so far forced some 300,000 people to abandon their villages and live in internally displaced camps in the north or as refugees in neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Sudan.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:40 0 comments
Labels: Central African Republic
Ethiopian PM holds talks with French military official.
Xinhua News Agency
17 October 2007

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said Tuesday the presence of the French military base in Djibouti plays a significant role in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa region.

Meles made the remarks while meeting with Brigadier General Philippe Lefot, commander of the French military base in Djibouti.

Meles also said the governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti are closely working in various fields, and added that the two countries are enjoying excellent relations in various fields of cooperation.

During their talks, Meles and Lefot exchanged views concerning the security situation in the Horn of Africa region.

Lefot, who is here for a working visit, told journalists after their talks that France has 3,000 soldiers at its military base in Djibouti.

He did not give details on what he discussed with Meles, saying that he had "important discussions" with the Ethiopian prime minister.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:34 0 comments
Labels: Djibouti, Ethiopia, France
SPLM To Rejoin National Government
Reuters
17 October 2007
By Skye Wheeler

Sudan's former southern rebels will rejoin the national government to work through a stalemate on implementing a 2005 peace deal which ended Africa's longest civil war, spokesman Samson Kwaje said on Wednesday.

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) last week froze participation in Sudan's coalition government complaining it was being sidelined and that key elements of a January 2005 peace deal were being ignored.

The statement that the SPLM would rejoin government came shortly after President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, following a three-month delay, approved a cabinet reshuffle of SPLM ministers. The SPLM has about a quarter of the seats in Bashir's cabinet.

"President (of south Sudan) Salva Kiir is going (to Khartoum) tomorrow and there he will make a statement ... swear in the new ministers and then they will start work," southern Information Minister Kwaje told Reuters.

But other senior SPLM officials said the formal decision on whether to return to government would be taken after a meeting between SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir and Bashir on Thursday.

"Until Salva is satisfied with the outcome of the meeting with Bashir ... the one who is going to decide about resuming work or not is Salva," said one senior SPLM official who declined to be named.

The officials said the ministers approved by Bashir were not the ones Kiir wanted and the president should have waited until he met Kiir to make an announcement.

The SPLM decision to withdraw from the coalition government formed by the 2005 peace agreement was seen as the biggest challenge to date to the landmark deal which ended Africa's longest civil conflict.

The SPLM called it a "wake-up call" for their former foes, the National Congress Party, to encourage them to move on and implement the deal.

"I think it will happen, they've learnt a good lesson," Kwaje said.

But other SPLM officials said Kiir would have the final veto on whether the SPLM ministers would return to work.

"Definitely they will go back to work ... but ultimately on the directives of the President (Kiir)," said Michael Makuei, the Minister for Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development.

Kwaje said the SPLM was rejoining the government to work through unresolved issues together, but added southern leaders still wanted to see progress by the third anniversary of the 2005 peace deal on Jan. 9.

Sudan's north-south war claimed 2 million lives and drove 4 million from their homes. It largely pitted Khartoum's Islamist government against mostly Christian animist rebels.

On Tuesday SPLM Deputy Secretary-General Yasir Arman and Deputy Chairman Riek Machar said outstanding problems included the redeployment of northern troops from southern oil fields, resolving the status of the oil-rich Abyei region and constitutional violations such as political prisoners and encroaching on press freedoms.

Arrived at after more than a week of intense dialogue within the SPLM political bureau, diplomatic sources said not all within the party were happy at the latest position.

"They had no exit strategy," said one diplomatic source in Khartoum. Many were worried that despite both sides declaring they did not want a return to war, the move could derail the fragile peace process.

(Additional reporting by Opheera McDoom in Khartoum)
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:32 0 comments
Labels: Riek Machar, SPLM, Sudan
Sudan’s Bashir relieves Lam Akol from foreign ministry, appoints Deng Alor.
Sudan Tribune
17 October 2007

In unexpected move Sudanese president tonight has removed the former minister of foreign affairs, Lam Akol, and appointed Deng Alor in his place. He also dismissed Telar Deng from the presidency.

Deng AlorOmer Hassan al-Bashir on Tuesday night issued a presidential decree appointing three SPLM ministers: Deng Alor as minister of foreign affairs, Mansour Khalid as minister of foreign trade and Lam Akol as cabinet affairs minister.

Al-Bashir also named prof George Bornek, minister of higher education, James Kol Rona, minister of humanitarian affairs, Kosta Manibi, minister of investment.

Peter Neyot Kok and William Ajak Deng were appointed presidential advisors.

Also Al-Bashir issued a decree nominating the following state ministers: Lual Ashol Lual, minister of state at the presidency of the republic, Telar Deng, minister of state at the Ministry of Justice, Abbas Juma Obeid Allah, minister of state at the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries, Bol Mirial Dok, minister of state at the Ministry of Industry, Ismail Khamis Jallab, minister of state at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aleu Anitu, minister of state at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

The cabinet reshuffle is one demand of SPLM’s demands that provoked withdrawal from national unity government last week triggering the country’s worst political crisis in years.

This move comes hours after a meeting between the Sudanese president and a SPLM delegation headed by Riek Machar the southern Sudan vice-president.

Machar told the press that Bashir and Kiir will meet within 48 hours to discuss the pending issue in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:31 0 comments
Labels: SPLM, Sudan
Sudanese official cites army pullout delay, calls for Japan aid.
Sudan Tribune
17 October 2007

Sudanese Interior Minister Elzubair Bashir Taha predicted a delay of possibly two years in an already overdue plan for a northern Sudan army to withdraw from southern Sudan, while calling for various means of assistance from Japan including technical support for criminal investigation expertise.

’I would say in two years perhaps,’’ Taha said in a recent interview with the Japanese Kyodo News in Tokyo, referring to the time it will take to complete the pullout from the southern Sudan effectively controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

Taha is a Cabinet member of the national unity government, which was jointly established in July 2005 by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM after the signing of a peace deal ending north south civil war.

Taha’s remarks have heightened concerns about the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005 by the NCP and the SPLM.

The plan for the withdrawal of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from the south is one of the key issues under the framework of the agreement. The initial deadline for the pullout was July 9.

Taha defended the policy of keeping the SAF in southern Sudan for economic reasons, saying 93 percent of the northern Sudan army has pulled out but ’’7 percent of our troops are protecting the oil installations.’’

Taha, 61, expressed hope that Japan will provide ’’training and also technical support in terms of criminal investigation laboratories’’ as a way to help ensure ’’stability’’ in the country.

The interior minister visited Japan mainly to attend a Science and Technology in Society forum held in Kyoto earlier this month.

Stressing that there is a need to boost forensic equipment for crime prevention, Taha said, ’’Sudan is a big country...But we don’t own a single electron microscope...We look forward for laboratories for genetical investigation and DNA examinations.’’

Taha called on the Japanese government to enhance various assistance measures, saying, ’’Japan is the largest single donor of aid to Darfur. It comes via the United Nations in the name of United Nations operations but we know the source is Japan.’’ the Japanese agency Kyodo reported.

Taha urged people helping rebel leaders in European countries such as France and Britain to halt the assistance, saying such people have ’’responsibility’’ for an outcome of a session of peace talks on the Darfur crisis slated for Oct. 27 in Tripoli.

Taha said the Sudanese government is ’’determined’’ and ’’confident’’ that it will follow the schedules of holding a census, which is a crucial process for a general election planned for 2009 and a referendum slated for 2011 on whether to authorize independence of the southern region.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:23 0 comments
Labels: Darfur, France, Japan, Sudan, United Kingdom
WFP Employee Detained in Somalia
AFP
17 October 2007

Somali government forces stormed the United Nations compound in Mogadishu on Wednesday and detained the World Food Programme's (WFP) top representative in the capital, a UN official said.

"About 30 Somali government forces in two military trucks and armed with machine guns have raided the UN headquarters, forcefully entered the offices and arrested Idris Mohamed Osman," said the official, who declined to be identified.

"They took him to the presidential palace area and we do not know why they have arrested him," added the official.

The WFP spokesman in the Kenyan capital confirmed the incident, which came hours after Somali forces battled insurgents in overnight artillery duels that left four civilians dead and at least 34 others wounded.

"Mr. Idris Osman, officer in charge of WFP Mogadishu, was detained this morning and we are urgently taking up the matter with the authorities," spokesman Peter Smerdon told AFP in Nairobi.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:19 0 comments
Labels: Somalia, UN, WFP
Somaliland dumps away the involvement of foreigners in the battle.
Shabelle News Network
17 October 2007

The authority of the self-styled government of Somaliland kept a side and called null and void to what the autonomous president of put land said. The president of punt land Ade Muse said that foreigners were involved in the fight between his men and those of Somaliland in Lasanod town.

The chairman of UID party Feysal Ali Warabe in Hargeisa told radio Shabelle that what the administration of punt land is saying is beyond the normal truth and there were no foreigners involved in this fight. The Somaliland forces conquered Lasanod town from put land forces last Monday.

Warabe said the statement of the president was nothing other than asking to get military assistance as Feysal put it.
Ade Muse said forces from Somaliland and those of Sool region attacked our men and they defended themselves.

Warabe also said that Muse wants foreign troops to join the combat. Feysal’s talks came after the president of the self autonomous state of punt land said that there was participation of foreigners on Monday’s clashes.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:11 0 comments
Labels: Puntland, Somalia, Somaliland
DRC Pygmies Appeal Over Logging Violations.
Reuters
17 October 2007

A delegation of rainforest pygmies from Democratic Republic of Congo will fly to Washington this week to complain to the World Bank about its support for wholesale logging to help rebuild the war-ravaged economy.

The visit follows a leak of a report last week by the bank's Inspection Panel that criticised it for backing a number of logging projects without adequate consideration of their sociological or environmental impact.

"We are going to Washington to tell the World Bank that they must not allow any expansion of the logging industry," pygmy spokesman Adrian Sinafasi said in a statement released by the Rainforest Foundation, which is accompanying the delegation.

"We have been stewards of these forests for many generations and to lose them now would be utterly devastating."

The delegation hopes to meet new World Bank President Robert Zoellick, who has said that protecting the environment and indigenous peoples will be two of his main priorities.

Since the restoration of peace in most of the former Zaire after a 1998-2003 war, the World Bank has promoted logging as a way of quickly rebuilding the country's shattered economy.

Last week's leaked report - prompted by a complaint from the pygmies - criticised the bank for failing to follow its own guidelines on environmental impact assessments, on the verification of logging areas, and on policing.

It also accused it of hugely overestimating the potential benefits to the pygmies.

The Rainforest Foundation, a charity whose mission is to support indigenous peoples in the world's rainforests, said more than 40 million Congolese depended on the rainforests for their livelihood.

"The indigenous `Pygmy' people of the Congo have fought hard to have their voices heard. The recent Inspection Panel report was instigated by these people and the findings have shamed the World Bank," said director Simon Counsell.

"Now the Pygmies have the chance to meet face to face with the organisation that risked devastating their forests. Hopefully President Zoellick and his colleagues will listen to what we have to say and commit to working with them to protect Congo's forests in the future."
Posted by WNJ Editor at 02:58 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, United States, World Bank
Kagame to Attend CHOGM.
The New Vision
16th October, 2007
By Cyprian Musoke

Uganda has invited Rwanda as its “special guest” to the Commonwealth meeting (CHOGM) next month.

Addressing a press briefing at the Ministry of Foreign affairs yesterday, the permanent secretary, Ambassador James Mugume, said the gesture was intended to aid Rwanda’s bid to join the Commonwealth.

Rwanda applied to join the group with some other francophone countries, and their applications are due for consideration in Trinidad and Tobago in 2009.

“If a country hosts CHOGM, it is given an opportunity to invite their special guest who is not a member of the fraternity.

“The President chose to invite Rwanda’s leader Paul Kagame as a means of showing our support for Rwanda joining the commonwealth and becoming familiar with its operations,” Mugume said.

He added that Rwanda had contributed $50,000 (about sh85m) towards the hosting of the business forum, which Kagame will address on business opportunities in the region.

Mugume said membership was initially a reserve of Anglophone countries, but had been extended to countries like Mozambique and Cameroon. Rwanda and Madagascar are the others that had applied to join.

The ambassador said some members were still opposed to the admission of non-Anglophone countries, fearing that the fraternity will lose its fundamental values.

On the contrary, Mugume said, Zimbabwe, which opted out of the Commonwealth in Abuja in 2003, was not welcome at the summit until 2009 when their membership will be reviewed in Trinidad and Tobago.

“The question of Zimbabwe being welcome does not arise. Once you quit the club you can only re-apply. Zimbabwe cannot re-apply this year because in 2005, it was decided that their membership be reviewed after a report that will establish the process and criteria of admissions,” he said.

The heads of state, Mugume revealed, will also appoint a new secretary general to take over from Don Mckinnon. The two contenders for the post are, the Indian High Commissioner to the UK Kamalesh Sharma and Maltese foreign minister Michael Frendo.

The new secretary general will appoint a deputy when Florence Mugasha’s tenure expires in April next year.

Mugume said the Kampala summit will discuss promotion of common political values like democracy, human rights, good governance and separation of powers.

Also to be discussed are global economic issues, climate change and ‘adding political weight’ to decreasing carbon emissions, he added.

According to Mugume, the summit will also discuss agricultural and trade subsidies, promotion of tolerance, understanding and respect to ease tension between Christian and Arab states.

“This underpins the issue of terrorism. We shall try to use the commonwealth to create an understanding of each other and a civil path to peace between Islamic and non-Islamic states.”

The commonwealth fraternity is divided into the developed countries, the newly industrialised and small peasant countries, Mugume noted.

“The commonwealth will form a microcosm for others to learn.

“It will come up with the Kampala declaration for the achievement of political and economic transformation,” said Mugume.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 01:48 0 comments
Labels: Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe
16 October, 2007
DRC: Defense Minister reaffirmed the government's commitment to put an end to Nkunda's Adventure.
Kinshasa, 16/10 (ACP).-

Le ministre de la Défense, Chikez Diemu, a réaffirmé, lundi à Goma, au Nord-Kivu, la détermination du gouvernement de Kinshasa à mettre fin à l’aventure Nkunda. Kinshasa, Oct. 16 (ACP) .- Defense Minister, Chikez Diemu, reaffirmed Monday in Goma, in North Kivu, the government in Kinshasa to end the adventure Nkunda.

Cette déclaration, Chikez Diemu l’a faite à l’occasion de l’expiration le 15 octobre 2007 de l’ultimatum de 21 jours lancé aux hommes de l’ex-général de rejoindre le processus de brassage. The statement, Chikez Diemu has made at the time of the expiration on October 15, 2007 of the 21-day ultimatum issued to men in the former joining the brewing process. Le ministre de la Défense accompagne, dans le Nord-Kivu, le Président de la République, Joseph Kabila Kabange qui s’y est rendu dimanche en vue de se rendre compte de la situation sécuritaire et humanitaire qui prévaut dans cette partie de l’Est de la République Démocratique du Congo. Defense Minister accompanies, in North Kivu, the President, Joseph Kabila Kabange who went there Sunday to be aware of the security and humanitarian situation prevailing in this part of the East Democratic Republic of Congo.

Près de 1.000 hommes des troupes à la solde Nkunda sont prêts à rejoindre les sites de brassage, a annoncé le ministre, précisant que 137 d’entre eux sont déjà à Kamina (Katanga, Sud-Est du pays), base militaire où ils suivront le processus de brassage à l’instar d’autres militaires venus d’autres provinces. Nearly 1,000 men of the troops in the pay Nkunda are ready to join the brewing sites, the minister said, adding that 137 of them are already in Kamina (Katanga, southeastern area), where military base they follow the brewing process like other military personnel from other provinces. A l’expiration du délai de l’ultimatum, Laurent Nkunda s’est dit favorable au brassage de ses « hommes » dans une déclaration faite lundi à partir de son maquis, mais il réclame des discussions pour une reddition honorable. At the expiration of the ultimatum, Laurent Nkunda expressed support for the brewing of its "men" in a statement Monday from its bush, but it calls for a discussion honorable surrender.

© C-Rétro-Actuel Magazine 2004-2007 © 2004-2007 C-Rétro-Actuel Magazine
Posted by WNJ Editor at 21:40 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, Nkundabatware, North Kivu
Chad declares state of emergency in north, east.
African News Agency
16 October 2007

The Chadian government on Tuesday declared a state of emergency in the northern and eastern parts of the country in a bid to stem insecurity and intercommunity conflicts in these parts of the country, official sources told APA.

The measure involves the regions of Ouaddaï, Ouaddi Fira and BET (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti).

Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno took the decision at midday in N’Djamena, at the end of an extraordinary cabinet meeting he convened.

The state of emergency comes into force on Tuesday at 12 am (11am GMT) and will last twelve days. It could however be extended if the government does not meet its goal by then, official sources said.

The government noted that the military and administrative authorities had been ordered to bring back peace and security in the northern and eastern parts of the country which are plagued by highwaymen.

The four main rebel movements attempting to oust President Deby’s regime are also operating in these regions.

The rebel groups are namely the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) of Mahamat Nouri, the Rally of Forces for Change (RAFC) of the Erdimi brothers, the Chadian National Concord (CNT) of Hassan Saleh Al-Djinedi and hard-line UFDD of Acheikh Ibn Oumar.

Earlier in November 2006, the Chadian government declared a state of emergency following the repeated attacks of rebel movements, and the intercommunity conflicts.

As a result, the authorities had also censored independent media for over six months.

The state of emergency declared on Tuesday comes while there are signs of resumption of hostilities between the rebels and the government forces.

For over two weeks, the state army has significantly reinforced its positions in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country with the deployment of a strong war unit.

The rebels did quite the same with huge infiltrations inside the country and by occupying advanced positions such as the rocky foothills in Hadjer Marfaïne.

However, the various protagonists of the Chadian crisis had signed an agreement early this month in Tripoli, Libya. But the various signatories interpreted this agreement differently.

The Chadian President, Gen. Idriss Deby Itno himself spoke out a week ago to cheer up his troops and, according to military sources, he personnally heads the fight against the rebels.

Editor's Note: These Chadian rebels, backed by Eritrea and Libya, are the antithesis of the Sudanese rebel groups in Darfur armed and trained by Chadian troops.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 21:25 0 comments
Labels: Chad
DRC gives 72-hour ultimatum for rebel forces to join demobilisation process.
African News Agency
16 October 2007

The Congolese government Monday issued a 72-hour ultimatum to Cobra Matata, the leader of the Ituri revolutionary and popular forces (FRPI), an armed group operating in Ituri, Eastern province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (north-east), for him to join the demobilisation process, APA learnt here.

Those members of the FRPI who do not join the transit camps would be considered outlaws and dealt with accordingly, according to a decision made at a meeting held Monday between a governmental delegation, representatives of the UN mission in DR Congo (UNMIC), UNDP and other NGOs involved in the quest for peace in DRC.

Cobra Matata did not attend the meeting, which took place at the headquarters of UNMIC in Ituri.

The small number of his men in the transit sites was also pointed out during the meeting. In fact, only 896 out the 3,495 men expected to attend have joined the transit camps.

The 72 hour-ultimatum was solicited by the chief of operations of the Congolese Armed Forces in Ituri, Gen. Kinkela, and it is meant to convince Cobra and his men to reconsider their position.

In total, 1,765 out of the 4,500 fighters of the armed groups operating in Ituri have joined the transit camps.

The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme, which is now at its third phase in DRC, mainly involves the nationalists integrationalists front (FNI) of Peter Karim, the Congolese revolutionary movement (MRC) of Mathieu Ngudjolo and the Ituri popular and revolutionary forces (FPRI) of Cobra Matata.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 21:17 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, FNI, FRPI, Ituri, Matata, MONUC, MRC
Former Sudan rebels set Jan. deadline for implementing deal.
Reuters
16 October 2007

Former south Sudanese rebels demanded on Tuesday that outstanding provisions of a 2005 peace deal with the Khartoum government be implemented by Jan. 9 to salvage an agreement that ended more than 20 years of civil war.

Sudan's president met a delegation led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement's vice chairman, Riek Machar, the first meeting since SPLM ministers quit the government last week.

The two sides say they will not return to war, but blame each other for a stalemate in implementing the Jan. 2005 deal.

Describing the 30-minute meeting as "cordial", Machar told reporters SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir would arrive in Khartoum within 48 hours to sit down with President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and resolve the stalemate.

"The return of the ministers to work is dependent on how fast the critical provisions ... are resolved and how fast the violations are corrected," Machar said.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said in Cairo that he and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman would travel to the southern Sudanese capital, Juba, on Wednesday for talks with both sides to help resolve the dispute.

The SPLM complains that hundreds of political prisoners are still being held in northern jails; that northern troops remain deployed in southern oil fields; that the north-south border has not been demarcated; and that the oil sector is not being run in a transparent way. It also says promised press freedom has not materialised.

A key bone of contention is the oil-rich central region of Abyei. The 2005 peace deal gave independent international experts the job of marking Abyei's borders, but Bashir's National Congress Party rejected its findings.

Kiir submitted a reshuffle of SPLM ministers three months ago, which Bashir has still not approved.

"Most of the issues can be resolved by the president alone ... by a stroke of his pen," Machar said, adding: "On the issues of non-implementation (we gave them) up to Jan. 9, the third anniversary of the deal."

CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS

The peace deal ended Africa's longest civil war, which claimed 2 million lives and drove some 4 million from their homes. The war largely pitted the Islamist government in Khartoum against mainly Christian or animist southern rebels.

Machar said that, despite having waited two days for Bashir to receive him, he was confident the problems would be resolved: "I believe the president has the political will to do this."

He declined to say what the SPLM would do if outstanding issues were not settled by Jan. 9. But he said thousands had taken to the streets in southern towns to show their support for the deal.

The NCP insists it is being implemented and blames the SPLM for delays. Observers say the international community has neglected the north-south deal, distracted by the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region.

"The extensive and compelling list of grievances articulated by the SPLM in its ... communique has long been well known to international actors, and yet pressure on Khartoum to abide by its commitments has been virtually non-existent," said Sudan expert and U.S. academic Eric Reeves.

Machar said he hoped the crisis would be resolved before Darfur peace talks begin on Oct. 27 in Libya.

Darfur rebel factions are meeting in Juba this week to try to agree a unified position, one of the main obstacles to peace.

The SPLM wields influence over the Darfur rebels, and SPLM participation in the government delegation at previous talks greatly helped mediation efforts.

Machar declined to say whether the SPLM would join the government team at the Libyan talks or send its own.

"I'm hoping it will be resolved in the next two days so that we don't have to send a separate delegation," he said.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 21:07 0 comments
Labels: Darfur, Libya, SPLA, SPLM, Sudan
North Kivu: Ultimatum Up, Desertions in Nkunda's Ranks.
MISNA
16 October 2007

There is a precarious calm this morning in North Kivu, in north-east Democratic Republic of Congo, after the expiration of an ultimatum, last night at midnight, demanding that militants loyal to the pro-Rwandan dissident general Laurent Nkunda go to centres set up for their integration into the national army, or be forcibly disarmed in a large-scale military offensive. The government of Kinshasa is determined to put an end to “Nkunda’s adventure”, defined “a widely known criminal” by Defence Minister Chikez Diemu, who yesterday spoke to the press from Goma, capital of the North Kivu province, where he is on a visit with Congolese President Joseph Kabila.

“Nkunda doesn’t want to surrender, but the morale of his troops is very low. Some of his battalions have chosen to surrender, such as that commanded by so-called captain ‘Castro’”, a local source said to MISNA, referring to the desertions in Nkunda’s ranks. According to Diemu, 1,200 militants on an estimated around 4,500 went to the integration centres in the past month. Some sources say that Nkunda, in fear of a vast army offensive, left his headquarters in Bwiza for the bush. Concern remains high for the population of the zones where the fighting has been underway since the end of August. “It is an immense sufferance for the families, both physically and psychologically”, concluded the MISNA source, expressing fear that the fighting sparked by the dissident general cause new inter-ethnic tensions in the region.

Editor's Note: A number of these commanders with one-word names who are unknown are reportedly RDF soldiers using aliases. As insinuated in yesterday's report, the Congolese Government extended the disarmament deadline for 21 days earlier today. No major fighting has occurred today.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:50 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, Nkundabatware, North Kivu, Rwanda
Somaliland-Puntland: Precarious Calm, Troop Movements Around Las Anod.
MISNA
16 October 2007

The situation appears calm this morning in Las Anod, capital of the Sool province, where there was heavy fighting yesterday between the armies of Puntland and Somaliland, the self-proclaimed autonomous regions of northern Somalia engaged in a dispute for control over the Sool and Sannang border provinces. Local sources refer that despite the halt in fighting over the past hours, tension remains high and troop manoeuvres are underway on both sides. Based on reports in circulation, Las Anod is now under the control of Somaliland troops, which yesterday seized the city from Puntland forces. Defence posts were set up in the city and surrounding areas, while Puntland forces are building up reinforcements in the city of Garowe, from where, according to some sources, a new offensive may be launched today to take back Las Anod. The death toll of yesterday’s fighting remains uncertain: estimates range from 8 dead reported by some to over twenty dead reported this morning by the Somali press. Puntland and Somaliland forces clashed at the start of October also in Las Anod, resulting in at least 15 dead and Puntland’s forces seizing control of the city. Somaliland and Puntland – which broke-away from the rest of Somalia in 1991 after the fall of the dictator Siad Barre - have clashed on several occasions since 2002 for sovereignty over the Sool and nearby Sanang regions. On the map the two regions are part of the Somaliland territory, but the majority of the inhabitants are of the Darod clan, as the people of Puntland.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:48 0 comments
Labels: Puntland, Somalia, Somaliland
US Loses Cotton Subsidies Fight.
BBC News
16 October 2007

The US could face billions of dollars in trade sanctions for failing to scrap illegal subsidies paid to American cotton growers.

The World Trade Organisation ruling is a victory for Brazil's cotton industry and for West African states which say the payments harmed their producers.

Brazil hailed the ruling, saying US subsidies had hit world prices, hurting farmers in Brazil and elsewhere.

But US officials believe the payments comply with international trade rules.

Washington is expected to make an appeal against the ruling.

Roberto Azevedo, the Brazilian foreign ministry's trade chief, said that the three-member WTO compliance panel had upheld the findings of its interim report released in July.

"It wasn't changed," he told the Associated Press (AP) news agency just after the ruling was released confidentially to US and Brazilian officials in Geneva.

The office of the US Trade Representative in Washington confirmed the news, saying the US was "very disappointed".

Brazil has reserved the right to impose annual sanctions of up to $4bn on the United States but would probably seek less in retaliatory measures because the US has removed some of the offending subsidies, AP notes.

Oxfam official Gawain Kripke told the BBC that the ruling would also have a beneficial impact on African cotton farmers, if Brazil is successful in reducing American cotton subsidies.

But if they are not then small countries, like Mali or Burkina Faso, wouldn't really hurt American producers very much.

"The truth is that it takes a bigger country to really make the US comply, because the market has to be big enough that the US is worried about it," he said.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:26 0 comments
Labels: Brazil, United States, WTO
Dr. Besigye is Stepping Down from Leadership of FDC in 2010.
The Monitor (Kampala)
Daily Monitor
16 October 2007
By Yasiin Mugerwa & Ephraim Kasozi


Kizza Besigye, the Forum for Democratic Change leader will step down as party head in 2010, it has been revealed.

The decision, is intended to create room for the election of another person to lead the major opposition party, ahead of the 2011 presidential elections. Dr Besigye has been the FDC president since 2005.

Addressing a press conference at the party headquarters in Kampala yesterday, Dr Besigye, who has just returned from the US and Europe, told reporters that he would not cling to the FDC presidency.

FRUSTRATED: Dr Besigye (L) Prof. Latigo and Mr John Kikonyogo (R) an FDC supporter at the press conference at Najjanankumbi yesterday. Photo by Joseph Kiggundu

"I have never campaigned to become a party president," he said. "In fact to be an FDC president means risking teargas, torture and all kinds of suffering. I don't get any penny from the FDC. There is nothing for me to push in order stay in power for life."

He said he was ready to handover the party presidency to a newly-elected person to push the party forward.

However, the two-time presidential candidate did not rule out the possibility of taking another shot at the presidency.

That decision, he said, depends on the actions of the FDC National Delegates Conference scheduled to take place at the end of 2010, adding that his decision to quit the party leadership is enshrined in the new FDC structural leadership plan.

" Staying in one office for long leads to staleness," Dr Besigye said.

In a separate interview, FDC spokesperson Wafula Oguttu told Daily Monitor that Dr Besigye was free to quit the party leadership. "It's not him to decide but the party. If he insists on quitting then we have nothing to do," Mr Ogutu said.

Aswa MP Reagan Okumu has publicly declared his intention to contest for the party leadership, a move critics have said is inspired by a north-south power struggle within FDC.

Although Dr Besigye challenged Mr Okumu questioning his popularity, he said the FDC has developed and put in place a plan for the next five years to enable the party achieve victory in the next elections.

Dr Besigye has twice lost to President Museveni and each time sought court redress. The latest proclamation follows his resolve that he would never return to court to challenge the outcome of an election, after the Supreme Court dismissed his petition challenging the conduct of the February 23, 2006 election.

The FDC leader also announced that the party has decided to rebuild all its structures starting with the village level to the National Delegates Conference. He said election of party youth and women leaders would start in Busoga region on November 3.

Commenting on his London meeting with Col John Ogole, the top ex-Milton Obote Commander, Dr Besigye said it was a milestone towards reconciliation and an effort towards building a great nation for all.

On the government's intervention in the flood areas of eastern and northern Uganda Dr Besigye said it was a shame that the government was busy buying wine for the Queen when people in the east and north are dying of floods and hunger.

"We have already spent about Shs192b for a three-day Chogm event and yet people are continuing to suffer,'" he said.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:24 0 comments
Labels: Uganda
RWE Dea Makes New Oil Discovery in Sirte Basin in Libya.
African Oil Journal
16 October 2007

NOC Libya announced that the German Company RWE Dea – North Africa, a party to an EPSA 3 agreement concluded with NOC, has made a new oil discovery in the exploration well (C1 NC-193) at Area 193 in Sirte Basin (around 700 kms east of Tripoli, 150 kms south west of Ras Lanuf).

The average daily production upon test amounted to 393 b/d at a choke of (32/64) inches and with a gravity of 36 API, from the calcium carbonate formation (Gir-Houn) at a depth of 878 meters.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:19 0 comments
Labels: Germany, Libya, Oil
US naval ship due in west African coast to enhance maritime security.
African Press Agency
16 October 2007

Editor's Note: Scouting for a AFRICOM base on the western and central coastline.

The U.S Naval ship, USS Fort McHenry, is expected in Liberia Tuesday and will visit several other West African countries in an effort to enhance maritime security and promote better ties between these States and the US, APA learnt from reliable sources in Monrovia.

"The USS Fort McHenry and its 350-plus sailors are set to deploy Tuesday as part of the Navy’s Global Fleet Initiative (GFI). Global Fleet Shipping aims to promote maritime security and build relationships with surrounding nations, as well as provide a stronger naval presence," said a dispatch to APA in the Liberian capital.

Other countries that Fort McHenry is expected to visit are Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.

According to the dispatch, "the amphibious Dock Landing Ships will remain on station in the Gulf of Guinea region during the deployment, and is expected to make repeated visits to many nations."

The USS Fort McHenry is homeported in Little Creek (Virginia), the largest base of amphibious forces in the world and the major operating station in the United States Navy’s Atlantic Fleet.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:13 0 comments
Labels: AFRICOM, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, United States
Russia, Iran Warn Over Pipelines
AFP
16 October 2007
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV

Leaders of Russia and Iran spoke out strongly Tuesday against outside interference into Caspian Sea affairs during a summit that focused on ways to divide the region's substantial energy resources.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose trip to Tehran is the first by a Kremlin leader since World War II, warned that energy pipeline projects crossing the Caspian could only be implemented if all five nations that border the inland sea support them.

Putin did not name any specific country, but his statement underlined Moscow's strong opposition to U.S.-backed efforts to build pipelines to deliver hydrocarbons to the West bypassing Russia.

"Projects that may inflict serious environmental damage to the region cannot be implemented without prior discussion by all five Caspian nations," he said.

Other nations bordering the Caspian Sea and in attendance at the summit are: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Putin also emphasized the need for all Caspian nations to prohibit the use of their territory by any outside countries for use of military force against any nation in the region — a clear reference to long-standing rumors that the U.S. was planning to use Azerbaijan, a former Soviet republic, as a staging ground for any possible military action against Iran.

"We are saying that no Caspian nation should offer its territory to third powers for use of force or military aggression against any Caspian state," Putin said.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also underlined the need to keep outsiders away from the Caspian.

"All Caspian nations agree on the main issue — that all aspects related to this sea must be settled exclusively by littoral nations," he said. "The Caspian Sea is an inland sea and it only belongs to the Caspian states, therefore only they are entitled to have their ships and military forces here."

The legal status of the Caspian — believed to contain the world's third-largest energy reserves — has been in limbo since the 1991 Soviet collapse, leading to tension and conflicting claims to seabed oil deposits.

Iran, which shared the Caspian's resources equally with the Soviet Union, insists that each coastal nation receive an equal portion of the seabed. Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan want the division based on the length of each nation's shoreline, which would give Iran a smaller share.

Putin's visit took place despite warnings of a possible assassination plot and amid hopes that a round of personal diplomacy could help offer a solution to an international standoff on Iran's nuclear program.

Putin's trip was thrown into doubt when the Kremlin said Sunday that he had been informed by Russian intelligence services that suicide attackers might try to kill him in Tehran, but he shrugged off the warning.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini dismissed reports about the purported assassination plot as disinformation spread by adversaries hoping to spoil good relations between Russia and Iran.

Putin has warned the U.S. and other nations against trying to coerce Iran into reining in its nuclear program and insists peaceful dialogue is the only way to deal with Tehran's defiance of a U.N. Security Council demand that it suspend uranium enrichment.

"Threatening someone, in this case the Iranian leadership and Iranian people, will lead nowhere," Putin said Monday during his trip to Germany. "They are not afraid, believe me."

Iran's rejection of the council's demand and its previous clandestine atomic work has fed suspicions in the U.S. and other countries that Tehran is working to enrich uranium to a purity usable in nuclear weapons. Iran insists it is only wants lesser-enriched uranium to fuel nuclear reactors that would generate electricity.

Putin's visit to Tehran is being closely watched for any possible shifts in Russia's carefully hedged stance in the nuclear standoff.

The Russian president underlined his disagreements with Washington last week, saying he saw no "objective data" to prove Western claims that Iran is trying to construct nuclear weapons.

Putin emphasized Monday that he would negotiate in Tehran on behalf of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members — United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — and Germany, a group that has led efforts to resolve the stalemate with Tehran.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Tom Casey said the U.S. government expected Putin to "convey the concerns shared by all of us about the failure of Iran to comply with the international community's requirements concerning its nuclear program."

Putin's schedule also called for meetings with Ahmadinejad and the Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

While the Kremlin has shielded Tehran from a U.S. push for a third round of U.N. sanctions, Iran has voiced annoyance about Moscow's foot-dragging in building a nuclear power plant in the southern port of Bushehr under a $1 billion contract.

Russia warned early this year that the plant would not be launched this fall as planned because Iran was slow in making payments. Iranian officials have angrily denied any payment arrears and accused the Kremlin of caving in to Western pressure.

Moscow also has ignored Iranian demands to ship fuel for the plant, saying it would be delivered only six months before the Bushehr plant goes on line. The launch date has been delayed indefinitely amid the payment dispute.

Any sign by Putin that Russia could quickly complete the power plant would embolden Iran and further cloud Russia's relations with the West. But analysts said Putin's trip would be important for Iran even if it yielded no agreements.

Associated Press writers Ali Akbar Dareini and Nasser Karimi contributed to this report.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 12:59 0 comments
Labels: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Oil, Russia, Turkmenistan, United States
A little-known company called Narus makes the packet-inspection
by Robert Poe
Wired.com (April 17 2006)

The equipment that technician Mark Klein learned was installed in the
National Security Agency's "secret room" inside AT&T's San Francisco
switching office isn't some sinister Big Brother box designed solely to
help governments eavesdrop on citizens' internet communications.

Rather, it's a powerful commercial network-analysis product with all
sorts of valuable uses for network operators. It just happens to be
capable of doing things that make it one of the best internet spy tools
around.

"Anything that comes through (an internet protocol network), we can
record", says Steve Bannerman, marketing vice president of Narus, a
Mountain View, California, company. "We can reconstruct all of their
e-mails along with attachments, see what web pages they clicked on, we
can reconstruct their (voice over internet protocol) calls".

Narus' product, the Semantic Traffic Analyzer, is a software application
that runs on standard IBM or Dell servers using the Linux operating
system. It's renowned within certain circles for its ability to inspect
traffic in real time on high-bandwidth pipes, identifying packets of
interest as they race by at up to ten billion bits per second (10 Gbps).

Internet companies can install the analyzers at every entrance and exit
point of their networks, at their "cores" or centers, or both. The
analyzers communicate with centralized "logic servers" running
specialized applications. The combination can keep track of, analyze and
record nearly every form of internet communication, whether e-mail,
instant message, video streams or VOIP phone calls that cross the network.

Brasil Telecom and several other Brazilian phone companies are using
Narus products to charge each other for VOIP calls they send over one
another's IP networks. Internet companies in China and the Middle East
use them to block VOIP calls altogether.

But even before the product's alleged role in the NSA's operations
emerged, its potential as a surveillance tool was not lost on corporate
America.

In December, VeriSign, also of Mountain View, chose Narus' product as
the backbone of its lawful-intercept- outsourcing service, which helps
network operators comply with court-authorized surveillance orders from
law enforcement agencies. A special Narus lawful- intercept application
does this spying with ease, sorting through torrents of IP traffic to
pick out specific messages based on a targeted e-mail address, IP
address or, in the case of VOIP, phone number.

"We needed their fast packet- detection and inspection capability", says
VeriSign Vice President Raj Puri. "They do it with specialized software
that can isolate packets for a specific target".

Narus has little control over how its products are used after they're
sold. For example, although its lawful- intercept application has a
sophisticated system for making sure the surveillance complies with the
terms of a warrant, it's up to the operator whether to type those terms
into the system, says Bannerman.

That legal eavesdropping application was launched in February 2005, well
after whistle-blower Klein allegedly learned that AT&T was installing
Narus boxes in secure, NSA-controlled rooms in switching centers around
the country. But that doesn't mean the government couldn't write its own
code to do the dirty work. Narus even offers software- development kits
to customers.

"Our product is designed to comply (with) all of the laws in all of the
countries we ship to", says Bannerman. "Many of our customers have built
their own applications. We have no idea what they do".
Posted by WNJ Editor at 12:58 0 comments
Labels: United States
How the Wiretap Net Operates.
by Ryan Singel
Wired.com (August 29 2007)


The FBI has quietly built a sophisticated, point-and-click surveillance
system that performs instant wiretaps on almost any communications
device, according to nearly a thousand pages of restricted documents
newly released under the Freedom of Information Act.

The surveillance system, called DCSNet, for Digital Collection System
Network, connects FBI wiretapping rooms to switches controlled by
traditional land-line operators, internet-telephony providers and
cellular companies. It is far more intricately woven into the nation's
telecom infrastructure than observers suspected.

It's a "comprehensive wiretap system that intercepts wire-line phones,
cellular phones, SMS and push-to-talk systems", says Steven Bellovin, a
Columbia University computer science professor and longtime surveillance
expert.

DCSNet is a suite of software that collects, sifts and stores phone
numbers, phone calls and text messages. The system directly connects FBI
wiretapping outposts around the country to a far-reaching private
communications network.

Many of the details of the system and its full capabilities were
redacted from the documents acquired by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, but they show that DCSNet includes at least three collection
components, each running on Windows-based computers.

The $10 million DCS-3000 client, also known as Red Hook, handles
pen-registers and trap-and-traces, a type of surveillance that collects
signaling information - primarily the numbers dialed from a telephone -
but no communications content. (Pen registers record outgoing calls;
trap-and-traces record incoming calls.)

DCS-6000, known as Digital Storm, captures and collects the content of
phone calls and text messages for full wiretap orders.

A third, classified system, called DCS-5000, is used for wiretaps
targeting spies or terrorists.


What DCSNet Can Do

Together, the surveillance systems let FBI agents play back recordings
even as they are being captured (like TiVo), create master wiretap
files, send digital recordings to translators, track the rough location
of targets in real time using cell-tower information, and even stream
intercepts outward to mobile surveillance vans.

FBI wiretapping rooms in field offices and undercover locations around
the country are connected through a private, encrypted backbone that is
separated from the internet. Sprint runs it on the government's behalf.

The network allows an FBI agent in New York, for example, to remotely
set up a wiretap on a cell phone based in Sacramento, California, and
immediately learn the phone's location, then begin receiving
conversations, text messages and voicemail pass codes in New York. With
a few keystrokes, the agent can route the recordings to language
specialists for translation.

The numbers dialed are automatically sent to FBI analysts trained to
interpret phone-call patterns, and are transferred nightly, by external
storage devices, to the bureau's Telephone Application Database, where
they're subjected to a type of data mining called link analysis.

FBI endpoints on DCSNet have swelled over the years, from 20 "central
monitoring plants" at the program's inception, to 57 in 2005, according
to undated pages in the released documents. By 2002, those endpoints
connected to more than 350 switches.

Today, most carriers maintain their own central hub, called a "mediation
switch", that's networked to all the individual switches owned by that
carrier, according to the FBI. The FBI's DCS software links to those
mediation switches over the internet, likely using an encrypted VPN.
Some carriers run the mediation switch themselves, while others pay
companies like VeriSign to handle the whole wiretapping process for them.

The numerical scope of DCSNet surveillance is still guarded. But we do
know that as telecoms have become more wiretap-friendly, the number of
criminal wiretaps alone has climbed from 1,150 in 1996 to 1,839 in 2006.
That's a sixty percent jump. And in 2005, 92 percent of those criminal
wiretaps targeted cell phones, according to a report published last year.

These figures include both state and federal wiretaps, and do not
include antiterrorism wiretaps, which dramatically expanded after 9/11.
They also don't count the DCS-3000's collection of incoming and outgoing
phone numbers dialed. Far more common than full-blown wiretaps, this
level of surveillance requires only that investigators certify that the
phone numbers are relevant to an investigation.

The Justice Department reports the number of pen registers to Congress
annually, but those numbers aren't public. According to the last figures
leaked to the Electronic Privacy Information Center, judges signed 4,886
pen register orders in 1998, along with 4,621 time extensions.


CALEA Switches Rules on Switches

The law that makes the FBI's surveillance network possible had its
genesis in the Clinton administration. In the 1990s, the Justice
Department began complaining to Congress that digital technology,
cellular phones and features like call forwarding would make it
difficult for investigators to continue to conduct wiretaps. Congress
responded by passing the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, or CALEA, in 1994, mandating backdoors in US telephone switches.

CALEA requires telecommunications companies to install only
telephone-switching equipment that meets detailed wiretapping standards.
Prior to CALEA, the FBI would get a court order for a wiretap and
present it to a phone company, which would then create a physical tap of
the phone system.

With new CALEA-compliant digital switches, the FBI now logs directly
into the telecom's network. Once a court order has been sent to a
carrier and the carrier turns on the wiretap, the communications data on
a surveillance target streams into the FBI's computers in real time.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation requested documents on the system
under the Freedom of Information Act, and successfully sued the Justice
Department in October 2006.

In May, a federal judge ordered the FBI to provide relevant documents to
the EFF every month until it has satisfied the FOIA request.

"So little has been known up until now about how DCS works", says EFF
attorney Marcia Hofmann. "This is why it's so important for FOIA
requesters to file lawsuits for information they really want".

Special Agent Anthony DiClemente, chief of the Data Acquisition and
Intercept Section of the FBI's Operational Technology Division, said the
DCS was originally intended in 1997 to be a temporary solution, but has
grown into a full-featured CALEA-collection software suite.

"CALEA revolutionizes how law enforcement gets intercept information",
DiClemente told Wired News. "Before CALEA, it was a rudimentary system
that mimicked Ma Bell".

Privacy groups and security experts have protested CALEA design mandates
from the start, but that didn't stop federal regulators from recently
expanding the law's reach to force broadband internet service providers
and some voice-over-internet companies, such as Vonage, to similarly
retrofit their networks for government surveillance.


New Technologies

Meanwhile, the FBI's efforts to keep up with the current communications
explosion is never-ending, according to DiClemente.

The released documents suggest that the FBI's wiretapping engineers are
struggling with peer-to-peer telephony provider Skype, which offers no
central location to wiretap, and with innovations like caller-ID
spoofing and phone-number portability.

But DCSNet seems to have kept pace with at least some new technologies,
such as cell-phone push-to-talk features and most VOIP internet telephony.

"It is fair to say we can do push-to-talk", DiClemente says. "All of the
carriers are living up to their responsibilities under CALEA".

Matt Blaze, a security researcher at the University of Pennsylvania who
helped assess the FBI's now-retired Carnivore internet-wiretapping
application in 2000, was surprised to see that DCSNet seems equipped to
handle such modern communications tools. The FBI has been complaining
for years that it couldn't tap these services.

The redacted documentation left Blaze with many questions, however. In
particular, he said it's unclear what role the carriers have in opening
up a tap, and how that process is secured.

"The real question is the switch architecture on cell networks", said
Blaze. "What's the carrier side look like?"

Randy Cadenhead, the privacy counsel for Cox Communications, which
offers VOIP phone service and internet access, says the FBI has no
independent access to his company's switches.

"Nothing ever gets connected or disconnected until I say so, based upon
a court order in our hands", Cadenhead says. "We run the interception
process off of my desk, and we track them coming in. We give
instructions to relevant field people who allow for interconnection and
to make verbal connections with technical representatives at the FBI."

The nation's largest cell-phone providers - whose customers are targeted
in the majority of wiretaps - were less forthcoming. AT&T politely
declined to comment, while Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon simply ignored
requests for comment.

Agent DiClemente, however, seconded Cadenhead's description.

"The carriers have complete control. That's consistent with CALEA",
DiClemente said. "The carriers have legal teams to read the order, and
they have procedures in place to review the court orders, and they also
verify the information and that the target is one of their subscribers".


Cost

Despite its ease of use, the new technology is proving more expensive
than a traditional wiretap. Telecoms charge the government an average of
$2,200 for a thirty-day CALEA wiretap, while a traditional intercept
costs only $250, according to the Justice Department inspector general.
A federal wiretap order in 2006 cost taxpayers $67,000 on average,
according to the most recent US Court wiretap report.

What's more, under CALEA, the government had to pay to make pre-1995
phone switches wiretap-friendly. The FBI has spent almost $500 million
on that effort, but many traditional wire-line switches still aren't
compliant.

Processing all the phone calls sucked in by DCSNet is also costly. At
the backend of the data collection, the conversations and phone numbers
are transferred to the FBI's Electronic Surveillance Data Management
System, an Oracle SQL database that's seen a 62 percent growth in
wiretap volume over the last three years - and more than 3,000 percent
growth in digital files like e-mail. Through 2007, the FBI has spent $39
million on the system, which indexes and analyzes data for agents,
translators and intelligence analysts.


Security Flaws

To security experts, though, the biggest concern over DCSNet isn't the
cost: It's the possibility that push-button wiretapping opens new
security holes in the telecommunications network.

More than 100 government officials in Greece learned in 2005 that their
cell phones had been bugged, after an unknown hacker exploited
CALEA-like functionality in wireless-carrier Vodafone's network. The
infiltrator used the switches' wiretap-management software to send
copies of officials' phone calls and text messages to other phones,
while simultaneously hiding the taps from auditing software.

The FBI's DiClemente says DCSNet has never suffered a similar breach, so
far as he knows.

"I know of no issue of compromise, internal or external", DiClemente
says. He says the system's security is more than adequate, in part
because the wiretaps still "require the assistance of a provider". The
FBI also uses physical-security measures to control access to DCSNet end
points, and has erected firewalls and other measures to render them
"sufficiently isolated", according to DiClemente.

But the documents show that an internal 2003 audit uncovered numerous
security vulnerabilities in DCSNet - many of which mirror problems
unearthed in the bureau's Carnivore application years earlier.

In particular, the DCS-3000 machines lacked adequate logging, had
insufficient password management, were missing antivirus software,
allowed unlimited numbers of incorrect passwords without locking the
machine, and used shared logins rather than individual accounts.

The system also required that DCS-3000's user accounts have
administrative privileges in Windows, which would allow a hacker who got
into the machine to gain complete control.

Columbia's Bellovin says the flaws are appalling and show that the FBI
fails to appreciate the risk from insiders.

"The underlying problem isn't so much the weaknesses here, as the FBI
attitude towards security", he says. The FBI assumes "the threat is from
the outside, not the inside", he adds, and it believes that "to the
extent that inside threats exist, they can be controlled by process
rather than technology".

Bellovin says any wiretap system faces a slew of risks, such as
surveillance targets discovering a tap, or an outsider or corrupt
insider setting up unauthorized taps. Moreover, the architectural
changes to accommodate easy surveillance on phone switches and the
internet can introduce new security and privacy holes.

"Any time something is tappable there is a risk", Bellovin says. "I'm
not saying, 'Don't do wiretaps', but when you start designing a system
to be wiretappable, you start to create a new vulnerability. A wiretap
is, by definition, a vulnerability from the point of the third party.
The question is, can you control it?"
Posted by WNJ Editor at 03:35 0 comments
Labels: United States
Burkina Faso, Libya, and Vietnam Join UN Security Council.
AFP
16 October 2007

Burkina-Faso, Libya and Vietnam were set Tuesday to be elected non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for two years beginning next January 1, a UN source said Monday.

The three countries, which enjoy the support of their respective regional groups, will be elected by secret ballot by the 192-member General Assembly to succeed Congo, Ghana and Qatar, said the source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Five non-permanent seats on the 15-member Security Council are up for grabs. Winners need a two-thirds majority and will take their seats on the panel on January 1.

The outcome of contests in the East European and Latin American/Caribbean groups was still uncertain, with two candidates vying for each of the two seats up for grabs.

In the East European group, a vote is to take place to choose who between Croatia and the Czech Republic will take over the seat which Slovakia will leave vacant at the end of the year.

In the Latin American/Caribbean group, the contest will be between Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic to succeed Peru.

The powerful Security Council is made up of five veto-wielding permanent members -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- and 10 non-permanent mebers, elected every year by groups of five for two-year mandates that cannot be immediately renewed.

Non-permanent members South Africa, Belgium, Indonesia, Italy and Panama will stay on the council until the end of 2008.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 03:16 0 comments
Labels: Belgium, Burkina Faso, China, France, Libya, Russia, South Africa, UN, United States, Vietnam
President Bush Invites President Museveni to the White House on Oct. 30th.
The New Vision
Raymond Baguma
16 October 2007

Editor's Note: President Museveni will be arriving only 4 days after President Kabila's visit to the White House, also a personal invitation from President Bush. Uganda's newly found oil wealth is sure to be the topic, especially what President Museveni is going to do to ensure security and border control if large scale fighting breaks out in Congo. President Kabila is reportedly considering holding off an FARDC offensive in North Kivu until he returns from the USA.

Clearly, General Nkundabatware expects the worst. He is demanding talks to secure the right for Congolese Tutsi refugees to return, but DRC government officials believe this is a ploy to buy himself time as the repatriation terms are being hashed out. As the deadline for his surrender came to a close today, Col. Makenga's men in Tongo and RDF reinforcements that arrived during the first week of October tried to take the hills over Runyoni from the 6th Mixed Brigade. This key position was what secured an escape route for General Nkunda back in November 06, when he fled to Rwanda to escape the fierce fighting. General Nkunda's soldiers fiercely defended this strategic position into 2007, when a negotiated withdrawal occured.

Yoweri Museveni is to meet President George Bush in the USA on October 30, the White House has said.

Karen O’Donnell, the director for African affairs, said in a statement: “The two presidents will discuss Uganda’s leadership in Somalia, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and the development plan for northern Uganda as well as the partnership to combat malaria and HIV/AIDS in Uganda.”

Foreign affairs minister Sam Kuteesa yesterday said: “President Bush invited President Museveni to discuss bilateral issues involving the two countries, the region and Africa.”

Kuteesa said the agenda of the meeting would include regional peace, security and economic issues. “The current security issues are the peace talks in Juba, the Somalia situation, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Burundi peace initiative,” Kutesa added.

“Other issues will include the national peace, recovery and development plan for northern Uganda and the Millennium Challenge Account.”

Presidential press secretary Tamale Mirundi confirmed the meeting.“I know the President is travelling to USA. It is two weeks from now,” he said.

The White House website says Bush last hosted Museveni during the latter’s visit to the US on June 10, 2003.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 02:00 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, J. Kabila, LRA, Oil, Somalia, Uganda
15 October, 2007
Puntland-Somaliland: Fighting Underway in Las Anod.
MISNA
15 October

New heavy fighting broke out this morning between the armies from the breakaway Puntland and Somaliland regions, in northern Somalia. As referred to MISNA by local sources, soldiers from the semi-autonomous Puntland state and those of the self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic resumed clashes this morning at dawn in the area of the city of Las Anod, capital of the Sool province, a border provinces along with Sanaag disputed by the two administrations. There are no estimates yet on the number of victims, though some international news agencies report four dead. Local sources define the fighting as “particularly intense”, with the use of heavy artillery on both sides. Puntland and Somaliland forces clashed at the start of October also in Las Anod, resulting in at least 15 dead and Puntland’s forces seizing control of the city. Somaliland and Puntland have clashed on several occasions since 2002 for sovereignty over the Sool and nearby Sanang regions. On the map the two regions are part of the Somaliland territory, but the majority of the inhabitants are of the Darod clan, as the people of Puntland.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 15:16 0 comments
Labels: Puntland, Somalia, Somaliland
Shooting in Capital, Tension High Between Government and Rebels.
MISNA
15 October 2007

Three top members of the dissident wing of the FNL (National Liberation Forces) last active rebel group were killed and a fourth critically wounded in a shooting on Saturday evening outside a restaurant in the centre of the Burundian capital Bujumbura. According to Burundian military and police sources, the dissident wing of the FNL headed by Agathon Rwasa is growing. “We have counted around 1,400 FNL dissidents, including around a thousand in Rugazi (30km north of Bujumbura) and the others in Randa (10km north of the capital”, said an army spokesman.

FNL sources loyal to Rwasa denied such a high number of ‘deserters’, expressing doubts on the circumstances of the shooting: “These people are not dissidents of the FNL, but instruments used by the government to destroy our movement”, said the spokesman for the rebel group Pasteur Habimana. A press conference is expected to be held today by South African Minister Charles Nqakula, facilitator in the Burundian peace process with the FNL, which is demanding his replacement accusing him of bias toward the government delegation. Nqakula is a member of the regional initiative for Burundi, a sort of mediation commission that also includes Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, which is seeking a final peace accord before the end of the year. A cease-fire was already signed over a year ago, but negotiations stalled. The FNL is the only group among those active during the 1993-2003 civil war to have not signed a peace deal.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 15:14 0 comments
Labels: Burundi, FNL
Private US military contractors move into Helmand Province
The Independent
Kim Sengupta
14 October 2007

Editor's Note: Keep in mind Helmand Province is responsible for nearly half of the world's opium supply.

Large numbers of US private military personnel are expected to arrive in Helmand, the focal point of British involvement in Afghanistan, as part of a new effort to promote reconstruction and development in the war-torn province.

The US has contributed the largest sum to the new aid effort, over $200m. But British officials striving to win "hearts and minds" in the conflict against the Taliban have expressed concern over the potential influx of military contractors, amid a continuing furore over the shooting of civilians in Iraq by Blackwater.

As Nato troops reclaim territory from the Taliban, the movement has increasingly resorted to suicide attacks and roadside bombings. "The worry is that there will be a blast, and some contractors will panic and open fire, as happened with Blackwater in Baghdad. That is the very last thing that Helmand needs at the moment," said a Western diplomat.

"On paper the Americans are by far the largest donors in the province, but a big portion of that never filters down to the ground." A recent meeting of donors decided that the security situation in Helmand was now stable enough to start bigger aid projects. But there are recurring complaints, including among some USAID workers, that a substantial proportion of American aid money is siphoned off for security. The US government spends, on average, just over $1m a year to protect each aid worker it sends to Afghanistan.

DynCorp, one of the main American security companies, has already sown resentment in Helmand with its participation in the campaign to eradicate the opium poppy crop. British commanders accept that farmers whose livelihoods have been destroyed do not distinguish between private contractors and soldiers, despite repeated assurances that British troops are not involved. The government of President Hamid Karzai, like its counterpart in Iraq, has expressed concern about the activities of private contractors and is discussing new legislation to tighten control.

Blackwater provides security for the US embassy in Kabul, but the largest American government contract in the country is believed to be held by Texas-based USPI. According to reports in its home state last week, the company has been accused of overbilling the US government by millions of dollars for non-existent employees and vehicles. USPI acknowledges that it is being investigated, but insists that the allegations are untrue.

USPI's hiring practices in Afghanistan have drawn criticism from the International Crisis Group, a think tank. It said in a report that a majority of the men on USPI's payroll were associated with private militias. "Many have used their authority to engage in criminal activity, including drug trafficking," it claimed.

An American supervisor working for USPI was accused of shooting dead an Afghan interpreter and is said to have been flown out of the country the next day. Officials from Blackwater later took part in a raid on its offices in which computers and files were removed.

USPI has been the target of several bomb attacks. Its headquarters in Kandahar was hit by a suicide bomb, and another suicide bomber targeting a convoy being escorted by the company's personnel killed 15 people and injured 26.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 14:00 0 comments
Labels: Afghanistan, Private Military Companies, United States
North Kivu: President Kabila in Goma, Ultimatum for Nkunda Almost Up.
MISNA
15 October 2007

Congolese President Joseph Kabila arrived yesterday in Goma, capital of the North Kivu province, in north-east Democratic Republic of Congo, to personally take a handle on the unfolding security and humanitarian situation, just hours from the deadline of the ultimatum given to the militants of the pro-Rwandan dissident general Laurent Nkunda, who have until midnight to disarm. President Kabila was accompanied by some ministers, including the head of Defence. It is highly improbable that Nkunda’s men accept the proposal to disarm and integrate into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC), a process already attempted and failed in North Kivu at the end of August. MISNA sources reported sporadic fighting over the weekend in various areas of the province. An army brigade also arrived in North Kivu over the weekend in reinforcement against the dissidents who refuse to disarm. “We fear that Nkunda’s men will take to the bush, causing an escalation and spread of the fighting. A situation that further threatens the civil population”, said to MISNA an aid source contacted in Kivu. Since August 26, date of the first ambush by Nkunda’s men against the FARDC, at least 70,000 displaced gathered a few kilometres outside of Goma and other locations of the province. The widespread insecurity renders efforts in assistance of the displaced not in the camps outside Goma extremely difficult. Not only for the aid workers, but mainly for the civilians that just hours after the distribution of food are robbed of the provisions by militants or soldiers.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 13:22 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, Nkundabatware, North Kivu
14 October, 2007
Namibia shuts down mercenary firm, deports 2 US citizens.
PanaPress
13 October 2007.

Namibia has deported two US citizens and shut down an American mercenary firm for recruiting Namibians to work as 'security guards' in war torn Iraq and Afghanistan.

The government swiftly ordered the closure of mercenary firm Special Operations Consulting-Security Management (SOC-SMG), which had set up a base in Namibia and was recruiting former war veterans to work in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Minister of Information and Broadcasting Netumbo-Nandi Ndaitwah declared the two US nationals - Paul Grimes, SOC-SMG country representative for Namibia, and Fredric Piry, chief of operations - 'prohibited immigrants.'

"On a directive of the cabinet, the State Security committee recommended the closure of SOC-SMG. The two US nationals are immediately removed from Namibia," Nandi-Ndatwah said in a statement Saturday.

The US-based SOC-SMG recently set up a Namibian branch.

The firm said it was recruiting up to 4,000 Namibians with military experience to go and work in Iraq and Afghanistan as 'security guards.'

A week ago, government warned against Namibians going to fight in other countries' wars, saying the Defence Act criminalised the involvement of Namibians in other countries' wars without government approval.

Grimes said Wednesday his company had set up operations in Namibia with the approval of the Ministries of Safety and Security, Labour and Industry and Trade.

"The involvement of the United States of America in Iraq has never been sanctioned or supported through international agreement, and can thus not be supported by Namibia," Nandi-Ndaitwah said.

Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution, on the country's Foreign Relations, states the government's policy of non-alignment, the promotion of international co-operation, peace and security and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

"This is also true for the conflict in Iraq and, therefore, the government cannot allow its citizens to get involved in that war," the Minister said.

She warned those volunteering to get involved in the war torn countries might be stripped of their citizenship.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 22:50 0 comments
Labels: Afghanistan, Iraq, Namibia, Private Military Companies, United States
Somaliland requests from the Arab nations to open diplomatic office in UAE.
Shabelle News Network
14 October 2007

Parliament members in the self-styled government of Somaliland appalled from the Arab nations to open a diplomatic office in Hargeisa the capital of Somaliland.

Nasir Naji Ali a member of Ucid party had an interview with Khaleej times of the UAE and requested from the Arab nations to have a diplomatic office in Hargeisa. The appeal was particularly to the Emirates co-operation council to send a committee to asses the function of Somaliland administration and to consider its governance.

Nasir also requested from the Arab nations to send a vanguard team to assess the possibility to open a diplomatic office in Somaliland.

Nasir also added that this will help them to be a member of the African union.

Mr. Nasir in another statement said that he is requesting from the Arab council to assist the reconstruction of Somaliland regions. Nasir mention the assistance provided to his country by the European Union such as roads and seaport renovations.

The republic of Somaliland which isolated its self from the rest of Somalia in 1991 did not have independent since they bisected. The separation of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia came after the elders and politicians met in a convention held in Buro town.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:54 0 comments
Labels: Somalia, Somaliland, United Arab Emirates
Canada trains AU military officers.
The New Times
By James Buyinza
14 October 2007

Two Rwandan military officers are among twenty-five officers of the African Union attending a ten-day training in Tactical Operations Staff Course in peacekeeping in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Canadian Department of Defence and the International Peace Support Training Centre of Kenya are conducting the training at the International Mine Action Training Centre.

The first phase of the course commenced on October 8. The second will kick off on October 29; according to Military Spokesman Maj. Jill Rutaremara, this will also be attended by two more Rwandan military officers.

A statement from the Canadian High Commission on October 10 said the trainees represent a diverse cross-section of other African nations including Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Senegal Egypt, Mali, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia. The training follows the recent renewed violence in Sudan’s war-ravaged Darfur region in which ten African Union Peacekeepers were killed.

Major Mike Calnan, an architect of the training from the Canadian Defense Department, said that the course will prepare trainees with the basic skills necessary to effectively participate in peacekeeping operations in mid to high intensity environments.

The course intends to provide juniors and field officers — majors and captains— with skills and knowledge of Command Post operations to enable them address the crisis in the region and function in global peace operations as well.

“The tactical operation Staff Course is part of a comprehensive response to the Darfur crisis and efforts to restore peace in the region through peacekeeping training for the African Union,” Major Calnan said.

The Canadian Military Training Assistance Programme is a key instrument of Canadian foreign policy and defence diplomacy, promoting Canadian interests and values abroad and contributing to international peace and security as well.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:43 0 comments
Labels: AU, Canada, Rwanda
Letter Explaining the ICTR Hunger Strike
Arusha, le 5 octobre 2007



Les Détenus du TPIR

Arusha – Tanzanie Arusha-Tanzania


Monsieur le Président du TPIR

Honorables Juges du TPIR

Arusha – Tanzanie





Objet : Dénonciation des requêtes aux fins de transfert des dossiers des détenus

Yusuf Munyakazi, Gaspard Kanyarukiga et Ildephonse Hategekimana Yusuf Munyakazi, Gaspard Kanyarukiga and Ildephonse Hategekimana



Monsieur le Président,

Honorables Juges,

En date du 7 septembre 2007, le Procureur du Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda a adressé au Président de ce Tribunal des requêtes aux fins de transfert des dossiers des détenus Yusuf Munyakazi, Gaspard Kanyarukiga et Ildephonse Hategekimana vers les juridictions rwandaises. Le 2 octobre 2007, l’Honorable Juge Dennis C. On October 2, 2007, the Honorable Judge Dennis C. M. Mr. Byron, Président de ce Tribunal, a désigné des Chambres spéciales chargées de prendre des décisions sur ces affaires. Nous signataires de la présente lettre (détenus en attente de procès, détenus en procès et condamnés nous trouvant à l’UNDF), toujours préoccupés par l’état de l’administration de la justice au sein du TPIR, nous vous soumettons nos avis et considérations sur ces requêtes. Notre position actuelle est dictée par les mêmes appréhensions que celles régulièrement évoquées dans nos diverses correspondances sur le sujet.

En effet, dès que nous avons eu vent des premières négociations entre le Procureur du TPIR et le gouvernement rwandais relatives au transfert des procès du TPIR au Rwanda, nous avons alerté le Secrétaire général de l’ONU et avons dénoncé le fait que le Procureur se laisse influencer et pousser à faire des poursuites sélectives afin de couvrir les criminels au pouvoir à Kigali et de leur assurer l’impunité.

Dans la lettre adressée au Secrétaire Général de l’ONU, le 16 février 2004, nous avons dénoncé le projet de transférer au Rwanda les détenus et les condamnés du TPIR car pour nous:

«Il ne fait aucun doute que les hommes au pouvoir à Kigali, soucieux si pas de faire disparaître tous leurs anciens adversaires du moins de les museler définitivement, n'apprécient pas qu'il y ait encore quelques hauts cadres politiques et militaires, quelques hommes d'affaires et quelques intellectuels qui, même condamnés par le TPIR, leur échappent encore.

En effet, Kigali craint qu'ils continuent à clamer leur innocence et à désigner, preuves à l'appui, le FPR et ses dirigeants, dont le Général Président Paul Kagame, comme les premiers responsables de l'hécatombe rwandaise. Si le pouvoir actuel de Kigali mène aujourd’hui une propagande musclée (et multiplie des déclarations sur les antennes de radios internationales et nationales, dans les journaux de portée nationale et internationale) en vue d'obtenir le transfert [des détenus] et l'emprisonnement au Rwanda des condamnés du TPIR, ce n'est pas parce qu'ils sont Rwandais… mais parce qu'il les considère toujours comme ses opposants farouches qu'il faut éliminer par tous les moyens».

Par ailleurs, nous avons rappelé, dans cette lettre du 16 février 2004, le « mea culpa » de l’ancien Secrétaire général de l’ONU, Boutros-Boutros Ghali qui a regretté d’avoir pris de mauvaises décisions portant sur le TPIR et sur les personnes détenues par ce tribunal . Nous avons alors soulevé ces deux questions qui sont toujours d’actualité:

«Les autorités onusiennes se préparent-elles à prendre encore une décision lourde de conséquences quitte à présenter leur « mea culpa » plus tard? Les principaux décideurs onusiens dans l'affaire rwandaise doivent-ils perpétuellement regretter de s'être trompés comme si les erreurs passées ne leur inspirent pas la prudence et le regard plus attentif et plus humain sur ceux qui doivent subir les conséquences de leurs décisions?»

Dans la lettre que nous avons adressée au Président du TPIR le 6 août 2007, nous avons indiqué, et les rapports récents d’Amnesty international et de Human Rights Watch nous appuient sans équivoque, que le pouvoir de Kigali mène sous divers prétextes une politique d’anéantissement et, pourquoi pas, de lentes exterminations des membres de l’ethnie hutu, que les responsables de la police rwandaise ne cachent pas que les détenus Hutus sont d'office présumés coupables et qu’ils trouvent normal qu'ils soient l'objet d'exécutions extrajudiciaires. Intervenant lors d’une interview sur la RFI dernièrement, Filip Reyntjens a appuyé davantage les constats d’Amnesty International et de Human Rights Watch. Speaking in an interview on RFI recently, Filip Reyntjens supported further findings of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Il a dit: « Il y a un rapport récent de décembre 2006 d’Amnesty International qui donne un avis tout à fait défavorable, qui suggère qu’il ne faut pas transférer des gens vers le Rwanda notamment parce que les procès ne seraient pas équitables mais Amnesty évoque même des récits de tortures et d’autres mauvais traitements » [1] .

Monsieur le Président,

Honorables Juges,

Dans ses requêtes, le Procureur s’appuie sur la récente suppression de la peine capitale dans le code pénal du Rwanda. In his complaints, the Prosecutor based on the recent abolition of capital punishment in the penal code of Rwanda. La réalité est que le pouvoir de Kigali a finalement accepté cette suppression dans le but d'obtenir des pays étrangers le bénéfice de faire arrêter et de juger au Rwanda plusieurs de ses opposants en exil et d’avoir sous sa coupe les détenus du TPIR. De ce fait, il aura pu neutraliser définitivement tous ses adversaires politiques et faire peur à tous ceux qui auront encore quelque audace de décrier ses crimes. Le Procureur est parfaitement au courant de cette intention criminelle des autorités rwandaises dont l’ingérence paralysante dans l’administration de la justice est bien connue et dont les syndicats de délateurs regroupés dans les associations IBUKA et AVEGA fabriquent les témoins de l’accusation et terrorisent les équipes et les témoins de la défense à tous les niveaux. Il n’ignore pas non plus le nombre trop élevé de prisonniers en attente de jugement dans ce pays dont beaucoup d’entre eux sont sans dossiers. Les requêtes du Procureur ne s’inscrivent ni plus ni moins que dans l’entente tripartite entre les USA, la Grande Bretagne et les dirigeants du FPR au pouvoir à Kigali visant à mettre rapidement fin au mandat du TPIR afin de soustraire les membres de ce front des poursuites pénales pour les crimes qu’ils ont commis au Rwanda durant la période de compétence de ce Tribunal. Cette vérité ahurissante vient d’être révélée par Florence Hartmann, ancienne porte-parole de la Procureure Carla Del Ponte, dans son livre intitulé Paix et châtiment; les guerres secrètes de la politique et de la justice internationales (Paris, Flammarion, 10 septembre 2007), particulièrement dans les pages 262 à 275. En tant que témoin direct et privilégié, l’auteur dévoile en détails les pressions qu’a subies, en mai 2003, la Procureure du TPIR, Madame Carla Del Ponte, de la part de l’Ambassadeur américain, Monsieur Richard Prosper, pour la forcer à abandonner les enquêtes spéciales en cours contre les membres du FPR et de transférer les dossiers du TPIR au Rwanda. Elle révèle comment les Américains et les Britanniques ont collaboré pour évincer Madame Carla Del Ponte du poste de Procureur du TPIR en vue d’avoir les coudées franches pour protéger les membres du FPR contre toute poursuite. Dans son livre, Florence Hartmann rend compte des négociations tenues du 14 au 16 mai 2003 à Washington D.C. À l’issue de la rencontre du 14 mai 2003, l’Ambassadeur Richard Prosper «conclut en soulignant la nécessité de parvenir à un accord sur le renvoi des dossiers au Rwanda». Voici ce qu’écrit en substance Florence Hartmann sur les travaux du 16 mai 2003:

« Vendredi 16 mai, à 11 heures. Les Rwandais ne sont pas de la partie. Del Ponte a rendez-vous au Département d'État pour discuter du TPIY. Del Ponte has an appointment to the State Department to discuss the ICTY. Prosper et ses conseillers l'attendent dans un bureau exigu. Ils lui soumettent un document intitulé «Résumé des conclusions entre le gouvernement du Rwanda et le TPIR » et formulé comme une feuille de route. They submit a document entitled "Summary of findings between the government of Rwanda and the ICTR" and formulated as a road map. Prise au piège, Del Ponte accepte néanmoins de regarder le texte. Taking the trap, nevertheless accepts Del Ponte to look at the text. Le projet a travesti la teneur des discussions de la veille. Il prévoit l'abandon de toutes les enquêtes à l'encontre des suspects de l'Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR) par le parquet du TPIR et leur renvoi devant la juridiction rwandaise, sans aucune garantie de résultats […] The project travesti content of the previous day's discussion
Del Ponte proteste […]

Lorsque Prosper suggère de lui envoyer la nouvelle version par fax à La Haye, elle repart soulagée.

Le document arrive la semaine suivante au bureau de La Haye. Les Américains n'ont rien modifié de substantiel […]

Del Ponte repousse le document de la main et laisse à ses conseillers le soin d'informer Prosper de son refus d'y souscrire. De son côté, elle avertit le cabinet de Kofi Annan qui condamne la manœuvre américaine mais tient grief à Del Ponte de s’être exposée à la pression d’un État [.. . ].

Prosper n’accepte pas la défaite […]

Les Américains demandent aux Britanniques de monter au front [ … ]

Fin juin [2003] , Jack Straw remet à Kofi Annan, de passage à Genève , une lettre dans laquelle il demande de scinder le poste de procureur, commun au TPIR et au TPIY, et la nomination d'un procureur pour le tribunal d’Arusha [...] » (C’est nous qui soulignons).

Monsieur Hassan Bubacar Jallow, Procureur actuel du TPIR a entériné cet accord macabre à sa prise de fonctions, comme le révèle l’Agence de Presse Hirondelle.

«En novembre 2003, alors que New York débat du texte qui aboutira à la résolution du 26 mars 2004 portant sur la «stratégie de fin de mandat» des tribunaux ad hoc, Pierre Richard Prosper rassure le président Kagamé. Florence Hartmann affirme ainsi qu'«Il le convainc de ne pas se soucier du texte de la future résolution puisque le gambien Hassan Bubacar Jallow, nommé début septembre pour succéder à Del Ponte, a entériné la promesse des États-Unis aux autorités rwandaises sur l’abandon des poursuites contre les militaires tutsis par le TPIR» [2] . Florence Hartmann declared that "It convinced him not to worry text of the future because the resolution Hassan Bubacar Jallow of Gambia, who was appointed in early September to succeed Del Ponte, has endorsed the promise of the United States to the Rwandan authorities on the 'dismissal of charges against the Tutsi military by the ICTR "[2].



Monsieur le Président, Sir,

Honorables Juges, Honorable Justices,

Accepter les requêtes vous soumises par ce Procureur soi-disant pour respecter la «stratégie de fin de mandat» du TPIR reviendrait à adhérer vous aussi à ce plan scellé en 2003 visant à la fois à assurer l’impunité aux responsables du FPR, dont le Président Kagame, impliqués dans les massacres de plusieurs milliers de Rwandais et à faire éliminer, par ces mêmes responsables présumés coupables de graves crimes contre l’humanité, toutes les personnes actuellement sous la responsabilité du TPIR. Accept requests you submitted by the prosecutor to respect the so-called "completion strategy" of the ICTR would you also adhere to the plan sealed in 2003 aimed at both ensure impunity to the leaders of the RPF, whose President Kagame, implicated in the massacre of thousands of Rwandans and to eliminate, by those allegedly responsible for serious crimes against humanity, all persons who are currently under the responsibility of the ICTR. En effet, il saute aux yeux que la mise en exécution totale de ce plan américano-britannique inclut également le transfert des condamnés du TPIR vers les prisons du Rwanda. Indeed, it is glaringly obvious that the enforcement of the total British plan also includes the transfer of convicts of the ICTR to Rwanda's prisons. Nous pensons que ce serait l’une des raisons qui font que depuis 2003, aucune décision de transfert des condamnés vers les pays qui ont accepté de les recevoir n’a été prise [3] . We believe this would be one of the reasons why since 2003, no decision on transfer of sentenced persons to countries that have agreed to receive them has been taken [3].



Monsieur le Président,

Honorables Juges,

Nous vous suggérons de confirmer l’indépendance du TPIR, de rejeter les requêtes du Procureur aux fins de transfert des dossiers vers le Rwanda, de demander plutôt aux trois Présidents des trois Chambres de première instance du TPIR de se concerter afin de programmer sans plus tarder les audiences pour tous les six détenus encore en attente de procès . We suggest that you confirm the independence of the ICTR, to dismiss the complaints of the Prosecutor for the transfer of cases to Rwanda, requesting instead to the three presidents of the three Trial Chambers of the ICTR to act in concert in order to plan without further delay the hearings for all six detainees still awaiting trial. C’est d’ailleurs dans cette optique que, d ans sa résolution 1774 du 14 septembre 2007, le Conseil de S écurité a rappelé que conformément à sa résolution 1503 du 28 août 2003 : « le tribunal prenne toutes les mesures possibles pour que tous les procès de première instance soient terminés fin 2008 au plus tard et que la totalité de ses travaux soit achevée en 2010 ». It was with this in mind that, years of its resolution 1774 of September 14, 2007, the Council of S afety recalled that pursuant to its resolution 1503 of 28 August 2003, "the court should take all possible steps to ensure that all the trial of first instance to be completed by the end of 2008 and that all of its work is completed in 2010. " Ceci ne sous-entend pas qu’il faille transférer les dossiers vers le Rwanda. This does not need to transfer files to Rwanda.

Nous osons penser que les assurances données récemment à la délégation de neuf diplomates venus de Dar es Salaam pour se rendre compte de l’application de la stratégie de fin de mandat du TPIR selon lesquelles « le délai imparti pour terminer tous les procès en première instance le 31 décembre 2008 sera respecté, à l’exception d'un seul procès, qui devrait se finir en mars 2009 » [4] signifient clairement que le TPIR entend avoir jugé en première instance même les six détenus actuellement en attente de procès. We dare suggest that the recent assurances to the delegation of nine diplomats from Dar es Salaam to realize the implementation of the completion strategy of the ICTR that "the deadline to complete all trials at first instance December 31, 2008 will be respected, except for a single trial, which is expected to end in March 2009 [4] indicate clearly that the ICTR intends to be judged in the first instance even six detainees currently awaiting trial.

Dans le cas où les trois Chambres de Première Instance ne seraient pas en mesure de terminer tous ces procès à la fin de 2008, nous suggérons au Président du TPIR de saisir en temps opportun le Conseil de Sécurité pour prolonger le mandat de ce Tribunal en conséquence ou alors de transférer des procès non terminés vers des juridictions autres que celles du Rwanda. Where the three chambers of First Instance would not be able to complete all trials by the end of 2008, we suggest to the President of the ICTR to take timely the Security Council to extend the mandate of this Court accordingly or then transferring to trial not completed courts other than those of Rwanda.



En guise de protestation contre les transferts envisagés et pour exprimer notre profonde consternation et notre totale dénonciation de la complicité américano-britannique pour garantir l’impunité aux criminels évoluant au sein du FPR et visant notre total anéantissement, nous, les détenus signataires de la présente, avons décidé d’observer une grève de la faim à partir du lundi 08 octobre 2007. As a protest against the transfers and to express our deep concern and our total denunciation of the British complicity to guarantee impunity for criminals operating within the RPF and for our total annihilation, we detainees signatory to the present , have decided to observe a hunger strike from Monday, October 8, 2007.



Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président du TPIR, l’expression de notre très haute considération. Please accept, Mr. President of the ICTR, the expression of our highest consideration.



En annexe, la liste des signataires : In annex, the list of signatories:



Copie pour information: Copy for information:



-Son Excellence Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de l’ONU, à New York - His Excellency the Secretary General of the United Nations, New York

-Son Excellence Monsieur le Président du Conseil de Sécurité, New York, NY - His Excellency Mr. President of the Security Council, New York, NY

-Madame/Monsieur le Représentant du pays membre permanent du Conseil de Sécurité (tous) - Dear Sir / Madam Representative of the permanent member countries of the Security Council (all)

-Monsieur le Greffier du TPIR à Arusha Mr Registrar of the ICTR in Arusha

-Monsieur le Procureur du TPIR à Arusha - Mr Prosecutor of the ICTR in Arusha

-Madame/Monsieur l’Avocat(e) de la Défense (tous) - Dear Sir / Madam Advocate (e) of Defense (all)

-Monsieur le Président de l’ADAD, à Arusha. - Mr President of the Desnível in Arusha.

-Commission des Droits de l’homme, à Genève - Commission on Human Rights in Geneva

-Commission Internationale des Juristes, à Genève - International Commission of Jurists in Geneva

-Association Américaine des Juristes - American Association of Jurists

-Association internationale des Juristes démocrates, New Delhi - International Association of Democratic Lawyers, New Delhi

-Cour Européenne de Justice - European Court of Justice

-Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme - European Court of Human Rights

-Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme - African Court of Human Rights

-Centre de lutte contre l’impunité et l’injustice au Rwanda, à Bruxelles - Center for combating impunity and injustice in Rwanda, in Brussels

-Association Dukomere, à Bruxelles Dukomere Association, in Brussels

-Amnesty International à Londres - Amnesty International in London

-Avocats sans frontière à Paris. - Lawyers without Borders in Paris.

-FIDH à Paris FIDH-Paris

-HRW (Human Rights Watch) - HRW (Human Rights Watch)

-La presse. - Press.





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Interview de Filip Reyntjens sur Radio France Internationale le 19 septembre 2007. Il détaille sa position dans son “ Expert report - Filip Reyntjens on behalf of Vincent Bajinya in the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court ”, 2007. [1] Filip Reyntjens interview with Radio France Internationale on September 19, 2007. He explains his position in his "report - expert Filip Reyntjens on behalf of Vincent Bajinya in the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court," 2007.

Voir aussi nos différentes correspondances à ce sujet : See also our correspondence on this subject:

- Notre lettre du 18 mars 2002 - Our letter of March 18, 2002

- Notre lettre du 19 février 2005 - Our letter of February 19, 2005

- Notre lettre du 10 janvier 2007 Our letter dated January 10, 2007

- Notre lettre du 23 janvier 2007 Our letter dated January 23, 2007

- Notre lettre du 19 avril 2007 - Our letter of April 19, 2007

- Notre lettre du 08 juillet 2007 Our letter dated July 8, 2007

[2] Fondation Hirondelle - Agence De Presse Hirondelle à Arusha Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda, 7 septembre 2007. [2] Fondation Hirondelle - Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, September 7, 2007.

[3] Les pays suivants ont accepté de recevoir les condamnés du TPIR dans leurs prisons et ont signé avec ce Tribunal des accords ad hoc : Mali, Swaziland, Bénin, Italie, France, Suède. [3] The following countries have agreed to receive ICTR convicts in their prisons and signed with the Court of ad hoc agreements: Mali, Swaziland, Benin, Italy, France, Sweden.

[4] Fondation Hirondelle - Agence De Presse Hirondelle à Arusha Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda, 20 septembre 2007. [4] Fondation Hirondelle - Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, on September 20, 2007.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:26 0 comments
Labels: ICTR, Kagame, Rwanda
DR Congo rebels reject disarmament deadline.
AFP
13 October 2007

DR Congo rebels said Sunday they would not give up their weapons without holding talks with the authorities, on the eve of a government-set ultimatum to disarm or face a fresh army offensive.

The Congolese government has given forces under renegade Tutsi general Laurent Nkunda until Monday to disarm and either join the army or demobilise. It has refused to negotiate with the rebels.

"We agree on the principle of integrating our forces with the army, but not in any old way," Nkunda spokesman Rene Abandi told AFP from the eastern region of Nord-Kivu, where rebels and government troops have been fighting all week.

DR Congo President Joseph Kabila arrived Sunday in Goma, the capital of Nord-Kivu, airport sources said. The visit was unscheduled and it was unclear how long he would stay.
Posted by WNJ Editor at 16:15 0 comments
Labels: Congo-K, Nkundabatware, North Kivu, Rwanda
Rwanda : La version de Dallaire contredite.
12 octobre 2007
Paul Martineau


Robin Philpot a décidément le sens du timing. Alors que le film J’ai serré la main du diable vient de prendre l’affiche et relaie à travers le Québec la version «canadienne» de la tragédie du Rwanda, vue à travers les yeux de l’ex-général devenu sénateur libéral Roméo Dallaire, Philpot livre un nouvel essai percuttant sur le sujet.

De nouvelles révélations

Dans Rwanda : Crimes, mensonges et étouffement de la vérité, l’auteur de Ça ne s’est pas passé comme ça à Kigali s’appuie entre autres sur une entrevue exclusive d’un ancien capitaine sénégalais qui travaillait pour Dallaire au Rwanda et qui contredit complètement la thèse de son ancien général, soutenue par le Canada, les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni.

Les propos du capitaine Amadou Deme, un membre de la section de renseignements des troupes de l’ONU qui agissait comme « les yeux et les oreilles » de Roméo Dallaire et son équipe sur le terrain, laissent carrément entendre que Dallaire a menti pour protéger les États-Unis, le Canada et leur allié du Front Patriotique rwandais et pour camoufler la vérité sur cette tragédie, «probablement la plus importante depuis 1945» selon Robin Philpot.

L’auteur a étayé cette thèse depuis des années à partir de nombreux documents et entrevues. Son nouveau livre prouve cependant pour la première fois que le général Dallaire et ses anciens officiers des renseignements ont des versions diamétralement opposées de la tragédie, ce qui pourrait forcer Dallaire et les producteurs de son film à se lancer dans des explications embarrassantes.

L’Histoire officielle
Rappelons que la version « officielle » de la guerre de 1994 au Rwanda acceptée par le Canada et les États-Unis se résume à peu près à ceci : Tout a commencé le 7 avril 1994 lorsque des génocidaires hutus ont mis à exécution un plan visant à éliminer la population Tutsie sans défense, et non le 6 avril, lors d’un mystérieux « accident d’avion » qui a coûté la vie à deux présidents africains.

Face à ce génocide, sous l’habile direction de Paul Kagame, le Front Patriotique rwandais (FPR) est entré au pays pour marcher sur Kigali, mettre fin au génocide et prendre le pouvoir en juillet 1994.

La communauté internationale, insensible à l’Afrique, est demeurée impassible et immobile malgré les appels incessants du général canadien Roméo Dallaire.

Une guerre a éclaté ensuite au Congo voisin (l’ex-Zaire) à cause de tous les génocidaires rwandais qui s’y étaient réfugiés. Le nouveau gouvernement rwandais sous Paul Kagame, aidé par l’Ouganda et le Burundi, a envahi ce pays pour poursuivre les génocidaires.

Or, rien n’est si simple, démontre Robin Philpot.

L’utilisation abusive du terme « génocide rwandais »
Philpot n’a jamais nié qu’un nombre effroyable de Tutsis ont été massacrés au Rwanda. Il soutient toutefois depuis longtemps que l’utilisation abusive du terme « génocide rwandais » a servi à masquer les crimes du FPR de l’actuel président Kagame, un protégé des États-Unis. Kagame et ses troupes pouvaient bien mener une guerre d’agression contre le Rwanda, envahir le pays, se livrer à des massacres, prendre le pouvoir puis envahir le Zaïre voisin et faire main basse sur ses ressources avec l’accord de Washington.

Tout cela se trouvait maintenant justifié, puisqu’il ne faisait que libérer l’Afrique des « génocidaires Hutus », discrédités au yeux de l’opinion publique.

Le mantra des « génocidaires hutus qui ont massacré environ 800 000 Tutsis et Hutus modérés » ne tient pourtant plus la route souligne Philpot, entre autres depuis la publication des chiffres compilés par le témoin expert à charge du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) Filip Reyntjens.

Selon lui, 600 000 Tutsis et 500 000 Hutus ont été massacrés, dans ce qui constitue une hécatombe indéniable, mais pas un génocide systématique d’un groupe ethnique contre un autre.

« L’utilisation abusive de l’expression « génocide rwandais » a eu pour effet d’étouffer la vérité sur des crimes terribles commis dans ce pays », écrit-il. Cette position lui a valu une campagne de salissage du quotidien La Presse alors qu’il se présentait pour le Parti Québécois aux dernières élections, le journal l’accusant carrément de « négationnisme » pour avoir remis en cause la version officielle. Philpot revient longuement dans son livre sur cette tentative d’assassinat médiatique.

Pour Philpot, le but non-déclaré de Roméo-Dallaire, du Canada, des États-Unis, de la Belgique et du Royaume-Uni au Rwanda était de faciliter la prise de pouvoir par le FPR, un précieux allié africain, dans une lutte géopolitique contre la France. Le tout, au mépris des millions de morts dénombrées.

L’auteur s’appuie aussi sur 1600 documents de la mission de l’ONU, sur une entrevue personnelle avec Boutros-Ghali, l’ex-secrétaire général des Nations Unies, sur le témoignage du général canadien Guy Tousignant et celui de dizaines de réfugiés, entre autres.

Il résume par ailleurs les conclusions du juge antiterroriste français Jean-Louis Bruguière, qui a effectué une enquête de huit ans sur le drame rwandais, avec tous les moyens du tribunal de grande instance de Paris.

Une autre version des événements
Voici ce que le juge établit : Paul Kagame et le FPR avaient planifié l’attentat contre l’avion du président rwandais Habyarimana et supervisé son exécution pour prendre le pouvoir avec une offensive militaire par la suite.

Kagame comptait sur l’assassinat du président pour rompre le cessez-le-feu en vigueur depuis août 1993 et recommencer la guerre totale.

Notons que dans sa brique J’ai serré la main du diable, Roméo Dallaire ne consacre que quelques pages à ce qu’il considère comme un « accident d’avion », sans préciser que l’accident a été causé par…un missile sol-air.

Le juge a aussi établi que les missiles utilisés appartenaient à l’Ouganda, où les tireurs avaient reçu leur entraînement. L’Ouganda était alors l’allié principal des États-Unis dans cette partie de l’Afrique.

Dans une entrevue avec Philpot, l’ex-secrétaire général des Nations Unies Boutros-Ghali relate d’ailleurs que Bruguière lui a confié qu’il avait la certitude que la CIA était impliquée dans l’attentat.

« Un combat de titans se déroulait en toile de fonds du drame rwandais, opposant les États-Unis et ses alliés fidèles, dont l’Angleterre et le Canada, à la France. L’objectif consistait à redessiner la carte politique de l’Afrique centrale et à contrôler militairement et économiquement la région », souligne Philpot en conclusion.

Les acteurs de ce plan savaient très bien ce qui arriverait au Rwanda s’ils organisaient l’assassinat de deux présidents africains et brisaient le cessez-le feu. « Dans un tel contexte, vu l’histoire du Rwanda et de son voisin, le Burundi, les massacres qui ont suivi, quel que soit le qualificatif utilisé pour les décrire, étaient prévisibles, et ils ont été prévus. En revanche, même les plus cyniques en ont sûrement sous-estimé l’ampleur », écrit-il.




Extraits de l’entrevue de Philpot avec Amadou Deme, membre de la section des renseignements des troupes de l’ONU sous Roméo Dallaire.

Le FPR de Paul Kagame était armé et prêt à l’offensive, avant l’assassinat du président.
« Peu après la chute de l’avion, le FPR a commencé à utiliser ces lances-roquettes multiples sans interruption. Ils n’ont pas été arrêté. Les tireurs avaient les coordonnées exactes de toutes leurs cibles à Kigali. Ce sont ces mêmes armes qui leur ont permis de prendre Kigali et de gagner la guerre. »

Dallaire et ses troupes savaient que le FPR préparait une reprise des combats
« Il y avait beaucoup d’éléments qui ne laissaient pas de doute quant à la reprise de la guerre par le FPR, mais on ne savait pas comment cela se ferait. »

Les troupes de l’ONU surveillaient davantage les forces gouvernementales que le FPR
« Alors que le FPR, de son côté, était en train de se doter d’une capacité de destruction et de logistique inégalée, les forces gouvernementales ne pouvaient même pas approvisionner leurs unités en armes et en munition. »

Les États-Unis suivaient de très prêt les préparatifs du FPR
« [En 1993] nous devions organiser régulièrement des escortes jusqu’au quartier général du FPR dans le nord du pays, la plupart du temps pour l’ambassadeur des États-Unis et pour des membres du département d’État des États-Unis. »

Le FPR a refusé de cesser le combat pendant la pire période des massacres
« Pendant la période terrible des tueries, les forces gouvernementales n’ont pas cessé de demander une trêve pour pouvoir rétablir l’ordre. Pour sa part, le FPR a toujours refusé la trêve parce que sa machine de guerre était déjà en route. »

« En outre, le FPR aurait dû accepter la demande de trêve pour des raisons humanitaires, vu les tueries massives de personnes qui appartenaient aux deux groupes ethniques. Le fait d’avoir refusé la trêve a sûrement été un terrible crime contre l’humanité. »

Les troupes de l’ONU savaient que le FPR avait fait abattre l’avion
« Je n’ai jamais rencontré d’officier militaire, surtout parmi les observateurs militaires, qui ait douté un instant que c’était le FPR qui était responsable de l’attentat. »
Posted by WNJ Editor at 15:51 0 comments
Labels: Belgium, Canada, Congo-K, Kagame, Rwanda, UNAMIR, United States
An Interview of Paul Kagame.
This French TV segment shows Paul Kagame being interviewed only 3 days after the RPF captured Kigali. Note the presence of multiple Canadian UNAMIR officers in his presence along with the international press.


Intw. de Kagamé après la prise de Kigali (04/07/1994)
Uploaded by LiliTheKing
Posted by WNJ Editor at 04:37 0 comments
Labels: Canada, Kagame, Rwanda, UN, UNAMIR
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